Col Avnish Sharma (retd)

Colloquially, various entities in an Army unit derive their nicknames from the animal planet. The adjutant, who is the prime functionary responsible for running the unit, is called the ‘lion’. The quartermaster, the annadata, is the ‘panther’. The second-in-command, with his envious charter, is the ‘lamb’, and so on. The Commanding Officer (CO), who earns his stripes in the true sense, however, remains the enigmatic ‘tiger’.

On January 3, 1981, fresh from the training academy, I reported to my unit, then out on a tactical war exercise in the desert of Rajasthan. The moment our jeep entered the camouflaged camp, the sign-postings gave me a feeling of having entered a jungle abode. Arrowed signs spelt every prominent beast until I came across one indicating a tiger’s den, a dugout with an imposing camouflage net. Shy of embarking on a questioning spree immediately, I nonetheless asked the senior subaltern who this tiger was supposed to be. ‘Mister’ (a newly commissioned Second Lieutenant is addressed so), the CO is the tiger.’

During the battle run, where tanks fire live shells while on the move, the CO on his tank was the first to lead the fray, setting an example of fearlessness among the entire regiment. One of the tanks reported a live 105-mm shell stuck in the barrel of the main gun, a dangerous situation requiring precise and cool handling. There was a looming risk of the shell bursting in the barrel with the crew getting roasted in the 40-tonne cast iron. The CO took charge and personally ensured the defusing and unloading of the errant shell, displaying high standards of professionalism. A tiger, indeed!

It is the dream of every officer to don the mantle of a CO. Having experienced the exhilaration of being one, I am reminded of an incident that pushed me towards my goal amidst a highly competitive structure in the Army. We were in a major war exercise and were to link up with troops of another unit. ‘Balkar (his name tab read), what is the name of your CO?’ I, a Captain then, tasked to identify and guide the unit, asked the jawan from the incoming unit. The response was instantaneous, ‘CO saab.’ ‘What is his location?’ I insisted. He proudly thumped his chest, pointing to his heart, ‘CO saab yahan hain shriman.’ Such is the pedestal that a CO occupies among the rank and file of the thousand odd officers and men he commands.

The recent cases of the martyrdom by COs, an anti-terrorist operation at Handwara in north Kashmir, and the deadly brawl in the Galwan valley in Ladakh, has brought the office of the CO into sharp public focus. Yet again, as hitherto, through the ages, it gets demonstrated to our countrymen that he forms the backbone of the Indian Army — an apostle of raw courage and sacrifice.

Lt Gen KJ Singh (retd)

Former Western Army Commander

Satellite imagery has picked up a buildup of Chinese armour — medium and light tanks — in proximity to the Line of Actual Control (LAC). It is the operationalisation of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) concept, practised in mechanised exercises, in recent years. Manoeuvres have included a heavy drop of armoured vehicles, simulating the capture of passes. There are reports that the 6 Mechanised Division has deployed assorted AFVs (armoured fighting vehicles) — medium and light tanks — to leverage their coercive messaging potential, as part of psychological warfare.

At the outset, it will be appropriate to categorically state that India has adequate forces in a prepared and trained state, not only to take care of the threat but even cause criticalities for the Chinese. However, the PLA has more versatility in its fleet with the introduction of light tank, ZTQ, first fielded during the Doklam crisis. Our BMP-2s and ICVs (infantry combat vehicles) can be adapted to a limited extent for relevant tasks.

In the past few weeks, transport aircraft have been making repeated sorties to shore up our mechanised deployment in Ladakh. What is indeed baffling is that there have been discussions, questioning the very relevance of mechanised forces. The unfortunate truth is that it has become almost a compulsive habit to occasionally tinker with our force mix. Mercifully, a crisis jolts us out of such forays. It is also relevant that articles have appeared in magazines, in support of this exercise, sounding the death knell of tanks and calling for major cuts in inventory. Like the proverbial cat with nine lives, tanks have not only survived, but have a battle-winning presence, generating deterrence and psychological pressure, as is being felt in Ladakh.

The fielding of light tanks across the Zoji La pass in 1947 operations, Chushul in 1962 and PT-76 tanks of the 63rd Cavalry racing to Dhaka, are abiding examples of their relevance, provided commanders employ them boldly with imagination. Our armoured cars were in the vanguard in the Katanga (Congo) UN peace-keeping operations in the 1960s and later in counter-insurgency operations in the North-East. Tank battles of Asal Uttar, Basantar and Chawinda in 1965 and 1971 operations are proof of their potential.

One of the widely proliferated images of the ongoing standoff has been the Chinese Humvee type of patrol cars. Yet, we have chosen to eliminate light tanks and armoured cars, part of most modern armies, from our arsenal, citing a host of reasons. The primary justification has been budgetary constraints, especially in the past decade. Naturally, the guillotine has to fall on cost-intensive platforms. The other overriding factor has been a Pak-centric approach with excessive focus on proxy war.

Consequently, we have diluted our conventional options, which entail the use of mechanised forces. Such blinder- driven approach has meant that we are trapped in Pak’s preferred domain of hybrid war and lack deterrence against China. Our mainstay, infantry, has been denied the much needed protection. Ideally, it should have some proportion of lightly armoured vehicles for quick reaction teams, reconnaissance and commanders. A proposal for such vehicles was torpedoed within the Army in 2012, despite multiple screening and demand from the other two services. Considering that it takes six to seven years for the proposals to fructify, we are already pushed back. This proposal was revived and is now in its last stages. Interestingly, it was shot down on specious grounds that once mounted, the infantry would lose orientation, a gross under-estimation of their resilience.

The light tank has been another sad story and a part of the blame lies with the hierarchy of mechanised forces, who have felt that limited budget should be applied on medium tanks like T-90s, T-72s and indigenous Arjuns. Our current force mix in Ladakh and Sikkim can match the Chinese medium tanks— ZTZ-99 and ZTZ-96 (Types 99 and 96) — though in the long run, it will be appropriate to induct the T-90s. The only way to deter the Dragon is by upgrading our equipment profile. There is also a crying need to create an ecosystem for retrofitting and upgrading our tank fleet, as the prohibitive cost of replacement dictates a need for life extension, coupled with modernisation. The current production base is a combination of Avadi (Chennai) and Medak (Telangana). The logistics cost of transportation of equipment for overhaul to South India even when the platforms are deployed on the western and northern borders has been imposed due to parochial preferences. The new infrastructure for light tanks, armoured cars and retrofitting should leverage the available land and skill base in the vacant HMT Pinjore complex. It can be mentored by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) labs in the vicinity, such as the Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory (TBRL) and Snow and Avalanche Study Establishment (SASE), coupled with IIT Ropar and PEC.

The Chinese light tank, ZTQ, is a hybrid variant and essentially a lighter version of the medium tank, weighing 36 tonnes. It is equipped with low-pressure 105 mm gun and has 1,000 HP power pack. India should strive to field agile and versatile — air portable light tank, with missile and gun firing capabilities. It is an ideal platform for high altitude — Rann of Kutch, Siliguri corridor, riverine terrain, island territories and peace-keeping operations. Most importantly, it is crucial for quid pro quo options. It is learnt that some development work has been done by the DRDO and industry. There is also a possibility to optimise the hull (chassis) of K-9, Vajra self-propelled gun system. It will be prudent to quickly fix the qualitative requirements and initiate the project, in mission mode, synergising capabilities on work-sharing basis. If we can find partners like South Korea and Vietnam, it will be a new beginning.

Finally, notwithstanding the Chinese muscle-flexing, it’s the men behind the gun who make the vital difference. Our tank crews have shown their grit in operations and the most notable was overcoming the vast disparity between the Pattons and our Centurions in 1965.

PK Jaiswar

Tribune News Service

Amritsar, June 30

After the Enforcement Directorate(ED) started a probe into the alleged fake Covid reports scam, Ex-servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS), Ministry of Defence, has also sought details of the case and documents pertaining to the case.

Reliable sources in the Vigilance Bureau here have confirmed the development, adding that EMC Hospital was among the empanelled list of ECHS hospitals.

Earlier, the Enforcement Directorate had started a probe into the scam to ascertain whether money changed hands through illegal means. It has asked for the records and FIR in this connection.

The Vigilance has booked five doctors and a hospital owner on charges of murder bid, fraud, forgery, criminal conspiracy and corrupt practices on June 23 after a number of patients, who were tested positive by a private laboratory and under treatment at hospital, were found to be negative. More complaints have been coming to the Vigilance Bureau in this connection, it is learnt.

Earlier, the hospital owner and its doctor have applied for bail. Today, the remaining suspects also applied for bail in the local court which has fixed July 3 the next date of hearing.

The lab authorities had also approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court demanding that the Vigilance Bureau be restrained from conducting raids and release the machine and records seized illegally. The High Court has also fixed July 3 as the next date of hearing.

New Delhi, July 1

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh is scheduled to visit Ladakh on Friday to take stock of India’s military preparedness in the wake of a bitter border stand-off with the Chinese troops in the region, government sources said.

To be accompanied by Chief of Army Staff Gen M M Naravane, it will be the Defence Minister’s first visit to Ladakh after the stand-off between the two armies began on May 5.

During his visit, Singh will carry out a comprehensive review of the security situation in the region with Gen Naravane, Northern Army Commander Lt Gen Yogesh Kumar Joshi, Commander of the 14 Corps Lt Gen Harinder Singh and other senior Army officials, sources said.

The visit is also aimed at boosting morale of the Army personnel engaged in the seven-week bitter border faceoff with the Chinese troops in the region, sources added.

The Army Chief visited Ladakh on June 23 and 24 during which he held a series of meetings with senior Army officials and visited various forward areas in eastern Ladakh. Gen Naravane earlier visited Leh on May 22.

The Indian and Chinese armies are locked in a standoff position at multiple locations in eastern Ladakh for the last seven weeks. The tension escalated manifold after 20 Indian soldiers were killed in a violent clash in Galwan Valley on June 15.

The Chinese side also suffered casualties but it is yet to give out the details.

The Defence Minister’s visit to the region comes in the midst of India significantly ramping up the number of troops and weaponry along the Line of Actual Control(LAC) in the Eastern Ladakh region.

Following the Galwan valley clashes, the Army has sent thousands of additional troops to forward locations along the border besides moving in heavy weapons.

The IAF has also moved air defence systems as well as a sizeable number of its frontline combat jets and attack helicopters to several key air bases.

On Tuesday, the Indian and Chinese armies held the third round of Lt General-level talks during which both sides agreed on the need for an “expeditious, phased and stepwise” de-escalation as a “priority” to end the standoff.

However, military sources did not give any indications of early resolution of the standoff, and said it may continue till winters.

The process of disengagement along the LAC is “complex”, sources said but added that the 12-hour discussions on Tuesday reflected the commitment of both sides to reduce tensions in the region.

The Tuesday talks took place on the Indian side of the LAC in Chushul sector in eastern Ladakh.

The Indian delegation at the meeting was headed by 14 Corps Commander Lt Gen Singh while the Chinese side was led by the Commander of the Tibet Military District Major General Liu Lin.

It was the third senior military commander level engagement to discuss issues related to disengagement at the faceoff sites along the LAC and de-escalation in the border areas.

In the previous two rounds of talks, the Indian side demanded immediate withdrawal of Chinese troops from various areas in the region.

Following the Galwan Valley incident, the government has given the armed forces “full freedom” to give a “befitting” response to any Chinese misadventure along the LAC, the 3,500-km de-facto border, sources said.

The first round of the Lt General talks was held on June 6 during which both sides finalised an agreement to disengage gradually from all the standoff points beginning with Galwan Valley.

However, the situation deteriorated following the Galwan valley clashes as the two sides significantly bolstered their deployments in most areas along the LAC.

The situation in eastern Ladakh deteriorated after around 250 Chinese and Indian soldiers were engaged in a violent face-off on May 5 and 6. The incident in Pangong Tso was followed by a similar incident in north Sikkim on May 9. PTI

Arun Joshi

Tribune News Service

Jammu, July 2

Pakistan army on Thursday refuted all the reports suggesting that it had inducted additional troops in PoJK and Gilgit-Baltistan to ally with China to open a two-front situation, with India already facing a tense standoff with Chinese troops in Eastern Ladakh. However, the Pakistan army’s denials are being taken with a pinch of salt by the border people who have witnessed movement of troops on the other side.

At these places LoC is mostly demarcated by rivers, which are seven to 20 feet wide. The border residents can watch each and every movement on the other side of the Neelum river, which at places is just three to four metre wide.

These reports had caused consternation on the borders, particularly in the Gurez Valley and other areas facing Neelum district of Pakistan occupied Jammu and Kashmir and also in Ladakh where Gilgit-Baltistan lies just across the LoC.

Pakistan had used these areas as launching pads to help its troops intrude into the Himalayan heights in Ladakh ahead of the Kargil war in the summer of 1999.

In the first response to the reports carried mostly by the Indian news channels since Wednesday, Director General of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Major General Babar Iftikhar termed them as “false”.

“News circulating in Indian electronic and social media claiming additional deployment of Pakistan army troops along Line of Control in Gilgit-Baltistan and alleged use of Skardu airbase by China is false, irresponsible and far from truth,” said Major General Babar Iftikhar.

Continuing with his assertion that no additional deployment is being made, the DG ISPR, the designated official spokesperson for the armed forces of Pakistan, tweeted, “No such movement or induction of additional troops has taken place”. He went on to chastise the reports by saying, “We also vehemently deny presence of Chinese troops in Pakistan.”

Notwithstanding denial by the Pakistan army, the fact is that there are PLA troops in Gilgit-Baltistan and they maintain security of the projects being set up or run by the Chinese companies. This is factual position since 2009, which was widely reported by the Western media that time.