RK Saboo

Recently, it was reported that the Army might allow young citizens who want to experience Army life — for a short period, not as a career — to join the force for three years as part of a model ‘Tour of Duty’. The Army would benefit by getting young manpower and the young recruits would have the chance to imbibe the Army’s ethos of discipline and dedication. This was refreshing news in these gloomy times, and kindled my interest and memories.

I visited South Korea in 1988. I was in a metered taxi in Seoul. In the middle of the journey, the driver stopped and demanded double the fare, otherwise he wouldn’t move. I had to pay. Another day, walking, I lost the way to my hotel. I asked a policeman for help; no help until I greased his palm. Such was the rampant corruption in Korea, but when I went there again in 2015, I was amazed how things had changed. I was in a taxi and by mistake, the driver took a wrong route. Realising this, he stopped the meter, found the right route to my hotel and refused to accept any fare. The police and young people in particular were extremely polite and helpful. I asked my Korean friends what caused the change. I learnt that much of it was due to the new policy requiring all young men to join the military for two-three years (for women it was optional). This instilled discipline, loyalty and responsibility. No wonder Korea developed fast.

Another example is of Switzerland. The country has not fought war since long, but they have a superbly organised army. Army service is obligatory for young men for about two years, with short refresher courses later (for which their employers continue to pay salary). Interestingly, most Swiss find it useful for their self-development. A Swiss business associate told me that many of the friends he made during army service were top corporate leaders and professionals today.

A survey has indicated that out of the participating countries, 56 require mandatory military service in some form, while 109 have no conscription rules. In India, opinions drawn from corporate leaders show that they would prefer employing individuals who have had some military experience. By opting for the ‘Tour of Duty’, young people will become more employable, besides experiencing the adventure of the Army and the unique pride of the uniform.

The internship can also be extended to all who have passed class XII. It should be a paid internship. Besides training in physical fitness, survival techniques, self-defence and introduction to firearms, some manual vocational skills should be taught. It can be dove-tailed into the Skill India campaign.

The interns will imbibe attention to detail and the importance of achieving goals. The Army also symbolises ‘unity in diversity’. I heard a TEDx talk by Capt Raghu Raman in which he spoke of how in the Army he learned to drink and wash and shave with colleagues from a common mug, no matter what their religion or caste. These are priceless life lessons.

The Diamer-Bhasha dam project is in Gilgit-Baltistan, which is ethnically closer to Kargil district of Ladakh. Its political context is constricting as China and Pakistan are connected through the Karakoram highway that traverses through the region. Its control lies with the federal government.

Luv Puri

Journalist and author

Pakistan has decided to go ahead with the 450 MW Diamer-Bhasha dam in the Gilgit-Baltistan area on the Indus river. Diamer-Bhasha dam is being jointly constructed by a Chinese state-run firm and a commercial entity of Pakistan’s military. A slew of infrastructural projects being pursued by China and Pakistan in the region, including the dam, are taking place in the context of reinforcement of the federal government’s impulse to continue the old structures of control and micro-management.he 1960 Indus Waters Treaty stipulated that the waters of the three eastern rivers — Ravi, Beas and Sutlej — would be made available for unrestricted use by India. The waters of the three western rivers — Indus, Jhelum and Chenab — were allowed to flow for unrestricted use by Pakistan, except for limited use by India such as generation of hydroelectric power from run-of-the-river plants. India and Pakistan have built dams on either side of the Line of Control. On the Chenab, India has built Salal, Baglihar and Dul Hasti, whereas Kishanganga is built on the Jhelum.

While inaugurating the Diamer-Bhasha dam, PM Imran Khan implicitly invoked the Mangla dam on the Jhelum and the Tarbela dam on the Indus as the other two big dams constructed by Pakistan. Along with the Tarbela dam in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, Mangla dam in PAJK was financed through the World Bank (WB) established Indus Basin Development Fund. The fund was set up mainly to allow Pakistan to compensate for its water losses because of the World Bank treaty and build replacement irrigation capacities and harness electricity. An American consortium of eight firms constructed the dam in 1967 with reportedly more than 50 per cent funding coming from US sources. As per an estimate, the construction involved nearly 4,500 expatriates and 9,000 Pakistani workers.

The construction of that dam fulfilled its mandate though leaving behind a litany of local grievances that have become part of the community’s institutionalised memory. The dam halted all agricultural activity along the river Jhelum and led to displacement on a wide scale of more than 81,000 people. On a field trip to Mirpur in 2006, the locals lamented to this writer the loss of historical sites, including a temple, as the old town was submerged due to the dam reservoir. The dam led to a second wave of migration from Mirpur area to the UK.

In the first wave around the first quarter of the 20th century, many Mirpuris had earlier settled down in the UK after working as coal stokers for the British steamships. During the second wave, the British government had originally granted 400 work permits, though family ties enabled the migrants to grow manifold in the years to come. Consequently, Mirpuris and their descendants are one of the largest South Asian communities in the UK. A smaller segment also lives in the Midwood area of Brooklyn borough of New York city. With agricultural fields lost for perpetuity, fluctuating foreign remittances have become a financial lifeline for the locals.

The displacement fuelled an already festering political movement as the locals questioned the official claim that PAJK, called ‘Azad Kashmir’ in Pakistan, is an independent entity. In actual practice, the powers are less than those granted to the Pakistani provinces. Several of its local leaders, most prominently, late Abdul Khaliq Ansari, spent several years in Pakistan’s jails for questioning official duplicity. In the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century, a section of the Mirpuri community leaders protested whenever representatives of the Pakistani government came to Britain. An Anti-Mangla Dam Committee was formed in the UK. Apart from apparent mismanaged relief and rehabilitation, Mirpuris allege that they have to suffer far more electricity cuts in contrast to neighbouring Punjab province.

Coming to Gilgit-Baltistan, ethnically closer to Kargil district of Ladakh, the displacement due to the proposed dam will be far less as compared to Mangla dam on account of sparse population. Nevertheless, the political context in which the construction will take place is even more constricting. China and Pakistan are connected through the Islamabad-Kashgar-Karakoram highway that traverses through the region. The 1949 Karachi agreement signed between the Muslim Conference-led PAJK and Pakistan government separated the region from PAJK and gave direct control of the region to the federal government.

In March 1999, the Supreme Court of Pakistan had ordered that the Northern Areas be given the same political, economic and administrative rights as given to the other provinces of Pakistan. Northern Areas Council, an executive body of the region, became the legislative council, though the elected deputy chief remained subservient to the chief secretary, appointed by the federal government. The chief executive of the council was the Islamabad-based Federal Minister for Kashmir affairs and Northern Areas.

A confusion has marked Pakistan’s international position on the region. In 2006, Pakistan’s ambassador to Belgium, Mohammad Sayeed Khalid, stated that the Northern Areas was a part of Pakistan and therefore the United Nations resolutions, giving the people of Jammu and Kashmir the right to decide between India and Pakistan, didn’t apply to the region. The diplomat’s response came in response to the Emma Nicholson report on J&K, which was presented to the European Parliament. The report had raised the issue of lack of constitutional rights for the people of Northern Areas. On August 29, 2009, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani announced political reforms in Northern Areas and renamed the region as Gilgit-Baltistan. A legislative assembly was created with the post of chief minister to spread the notion that the region is governed by locals.

In 2018, a committee headed by Sartaj Aziz had recommended the abolition of Islamabad-based Gilgit-Baltistan council. The launch of the dam came in the backdrop of a reversal of decision to loosen control as the new government decided to retain the council which is headed by the Pakistan PM. In June this year, after the completion of a five-year term of the assembly, PM Imran Khan appointed a caretaker CM, a retired police officer. The elections have been postponed as the voter lists are apparently incomplete.

Lt Gen Harwant Singh (Retd)

The word ‘jugaad’ typically conveys a somewhat ad hoc and ingenious effort to make defective machinery or any other undertaking moving again, or muddle along. While this mode and method of setting right anything defective may be in use, to some extent, elsewhere in the world, it is universally adopted in India.

Many Indians lean heavily on ‘jugaad’, and though it is largely viewed as an ability to innovate and improvise, there are those who feel ‘such shoddiness’, as they put it, harms quality control in the long run.

During Exercise Brass Tacks, I as the defending commander had a frontage of 120 km to cover and the opposing force had 15 armoured regiments (675 tanks). To block such a large force, besides much else, I required the front to be covered with anti-tank mines. To lay mines manually on a frontage as large as that was impossible. One required mechanical minelayers and the Army had none.

Prior to the exercise, we were training in Rajasthan, where I saw unusually large farm machinery lying for repair at a workshop. I asked the mechanic if he could fabricate mine-laying equipment for us. I explained to him that anti-tank mines would be carried in a large vehicle from where the mine would be manually lowered into a “shoot” and these should land in the deep furrow. The same would be covered with earth dug out of the furrow.

The fabricated equipment would be fitted below a jeep trailer, which would be towed by this big vehicle. He seemed to fully understand the requirement. A dummy mine and a jeep trailer were left with him.

In four days flat, his fabrication was ready. He had also made a provision to adjust the equipment for sandy, hard and semi-hard ground. The trailer with the contraption under it was attached to a Tatra vehicle. The equipment laid the mines perfectly well.

Army Chief General Sundarji was requested to see the equipment. He came with Arun Singh, then Deputy Defence Minister. Both, in turn, sat in the jeep trailer to see as to how the equipment worked. It was indeed a funny sight to see them lean over to look at the mine-laying process. Developing a mechanical minelayer by a wayside mechanic was indeed a remarkable achievement and part of the great Indian ‘jugaad’.

This does establish the simple fact that there is no dearth of innovation and talent in India. What is required is to impart the right technical education, encouragement and creation of appropriate facilities for ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’.

Local resources in Ladakh are restricted due to the limitations of weather and terrain. Requirements for consumption rise due to the deployment of military and paramilitary forces. Therefore, all stores for survival and operations are met by stocks from the plains. Forecasting and demand consolidation is an ongoing process which starts well in advance at all levels.

Lt Gen Balbir Singh Sandhu (Retd)

Former Director General of Army Supplies & Transport

A lot has been written about the Galwan valley and the Pangong lake and the intricacies of operations in such difficult areas in Ladakh. There is no doubt that sheer survival in high-altitude areas is a big challenge, to conduct operations in such a terrain is like pushing even fit and acclimatised soldiers to the ultimate limits of the human body’s tolerance. For a citizen to understand how it feels, one must go for a holiday to a well-connected place like Leh, which is not even located in a difficult area. It has been experienced that many tourists spend their holiday in hospitals or their rooms, even in Leh, because they cannot withstand the rarefied atmosphere to go for local sightseeing, such are the challenges imposed by nature in this terrain. Imagine the tenacity and stamina, both physical and mental, of those officers and soldiers who recaptured the Kargil heights in 1999. We can only express our gratitude to them by saluting them every time we think of the Kargil War and the Galwan valley incident and other such operations undertaken by the Indian Army.

One issue which has escaped attention during this period, especially in the media, is the complexity of maintaining the supply chain to provide operational logistics support to the troops fighting in such difficult areas. It is a fact that Ladakh is connected to the rest of the country only by road and air, the road being closed for better part of the year. In fact, the road is open for about four months only during which period, logistics for the entire year are required to be built up for all items of survival and war fighting. The condition of the road deteriorates immensely, having stayed under snow for most part of the year.

Hence, driving heavy vehicles is not only dangerous and risky, but needs high level of skills. Within Ladakh, each sub-sector has different terrain imperatives and some posts are accessible only on foot or by animal transport for a very limited period during which logistics echelons carry out the advance winter stocking (AWS) to last for the whole year besides some reserves for unforeseen operational requirements or natural calamities.

It is also a fact that local resources available in Ladakh are extremely restricted due to the limitations of weather and terrain. Requirements for consumption become even more due to the deployment of military and paramilitary forces to meet the national security requirements. Therefore, all stores for survival and conducting operations are met by stocks coming from the plains. Since the period for the induction of these stocks into the sector is limited after the snow melts, there is a requirement to forecast the demand for all stores in great detail and procure them well in time in the plains so that they can be inducted in a systematic manner once the road opens. Forecasting and demand consolidation is an ongoing process which starts well in advance at all levels. Procurement has to keep in mind that perishables are not procured too early, lest their shelf life should expire before the road opens the next year. This factor also decides the sequence of pushing forward the items during the road open period. The quantum of stocks required at each location depends on the duration it is likely to be cut off and is worked out in terms of number of days converted into gross quantities for each item, howsoever insignificant it may appear. There is a well-oiled machine which involves the forward most post to the Army headquarters in which the demand moves backwards to Delhi and the stocks go forward to the posts through the intermediary channel of logistics in a very smooth manner.

During the ‘Road open period’ as it is popularly known, the collective effort up the chain comes into effect. This is the period during which items ranging from ration, engineering stores, weapons and equipment, clothing, medical stores, ammunition and vehicles, to name a few, need to be inducted into the sector. The range of items required is vast. Fuel requirements, including kerosene for heating purposes, are colossal. It moves up in bulk lorries which must refill it into barrels and jerricans for the forward areas. Effort has been made to reduce the carbon footprint by utilising non-conventional sources of energy, but the quantum required is still substantial. It is interesting to note that the modes of transport are as varied as goods trains from the hinterland to the railhead to load carrying vehicles in the hilly areas followed by mules/local ponies and at times, civilian porters for the last kilometre connectivity. The entire supply chain works in unison right from the hinterland to the forward areas on ‘Seek and support’ or ‘Push model’ of replenishment, setting extremely high standards of professionalism and supply chain management. Failure or under-performance of the supply chain in such sensitive areas is not acceptable under any circumstances. Hence, the model followed is ‘Just in case’ which translates to high assurance levels and reserves unlike the corporates who adopt ‘Just in time’ model of logistics, risking assurance for the economy.

Formation commanders in such areas personally monitor the progress of AWS and the stock build-up, because not only are operational logistics important for survival and war fighting by the troops, they act as great morale booster. The soldiers need to be given a feeling of being cared for by their leaders and that is what differentiates a professional force like the Indian Army from the rest. Operational logistics in difficult areas like high altitude or deserts will often dictate the size of the forces that can be deployed in operations because deployment of forces may be easier than sustaining them through the anticipated period of operations.

t’s now clear that this stand-off with China will continue till winter. For that, we need to equip a force level five times that in Siachen. It would also require a shift in focus from being Pak-centric to at least be equally balanced when facing threats from two fronts. China has built up Pak capabilities for such a time, to present us a two-front threat.

Maroof Raza

Strategic Affairs Analyst

There are some uncanny similarities between the Pakistani intrusions in the summer of 1999, on the northern half of the Line of Control (LoC) — commonly referred to as the Kargil sector — and the Chinese intrusions at multiple points along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) east of Ladakh this summer. But there’s also a big difference. The LoC was a marked and accepted boundary with Pakistan, and hence Pakistan’s intrusions were illegal. This gave India considerable international support. But regarding the LAC between India and China, New Delhi’s arguments are not

watertight, even though the world is still very much in India’s favour.

And while Pakistan’s intrusions in 1999 took place as troops withdrew in the winter months from the higher reaches of the LoC — as agreed — the Chinese took up their positions now when the Indian Army dropped its annual Op-Alert to check their deployments along the LAC, due to the overzealousness to follow the government’s guidelines on anti-Covid-19 measures. The Chinese, however, used this Indian lapse to build up considerable force levels opposite Indian positions on the LAC, and worse still, they intruded in areas that were traditionally not held, as every hilltop and valley isn’t held physically. The Chinese army is still holding on to most of their gains, regardless of the optimism among the apologists for the government.

But a similarity between the experiences of the Kargil conflict and the current Chinese intrusions is that our tools of gathering external intelligence haven’t delivered. Whether it is the ‘shepherds’ or satellites that the government’s well-funded intelligence bodies were banking on, they’ve either failed us, or those in charge of gathering these inputs have glossed over the inputs. Either way, our brave jawans have again paid with their lives.

And as was the case in the initial stages of the Kargil conflict, the swift use of PR by the intel agencies once again led to their friends in the media to blame the CDS and his lot, for the ‘intelligence lapse’ against the Chinese. A similar line was adopted by the shadowy men in our establishment when the Kargil surprise had raised the call for scapegoats, when the media went on to say ‘that the blame lay with the then Army chief for gross negligence of Pakistani build-up and intrusions.’ But the new appointment of CDS is not responsible for gathering external intelligence, even now. This has to come to the armed services from the multiple organisations there to gather and pass on their inputs. Otherwise, why have them? Two decades after the Kargil conflict, our commentators cannot still surely be arguing who must be responsible for gathering information from across our borders?

However, then (in 1999) and now, a bigger failure has been our inability to read or assess the intentions of our adversaries. In the current situation, it is now clear that neither those who are Mandarin speakers nor those who know the Chinese and their ways had fathomed what was on Beijing’s mind. More so, when the plainspeaking politician, George Fernandes, pointed a finger at the Chinese, as India’s Defence Minister in the mid-1990s, to say they presented a bigger threat to India, and not Pakistan. Some of us agreed with him then, and continued to say so, but the policy makers on Raisina Hill in Delhi had other illusions. But just as the Kargil shock had led to additional military deployments north of Kashmir and west of Ladakh — with the raising of a new corps in Leh and an additional army division added to it — the Chinese intrusions have led to the move of at least two extra divisions plus armour and mechanised forces along the LAC. Apparently, they will be there to stay, for the long haul.

While during the Kargil conflict, troops were rushed in to throw out the Pakistani intruders — with little time even for troops to acclimatise — then and now, there is also a similar situation of insufficient weapons and equipment for our frontline soldiers, though it wasn’t because of that the men of 16 Bihar had to resort to hand-to-hand fighting in the Galwan valley. In the Kargil conflict, our men fought against many odds to regain those icy heights, and fight they surely did. But the Chinese aren’t going to be a pushover, more so, unlike Pakistan in 1999 that was a divided house — between a much surprised Nawaz Sharif and an aggressive General Musharraf — Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Communist Party of China (CPC) have an aggressive agenda on multiple fronts in Asia.

But our armed forces do have many new weapon platforms now, to the credit of the NDA and UPA governments, from expensive fighter aircraft to long-range maritime drones and attack helicopters. While these fit more into the plans to show your muscle to the adversary with ‘military force multipliers’, a lesson from the Kargil conflict was the need to equip our infantrymen well to fight in those icy heights — and Aksai Chin too has tough high-altitude terrain — with air and artillery support on that hazardous front. It’s now clear that this stand-off with China will go into the winter months. For that, we need to equip a force level five times that we have in Siachen. It would also require us to shift the focus of our forces from being Pakistan-centric to at least be equally balanced when facing the threats from two fronts. China has built up Pakistan’s capabilities for precisely such a time, to present us the two-front threat.

More importantly, India must now quickly create two ‘strike corps’ by using the existing manpower better — since new resources may be hard to come by — with one each to be launched anywhere northwest of Nepal and east of Bhutan, to divide the attention of China’s western theatre command that’s responsible for their entire land borders with India. By using the multiple military commands facing China, India could spring many surprises, if the political order so desires. However, budgetary re-allocations will have to be made now (not next year) — to give these strike corps alpine equipment for a war in the high Himalayas — if the assertions of our ministers are anything to go by.

As we have seen until now, the initiatives adopted — diplomatic, economic and military — haven’t been effective enough. Are we running out of options because we have failed to learn lessons from the past? Is there a sense of a 1962 déjà vu? Perhaps to prevent that, our leaders may do well not to raise the rhetoric, because when the people’s expectations go up, then a nation can be driven into a conflict, the cost of which is always high.

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An aerial view of USS Nimitz, one of world’s largest air craft carriers. USS Nimitz’s joint exercise with the Indian Navy and the possible expansion of Malabar naval exercises will add to India’s strength(PTI)

A new low has been reached in the simmering United States (US)-China discord with the Donald Trump administration forcing the closure of the Chinese consulate in Houston, and Beijing vowing to retaliate at what it described as an “unprecedented escalation”. The foreign ministry in Beijing announced on July 22 that China planned to “react with firm countermeasures” if the Trump administration did not “revoke this erroneous decision.”

This unexpected US decision to raise the diplomatic heat on China comes in the wake of a US carrier strike group led by the nuclear-powered USS Nimitz exercising with warships of the Indian Navy’s eastern fleet on July 20 in the Indian Ocean. While this has been described as a routine “passex” (basic naval exercises when warships of two navies pass by each other in the oceans), the subtext points to a subtle demonstration of US-India partnership even as India and China are engaged in a slow disengagement process — which now appears to have hit a roadblock — after the Galwan incident.

As is now well-recognised, the altercation at Galwan in the Ladakh region of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), where the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops ambushed and killed 20 Indian soldiers, marked a different low point in the bilateral relationship between India and China. The template that framed Sino-Indian relations since 1993 and ensured an extended period of guarded “peace and stability” is no longer valid. Delhi is now exploring a new level of diplomatic mediation with layered military messaging.

The immediate objective for India is a return to the pre-Galwan status quo along LAC. It appears that PLA is unlikely to withdraw from the locations it has occupied and fortified in a swift and consensual manner. In reviewing other options, Delhi has revived certain naval/maritime possibilities and these include the likelihood of inviting Australia to join the India-US-Japan trilateral Malabar naval exercises towards the end of the year. This points to reviving the Quad — a group of four nations that came under one umbrella for the first time in the aftermath of the December 2004 tsunami.
It may be recalled that when India had mounted a Quad-plus Singapore five-nation naval exercise in 2007, China bristled at what it considered to be a latent threat. Delhi, then, chose to placate Beijing’s concerns by reverting to a bilateral Malabar with the US.

The abiding anxiety for China is what is referred to as the Malacca dilemma. This refers to Beijing’s perceived vulnerability in the Indo-Pacific given its enormous dependence on unimpeded merchant shipping, which is predicated on the freedom of the oceans and the sea-lines of communication.

One strand of this dependence is illustrated by the fact that in 2019, China imported an average of 10.1 million barrels of crude oil per day and most of this passes through the Malacca Strait. The vulnerability-leverage matrix can be suitably calibrated depending on the prevailing geopolitical context and Beijing is sensitive to this factor.
Consequently, Beijing has been seeking to mitigate this dilemma in various ways and an ambitious China-Iran strategic partnership is the latest initiative. It envisions a $400-billion Chinese investment in return for long-term hydrocarbon supplies and access to the Chabahar port. Along with Gwadar in Pakistan, this maritime connectivity and access, while ostensibly being part of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative project, will enhance Beijing’s footprint in a strategic location near the Persian Gulf. In summary, the Indian Ocean is being differently animated by China and the US in the main. India has to evolve a short-term and long-term maritime orientation that will enable Delhi to protect and advance core national interests.

This is where the presence of the USS Nimitz offers an insight into the suasive nature of the naval capability and the spectrum of options it can provide in managing the relationship with a bellicose China. The US, in recent days, has upped the ante against China in relation to the South China Sea (SCS), and termed Beijing’s actions as “unlawful” and reiterated its commitment to a “free and open Indo-Pacific”.

It is instructive that the USS Nimitz carried out a freedom of navigation patrol in the SCS before exercising with the Indian Navy and Beijing would be reading the tea leaves carefully. Astute application of military/naval capability can enhance diplomatic efficacy and India needs to acquire the requisite material capability and the partnership with the US has been useful. In an innovative use of naval platforms, the US-supplied P-8I maritime recce aircraft have been deployed along LAC for surveillance and points to maximising limited assets in unexpected exigencies.
India’s predicament is resource allocation for the military when the GDP is expected to shrink dramatically due to Covid-19. A focused strategic dialogue with the US and other Indo-Pacific nations that share both anxiety about China’s bellicosity, and an aspiration to realise a rule-based maritime order, may offer some policy options that could be pursued both individually and collectively.

For now, how Beijing will “retaliate” against the US whether in relation to the Houston consulate, or the joint naval exercise in the Indian Ocean, will offer some cues about the nature of the India-China relationship in its post-Galwan phase.