The artillery has always been a battle winning factor. It possesses the ability to strike deep with great accuracy and cause maximum damage to even well-constructed shelters and bunkers. This was evident in Kargil when it pulverised enemy bunkers on hill tops, making the task of assaulting infantry easier. However, Indian artillery for long, lacked equipment with increased calibre and range thus reducing its ability to shape the battlefield and cause large scale destruction.

Other than the Bofors inducted in 1984, it possessed the 130 mm guns inducted in the 1960’s and 70’s and the 105 mm, home developed and manufactured field guns of the 1980’s. The 130 lacked the ability to fire in mountains and the 105 lacked range. Both guns fired limited type of shells with lesser level of fragmentation. The Bofors scandal was the basic reason behind restricting modernisation of the artillery.

The ghost of the Bofors was visible to AK Anthony behind every door all through his tenure as the defence minister in the Manmohan Singh government. He was so spooked that he cancelled ‘Request for Proposals’ soon after they were issued and on one occasion even ongoing trials. Every time anyone mentioned kickbacks, procurement deals were scrapped. The biggest loser all through his tenure was the artillery, which post the acquisition of Bofors, remained way behind in desired capabilities.

The calibre implies the length of the barrel, which is one of the factors to determine the maximum range of the equipment. Finally, after a gap of 30 years, the artillery is now being modernised. In a ceremony this week in Deolali, the home of the gunners, in the presence of the defence minister and the army chief, the artillery will induct two new guns.

The guns being inducted are the K9 Vajra and the M777. Both are of 155 mm, with the Vajra being a tracked self-propelled gun and the M777 a light weight howitzer which can be carried underslung by a helicopter. Both guns can fire upto a range of 30 kms. The quantity being inducted are 100 of the Vajra and 145 of the M777. The Vajra is 52 calibre, while the M777 is 39.

The Vajra is a variant of the South Korean K9 Thunder and is being manufactured by L and T defence. 10 guns were bought from South Korea and the balance are being manufactured in the company’s plant near Pune. Twenty-five M777 guns would be imported in fly-away condition and the balance 120 would be manufactured by Mahindra Defence.

The Vajra is destined for the plains and deserts and would form part of the strike corps. Being self-propelled they would operate alongside armoured formations and provide much needed firepower. For a long time, these formations lacked requisite firepower with matching mobility. There were attempts at mix and match including mounting the 130 mm barrel on an Arjun tank chassis, but all these had limited success.

The M777 is ideal for the mountains where with its light weight, better manoeuvrability and helicopter-portability, it can be deployed faster and far more forward enhancing the engagement range. Thus, they would enhance firepower in a region where spread of deployment restricts fire support to troops holding ground in the defensive role.

There are other modernisation programmes in the pipeline for the artillery. Last week, ordnance factories were given a contract for upgrading 300 vintage 130mm guns to 155 mm/ 45 calibre. These would then equip 15 artillery regiments. This upgrading is to be completed by 2022. The upgradation involved changing the barrel, adding new sighting and loading systems, enabling better accuracy and enhanced rate of fire.

The upgrading costs 70 lakhs per gun and is one-fifth the cost of a new piece. Once upgraded, the range of the gun would increase from its present 29 Kms to 39 Kms. Its lethality would also increase by 300% as the new shell would have 8 kg of TNT as compared to 3.4 earlier. These would be employed in the plains and desert sectors.

Simultaneously trials are on for the Dhanush artillery guns, the Indian version of the Bofors, based on the transfer of technology from the original manufacturer, AB Bofors. These are also 155 mm/ 45 calibre. In case the trials are successful and there are no major shortcomings, firm orders would be placed for 300 Guns.

In addition, the Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS) is also in the process of different phases of trials. This is another 155 mm/ 52 Calibre gun system being developed jointly by the DRDO in collaboration with the private sector. The private concerns involved are Bharat Forge, Tata power strategic engineering division and Mahindra defence naval systems. The gun during its earlier trials had set a world record of 48.074 Kms for a gun of its calibre. This has recently been surpassed by a new weapon system being developed in the US. An initial order for 40 is expected.

The latest to commence trials is the Mounted Gun System, developed by the Gun Carriage Factory, Jabalpur. It was first displayed at the Defexpo in Chennai in April. The system is also 155mm/ 52 calibre, mounted on a multi-wheeled truck and can be deployed and prepared for firing much faster. It has a range of 40 Kms.

How many of the coming gun systems would the artillery purchase is yet to be confirmed. If not in service within the country, these could always be exported enhancing India’s military exports.

The artillery, which for decades was languishing behind in firepower and capability, is now witnessing a boom. All the guns now either under trials, procurement or development come under the ‘make in India’ or ‘made in India’ category. Opening doors to the private sector has witnessed a change in the artillery profile and could also be similar for all other equipment.

Pushing the DRDO into a corner compelled them to seek collaboration with the private sector for better technology. It has succeeded, though pitfalls and failures have occurred during the trials. These would be rectified, and the artillery would obtain new guns, which it had been seeking for decades.

Long range missiles would remain under the strategic command. This could alter response to ceasefire violations by Pakistan. With longer ranges and integrated target acquisition capabilities, the ability to target Pakistani posts, bases and terrorist camps in greater depth would exist. With better ammunition, possessing higher fragmentation, the damage would also be far more devastating.

Finally, the battle winning arm would now come of age and be able to change the nature and quantum of support to the assaulting forces. It would also change the force ratio along the LoC and cause more damage to Pakistan if it attempts any misadventures. The induction of these guns would also compel Pakistan to go into an arms race, which it can ill afford.

Smita Sharma

Tribune News Service

New Delhi, September 29

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Addressing the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in New York on Saturday, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj lashed out at Pakistan for glorifying terrorists and killers. “In our case, terrorism is bred not in some faraway land, but across our border. Our neighbour’s expertise is not restricted to spawning grounds for terrorism, it is also an expert in trying to mask malevolence with verbal duplicity,” Swaraj said, focusing on cross-border terrorism.

“Pakistan glorifies killers, it refuses to see the blood of innocents,” she remarked, alluding to postage stamps released by Islamabad in July commemorating Hizbul commander Burhan Wani, among others. India had cited the killing of security personnel, including a BSF jawan, whose throat was slit, as well as the release of the stamps when it called off talks with Pakistan. However, Islamabad had argued that both had occurred prior to the announcement of talks by New Delhi.

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“We are accused of sabotaging the process of talks. This is a complete lie. We believe that talks are the only rational means to resolve the most complex of disputes. Talks with Pakistan have begun many times. If they stopped, it was only because of their behaviour,” Swaraj declared.

Pakistan Foreign Minister SM Qureshi, in an interaction with a prominent think tank, had claimed that PM Modi and his government had developed cold feet after accepting the talks offer along the UNGA sidelines because of “domestic and electoral compulsions.”

India and Pakistan have not had a structured dialogue since 2012. Swaraj also cited the case of Pakistan Permanent Representative to the UN Maleeha Lodhi displaying photographic proof of “human rights violations” by India in Kashmir last year which later turned out to be from another country.

In her fourth address to the General Assembly on behalf of the BJP-led NDA government, Swaraj urged the need for the global community to deliver on the long-pending Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) .

“In 1996, India proposed a draft document on CCIT at the UN. Till today, that draft has remained a draft because we cannot agree on a common language. On the one hand we want to fight terrorism, on the other we cannot define it.”

She broadly spoke about sustainable development goals as well as India’s commitment to the Climate Change Treaty.

Time and again Pakistan keeps talking about the use of tactical nuclear weapons against the Indian forces if any attempt is made to enter its territory. Pakistan’s clamour in fact grew louder ever since it came to fore that India has something called as the Cold Start doctrine which is said to be an offensive plan of the Indian forces intended to quickly mobilise forces and subdue Pakistan before it even considers nuclear retaliation. This is is said to be a plan of swift multi-pronged attack in the event of conflict.

Pakistan has hinted in the past that it would not hesitate to use tactical nukes if Indian forces advance. Pakistan’s short range missle NASR is the weapon that the Islamabad boasts of whenever the issue of Indian aggression comes up.

A tactical nuclear weapon (TNW) or non-strategic nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon, generally smaller in its explosive power, which is designed to be used on a battlefield situations, in contrast to strategic nuclear weapons which are designed to be mostly targeted in the enemy interior away from the war front. Tactical nuclear weapons are of the range of 20-60 km with the blast radius of 3-5 km. These are developed to be used as deterrent against aggression on the border and not for a full-fledged war.

Pakistan claims that NASR can carry nuclear warheads of low yield with high accuracy. Pakistan has also claimed that it was designed to overcome missile defense systems.

Hypothetically speaking, if Indian Forces do enter Pakistan’s territory and Islamabad does indeed use tactical nukes then it would also be risking the lives of its own civilians as the device would detonate in Pakistani soil.

Another thing is once Pakistan uses a nuclear weapon in any form, Indian retaliation would be unimaginable as New Delhi will not be bound by ‘No First Use’ policy. India had declared ‘No First Use’ (NFU) as a policy; Pakistan is averse to it and feels that NFU in principle negates its deterrence advantage against India. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are intended to compensate for conventional forces which is largely believed to be lagging behind India.

India’s options against Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons ::

What Pakistan must keep in mind is that India has fairly developed secondary strike capability. India has ballistic missiles with nuclear warhead that can be launched from submarines in short notice. Pakistan can rest assured that any use of nukes- tactical or strategic – the retribution will be swift, severe and devastating threatening its very existence.

A tactic that India can use is to get closer to populated areas in Pakistan which would force Islamabad to think of collateral damage if a nuke device is used in its own territory. Indian Army can use this tactic to negate Pakistani nukes by inserting divisons in densely populated Pakistani regions like Punjab. If Pakistan resorts to battlefield nukes then it would effectively endanger its own population also making Pakistan lose its status and face in international society and will create a soft spot for India.

Use of assets like QR-SAM, S-400 and Akash Surface to Air missile can effectively negate Nasr. But, that would require careful and effective surveillance about where NASR would be fired from and how it can be met mid-air with air defence systems.

Best would, however, be for India to hit the locations where NASR missiles are deployed with conventional short range weapons. It must be considered that since NASR is aimed at stopping advances, it would be stored at locations close to the border and not in some remote area like strategic nuclear missiles. Again, effective intelligence and precise prior knowledge of military installations would be essential.

Most numerical strengths quoted in these write ups are erroneous — they relate to light divisions, which do not exist in the Indian Army except in the counter-insurgency forces of the Rashtriya Rifles. (Representational photo)

There was a time when the Indian Army’s structural and organisational changes took place under considerable secrecy. No longer. Every other day, ill-informed reports appear, mostly authored by writers who may never have understood the legitimacy and time-tested standing of some organisations, ranks and appointments, which contribute to the army’s command and control and decision-making. Two recent reports related to reorganisation are being questioned and discussed by India’s military community.

The first seeks the elimination of the one-star rank of brigadier with potentially the two-star rank of major general being considered for the first level of command above the unit level. It also speaks of the intent to have all officers of the army superannuating at least at the rank of major general, by time scale or selection. Another report, which appears to flow from the first, relates to the operational and organisational restructuring of the army. It reflects how a study is being undertaken to remove the division headquarters (HQ) from the hierarchy of formations that exercise command and control.

Most numerical strengths quoted in these write ups are erroneous — they relate to light divisions, which do not exist in the Indian Army except in the counter-insurgency forces of the Rashtriya Rifles. Indian Army divisions are usually never less than 17,000 in strength (as against the reported 10,000) as they also have units of all Arms and Services. One report states that the proposals include retaining the division HQ and the division as an entity only within 15 and 16 Corps in J&K, the three strike corps, 1, 2 and 21, and the mountain strike corps, that is about 16-18 divisions not including the counter-insurgency forces.

First, a comment on the manner of the change. The proposals are obviously budget-driven because the current, and potentially future, defence budget (1.47 per cent of the GDP) cannot support an army of 1.3 million without seriously affecting funds for capital expenditure. Second, the approach appears driven more by personnel management than capability based upon real threats. The idea is to have more appointments in the rank of major general by tailoring command appointments with resources half-way between what a one- and two-star officer currently commands. With this it is intended to have more officers achieving aspirations of two-star rank, with commensurately lower responsibility.

Such organisational changes do not occur through permutations and combinations to suit personnel management but rather on the basis of conceptual and doctrinal trials. A prime example was the creation of the Reorganised Army Plains Infantry Division (RAPID) in 1987, which brought about the induction of an armoured brigade into selected infantry divisions and other changes to meet Pakistan’s expanded armoured threat. It was the culmination of a long study and examination commencing in 1975 with the Experts Committee headed by Lt Gen (later General) Krishna Rao, with Maj Gen K Sundarji (later General) as a member.

No doubt the army leadership is going by the rationale that in view of tactical nuclear weapons being introduced in the battle zone, the parameters have changed. Smaller formations with just 4-5 infantry battalions with some matching support will present smaller targets and retain the capability to strike up to limited distances, as against the concept of deep thrust, defunct in a battlefield with a nuclear overhang. Another rationale in support of the proposed changes is a doctrine many armies around the world are favouring: Swarming by multiple small forces, thus creating greater deception and forcing a divided response by an adversary. The proposed task forces (TFs) would still need artillery and engineer support with signals remaining an inherent HQ element. The division of artillery and engineer support will require another major tampering with organisations which will militate against the neater tailor-made unit and sub-unit based support which currently exists. That will add complexity rather than the simplicity being sought. Anyway, offensive forces such as the strike corps are not being considered for reorganisation, although they are the ones which are lumbering. Reorganisation in their case would provide far better flexibility with their taking the battle into adversary territory.

Four other aspects need consideration. First, the command and control of the larger number of TFs than the number of division size forces by the corps HQ. Many of the support resources currently under the division HQ would revert to the corps HQ. Pre-location of such resources with the TFs would be necessary, while retaining control at the corps HQ with need-based release. This will make decision-making far more difficult.

The second issue is personnel management itself, which will witness greater complexity. There will be a need to grade the command appointments of major generals as some will command TFs and others, divisions. Whether this will provide a level-playing field for further promotion is an aspect bound to come up for legal scrutiny. Third, many of the divisions at the northern borders also perform counter insurgency duties by remaining split. The TF system will cause numerous functional problems for them. The fourth area relates to increasing the teeth-to-tail ratio, taking a line from China’s PLA. In 1998, a 50,000 cut in the non-field forces was decided and was under implementation until the Kargil War cut it short. The approach did not involve any large scale tampering as it only scaled off the bloated strength from organisations away from the battlefield.

If the army leadership is seriously seeking better esteem for its officers the non-functional financial upgradation is a better alternative. It won’t create undesirable organisational turbulence and the social challenges can be far easier met than the functional ones arising from forced organisational change.

If the army desires to overcome its shortage of officers in lower ranks and have more officers at the unit level and less at the HQ level, then this is definitely not the right approach.

Was awarded Vir Chakra for bravery and sacrifice in the 1965 war with Pak

Col Dilbag Dabas (Retd)

Nand Kishore, son of Tirkha Ram Yadav, was born at Dhawana village in present day Rewari district, which is part of the Ahirwal region. In the 1962 war with China two real brothers from Dhawana village, Sepoy Singh Ram, and his two years’ younger Sepoy Ram Kumar from 13 Kumaon, died fighting side by side in the battle of Rezang La. The elder was awarded Vir Chakra for his bravery.

Nand Kishore could not have formal education since there was no school nearby in the area. Whatever he learnt was in 4th Battalion of Kumaon Regiment in which he was enrolled on July 1, 1939.  Since there is no designated Ahir Regiment in the Indian Army, the Ahirs are mainly absorbed in Kumaon Infantry Regiment, besides logistics and combat support arms. At present, the overall strength of Kumaon Regiment comprises almost 30 per cent of Ahirs from all over India but mainly from north and central India, including  Bihar.

Considering his hard work, camaraderie and grit, Nand Kishore was awarded Junior Commission in the rank of Jemadar in 1961. Two years later, he was promoted to the rank of Subedar (Sub) and was given the command of 3rd platoon of ‘A’ Company in the battalion. As platoon commander, Sub Nand Kishore took Sepoy Tara Chand of his village as his ‘Sahayak’. During the 1965 war with Pakistan, by the end of September, the fighting ended in Poonch and Rajouri sectors but Pakistan-trained guerillas were still active along the ceasefire line in J&K. In some areas, they had entrenched themselves and the Army had to undertake extensive mopping-up operations.

In one such operation, 4 Kumaon was tasked with re-capturing Ring Contour, which overlooked and dominated the main bridge on the Kishanganga river. It was during the second assault and a fierce fight by ‘A’ Company of 4  Kumaon that the objective was captured, a fight in which Subedar Nand Kishore displayed the finest example of camaraderie and raw courage; a fight in which he was martyred but not before his platoon hoisted the National Flag on the majestic Ring Contour. For his conspicuous act of bravery, Sub Nand Kishore Yadav was deservedly awarded the coveted Vir Chakra. The battle account of his gallant act is recorded in the War Diary of 4 Kumaon.

To some, the impulsive reaction of Sub Nand Kishore might appear reckless, but a veteran who has been in the line of fire in the face of the enemy knows how high the emotions run, what camaraderie is all about, mission is all that matters and no price is high enough to pay for its accomplishment. Some people are like that. 

As a befitting tribute to the fallen junior leader, ‘A’ company of 4th Kumaon Battalion is referred to as ‘Nand Kishore Company’.

(The writer is a veteran Gunner, 6 Field Regiment)

The summary of gallant act in War Diary of 4 Kumaon reads…

On October 11, 1965, Sub Nand Kishore as Platoon Commander led the attack on Ring Contour. As the platoon reached the assaulting distance, it was pinned down by heavy automatic gunfire from the enemy in which Sub Nand Kishore was seriously injured and five of his men, including Tara Chand, his ‘Sahayak’, lay dead. Under the cover of own artillery and mortar fire, the dead and the wounded were evacuated to the Medical Aid Post around 300 yards in the rear. After regaining consciousness, the first thing he asked “Target capture hua”? He was answered in the negative. And then he asked “Aur Tara Chand”? He was told that Tara Chand is dead. Sub Nand Kishore thought for a while, borrowed a pistol from a signaler and without asking the medical officer, hastily limped back to the remaining personnel of his platoon on the front line, mumbling words like “Badla, dhava, kabza” (revenge, assault, capture) as he moved ahead. With heightened emotions and utmost fury, he rallied his men for the final assault. Seeing that a Browning machine gun was holding the assault, and assuming that the same gun killed his men, including his ‘Sahayak’, he called forward a rocket launcher. Despite a wounded shoulder, he fired two rockets and blasted the enemy’s machine gun and then joined the dash to the objective. Frightened by the fury of the assaulting Kumaonis, the enemy fled. But before the success signal was fired, a burst of indiscriminate firing by the fleeing enemy hit Sub Nand Kishore on the chest and he died instantly.

Major Leetul Gogoi . ANI file photo

Srinagar, September 18

The Army has shifted Major Leetul Gogoi, who was at the centre of the ‘human shield’ controversy, out of his unit and attached to local formation headquarters after being indicted by an Army Court of Inquiry (CoI) for “fraternising” with a local woman in Srinagar, officials said on Tuesday.

Last month, the CoI instituted by the army indicted Gogoi, an officer with 53 Rashtriya Rifles—a specialised anti-militancy force for Jammu and Kashmir, on two counts—“fraternising” with a local in spite of instructions to the contrary and “being away from the place of duty while in operational area”.  It recommended Summary of Evidence against him, a step before court martial proceedings are initiated.

The officials said Gogoi was shifted out of his unit in Budgam and “attached” to Awantipora-based Victor Force headquarters.

The officer, whose decision to tie a civilian to the bonnet of his vehicle in Kashmir on April 9 last year as a shield against stone-pelting by a mob had kicked up a huge controversy, will now face Summary of Evidence, a process similar to framing of charges. The process is likely to take three months.

Based on the Summary of Evidence to be compiled by “competent authorities”, the Army is likely to decide further action in the case which may include General Court Martial (GCM) or Summary General Court Martial (SGCM). The GCM is like a full court whereas the proceedings in SGCM are conducted in a much shorter time span and cases are disposed of quickly.

Gogoi, who was commissioned as a lieutenant in December 2008, was detained by Jammu and Kashmir police on May 23 following an altercation at a hotel in Srinagar where he was allegedly trying to enter with an 18-year-old woman.

Army Chief General Bipin Rawat had supported the young officer’s action and honoured him with the Army chief’s ‘Commendation Card’ for his ‘sustained efforts’ in counter-insurgency operations.

However, after the name of the major was embroiled in a controversy involving a girl, Gen Rawat said exemplary punishment would be given to Gogoi if he was found guilty of “any offence”.

“If any officer of the Indian Army is found guilty of any offence, we will take strictest possible action,” he had said. — PTI

India needs the best of warriors, weapons and war strategies. This necessitates a quantitative reduction and a qualitative upgradation of the services’ manpower. The historic initiative of right-sizing need to be sustained, supported and carried forward. That can, hopefully, facilitate India’s graduation towards a world class military power.

Bhartendu Kumar Singh
Indian Defence Accounts Service

Large manpower of our armed forces is increasingly becoming a concern. Uncertain impact on combat capabilities apart, sheer numbers are also leapfrogging towards huge revenue and pension expenditure. There is insufficient money for modernisation efforts. Therefore, the recent initiative by army to study ‘right sizing’ challenge is a commendable policy step since this could propel India’s tryst with Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). However, unless the study is conducted in an open and transparent environment, the intended objectives would continue to elude.

The Indian Army has seen a four-fold increase in its manpower strength since 1947. None of the great powers like the US, Russia, China, the UK, or France have had this kind of increasing trajectory. In fact, all of them had a decreasing trend after the vortex of Cold War was over. For example, the US, which had over 3.37 million total armed forces personnel at the peak of Cold War in 1967, has 13.54 million personnel now. Similarly, China, which had a manpower strength of 4.9 million armed forces personnel during Cold War days, has now around two million personnel. Numerous studies have proved that the combat capability of the Chinese PLA has indeed been enhanced due to manpower rationalisation and trimming.

In the Indian context, sporadic manpower reduction efforts in the past ccould not succeed. Many strategic experts chaffed at the idea, partially out of what Samuel S Huntington may have called as ‘confused and unsystematic set of assumptions about civil-military relationship’. No serious and acceptable reform proposals were allowed to emerge on the discussion table. Even when civilian manpower underwent reductions at every level in the government and fresh recruits guided towards the new pension scheme (NPS), the military rank and file kept proliferating. The dominant theme being propagated was that of a massive shortage of manpower in the armed forces, particularly at the officer cadre level. Strategic experts had (and still have) their own narratives of manpower shortages and why urgent steps were needed to plug the same. Such assumptions of the ‘so-called shortages’ are based on archival notions of ‘authorised versus posted manpower strength’ and blissfully ignore the contemporary realities where the services’ engagements need to be functionally reviewed so as to do away with  superfluous activities. 

This dichotomy between global trends and the Indian approach is due to many factors.

1There is a civil-military compartmentalisation in national security consciousness. Despite attempts to forge a common approach to national security in institutions like the National Defence College (NDC) for senior civil and military officers, perceptional division remains in situ. The services, partly out of their training, working culture and professional military ethics, stand for a dominating security policy. Demands for more budget and more manpower have to be understood in this context. 

2The armed forces practice conservative realism and support established values, institutional practices and functional expanse. There is an institutional reluctance to revise them and learn from best practices elsewhere. Some of these practices, like the orderly system and the involvement in basketful of non-core activities like running educational institutions, commercial complexes etc, lead to avoidable proliferation of rank and file.

3 There are few lateral mobility options for armed forces personnel in other professional fields. Media hype and hoopla notwithstanding, our soldiers have to demand respect and remain at the margins of social life. For example, despite the armed forces remaining stout champions of democratic values, very few military men have managed a political career. Such economic, social and political marginalisation deprive them an encompassing and comprehensive outlook of society to appreciate issues such as manpower reduction.

Contemporary experiences show that numerical preponderance and military modernisation do not go hand-in-hand. Manpower has been reduced in many countries to rationalise ‘teeth-to-tail’ ratio and spend the precious penny on weapons. Further, the nature of warfare is constantly changing where the physical hand-to-hand fight is being replaced by new platforms such as cyber warfare. Instead of dismantling enemy tanks, the challenge is to cripple the enemy’s functional system in critical fields. When we hypothesise a war scenario 20 years later, war techniques would have become more automated and indeed robotised. Infantry and mechanised infantry would be performing rear guard duties. Thus, the technological imperatives necessitate a technically educated manpower profile to handle the future warfare scenario. In the Indian context, unless the numbers are reduced, a qualitative pushover is difficult.

The present initiative seems to be a response to public policy calls for manpower reduction and jointness since 2015 and a look beyond the Shekatkar Committee’s recommendations on manpower reduction. One of the reasons why the Shekatkar Committee did not come up to expectations was its inability to conceptualise the issues and ask the right questions to itself. For example, the political economy of military modernisation warrants that revenue expenditure be capped to a maximum of 50 per cent of the defence budget. Such issues were ignored. Perhaps, that explains why it could not go beyond cosmetic recommendations, necessitating a comprehensive study afresh by the army.

India needs the best of warriors, weapons and war strategies. This necessitates a quantitative reduction and a qualitative upgradation of the services’ manpower. The historic initiative of right-sizing need to be sustained, supported and carried forward. That can, hopefully, facilitate India’s graduation towards a world class military power.

Views are personal

Capt Vikram Batra sacrificed his life during Kargil War fighting Pak intruders

Health Minister Vipin Singh Parmar unveils the statue of Capt Vikram Batra in Palampur.

Ravinder Sood

Palampur September 10

Health Minister Vipin Singh Parmar unveiled the statue of Captain Vikram Batra, PVC, on the occasion of his birth anniversary on the premises of Shaheed Captain Vikram Batra Degree College here on Monday. Captain Batra had sacrificed his life during the Kargil War while fighting intruders from Pakistan.

Speaking on the occasion, the Health Minister said he was fortunate to be in the institution named in the memory of the great solider, who had sacrificed his life at a the age of 20 for the unity and integrity of the country.

“It has been more than 18 years since then, but the unparalleled sacrifice and courage of Kargil heroes are still etched in the memory of the Indians and Vikram Batra is among those who will become the face of every Indian solider, who will fight fearlessly”, said Parmar.

Parmar said Captain Vikram Batra had left a message for every politician, student, employee and the common man. His message was loud and clear, “Always put the country first”. Had he wanted to come back after the triumph over Point 5140 in the Kargil sector, he could have, but he decided to go further and capture Point 4875, where he eventually attained martyrdom.

Speaking on the occasion, Girdhari Lal Batra, the martyr’s father, said Vikram left his job in the Merchant Navy only to serve his country. After his son attained martyrdom, he interacted with many soldiers, who had participated in the Kargil War. They told him how Vikram received bullets on his chest and head while saving the life of an injured soldier.

“He was always keen to accept challenges. He always wanted to be in the forefront. I still remember several instances of my son’s life when he volunteered to be posted on the frontline”, said Kamal Kant Batra, the martyr’s mother.

Earlier, the Health Minister Vipin Singh Parmar presided over an annual prize distribution function of the college. He said the state government had planned to spend Rs 7,044 crore to strengthen the education system. He asked the students not to take to drugs, which had become a matter of serious concern. Later, he also inaugurated a basket ball court in the college complex.

China remains the biggest arms exporter to Pakistan. According to a report by RAND, Pakistan accounts for nearly 42% of China’s total arms sales. On the contrary, Pakistan’s arch-enemy India remains the biggest economic partner of China in the region with bilateral trade expected to touch $100 Billion.

China has emerged as a key supplier of major weapons to South Asian countries especially Pakistan and Bangladesh. Sales to both the nations amount to over 53% total Chinese arms sales between 2000-14.

The most notable Chinese sale Pakistan was of JF-17 fighters followed by an agreement to build the fighter jets in Pakistan under a joint venture.

China has continued to provide significant defence assistance to Pakistan including assisting develop the country’s nuclear program. During the mid-1970s Beijing covertly assisted Islamabad’s nuclear ambitions to counter New Delhi, according to the RAND report.

“In 1988, China agreed to supply and train Pakistanis to operate the M-11 solid-fuel rocket, with a 185-mile range and carrying a 1,100-pound warhead. In succeeding decades, China has sold Pakistan hundreds of fighter jets and signed agreements to sell frigates and submarines to Pakistan,” the report read.

China maintains strong defence ties with Pakistan and it is to check what Islamabad states as Indian belligerence. of late. According to the document, close ties with Pakistan, “the linchpin of China’s South Asia policy”, are based on three factors: ensuring China’s internal stability, balance against India and defending China’s growing economic interests.

At the same time, China-India economic ties are soaring at a rapid pace. India is China’s largest trading partner in the region and the bilateral trade between 2000 and 2013 was estimated to be at $65 billion (compared to a modest $14 billion between China and Pakistan). By 2020, India-China trade volume is widely speculated to touch magical $100 Billion.