All posts by webadmin

Counter-insurgency expert likely to take charge of 15 Corps

Counter-insurgency expert likely to take charge of 15 Corps

Majid Jahangir

Tribune News Service

Srinagar, January 6

A counter-insurgency expert with varied experience in tackling Kashmir militancy is likely to don the mantle of the highly sensitive 15 Corps of the Army.

Lt Gen KJS Dhillon is likely to take charge of the Army’s Srinagar-based sensitive and strategic 15 Corps in February, defence sources in Delhi said.

Lt General Dhillon is at present the Director General of Perspective Planning of the Army. He has previously served in various capacities in the conflict-hit Kashmir.

He will be replacing Lt Gen AK Bhatt, who had taken over as the General Officer Commanding of the 15 Corps, also called the Chinar Corps, on January 31, 2017.

“The new Corps Commander is assuming office in February,” a senior defence official said.

Lt General Bhatt is proceeding to New Delhi to assume charge of the Military Secretary, the defence official added.

Lt General Dhillon, a Rajputana Rifles officer, had earlier served in the Valley and commanded a counter-insurgency brigade — 7 Sector of the Rashtriya Rifles — at Handwara in frontier Kupwara district in 2011.

As the Brigade Commander, he was instrumental in planning a large number of anti-militancy operations in Handwara. Later, he also served as the Brigadier General Staff of the 15 Corps.

Lt General Dhillon also commanded the 36 Infantry Division, also called RAPID in the Southern Command.

The new Corps Commander would assume office at a time when J&K is gearing up for the parliamentary and Assembly elections. During the tenure of Lt General Bhatt, the security forces stepped up anti-militancy operations in Kashmir. Over 240 militants were killed in Kashmir during his tenure.


Defence ministry nod to ₹3,000-cr weapon purchase

 

NEWDELHI: The Defence Acquisition Council on Saturday approved military procurement worth Rs 3,000 crore, including Brahmos supersonic cruise missiles for Navy’s two stealth frigates and armoured recovery vehicles for the Army’s Arjun main battle tanks, a senior official said.

HT FILE■ India is procuring two stealth frigates, which will be equipped with indigenously developed BrahMos missiles.

THE APPROVALS INCLUDE SUPERSONIC CRUISE MISSILES FOR STEALTH FRIGATES AND ARMOURED RECOVERY VEHICLES FOR THE ARMY’S MAIN BATTLE TANK, ARJUN

India is procuring two stealth frigates at a cost of $1 billion and both the ships will be equipped with indigenously developed BrahMos missiles.

The DAC also approved the procurement of Armoured Recovery Vehicles (ARVs) for the Indian Army’s main battle tank, Arjun. The ARVs are designed and developed by the DRDO and would be manufactured by defence public sector undertaking BEML, the official said. The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) is the ministry’s highest decision-making body on procurement.

Recently, India and Russia inked a $500 million contract to build two stealth frigates in Goa. Th ships are expected to be delivered by 2027.

Russia’s state-run arms exporter Rosoboronexport and India’s Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL) signed the contract in New Delhi to build the Grigorovichclass ‘Project 1135.6’ frigates with technology transfer from Russia, which is India’s top arms supplier.

“The indigenously designed Brahmos missile is a tested and proven supersonic cruise missile and will form the primary weapon on-board these ships,” said an official.

The frigate deal comes close on the heels of a Rs 39,000-crore deal with Russia for the supply of Russian S-400 Triumf air defence missile systems to India. The deal was signed despite appeals from the US that the air defence systems are a “focus area” of secondary sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which is aimed at punishing Russia for annexing Crimea and interfering in the 2016 US elections.

The agreement was inked during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s one-day visit to India early in October.

“Our relations go beyond military hardware and military exchanges. We paid attention to humanitarian response mechanisms,” Putin had said, while addressing a press conference.

Both the S-400 and the frigate deal are likely to be affected by the US sanctions legislation if India is unable to secure a waiver.

 

 

 

clip


CM: More than 10% Army intake our aim

CM: More than 10% Army intake our aim

Lt Gen Surinder Singh, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Command, presents Manohar Khattar Lal, Chief Minister, with a memento in Chandigarh on Thursday. Tribune photo

ibune News Service

Chandigarh November 29

Chief Minister Manohar Lal Khattar said though there has been a sizeable intake of officers into the armed forces from Haryana, efforts are being made to increase it beyond the 10 per cent mark.

Khattar was addressing the Civil Military Liaison Conference here today. General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Command, Lt General Surinder Singh, other senior government officials and Army officers also attended the conference.

While describing Haryana as the state of ‘jawan and kisan’, the CM said at present, the intake of officers into the armed forces from the state is over nine per cent, but we want to take it to over 10 per cent. Recently, the Khanda village panchayat in Sonepat district has given 50 acres for the setting up of an armed forces preparatory institute, he said.

Khattar said the state government has so far provided jobs to 252 dependents of the martyrs. It is the first time that dependents of martyrs of the 1962 and 1971 wars are also being provided government jobs.

It was informed that a General Degree College of Army would come up at village Bataur village, Barwala, Panchkula, for which the government had allotted 10 acres to the Western Command headquarters

 


*BATTLE OF LONGEWALA* As Stated by Brig Z A Khan in an Interview in Jan 2002

Please tell us in detail about the Longewala Operation of 1971?
While I was busy raising 38 Cavalry in Hyderabad I was called to Khairpur on October 16, where the 18 Division Headquarters were located. There the GOC Major General B. M. Mustafa explained his concept of forthcoming operations to Lieutenant Colonel Akram Hussain Syed and me, with his Colonel Staff Colonel Wajid Ali Shah present.
The general planned to defensively hold the  front south of Rahimyar Khan and outflanking the Indian left flank  seize Ramgarh and Jaisalmir; 38 Cavalry was to seize Ramgarh and 22 Cavalry was to neutralise the airfield at Jaisalmir; the GOC asked for our comments about the practicability of the plan from the armour point of view.
Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed and I said that the plan would succeed if we made an approach march to the border on one night and undertook the cross border operations the next night and air cover was made available on the first day from dawn to dusk till Ramgarh and Jaisalmir had been secured. The general said he would make arrangements for the air cover, he cautioned that the plan was ‘top secret’ and was not to be discussed with anyone.
In the first week of November, 38 Cavalry, less ‘A’ Squadron detached to 55 Brigade at Chor, concentrated at Manthar, about 25 miles on the road Sadiqabad-Rahimyar Khan. A few days after the regiment concentrated, the COAS and Air Marshal Rahim, the PAF chief came to Rahimyar Khan where the 18 Division plan was discussed and the PAF chief assured the required air support.
A few days after the Rahimyar Khan meeting, the GOC inter-changed the roles of 22 Cavalry and 38 Cavalry because he anticipated a tank battle in the Ramgarh area for which 22 Cavalry was better suited. I considered the operation, Jaisalmir was 120 miles from the rail head at Reti, I expected an engine breakdown every 15 miles and requested that 12 spare engines be provided with an EME team and a breakdown with a crane to change engines, the GOC agreed to make the necessary arrangements.
The officers of 38 Cavalry carried out reconnaissance for counter penetration covering the approaches to Rahimyar Khan and Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed and I took our officers along the route that we were to take to the border, Reti-Khenju-Gabbar-Masitwari Bhit-border without telling them that that was the route that we were to follow in the forthcoming  operations.
About the middle of November the news indicated that the attack on East Pakistan had begun and Indian aircraft started flying reconnaissance missions over Rahimyar Khan and Sadiqabad.
With war imminent I decided to let my officers and the Risaldar Major know that the mission of 38 Cavalry with an infantry battalion and mortar battery was to capture Jaisalmir and neutralise the airfield. I explained how the mission was to be conducted and that each tank was to carry 200 gallons of petrol in drums. At the division headquarters there was no preparations for the very imminent operations, on 1 December Colonel Saeed Qadir came to investigate the seizing of tank engines and ordered the removal of tank engines and cleaning of oil sumps and filters.
On 2nd December I received orders to report to the division headquarters and there the GOC told me that operations would begin that evening, that 38 Cavalry, 1 Punjab and a mortar battery would follow 51 Brigade upto Loganewala and proceed to Jaisalmir to neutralise the airfield. The GOC told me that I was not to attend the division orders but  to organise my force.
I telephoned my regiment to stop the work of taking down tank engines and prepare for moving out, I next went to the AA&QMG and told him that I required 16,800 gallons of octane 80 petrol, the AA&QMG told me that he knew nothing about the requirement and had no petrol available, after a discussion with the colonel staff the AA&QMG told me that the required petrol would be made available at Masitwari Bhit, 5 miles short of the border. It was obvious that the logistics of the operation had not been planned.
When the 18 Division ‘O’ group assembled, the PAF liaison officer, a wing commander informed the ‘O’ Group that the PAF would not be able to support the operation because the Jacobabad  airfield had not been activated. This announcement led the brigade commanders to ask the GOC to  cancel or postpone the operation, the GOC then telephoned the CGS and discussed the lack of air, after the discussion he  informed the ‘O’ Group that his orders were to conduct the operation without air support in the ‘national interest’. The brigade commanders then suggested that the GOC refuse to conduct the operation because it was very likely to fail. The GOC told the ‘O’ Group that he would conduct the operation because if did not he would be labelled as a general who had lost his nerve.
The plan made by Major General B. M. Mustafa required an approach  march of about sixty mile to the border, then a forty miles advance to Ramgarh by 51 Brigade of two battalions (the third battalion was a East Bengal battalion and had to be left out of the operations)  and 22 Cavalry, by passing Loganewala, to position itself to counter any reaction from the Indian 12 Division which was expected to be deployed facing Rahimyar Khan. I was to command the 38 Cavalry task force consisting 38 Cavalry less squadron, 1 Punjab ex-206 Brigade and a mortar battery,  and was to follow 51 Brigade till the metal road to Jaisalmir, 20 miles inside India was reached and then continue to Jaisalmir. 206 Brigade leaving one battalion on the Rahimyar Khan front (this front was held by Hur battalions) was to follow my force and secure Loganewala to form a firm base.
After these orders were issued the 206 Brigade commander objected to 38 Cavalry being sent to Jaisalmir with mechanically unsound tanks, the GOC changed the plan and ordered 28 Baluch the divisional Reconnaissance and Support Battalion less company and a mortar battery to neutralise the airfield and placed 38 Cavalry under command 51 Brigade. I was informed about the change in the plan on the afternoon of 2 December.
The orders received from GHQ differed from the plan that had been suggested, instead of making the approach march of 60 miles to border in one night and going across the border the next night, the GHQ order stated that the approach march was to start at 1530 hours on 3 December and the border had to be crossed at  2130 hours and the advance was to continue to Ramgarh and Jaisalmir, a total march of 120 miles in one night.
On the evening of 2 December I went to  the 51 Brigade Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed was already there, he told me that the brigade commander was shaken and had lost his nerve, a little later the brigade commander came to the tent where the ‘O’ Group had assembled, he appeared shaken. The GSO 3 laid out the maps of the operational area, the maps covered our territory, Indian territory was blank squares, the brigade had not collected the maps of the operational area from the division headquarters. I placed my maps, which showed the terrain features on both sides of the border, on the table.
From the ensuing discussion it became apparent that the brigade commander’s mind had stopped working. Nothing was known about the Indian deployment, even the number of the Indian division was incorrectly said to be 11 whereas it was 12. As the brigade commander hesitated I told him that my guess was that an infantry battalion and a tank squadron would be protecting the Indian flank at Loganewala, that 51 Brigade with 22 Cavalry with an infantry battalion on tanks to move on the track Masitwari Bhit-Loganewal and by passing Loganewala continue to Ramgarh. 38 Cavalry with an infantry battalion to follow and secure Loganewala or wait the arrival of 206 Brigade; no one objected and the brigade commander accepted the plan.
When the ‘O’ Group dispersed the artillery regiment commander asked me for my map saying that his maps were also without terrain features across the border.
On 3 December at 38 Cavalry tanks were to move on tracks for 25 miles and entrain at Sadiqabad and  arrived at Reti  railway station about, 30 miles from Sadiqabad at 1800 hours.  I went to Reti railway station at about 1730 hours and asked the station master at what time the tank train was to arrive, he surprised me by saying that he had no intimation of any tank train, I realised that the AA&QMG had not informed the railway about the movement. I then spoke to the railway movement controller at Sukkur and after a lot of shouting and threatening the controller agreed to move the train to Reti. At the Reti railway station a goods train was standing at the tank unloading line, there was no ‘power’ available at Reti, we were arguing about this when the station master started going through the procedure of allowing a train to pass through, I made him stop the train and use its locomotive to move the goods train. At about nine o’clock the tank train with 14 tanks whose engines had been hurriedly refitted without cleaning the filters arrived and were unloaded.
We were running well behind the divisional planned schedule, from Reti the tanks drove to Khenju along a canal bank, at Khenju my second in command Major Zia Uddin Javed was waiting  with petrol and the tanks were refuelled. From Khenju the desert track started and the tanks in low gear ground their way to Gabbar 19 miles from the border, thirteen out of fourteen tanks arriving at 0100 hours on 4 December. At Gabbar I was surprised to find 22 Cavalry and the GOC who told me that 22 and 38 Cavalry were the only troops which had arrived. At 0400 hours the GOC called off the operation for that day and both regiments dispersed. On the 4 December the Indian Air Force did not show up.
On checking up I found that the  lorries carrying the petrol promised by the AA&QMG  were stuck in the sand near Dharki, I sent a message to Risaldar Major Mazhar Ali Khan and he commandeered the EME battalion 6×6 vehicles and we refuelled. I looked for the tank that had broken down, it was a few miles from Khenju, the Tatra crane was bellied near Khenju, that put an end to my engine replacement plan.
During the day, on the advice of the brigade commanders the attack on the Jaisalmir airfield was abandoned and 1 Punjab reverted to 206 Brigade. Just before last light a battery of 130 mm guns passed through Gabbar and 38 Baluch joined 22 Cavalry  mounted their tanks moved off towards the border.
At about 2100 hours six tanks and the reconnaissance troop of 38 Cavalry reached Masitwari Bhit, 22 Cavalry was refuelling; Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed told me that Brigadier Tariq Mir was behaving very badly and had stated that he had no intention of going beyond Loganewala, I met Brigadier Tariq Mir and he told me that he intended not to go beyond Loganewal. At about 2300 hours 51 Brigade moved off leaving the elements of 38 Cavalry, a platoon of a Punjab battalion of 206 Brigade, one lost FOO at Masitwari Bhit and Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab joined us.
The operation so far was a movement of fiasco, civilian requisitioned  4×2 trucks could not negotiate the loose sand, 20 FF, a battalion of 206 Brigade, marched across the desert ‘to the sound of the guns’ when their vehicles failed to negotiate the desert.
At about 0200 hours on 5 December, Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab and I decided that no one else was likely to join us and we decided to follow 51 Brigade. I ordered 2nd Lieutenant Javed Iqbal with the reconnaissance troop to lead followed by the RHQ 38 Cavalry and six tanks under Major Javed Hussain.  About two miles after crossing the border I found 2nd Lieutenant Javed Iqbal coming back, when I asked him where he was going he told me that all the vehicles of the reconnaissance troop had disappeared, I realised that the NCOs had hidden their vehicles (I court martialled them after the ceasefire). Major Javed Hussain now took the lead and went 18 miles and four tanks broke down leaving two runners and we had to halt, two miles short of Loganewala, luckily on the highest ridge in the area.
At about 0730 hours, explosions were heard from the direction of Loganewala and columns of smoke started rising, I and my adjutant drove towards the smoke columns in my rover and from a ridge overlooking the Loganwala-Jaisalmir metal road we saw five tanks of 22 Cavalry and Indian tank burning, four Hawker Hunters of the IAF were circling and after firing all their rockets etc they flew away. A little later a helicopter took off, later I learnt that the GOC had come to  51 Brigade as it  was out of communications with the division headquarters and ordered Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed to capture Loganewala.
I and my adjutant drove to the 51 Brigade headquarters, I asked the brigade commander what the situation was and he said he did not know, I then  drove to the base of the hill on which Loganwala was located, two companies of 38 Baluch and a squadron of 22 Cavalry were formed up to attack.
22 Cavalry reached the rear of the Indian Loganewala defences at about 0200 hours, in the absence of the brigade commander 22 Cavalry and 38 Baluch decided to attack and clear Loganewala before advancing to Ramgarh. At 0700 hours a squadron and two companies of infantry attacked and were engaged by anti-tank guns, machine guns and AMX tanks, one AMX was knocked out then 6 Hawker Hunters appeared, knocked out 5 tanks of 22 Cavalry and the Baluchis went to the ground due to straffing. Half an hour later 22 Cavalry formed up again to attack and the IAF knocked out six tanks, at about 0900 hours 22 Cavalry formed up again but after a vehement and abusive argument the brigade commander overruled the attack. 22 Cavalry had cut off the roads Loganewal-Ramgarh, Loganewala-Tanot and the road to Jaisalmir. The brigade commander ordered the concentration of the regiment around the brigade headquarters re-opening the Indian communications to Loganewala. In subsequent air attacks 22 Cavalry lost six more tanks bringing the day’s losses to 17 tanks, 10 killed and 17 wounded.
Four Hawker Hunters of the Indian Air Force circled Loganewala  from 0700 hours to sunset and prevented any ground movement. 22 Cavalry fired all their 12.7 mm anti-aircraft ammunition and also tried their 100 mm in the anti-aircraft role but could not hit any aircraft that were releasing rockets and firing their guns from about five thousand metres.
After witnessing the pull back by 22 Cavalry I returned to where my tanks were, there I found Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab, I told him of the affairs at Loganelwala and he asked me to accompany him to Loganewala. We found 51 Brigade deployed astride the Loganewala-Jaisalmir  road out of contact with the Indian troops. The 51 Brigade commander told us that an Indian brigade had linked up with Loganewala.
While we were at the 51 Brigade headquarters a helicopter, flown by Captain ‘Mac’ Maqbool of 12 Cavalry, later lieutenant general, landed with orders from the GOC ordering 51 Brigade to capture Loganewal and Ghotaru, a place about ten miles on the road to Jaisalmir; on receiving  the orders Brig Tariq  Mir announced that he would not comply with the orders as the Indians were too strong for brigade to attack.
While we were witnessing the brigade commander’s refusal to obey the division commander’s orders,  Indian aircraft again attacked and we all went into trenches, Brigadier Jahanzeb and I went to the same trench, there we discussed what we had seen and I told Brigadier Jahanzeb that it would be a shame to withdraw after coming 20 miles and convinced him to assume command as the senior brigadier; he hesitated  and said I was creating trouble, but he agreed to assume control.
After the Indian aircraft departed Brigadier Jahanzeb informed Brigadier Tariq Mir that 206 Brigade would attack Loganwala and he ordered Lieutenant Colonel Shah, the CO 28 Baluch, the Reconnaissance and Support Battalion, to advance along the road Loganewala-Jaisalmir and capture Ghotaru. The CO 28 Baluch disappeared and explained after the ceasefire that he understood that he was to make a wide outflanking movement to Ghotaru by withdrawing to the Sadiqabad-Sukkur road.
Brigadier Jahanzeb returned to the point where my tanks had stopped, his brigade had concentrated there; he made an attack plan setting the H-hour at 0300 hrs 6 December, he gave out his orders and told me to go and explain the plan to Brigadier Tariq Mir and ask him to mark the “FUP” and provide a squadron of 22 Cavalry to support the attack. I reached the 51 Brigade area at about 1800 hours, I met Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed and explained the plan, he told me that Brigadier Tariq Mir had decided to withdraw across the border. I then went to 51 Brigade headquarter and gave the requirements of 206 Brigade to the brigade commander who said that he was withdrawing across the border and remained adamant about it; at about 1900 hours the brigade started moving back.
The withdrawing 51 Brigade and advancing 206 Brigade crossed each other on Kharo Tar a high ridge line slightly ahead of where my tanks had stopped, Brigadier Jahanzeb decided to take up a defensive position on the ridge, at about 1130 hours the next day the Indians made contact with tanks and infantry. The GOC came and ordered 206 Brigade to regain the Loganewala-Jaisalmir road and 51 Brigade to prepare a depth position.
Later  the GOC ordered a general withdrawal across the border and all ranks to fire small arms at the enemy aircraft. When I heard about this order, I drove to the division headquarters at Gabbar and met the GOC who confirmed his order, I told him that if there was a general withdrawal troops would not stop east of the Indus and if the order to fire small arms at the aircraft was not cancelled the troops would fire all their ammunition and run away. I asked the GOC to cancel both orders and order a fighting withdrawal with the two brigades withdrawing through each other, the GOC cancelled both his previous orders and adopted my suggestion. My motive in making the suggestion was to recover my broken down tanks lying between Kharo Tar and Gabbar and asked the GOC for recovery assistance, he arranged for WAPDA tractors which towed back most of the tanks.
While driving to the divisional headquarters I found the divisional Supply and Transport Battalion vehicles abandoned on the track on which the division had advanced, I ordered my driver to check the state of a vehicle and found that radiators had been drained and when my driver got into the driving compartment the driver of the vehicle came running, he was hiding in a bush.
By the morning of 7 December 206 Brigade was firmly established on Kharo Tar, my Quartermaster, Captain Bhatti, kept us supplied with food “meethi roti” and water from Sadiqabad and when a cry went up that 206 Brigade units were running out of ammunition, I made my Dodge Power Wagons available and ammunition was brought from Sadiqabad.
38 Cavalry squadron left at Manthar because their engines could not be refitted when the division started its movement, moved into counter-penetration positions on the approaches to Rahimyar Khan.
The GOC had complained that he was having a communication problem with 51 Brigade since the beginning of the operation, I told him I would see what the problem was. I sent my command vehicle with my adjutant to 51 Brigade Headquarters to establish communications between the brigade and the division and when my command vehicle would move the communication would break; my signal JCO could not  find the reason;  after the ceasefire an NCO disclosed that the brigade had kept its wireless set meant to communicate with division headquarters, switched off.
On the night 8/9 December 206 Brigade withdrew from Kharo Tar through the position prepared by 51 Brigade, 38 Cavalry after firing all the HE ammunition destroyed its two broken down tanks and moved to Masitwari Bhit. On 9 December after taking over the front, Brigadier Tariq Mir reported that two enemy tank regiments were turning his flanks to cut off the brigade, 22 Cavalry was moved from Gabbar and were attacked by the IAF and lost another tank; the two Indian tank regiments were a figment of the brigade commander’s imagination.
A little distance from my regimental headquarters the divisional gun area was located, the IAF attacked gun area and my headquarters, a cannon shot made a hole in my leather jacket and a rocket hit the open cupola flap of my tank and broke the hinge. The gun area was defended with training guns of the Anti-Aircraft School which fired single shots but kept the IAF away.
On the night 11/12 December the remnants of 38 Cavalry withdrew to Gabbar, on the morning of 12 December when I with my second in command went to find out where the ‘forward defended localities’ were, I found Major General B. M. Mustafa standing there, someone whispered that the general had been sacked and Major General Abdul Hamid Khan was in command of 18 Division.
I met the general and asked his GSO 2 (Intelligence) where the FDLs were, the general heard me and indicating the GSO 2 and himself he said that they were the FDLs and there was nothing forward of them. Major General Abdul Hamid Khan, the new GOC, on assuming command the previous day ordered a ‘general withdrawal’, both brigades took off in the ‘Gabbar Gallop’ and some men were rounded up and brought back from the Punjab Regimental Centre at Mardan.
On the night 12/13 December I established my headquarters at Khenju and collected all my broken down tanks and started engine replacement. On 16 December ‘Tiger’ Niazi surrendered, two days later, to everyone’s surprise, we ceased fire.
After the operation ‘Labbaik’ ended in fiasco everyone claimed that they were not privy to the operation though 206 Brigade commander was removed from command for objecting to the operation.  The mission assigned to 18 Division was “Defend the area of  responsibility in order to ensure the security of the main line of communications Karachi-Multan and be prepared to carry out the war into the enemy territory under favourable conditions.” This implied the guarding of 600 miles road and rail communications close to the border, 18 Division successfully carried out its mission. It was a classical spoiling attack which put the Indians off balance, the division’s mission was achieved.
If your allegations about the Gabbar gallop are true, why is it that no officer was taken to task?
Because the GOC  Major General Abdul Hamid Khan did not allow the general withdrawal  to be disclosed to the Awan  Committee.

Army pays tributes to Kulgam martyr

Tribune News Service

Srinagar, November 28

The Army on Wednesday paid tributes to its soldier Prakash Jadhav, who was martyred in a gunfight in Kulgam district on Tuesday.

Lt Gen AK Bhatt, Genearal Officer Commanding of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps, led a solemn ceremony at the Badami Bagh Cantonment in the city to pay homage to the soldier. “In a show of solidarity, representatives from other security agencies also joined in to pay their last respects to the martyr,” the Army said in a statement.

Jadhav, a Sapper, had sustained bullet injuries during a fierce gunfight at Redwani Bala village of Kulgam district and later succumbed at Srinagar’s 92 Base Hospital. Two militants were killed in the gunfight.

The soldier was 29 years old and had joined the Army in 2009. He belonged to Budihal village of Karnataka and is survived by his wife, the Army said.


Ex-serviceman booked for embezzling DSOI funds Had connived with another employee

Tribune News Service

Chandigarh, November 22

Two persons, including an ex-serviceman working as a cashier at the Defence Services Officers’ Institute (DSOI) in Sector 36 here, have been booked for embezzlement.

In a complaint to the police, DSOI secretary Lt Col Rakesh Gupta (retd) alleged that a former Naib Subedar, Gurdip Singh Dhaliwal, who worked as storekeeper and supervisor (administration) and another employee, Anil Sharma, connived to siphon off Rs 66,000 deposited by a member for booking halls for marriage function.

The complainant also alleged that between September 2017 and February this year, Dhaliwal and Verma used the same modus operandi wherein the cash deposited by members for booking of the DSOI hall for certain functions was not deposited with the accounts section.

A case has been registered under Sections 408 (criminal breach of trust by clerk or servant) and 120B (criminal conspiracy) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) at the Sector 36 police station.


*KAR CHALE HUM FIDA*…..

Image result for Maj Shaitan Singh Bhati
Today 18 Nov is commemorated by (some in) India as Rezangla Day, in memory of one of the *most stirring battles ever fought*. Last man last bullet is spoken of often but happens ever so rarely. Indian history has Saragarhi and Rezangla among its most well-known. While the former fought in 1897 for the British Indian Army is, perhaps, more remembered because the Brits recognized and spread word about it, the *latter was fought more recently in 1962 against the Chinese, for Independent India, but, alas, remains largely unknown* outside military circles.
http://

Almost the entire lot of people at the post viz. *114 soldiers (of the 120), of the Charlie company of 13th battalion of the Kumaon regiment, died defending Rezangla hill* about 20 km SE of Chushul, Ladakh at a height of 16500 feet and *repulsed the Chinese attack in this sector*. In the dark and depressing overall scenario of the 1962 war (notwithstanding supreme acts of bravery by individuals and units displayed at many places like that by its sister battalion the 6 Kumaon at Walong in the North East or by Jaswant Singh of 4th Garhwal Rifles at Nauranang, in Tawang, whose anniversary was yesterday. 17 Nov) Rezangla was the bright spot that showed the Chinese (and the World) that India was not the pushover they had imagined.
Details of the battle can be easily googled. Or if you please, read a brilliant piece by reputed military analyst and scholar Mohan Guruswamy on his Facebook post today. Suffice to just give some details. *120 (some reports say 123 or 124) Indian soldiers without artillery support, with most antiquated weapons against almost 5000 Chinese with artillery support and modern weapons. Icy cold weather, snow all around, oxygen in short supply, howling winds. And a battle on*.
Chinese soldiers kept advancing wave after wave even before the Indian soldiers could replenish their stocks and reload the machine guns, The Company Commander Major Shaitan Singh and his Ahir boys kept firing even though they were under a constant barrage of artillery. There was no hope and no way of replenishing their ammunition.
Major Shaitan Singh had two options: Fight to the last man and last bullet, or Abandon Post. The soldiers were tired and bleeding. But their morale was high. They chose to fight on. *Not a single man abandoned his post. Not a single man fled the battle*.
Almost all the Indian soldiers were killed in action (114 of them died, 6 were captured as POWs, of whom one died in captivity and one escaped back to Leh and recounted the tale) versus about 1300 Chinese who died. When their bodies were found later, in Jan of 1963, *many were clutching the triggers of their guns. They had died fighting until the last bullet*. Many had even resorted to fighting with bare hands after they could not use weapons or ran out of ammunition.
 http://

 A Rajput company commander Maj Shaitan Singh Bhatti from Jodhpur leading 120 Ahirs (Yadavs) from the plains of Haryana, of the 13 Kumaon regiment, laid down their lives in the cold and barren mountains of the Karakoram Range. *This is an inspiring India story for you*. Legend has it that Major Shaitan Singh did not want the Chinese army to take control of his body or mutilate it. He was mortally wounded in combat. *He ordered his jawans to hide his body behind boulders*. One of his buddies unslung his rifle, used the sling to tie Major Shaitan Singh’s body to his and rolled down the hill. As the brave Major Shaitan Singh breathed his last, his body was hidden behind boulders. Pse read the accompanying tweet of Major Gaurav Arya, a retired Kumaon regiment officer and now a well known military analyst seen frequently on TV.
Defence analyst and media person Gaurav Sawant, who recently anchored a TV episode on this war (India Today TV Channel) and who has written on this war himself recounted in his Facebook post last year, of the stories his father, a retired Army Brigadier told them.  “My father told us stories of how one soldier, a wrestler, crushed the heads of two Chinese soldiers with his bare hands, when he ran out of ammunition. Another soldier flung himself on two Chinese soldiers and took them down with him as they climbed towards the peak. All this is a part of the military folklore’.
What caused this *exemplary display of bravery and fortitude in most treacherous weather where breathing itself was difficult*. As Mohan Guruswamy puts it aptly “At this altitude it took hours to bring a kettle to boil for tea and whatever fruit and vegetables that came were frozen hard”. And let us not forget that 13 Kumaon was not even acclimatized having been *deployed in Chushul on 24 Oct* in the lull of the Indo China war. *Less than a month later* they were in the middle of a no holds barred battle. To quote Gaurav “The epic battle of Rezang La is the story of unparalleled valour, raw courage and victory buried in the crushing defeat in 1962’. Let us leave it to the management schools and other analysts to make sense of this. Let us simply today celebrate the strategic message they sent out.
On 18 Nov in this battle *seven waves of Chinese attacks were repulsed*. On Nov 21, barely 3 days later the war came to a halt. Surely the Chinese would have imbibed the lessons of Rezangla. If they came in again they would do so at their own peril. As the folklore goes, the Chinese stopped at Rezang La to count their dead and tend to the injured. They lost their will to move forward and retreated. The battlefield was covered in snow.
Why do we say legend or folklore in some descriptions? Simply because initially there was disbelief about what the one person who had escaped (or few survivors) had recounted. There was skepticism too.  It was only in 1963 when the snow had melted and a new battalion returned to Rezang La, (some accounts say a wandering shepherd but that should not matter) that they found the brave soldiers *of 13 Kumaon still in their trenches……Frozen. Finger still on the trigger*. To quote Guruswamy “It was as if the very last moment of battle had turned into a tableau”. This was bravery beyond the call of duty, in the line of fire. *And then, 114 bodies were cremated with full military honours in 1963 at those icy heights*. Brig TN Raina (later COAS), the Brigade Commander of 114 Brigade tasked to defend Ladakh and himself a Kumaon officer led the party that recorded the scenes for posterity and gave us a chance to tell our countrymen what happened that Sunday morning (coincidentally today is Sunday too).
The USMC war memorial inscribed after the battle of Iwo Jima in 1945 ‘uncommon courage was their common virtue’ to describe their marines. Perhaps the same can be said of the Rezangla braves. We have however been more deferential to the idea of service and duty and inscribed in their memorial these lines of *Thomas Macaulay “How can man die better than facing fearful odds, for the ashes of his fathers and the temples of his Gods.”* And this is the bravery that continues to inspire succeeding generations of Indian soldiers.
Maj Shaitan Singh was awarded the Param Vir Chakra, the highest award for bravery. The battalion also got 8 Vir Chakras and 4 Sena Medals for gallantry. 13 Kumaon got the battle honour ‘Rezangla’. Every man who fought that battle deserved a gallantry award though. *However, save some pockets of Haryana the story of Rezangla remains untold and the heroes unsung*. Of course, there has been some focus on this in the recent past. I can recollect excellent accounts by Shekar Gupta and Gaurav Arya (himself a retired officer of the Kumaon Regiment). And last year on this day, there was fair bit of remembrance. This year too over the last few days and from this morning social networks have been active remembering and recounting this battle. *Even so, this is one story that must resonate all over India. It must be told and retold, ballads sung and stories written*.
To get some sense of the poignancy and tragedy, the desolation and desperation and yet through it all human heroism and dignity, do go to you tube and watch one of the most *moving songs ever written and picturised on this war ‘Kar Chale Hum Fida..’ in, arguably, India’s best war movie ‘Haqeeqat’.* With lyrics by Kaifi Azmi, set to tune by Madan Mohan and sung by Mohammed Rafi, it is guaranteed to move you to tears. If there is just one thing you have to do today, please do this. *Read about the battle or atleast watch this song*.
Either way, before the night fades away and brings us the dawn of another day, before we go back to our worldly woes of money and mice, let us today spare a thought for the Rezangla warriors whose unsurpassed *courage will go down as one of the best and greatest examples of ‘last man, last bullet. Let us never forget Rezangla*.
We must also mourn the passing away, yesterday 17 Nov 18, of *Brig Kuldip Singh Chandpuri*, Maha Vir Chakra, VSM, the hero of the *Battle of Longewala, in 1971*. The movie ‘Border’ was made on this battle with Sunny Deol essaying then Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri. That battle is another must read, must know, must study in Indian annals. Again, 120 infantry men of 23 Punjab against nearly 5000 Paki forces with an armoured regiment of 45 tanks. Happily in this case (though not for those who passed away) our losses were much less and it was part of a winning campaign. Let us hope our countrymen and children, today and in future become aware of such epic battles.

Govt submits Rafale papers SC to take up PILs on court-monitored CBI probe tomorrow

Govt submits Rafale papers

Satya Prakash
Tribune News Service
New Delhi, November 12

Ahead of the November 14 hearing on PILs seeking court-monitored CBI probe into the Rafale deal, the Centre on Monday shared documents with petitioners on the decision-making process for the procurement of 36 Rafale fighter jets from France, in compliance with the court’s October 31 order.

The Centre pointed out that during the long period of inconclusive Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) procurement process, “our adversaries inducted modern aircraft and upgraded their older versions. They acquired better capability air-to-air missiles and inducted indigenous fighters in large numbers.

“Further, they (India’s adversaries) modernised and inducted aircraft with advanced weapon and radar capabilities… our adversaries inducted more than 400 fighters (equivalent to more than 20 squadrons) during 2010-15. They not only inducted 4th generation aircraft but also inducted fifth generation stealth fighter aircraft. The combined effect of our own reducing combat potential and our adversaries enhancing their combat potential made the situation asymmetrical and extremely critical.”

The Centre explained the purchase of 36 Rafale Jets (two squadrons) in fly-away condition as “an urgent need to arrest the decline in the number of fighter squadrons in IAF and enhance their combat capabilities.” Rafale fighter jet is a twin-engine MMRCA made by French aerospace company Dassault Aviation.

The top court is seized of petitions filed by advocates Vineet Dandha, ML Sharma and Prashant Bhushan and former Union Ministers Arun Shourie and Yashwant Sinha. They have sought a court-monitored CBI probe into the deal.

A three-judge Bench headed by Chief Justice of India Ranjan Gogoi — which had on October 31 asked the Centre to submit in a sealed cover in 10 days strategic, confidential and pricing details of 36 Rafale fighter jets — will take up the matter on November 14.

On Indian Offset Partners, the Centre said: “The offset contract does not envisage manufacture of 36 Rafale aircraft in India by any public or private sector firm.

As per the contract, the vendor is required to confirm the details of IOPs/products either at the time of seeking offset credits or one year prior to discharge of offset obligation.

“The annual offset implementation schedule… will commence from October 2019. The vendor is yet to submit a formal proposal in the prescribed manner…” Citing the preamble to the DPP, the Centre said, “Defence acquisition is not a standard open market commercial form of procurement and has certain unique features… As a result decision-making pertaining to defence procurement remains unique and complex.”


Boost for IAF’s VIP fleet

Vijay Mohan

Tribune News Service

Chandigarh, November 8

Even as a case for procurement of 48 Mi 17-V5 helicopters is underway, the Air Force’s VVIP transport fleet is getting a boost with two more such helicopters being modified for ferrying the nation’s top leaders.

The IAF’s No 3 base repair depot here, responsible for the maintenance of Russian-origin helicopters, has been tasked to convert two V5s, the Mi-17 latest version, from the conventional freighter version to VIP configuration.

The IAF has already modified a few Mi-17s for the VIP transport role, which form part of the Air Headquarters Communications Squadron based at Palam in New Delhi.

The move to induct Mi-17s in the squadron followed the phasing out of the Mi-8 helicopters and plans to induct the Italian AgustaWestland machines falling apart over corruption charges.

Modification of the choppers includes refurbishment, air-conditioning and soundproofing of the cabin, installing passenger seats as in airliners, making provisions for a small toilet and adding other necessary security and communication paraphernalia.

The IAF has projected a requirement to 6-8 Mi-17s for VIP role. While it earlier operated six Mi-8, a deal for 12 Agusta helicopters was signed, out of which three were actually delivered when the controversy erupted.

The numbers notwithstanding, a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General in 2016 had revealed significant under-utilisation of the fleet, with the shortfall in flying training being as high as 65 per cent.

The Air Force has inducted 151 Mi-17 V5 helicopters to replace Mi-8 and older versions of the Mi-17. These were assembled and flight-tested by 3BRD, where technical facilities for their maintenance and overhaul have also recently come up. Of the 48 prospective inductions, 38 would go to the IAF.


Bandi Chhor Divas

Bandi Chorh Diwas is a day on which Guru Hargobind Sahib was released with 52 Kings from Gwalior Prison. The word “Bandi” means “imprisoned”, “Chhor” means “release” and “Divas” means “day” and together “Bandi Chhor Divas” means Prisoner Release Day. It is celebrate with great joy as it was a time when “right” prevailed over “wrong”. The Mughals had held many hundreds of prisoners who were effectively “political prisoners” and were otherwise innocent leaders of their communities. They had been held without trial or any other legal process; jailed by brute force; held against their wishes.

Bandhi Chhor Diwas (Sikh Diwali): A Photo Essay

FORT OF GAWALIOR 

Bandhi Chhor Diwas (Sikh Diwali): A Photo Essay

The Guru had found a way to get 52 of these innocent leaders released from the prison without a battle. However, it had been a long process as the Guru spent many years in custody. However, in the end the unjust government of the day had to “give in” to the Guru’s just demands. An unlikely victory in a period of history when those in power were completely corrupt and injustice was the order of the day. However, the Guru had found a positive way out of an otherwise very dark situation. The lives of 52 local kings had been saved without a single shot and without a battle!

Bandi Chorh Diwas is not Diwali

http://

Bandi Chorh Diwas and Diwali are separate festivals and the events actually fall on different days; however, commonly in the popular calendars, they are celebrated on the same day. For this reason, many people often think of these events as if they are the same. In real terms, the day of release of the sixth Guru with the 52 rajahs (kings) was actually a few days before Diwali in 1619.

These two celebrations represent two quite different events in history. On Bandi Chorh Diwas, the long imprisoned Guru Hargobind was released from Gwalior, taking with him 52 long imprisoned Rajas, whose release was a result of the Guru’s wit.

Diwali (a Hindu festival) was being celebrated on the day when the Guru reached Amritsar. On the arrival of the Guru in Amritsar, the people lit up the whole city with thousands of candles, lights and lamps like they had never done before; there was much celebration and joy.

Bandi Chorh Diwas falls on the night of Amavas in the month of Assu; this actual Bandi Chorh Diwas is celebrated each year at Gurdwara Data Bandi Chor Sahib, Gwalior with much gaiety and joy, a few days before Diwali.

Historic background

During October/November, the worldwide Sikh Sangat (community) celebrates the safe return of the sixth Nanak, Guru Hargobind from detention from Gwalior Fort in about October 1619. The day of his return to Amritsar coincided with the Hindu festival of Diwali, (“the festival of lights”). This concurrence has resulted in a similarity of celebrations amongst Sikhs and Hindus.

When Murtaja Khan, Nawab of Lahore, noticed that Guru Ji had constructed the Sri Akal Takhat Sahib, ‘The Throne of the Almighty’, at Amritsar, and was also strengthening his army, he informed the Mughal Emperor Jahangir about this. He also, incorrectly, emphasized that the Sikh Guru was making preparations to take revenge for his father’s torture and martyrdom. When Jahangir heard about this he at once sent Wazir Khan and Guncha Beg to Amritsar in order to arrest Guru Hargobind Sahib Ji.

But Wazir Khan, who happened to be an admirer of Guru Hargobind, rather than arresting him, requested the Guru to accompany them to Delhi telling him that Emperor Jahangir wanted to meet him. Guru Sahib accepted the invitation and soon reached Delhi.

Jahangir meets the Guru

On their first meeting when Jahangir saw the Guru, he was completely won over by his youthful charm and holiness. Jahangir asked the Young Guru whether the Hindu or Muslim religion was better. The Guru quoted some lines of Kabir. Jahangir was very impressed with this answer. Deciding to become friends with the Guru he gave him a royal welcoming. Learning that the Guru was also an avid hunter he invited Guru Hargobind to accompany him on his shikars (hunts).

On one of these hunts the Moghul Emperor was hunting a lion which had been terrorizing a small village. Suddenly out of the bush the ferocious beast charged at Jahangir. Gunshots and arrows failed to end the attack of the lion. The beast was almost upon the Emperor when Guru Hargobind jumped between them. Yelling to the lion that he must first deal with him he raised his shield to deflect the lion and with a single stroke of his sword, the lion fell dead.

The appreciative Emperor and Guru Hargobind were now becoming good friends. But Chandu Shah could not bear this. A rich banker with much influence in Jahangir’s court he had once refused, with very derogatory remarks, sugestions that he arrange a wedding between his daughter and the young Hargobind, son of Guru Arjan.

Chandu Shah continues his evils ways

Later when he realized the match could be very beneficial he tried to arrange the wedding. But Guru Arjan, having heard of the unkind remarks by then, refused the proposal. Chandu’s anger and intriques then played a large part in Guru Arjan’s death. Now seeing the growing friendship of the two leaders and still smarting over his rejection by Guru Arjan Dev (his daughter was still unmarried and thus the rotten sore on his ego was still bleeding) he began his intrigues again this time taking aim at Guru Arjan’s son, Guru Hargobind.

While at Agra, the Emperor fell seriously ill. The royal physicians tried their best but they failed to cure him. Chandu Shah now saw his chance, conspiring with the astrologers, he asked them to tell the Emperor that his sickness was due to a bad convergence of the stars.

Jahangir was told that the disease could be cured, only if some holy man would go to Gwallior Fort and continuously offer prayers to the deity there. He suggested that there could be none more appropriate than his new friend Guru Hargobind Ji and that he should be asked go to Gwallior Fort. At the Emperor’s request the Guru readily agreed and left for the Fort with several companions.

In the fort Guru Ji met many Hindu Princes who were detained there due to political reasons. Their living conditions in the fort were very deplorable. With the help of Hari Dass, the governor of fort, the Guru had their conditions improved. The princes soon joined the Guru in his daily prayers. Unknown to Chandu Shah Hari Daas was a Sikh of Guru Nanak and he had become an ardent devotee of Guru Hargobind. When Chandu wrote to Hari Daas telling him to poison Guru Sahib, he had at once placed the letter before Guru Ji.

Mian Mir intervenes

Gurdwara Bandi Chhod Sahib at Gwallior

When several months had passed without their Guru being released, Baba Buddha Ji and a group of Sikh devotees traveled to the fort to meet with the Guru. They told the Guru that the whole of Amritsar, his family, devotees and all the pilgrims who had come, from near and far to visit him, were missing his presence dearly. They were worried that their Guru might never leave the prison.

The memory of his father’s recent imprisonment, torture and death weighed heavily on their hearts. The Guru assured them that they should not worry, he would join them soon. Outside the fort Sikhs gathered and began to carried out Parbhaat-Pheris (singing Gurbani), as they walked around Gwallior Fort waiting for their beloved Guru’s release.

The Guru is released, but refuses to go alone

In the meantime Sai Mian Mir, a noted Sufi Sant and friend of both the Guru and his father, had travelled to the Emperor’s Court to meet with Jahangir asking him to release the Guru. Jahangir, who had fully recovered then ordered Wazir Khan to release Guru Sahib.

Reaching Gwallior Fort Wazir Khan informed Hari Daas of the Emperor’s order to release the Guru. Hari Daas was very pleased to hear this and quickly informed Guru Ji about the message from the Emperor. But the Guru refused to leave the fort unless the 52 princes were released as well.

Emperor agrees but sets a condition

When Wazir Khan informed the Emperor of the Guru’s desire, the Emperor first refused, but finally agreed, after Wazir Khan reminded him of the debt he owed the Guru for his recovery. Not really wanting to free the prisoners the Emperor cleverly added the following condition:

“whoever can hold on to the Guru’s cloak can be released.”

The fifty–two princes who had been detained for political reasons or for defaulting on large sums of tribute owed the Emperor, had suffered in the fort for years. The Guru with his heart full of compassion for the plight of others was determined to get the prisoners freed.

He had a cloak made with 52 corners or tails, the cloak was soon delivered. So, as the Guru walked out of the gate of the fort the fifty-two princes trailed behind, each holding on to his own tail of the Guru’s special cloak. The Guru’s cleverness had trumped Jahangir’s clever condition and liberated the fifty-two princes. Guru Hargobind is therefore also known as Bandi-Chhor (Liberator).

Bandhi Chhor Diwas (Sikh Diwali): A Photo Essay

CHOLA WITH 52 CUTS WHICH WERE HELD BY EACH KING

Bandhi Chhor Diwas (Sikh Diwali): A Photo Essay

Celebrations held at Gurdwara Bandi Chor

Gurudwara Bandi Chor is built at the place where the Guru stayed during his detention. Jahangir advised Wazir Khan to bring Guru Hargobind in his court at Delhi with great honour. Jahangir had realised that he was wrong for allowing the torture and killing of Guru Arjan Dev Ji, who had not committed any crime or offence. Wanting to exonerate himself of any guilt in the death he indicted the crime on Chandu Shah and other officers. So in order to show his innocence he wanted to meet Guru Hargobind Ji. On meeting with the Emperor Guru Ji wasted no time in telling Jahangir that there was no such thing as a bad convergance of the stars.

The Sikhs celebrate this day as Bandi Chhorr Divas i.e., “the day of release of detainees”. So in the evening, illuminations are done with “Deewalee” (earthen oil lamps), candles and fireworks.

The celebrations are held both in the Gurdwaras and in homes.

What do we learn from Bandi-Chhor Diwas?

52 Hindu Princes were freed with Guru Sahib. Guru Sahib could have left the Fort when he was offered the chance. However, Guru Ji thought of others before himself. To the Guru others’ freedom and rights were more important than his own. Guru Ji is always thinking not of his emancipation but everyone’s emancipation. This is the attitude and virtue which Guru Ji filled within his Sikhs, by putting into reality this positive message.

http://