Sanjha Morcha

What’s New

Click the heading to open detailed news

Current Events :

web counter

Print Media Reproduced Defence Related News

China’s LAC stance expansive, goes beyond its1960 claim line

China’s LAC stance expansive, goes beyond its1960 claim line

Ajay Banerjee

Tribune News Service

New Delhi, July 21

China’s actions along the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh seek to alter whatever is the approximate alignment at the undemarcated border, aiming to create fresh tussles in addition to the 10 known points of dispute or differing perception.

The four fresh disagreements—Galwan, patrol points (PP) 15 and 17A and Finger-4 at Pangong Tso—have separate implications. While Galwan is a fresh claim, the other three fall in gray areas, implying these are geographically located between the multiple self-claimed boundaries of China and the Indian perception of the LAC. Any construction or holding onto territory in disputed (or gray areas) is barred under agreement between the two countries.

It is clearly an attempt to push India westwards to “fix” a fresh LAC that partly adheres to the 1962 war-time position of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and partly to China’s own claim line of 1960, said a senior functionary. The disengagement process that started some two weeks ago has hit a hurdle as the PLA is yet to fully pull back to points agreed upon by the two sides.

The PP-15, PP-17A and Finger-4 disputes are geographically located between China’s own claim line of 1960 and Indian perception of LAC. Then there is an overlapping claim also, stemming from the conflict of October-November 1962. Post the war, the PLA retreated to its own 1960 claim line in certain pockets and at other places, it remained west (towards India) of the 1960 claim line.

In 1996, a joint working group identified Trig heights in northern Ladakh and Demchok in southern Ladakh as the two points of dispute.

No maps have been exchanged but an Indian assessment, based on activities of the PLA patrol parties, is that there are eight other pockets of differing perceptions of the LAC. Starting from the northern-most point, these are Sumar Lung Pa, Depsang plains, point 6556 (that is height of the peak in metres), Chang Lung Nullah, Kongka La, Spanggur, Mount Sajjam and Domchelle.

A source cited that at Pangong, the 1960 claim of China was at Srijap, post-1962 it advanced to Finger- 8. In 2020, the PLA is at Finger-4. One of the preconditions India wants is that China moves back to Finger-8 before further de-escalation. At PP-17A, the PLA is keen to hold onto a vantage height.

Naval aircraft headed North

The Indian Navy’s Poseidon 8I anti-submarine warfare aircraft have been deployed in eastern Ladakh to carry out surveillance along the LAC and some of its MiG-29K jets are likely to be stationed at key IAF bases in the northern sector amid the border row with China, sources said. The Indian Navy has some 45 MiG 29K jets from Russia. It also has some 60 of the land-based jets called MiG 29.


India’s regional challenge China and nationalism have made it more complex for Delhi

External affairs minister S Jaishankar addresses the media in New Delhi, September 17, 2019

External affairs minister S Jaishankar addresses the media in New Delhi, September 17, 2019(Sanjeev Verma/HT PHOTO)

Last week, former Congress president Rahul Gandhi offered his explanation on why the Chinese decided to be aggressive at the border at this juncture. Among other reasons, he attributed this to the failure of the Narendra Modi government’s foreign policy, in particular, when it comes to the neighbourhood. External affairs minister S Jaishankar countered Mr Gandhi — and on the neighbourhood, listed out India’s engagement with smaller countries, the development assistance being offered, and landmark deals.

Between the political black-and-white worldview — where Mr Gandhi sees a failure in India’s handling of the neighbourhood, and Mr Jaishankar sees success — lies a complex truth. India is more invested in the neighbourhood than it has been, but it has also become more challenging for New Delhi to secure its interests in the region. This is due to two factors. The first reason is the increased presence of China. Beijing has decided to engage with political parties, official institutions, media, businesses, and societies in South Asia — with the objective of increasing its control, and eroding Indian influence. India has historic advantages of connectivity, people-to-people linkages, and cultural convergence. But it lacks the resources, single-minded determination, and is often caught between conflicting objectives and ad-hoc policymaking, which makes meeting the China challenge more difficult. The second reason is the nature of democratic contestation in the neighbourhood. Given India’s size and role in the domestic politics of Nepal, Bangladesh or Sri Lanka, there is a “nationalist” constituency in each of these countries that earns political advantage by being seen as adversarial to India. These domestic constituencies then become a natural, receptive partner for China.

These twin challenges affect the policy matrix in Delhi. The government has sought to break out of this challenge by taking a firm position against hostile governments and encouraging friendly parties which have come to power (Maldives), working with supposedly antagonistic partners to neutralise their hostility (KP Oli in Nepal, the Rajapaksas in Sri Lanka), or backing its allies (the Awami League in Bangladesh). But these methods are not foolproof, and have thrown mixed results, and will be a challenge for New Delhi. As the neighbourhood gets more complex, India’s government and Opposition should develop a bipartisan approach. Mr Gandhi and Mr Jaishankar should go offline, and have a chat about these complexities


China’s belligerence: We are all Hong Kong now | Opinion

Recall, China’s big advantage for the last decades has been its incrementalism

Recall, China’s big advantage for the last decades has been its incrementalism(AP)

In recent decades, the combination of a slow-but-certain incrementalism — couched in parables attributed to Confucius and other Chinese notables — had made Beijing’s diplomatic behaviour inscrutable, and yet, viewed as benign. It gave the country an advantage in being able to change facts on the ground, and attract zero retaliation and minimal critique. It was the perfect excuse for western and Indian companies and governments to look the other way, and continue with the high profits that this authoritarian regime brought.

This has now dramatically changed. The rest of the world has a red hot smoking gun of Beijing’s new diplomacy. As two astute American analysts, Kurt Campbell and Mira Rapp-Hooper put it, “Beijing appears less image-conscious now than in the past.” And they argue, “Xi (Jinping) has endured the reputational damage of his government’s ‘Wolf Warrior’ diplomacy (named after a series of nationalistic action films), likely calculating that China ‘will gain more by flexing its military and economic muscles even if it loses some of its soft power along the way’.”

Recall, China’s big advantage for the last decades has been its incrementalism. Especially in its foreign policy, its method was to move little-by-little, step-by-step, under-the-radar. This was a strategy of managing to stay just below the level of a full-blown provocation, such that any concrete retaliation by injured parties would look like a hysterical overreaction.

In fact, one can apply this insight to other aspects of China’s behaviour too. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is a case in point. China has slowly, deliberately, and quietly chipped away at the rules that underpin the multilateral trading system, but attracted scarce attention. In contrast, President Donald Trump’s diatribes against the WTO, and in-your-face decision to paralyse the Appellate Body of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism, has led even allies to view the United States (US) with disappointment and anger. There is considerable irony in the fact that a sulky US — the guarantor of trade multilateralism for decades — has chosen not to join the parallel interim dispute settlement mechanism (created by the European Union (EU), Norway, Canada and others), but China has. Similarly, deeply frustrated with the World Health Organization (WHO)’s apparent complicity with China, the US announced on May 29 that it would withdraw from the organisation. In doing so, the US has attracted the ire of the great and the good of the world. China, in contrast, for all its mishandling of the pandemic, and in spite of the threats that it issued to countries that demanded an enquiry (such as Australia), still manages to present itself as being on the side of the angels by reiterating its commitment to WHO.

The international community cannot dismiss Hong Kong as it has done Chinese excesses in Xinjiang. The issue goes to the heart of international jurisprudence and China’s new aggressive interpretation of its sovereignty. Hong Kong is not “just” another unit in China’s domestic jurisdiction; underpinning the handover of Hong Kong to China was the guarantee of “one country, two systems”. Hong Kong is not “just” another artificial island, being quietly militarised, somewhere in a faraway sea that the West does not need to bother about — in many ways, it is a cornerstone of a liberal, English-speaking, democratic West. Hong Kong is not even “just” another fatal border conflict with India, which the West can dismiss as a product of misperceptions over unclear boundaries drawn by careless colonial masters.

What has happened in Hong Kong should matter to all of us because of the deeply worrying repercussions it carries for its citizens. But as foreign policy is too seldom about values, here’s a straightforward reason why all realists should also be concerned about Hong Kong. China’s actions in Hong Kong are a clear signal of the heavy costs that its government is willing to bear to openly assert, consolidate, and further expand its power.

The costs for China are huge, both reputational and financial. Hong Kong — along with Taiwan — was a symbol of reassurance that China, despite its different model of governance and development, could co-exist peacefully with other models based on freedom, democracy, and free markets. Besides, the financial attractiveness of Hong Kong stemmed from the fact that there was rule of law, transparency, independent judiciary, checks and balances. Companies knew that they would be given a fair deal, if they entered into conflict with a state-owned enterprise. With these advantages gone, financial costs will be inevitable — and China has shown that it is ready to incur them. This does not augur well for Taiwan, for the region at large, or for global order.

And this is why banal statements from all defenders of the liberal multilateral order need to stop. German chancellor Angela Merkel, for instance, still talks remarkably of the need to “seek dialogue” with the Chinese government on the basis of a “relationship of trust”. EU high representative, Josep Borrell, also stated “It is clear that China has a global ambition. But, at the same time, I do not think that China is playing a role that can threaten world peace”. No, Mr Borrell, think what you may, there’s no way you can really know that. None of us can. Because ultimately, we can never know the intentions behind the actions of states. But when states take actions entailing high costs — especially to themselves — these are signals that must not be ignored.

We could all be Hong Kong tomorrow. And this is why — and not only for altruism — we should all be acting with one voice, with the people of Hong Kong now.


Manish Tewari | Parliament oversight key for reforms in intelligence agencies

 

There is an unnecessary and manufactured culture of secrecy enveloping our national security establishment
 Defence Minister Rajnath Singh addresses Indian Army soldiers, at Lukung post in Ladakh. PTI Photo

  Defence Minister Rajnath Singh addresses Indian Army soldiers, at Lukung post in Ladakh. PTI Photo

The multiple Chinese intrusions into India, occupation of our territory and the brutal murder of our soldiers undoubtedly constitute an intelligence failure. It is redux Kargil 1999 when the Pakistani army fronted by mercenaries and terrorists occupied the commanding heights that overlooked the Srinagar-Leh highway.

However, despite repeated intelligence failures over the years, there is a demonstrated reluctance by the political and administrative elite to shine the light of accountability on our intelligence structures.

The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) headed by the late Krishnaswamy Subrahmanyam (the current foreign minister’s father) had the following to say about the Kargil incursions in its executive summary.

“The Review Committee had before it overwhelming evidence that the Pakistani armed intrusion in the Kargil sector came as a complete and total surprise to the Indian government, Army and intelligence agencies as well as to the J&K state government and its agencies. The Committee did not come across any agency or individual who was able clearly to assess before the event the possibility of a large scale Pakistani military intrusion across the Kargil heights.” A more damning indictment could not have been handed down.

 

The committee further stated, “It is not widely appreciated in India that the primary responsibility for collecting external intelligence, including that relating to a potential adversary’s military deployment, is vested in RAW. The DGMI’s capability for intelligence collection is limited. It is essentially restricted to the collection of tactical military intelligence and some amount of signal intelligence and its main role is to make strategic and tactical military assessments and disseminate them within the Army.

Many countries have established separate Defence Intelligence Agencies and generously provided them with resources and equipment to play a substantive role in intelligence collection.

For historical reasons, the Indian Armed Forces are not so mandated. Therefore, it is primarily RAW which must provide intelligence about a likely attack, whether across a broad or narrow front.” This has changed somewhat with the constitution of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) on March 5, 2002.

The KRC report was equally critical of the role of the domestic intelligence service: “The Intelligence Bureau is meant to collect intelligence within the country and is the premier agency for counter-intelligence.

This agency got certain inputs on activities in the FCNA region which were considered important enough by the Director, IB to be communicated over his signature on June 2, 1998 to the Prime Minister, home minister, Cabinet secretary, home secretary and director general military operations.

 

This communication was not addressed to the three officials most concerned with this information, namely secretary (RAW), who is responsible for external intelligence and had the resources to follow up the leads in the IB report; chairman JIC, who would have taken such information into account in JIC assessments; and Director General Military Intelligence.”

Interestingly, the Group of Ministers (GOM) constituted by Prime Minister Vajpayee in the wake of the Kargil Review Committee report devoted a full chapter to reviewing the intelligence apparatus but it was dropped from the report that was made public with the following notation, “Chapter III Intelligence Apparatus Page Nos. 16-40 [Government Security Deletion] Para’s 3.1 to 3.72 [Government Security Deletion]”.

What may have transpired in these deliberations was conjectured by the strategic commentator Manoj Joshi in a March 2014 policy report, entitled “The Unending Quest to Reform India’s National Security System”.

He wrote, “All the recommendations on the area of intelligence in the 2001 GoM report were redacted in the report released to the public. Some information on the recommendations came through the press release accompanying the report. Other information came through scattered media reportage and an important article by the former deputy NSA in an annual publication of the NSCS. He further opined, “Intelligence agencies are loath to accept any oversight as it is. In addition, given the inexperience of Indian politicians with matters relating to security, there are worries that information could leak. However, given the fact there are several senior politicians who have served government in key ministries, it should not be too difficult to construct an oversight mechanism comprised of former members of, say, the CCS. In some measure, however, there is reluctance on the part of the government of the day on this issue because the Intelligence Bureau is involved in a great deal of domestic political espionage.”

Paradoxically, Joshi was a member of the Naresh Chandra Task Force on National Security constituted by the then UPA government. It submitted its report on August 8, 2012. The contents of that report have still not been made public by successive governments.

Contrast this with the American approach to 9/11 terror attack undoubtedly one of its biggest intelligence disasters. The 10-member bipartisan 9/11 Commission created by an act of Congress consisted exclusively of politicians. It analyzed and reported the tactical and institutional failures leading up to that terror outrage threadbare without any let or hindrance. The 585-page report put out in the public domain hardly has any or no redactions at all.

In India there is an unnecessary and manufactured culture of secrecy enveloping our national security establishment. This is to enable them to obfuscate and escape scrutiny and accountability for their omissions. The argument that we live in a bad neighbourhood is at best specious.

Other democracies that are transparent about the functioning of their intelligence systems to their respective parliaments remain equally vulnerable.

That is why I had moved a private member’s bill in 2011, entitled “The Intelligence Services (Powers and Regulation) Bill, 2011”, to put our intelligence agencies on a sound legal footing and provide for parliamentary oversight over their functioning. The bill lapsed in October 2012 when I moved to government.

 The bill has been re-tabled in parliament with minor modifications and would have been moved in the Budget Session had it not adjourned prematurely due to Covid-19.

Coming to the latest China fiasco. It is high time that parliament by special legislation should create a 10-member commission of parliamentarians drawn from both houses on the lines of the 9/11 Commission to study the national security paradigm between 1999 and 2020 and make binding recommendations for the future.


A PAGE FROM GLORIOUS HISTORY OF BRAVERY OF INDIAN ARMY

*The Birth of the Para Commandos.*

_It’s a known fact in history, that in September of 1965 when Pakistan was on the verge of victory in Kashmir with the Chamb offensive, a three pronged attack on Jammu Akhnoor and Pathankot to cut off Kashmir from the rest of India; one man stood up…_ *Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh the Western Army Commander.*

*The towering Khalsa, took upon himself to break the defensive mindset, and went on the offensive… thus, for the second time in history after the Khalsa offensive by the legendary Sardar Hari Singh Nalwa against the Pathans in 19th century; the Indian Army went on the offensive… Lahore was attacked.*

_Since early days,_ *Harbaksh* _was destined to always save India out of trouble. 13 Years of combat experience with his_ *parent unit 5 SIKH,* _fighting the Japanese in WWII, Harbaksh had seen it all from capturing posts, to being ambushed, injured and taken as Prisoner of War. By 1947 Harbaksh a senior Military officer and brilliant battle hardened soldier had just completed Staff College at quetta and was ready to take on the higher echelons of the military._

*As a full Colonel, he was the Deputy Commander of the famous 161 Infantry Brigade in Uri in 1947. He had volunteered to command a unit in battle but was denied as he was a full Colonel (units were commanded by Lt Cols).*

_During the offensive by 1 SIKH the CO Lt Col Dewan Ranjit Rai got Killed in Action, Harbaksh Singh again volunteered and this time removed a star from his shoulders (for the first time in history an officer demoted himself to lead his men in battle)._

*The battered battalion regrouped and fought like lions under Harbaksh to reclaim Farkian Gali and drove out Pakistanis from the valley.*

_Harbaksh Singh was promoted as_ *Brigadier* _in 1948. As the Commander of 163 Infantry brigade Harbaksh again conducted daring operations in Tithwal and captured Tithwal. He at the rank of Brigadier, was awarded Veer Chakra, the third highest gallantry award of India._

*In September 1965, the Indian Army went on the offensive with Jalandhar based 11 Corps launched all of its infantry divisions (7th Inf Div, 15th Inf Div and 4th Inf Div) launched towards Lahore and Army HQ Reserve 1 Strike Corps with the elite 1 Armoured Division launched further North Towards Sialkot to not only thwart the Pakistani Juggernaut but also to crush Pakistan feeling of supremacy and regain the pride of the Indian Army licking its wounds from 62 China debacle. Bitter battles followed with both sides fighting even for an inch of land. The Indian Armoured Corps came into its own with destruction of Pakistani counterparts despite having inferior Sherman tanks as compared to the modren Patton Tanks of Pakistan.*

_Legends were created on the battle field with units like 17 Poona Horse, 4 Horse, 3 Cavalry writing history in blood and gold. The infantryman went beyond the call of duty and beyond imagination to fight with tanks, the likes of Abdul Hamid showed the true colour of the sons of the soil. India regained its pride as not only Pakistani offensives were crushed, but Indians were now ready to capture Lahore._

*Pakistan however launched another offensive this time towards south Punjab in Ferozpore sector. In Hussainiwala, Pakistan cracked up Indian defences and a crisis developed. The Army Chief Gen JN Choudhary ordered 11 Corps, which was in offensive to withdraw and take defensive positions. Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh Western Army Commander refused, defied the Army Chief and instead ordered GOC 11 Corps to attack, thereby saving Punjab and India from a certain defeat.*

_Meanwhile in Kashmir, during the progress of operations history was in the making. The Operation Gibralter combined with the Pakistani offensive in Jammu, initially had succeeded due to the surprise and speed. It was a precarious situation as Poonch was threatened._

*The only possible way to recapture territory and save poonch was to go behind the enemy lines and destroy his flanks. Pakistanis knew India would loose Kashmir if the old road to valley from Poonch was lost. Doom prevailed on the horizon of the future of an integrated India.*

_At this time a miracle happened. It is often said that the outlaws create history, same thing happened when_ *Maj Megh Singh Rathore of the 3RD BATTALION BRIGADE OF THE GUARDS,* _a superseded officer who had been denied promotion, volunteered to the_ *Western Army Commander* _to carry out_ *commando raids* _behind the enemy lines._

*A preposterous idea given the time and situation and with no resources at hand. India had no commando units. Nor were there any plans to raise any. Gen Harbaksh listened patiently, and asked Megh Singh Rathore* _”Son if you succeed in this, I will put that star on your shoulder with my own hands.”_

*And without the govt’s approval, Harbaksh gave a nod to raise this force. Maj Megh Singh Rathore organised a force of volunteer dare devils personally chosen by him, A few Good Men. This force, known as the* _’MEGHDOOT FORCE’_ *after Megh Singh Rathore, the forgotten men not even recognised by the govt of the day, formed the nucleus of the first special forces unit in India. Thus was born the elite* _9 PARA COMMANDO_ *or the* _9th BATTALION THE PARACHUTE REGIMENT SPECIAL FORCES._

_Maj Megh Singh Rathore his mettle and carried out not one but three of the most outstanding and daring raids and link ups ever in history of warfare. His raids took Pakistanis completely off the guard as nothing this spectacular was ever expected by them from the Indians. Today Poonch stands with India courtesy Megh Singh Rathore._

*Maj Megh Singh Rathore outlawed man facing court martial charges before the raids, came back home with a bullet in his thigh and was pipped Lt Col by Gen Harbaksh Singh himself and became the first CO of 9 PARA.*

_By the time ceasefire was declared on 23 Sep 65, the Indian army had not only recovered from the initial losses, but instead captured large chunks of vital Pakistani territory in_ *North Punjab.*

*War as a whole was a stalemate but the Indian army was able to thwart the Pakistani intentions of capturing Kashmir with force, their Operation Gibralter proved to be an utter failure.Truly Harbaksh was the saviour of Kashmir, Punjab and that of the honour of India.*

_For saving India,_ *Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh* _was awarded with_ *Padma Vibhushan* _and_ *Padma Bhushan* _both the second and the third highest honours in the country._

*For inconspicuous bravery in the face of the enemy and outstanding leadership under fire Lt Col Megh Singh Rathore was awarded with Veer Chakra.*

_Today the_ *Indian Parachute Regiment* _and_ *Special Forces* _are considered amongst the best in the world including the British SAS, US Special Forces, Navy SEALs and Israeli Sayeret Matkal and Flotila 13._

*Few outlaws, few good men started a tradition of valour and sacrifice. The saga continues till date with Parachute Regiment being the most decorated regiment in the world despite it being only raised in WWII and despite it competing amongst the best of the best who have been there for centuries. The Maroon Berets are truly a different breed, and it all started with one man who said,* _”Who dares wins”._

_This post is dedicated to_ *Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh Padma Vibhushan, VrC, Padma Bhushan GOC-in-C Western Command 1965 and Lt Col Megh Singh Rathore VrC CO 9 PARA CDO BN….. True legends.*


Good field reporting to counter studio hawks by Lt Gen GS Sihota (Retd)

The recent skirmish between Indian and Chinese troops was an opportunity for the government and the Indian Army to have war reporters on the spot after the hand-to-hand combat. It could have prevented TV anchors from becoming studio strategists, building imaginary scenarios and discussing them ad nauseam. These war journalists could have then presented a clear picture of the incident.

Good field reporting to counter studio hawks

Tectonic shift: During the 1999 Kargil War, the nation saw the grit and determination of the Indian soldier first-hand.

Lt Gen GS Sihota (Retd)

Former Director General, Military Operations

NICK Ut’s iconic photograph of a nine-year-old girl scorched by napalm bombing in Vietnam drew the attention of the world to the horrors of war. It also changed the public opinion in the United States leading to widespread protests. Seeing death and deprivation on a daily basis, the American public pressured the government to withdraw and accept defeat. Such is the relevance of war reporting.

A war correspondent is distinct from a regular journalist as he provides first-hand information from a conflict zone. It is considered the most dangerous form of journalism. The reporter goes into an affected area with adequate background knowledge and a determination to get a good story. Though unarmed, he/she is not short on courage and has the ability to take life-threatening risks. Despite strict restrictions, many are known to seek unauthorised entry, only to be intimidated, detained and even tortured. The beheading of Daniel Pearl by the Al Qaeda and James Foley by the ISIS is still fresh in our minds.

Marie Colvin was a fearless and gutsy woman, who lost one eye while covering the Sri Lankan civil war and later met her destiny along with her cameraman in Syria. Both times, these were unauthorised infiltrations. Then we know about Jeremy Bowen’s reports from Sarajevo which led to the exposure of war crimes and the trial of Bosnian General Ratko Mladic. Christina Lamb is another war reporter who has written many books on her experiences. She crossed the Hindukush into Afghanistan with the Mujahideen who were fighting the Russians. Later, she saw and wrote about the West which failed miserably because they could not understand the local dynamics of the country. Many journalists have lost lives in crossfire and to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan. In Yemen, reporters have been known to be tortured and even used as human shields.

The story of Indian war correspondents’ role in various conflicts has been somewhat different. Information about the raiders in 1948 came only through the refugees. PN Sharma was the first reporter who saw action from the air, took pictures, but crashlanded on a tree and was captured but later repatriated. His accounts were known only after the war when he published his book. Indian war reporters did not get as many opportunities as their foreign counterparts. Not to say that there has not been any change since then. During the 1971 war, there was a major shift. Foreign correspondents were flown to the action sites. A foreign journalist from the New York Times appeared on the scene accompanying Lt Gen Sagat Singh, GOC, 4 Corps. He introduced himself as ‘Harmitt’. His real identity was discovered when he let out the choicest Punjabi abuse on confronting machine gun fire. We appreciated his real value only when he flew out after the surrender and we saw foreign magazines full of photos and articles lauding the Indian Army’s role in the liberation of Bangladesh.

Unfortunately, during my stint in the Kashmir valley from September 1994 to April 1996, I did not meet any journalist who was willing to move out of his comfort zone. Most were housed in hotels in Srinagar from where they wrote biased accounts of the high handedness of the armed forces under militant pressure. Keen to know the security arrangements being made for yatris, they requested a briefing. The GOC, Victor Force (RR), asked them to assemble at Anantnag. Sadly, they were not prepared to go there without protection or walk to the cave before the Amarnath yatra as they thought that it was too big a risk to their lives. This is not to take away from the fact that today, young men and women are at the forefront, capturing the situation on their cameras and reporting live from the scene of action.

Many young reporters risked life and limb to reach LTTE positions facing the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF). There was the intrepid Anita Pratap and her photographer Sham Tekwani whose reportage and photographs brought home to the Indian public the questionable decision for India to interfere in Sri Lankan affairs. Since the Indian government controlled all information, acts of bravery and sacrifice remained unrecognised.

The 1999 Kargil War saw a major change. Though Barkha Dutt’s reporting from a bunker may have been termed as jingoism, it made an impact. The nation saw the grit and determination of the Indian soldier first-hand.

Every nation must exercise control over access to the battlefield to prevent sensitive information from leaking out, particularly during the period of actual engagement. Free access can have negative results. This was the bitter lesson from the Vietnam War. The US changed its policy thereafter and was able to create better opinion during the Iraq war.

Though modern technology has made the conflict zone accessible and visible from a distance, frontline reporting has a greater influence on the minds of the public than listening to studio reports. It can also influence domestic and international policies. Today, TV channels produce talk shows to enhance their TRPs where they quote reliable sources, unnamed sources and senior government sources, all of whom are unidentifiable. Such reports become questionable in their authenticity. The public gets confused. Social media divides people into pro-and anti-establishment, nationalist and anti-nationalist sections. Any official version starts raising doubts. On the other hand, reports from the foreign media, which has better resources and access to information from the opponent, get more prominence. This is unhealthy as it leads to rumour-mongering. Viewers are left to ‘believe it or not’.

This haze can only be cleared by allowing limited access to war reporters into the conflict zone. When will it be possible for us to fly them into such areas and let them develop a ground understanding of the border?

The recent skirmish between the Indian and Chinese troops at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was an opportunity for the government and the Indian Army to have war reporters on the site after the grim hand-to-hand combat. It could have prevented TV anchors from becoming studio strategists, building imaginary scenarios and discussing them ad nauseam. The war journalists could have then presented a clear picture of the incident and the lie of the land.

War reportage is a force multiplier which can boost the image and might of the military and help in raising the morale of the Indian public.


Wrong command, and reprimand Recalling the PT drill when a junior officer panicked and broke the ‘military protocol’

Wrong command, and reprimand

Lt Gen Raj Kadyan (retd)

In the military units, a CO (Commanding Officer) is known as the father and the 2IC (Second-in-Command) the metaphorical mother. During our raising period, there were four of us Subalterns.

Morning PT is sacrosanct in every battalion. Special stress is laid on attendance by those performing sedentary duties: clerks, storekeepers, cooks and their ilk. As per the standard drill, after all Companies are assembled, the parade is reported to the Adjutant by the Subedar Major. The Adjutant reports the parade to the 2IC, and the latter, after ordering the ‘officers on parade’, gives a report to the CO, listing the total number of officers, JCOs and Other Ranks present. This way the CO can monitor if there is any significant number of absentees.

The battalion was to go on an outdoor training exercise and all Company Commanders, including the Adjutant, had proceeded early morning on reconnaissance. Apart from the CO and 2IC, only we Subalterns were present for PT. Being an Intelligence Officer and his understudy, I was to deputise for the Adjutant.

After taking the report from the Subedar Major, I awaited the arrival of the 2IC. It just so happened that before the 2IC could reach, the CO came and stood behind at his designated spot. Not knowing what to do, I panicked and ordered ‘officers on parade’, turned around and reported the parade to the CO. It was then that I saw the 2IC walking in from the mess side, where as a bachelor he was quartered along with us.

Later in the day, I was formally marched up to the 2IC.

“Why did you report the parade to the CO 20 seconds ahead of time?”

I never wore a watch during PT and could have said so. But I knew the peril of making excuses. “Sir, the CO came and stood behind and I thought you might be committed elsewhere.”

“What nonsense? As Adjutant, you should know my commitments. Besides, you know I never miss PT.” We knew he didn’t. In fact, he was horse-fit and whichever Company he joined for road run, could not keep up with him. All Companies dreaded the prospect.

I remained silent.

“Mr Kadyan, I am counting your sins. Be on the watch next time.”

“Yes sir,” I felt relieved to detect the finality in his tone.

The Senior Subaltern was the next to be marched in.

“Lt Mehra, you are the Senior Subaltern?” I could overhear from outside.

“Yes sir.”

“And you are the Subalterns’ mentor?”

“Yes sir.”

“How did you allow Mr Kadyan, an officer junior to you, to order you on parade?”

I could detect a hesitant mumbling as Vijay responded, “Sir, he didn’t give me a chance. The CO had already arrived and he just gave the word of command ‘officers on parade’.”

“Nonsense! You should have countermanded, ‘As you were — Jaise they. Mr Kadyan, report the parade to me.’ How could you allow a junior officer to break the military protocol? Not acceptable.”

“I am sorry sir. It won’t happen again.”

“Of course it must not happen, ever. I cannot accept breach of drills and procedure.”

Vijay Mehra was silent.

“This time I am not putting you up to the CO, even though for an officer with over two years’ service, it is a grave omission on your part. I am only making you the weekly duty officer continuously for next three weeks.”

At lunch, the 2IC was the ‘mother’ again — soft and sweet. Since Vijay Mehra had already been punished, and being the cause of his problem, I ordered a round of drinks.

A useful lesson learnt.


Why Indian Army is cautious of China during Ladakh disengagement

An army convoy moving towards the Zojilla pass in Drass (representational image) | ANI

In 1962, China had used deception to mount a full-frontal attack on India. However, some feel China can no longer catch India off-guard since Army has beefed up presence along LAC.

An army convoy moving towards the Zojilla pass in Drass | Representational image | ANI

New Delhi: The Army is being cautious about the disengagement with China in Ladakh as it feels Beijing could drag the whole process through the winter and use the distraction to make mischief elsewhere, possibly in the Northeast, ThePrint has learnt.

This probable scenario is high on the mind of military and security planners in New Delhi as well as those of the Northern and the Eastern commands, sources said.

China, the sources added, appears to be “intentionally dragging” the disengagement dialogue.

“China has built up (troops) in large numbers. We, too, have brought in a large number of troops into the Ladakh sector. The talks are very protracted and it seems China is intentionally dragging them,” a source said.

A second source added that “the fear is that, while China will force us to stay engaged in Ladakh, it might do something in another sector, possibly along Arunachal Pradesh”. “This could be coupled with pressure along the Line of Control by Pakistan,” the second source said.

The 1962 war, the sources added, is the biggest lesson in this regard, as the Chinese had then used deception and smokescreen to mount a full-frontal attack on India at multiple locations. Even so, one section in the security establishment believes China can no longer catch India by surprise since it has strengthened its defences on the border.


Also Read: Rifles, missiles, ammunition, drones — armed forces on shopping spree amid LAC tensions

We are deeply grateful to our readers & viewers for their time, trust and subscriptions.

Quality journalism is expensive and needs readers to pay for it. Your support will define our work and ThePrint’s future.

SUBSCRIBE NOW 


‘They may come back later’

The Indian military has already beefed up its presence along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), in the northern (Ladakh), central (Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh) and eastern (Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh) sectors.

The military’s apprehensions about the disengagement process, which seeks to resolve tensions triggered by Chinese incursions since May, were also brought to light by none other than Defence Minister Rajnath Singh during his visit to Ladakh last week.

He said the ongoing talks between the countries should resolve the situation, but he could not “guarantee” to what extent there would be a resolution.

The second source said even though the disengagement process is on, “nothing stops the Chinese from coming back later”. “One never knows what is running in someone’s mind. Hence, the policy for disengagement is trust but verify,” the source added.

However, a third source said China would not be able to catch India off-guard now since the Army has already taken steps all along the LAC to ensure that Beijing is not able to do come in like it did in Ladakh.

China no longer enjoys the surprise factor. They had the first-mover advantage in Ladakh initially but they have been countered there and everywhere now,” the source added.


Also Read: Here’s how Army is getting 30,000 additional troops winter-ready in Ladakh


The history factor

The 1962 experience lies at the heart of the apprehensions about Chinese intentions. In the war that took place that year, sources said, the Chinese had used deception.

They transgressed at multiple places in Ladakh much prior to the actual beginning of the war on 20 October and their foray into the erstwhile North East Frontier Agency (NEFA, now Arunachal Pradesh).

Even in NEFA, it was not a direct attack. “The Chinese had first lit the fuse on 8 September 1962 by intruding into the Thagla Ridge area but this was not treated as a prelude to a full-scale invasion. It was dismissed as yet another minor border incident which could be ‘localised and dealt with firmly’,” Late Brig J.P. Dalvi noted in his book Himalayan Blunder.

Asked if they feared a repetition by the Chinese, a source said measures have been taken along the entire LAC to counter any Chinese move.

The Army is already basing its preparations at the LAC on the estimate that the disengagement process will continue through Ladakh’s long, icy winter. It has consequently been on a massive drive to ensure adequate supply of the right gear and adequate rations for the 30,000 additional troops deployed in multiple places along the LAC.

The Army has also been on a shopping spree to ensure that they don’t face any shortage of firepower or surveillance capability, among other things, in case the situation takes a turn for the worse.


Also Read: Modi’s bid to sway China’s Xi with personal outreach was a big error. India’s paying for it