Indian troops “illegally crossed the Line of Actual Control on the southern bank of Pangong Tso and fired warning shots against patrolling Chinese forces,” Senior Colonel Zhang Shuili, a spokesman for the Western Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army, said in a statement Tuesday. Chinese troops were “forced to take countermeasures to stabilize the situation,” Zhang said, without elaborating.

“The Indian behavior has severely violated agreements reached between two sides and escalated tensions,” Zhang said, urging the Indians to withdraw. “Such behavior could easily lead to miscalculation. It is a serious military provocation.”

The latest dispute came just days after Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh and his Chinese counterpart, General Wei Fenghe, agreed to ease tensions after “frank and in-depth discussions” in Moscow. Pangong Tso is a glacial lake at 14,000 feet (4,300 meters) in the western reaches of the contested Kasmir area.

Chinese-Indian relations have soured over each other’s actions along the 3,488 kilometer (2,162 mile) Line of Actual Control. Multiple rounds of high-level military talks failed to end the months-long standoff.

Both India and China have moved thousands of troops, tanks, artillery guns and fighter jets close to the border since their standoff began in May.- Bloomberg

Also read: How Indian Army foiled China’s move to push 1,000 soldiers into Pangong Tso’s south bank

New Delhi: Union Minister of State for Youth Affairs and Sports Kiren Rijiju Sunday confirmed that the Army in Arunachal Pradesh has approached the Chinese military about the alleged abduction of five Indians Friday from near the border between the two countries.

Rijiju is one of the two Lok Sabha MPs from Arunachal Pradesh, and is also the MoS, Minority Affairs.

Rijiju said in a tweet Sunday that the Indian Army had already sent a hotline message to its People’s Liberation Army counterparts at the border point, and is awaiting a response.

The Army has also confirmed it has made the approach.

Usually, the hotlines are available at the brigade commanders’ level, and are used when a military commander wants to clarify or convey any point of concern to the military commander across the border.

Also read: Indian Army rescues 3 stranded Chinese nationals in North Sikkim amid LAC tensions

The incident

Five men belonging to the Tagin community had gone hunting in a forest in the Nacho area of Upper Subansiri district close to the India-China border, and were allegedly kidnapped by the PLA from the Sera-7 patrolling area of the Army.

Two others who were part of the group had managed to escape and report the matter to the Arunachal Pradesh Police, who are currently probing the matter.

This is not the first such incident that has come to light. Earlier this year, 21-year-old Togley Sinkam was abducted at gunpoint by the Chinese military from the Asapila sector of near the McMahon Line. He was released by the PLA after 19 days.

Tensions running high

Army sources confirmed that tensions are running high at the eastern sector in Arunachal Pradesh, and additional troops have been deployed at the forward locations, in the wake of the fresh tensions with China at the Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh last week.

No transgression or confrontation has, however, been reported so far between the two sides in the eastern sector.

Also read: All about Special Frontier Force, the secretive Indian unit in news after Ladakh clash

New Delhi: On the night of 28 August, China had attempted to move in over 1,000 soldiers to capture territory on the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control, near the southern bank of Pangong Tso, ThePrint has learnt.

However, the attempt was thwarted by a combination of an alert surveillance system and troops specialising in mountain warfare, who raced against time and managed to outflank the Chinese and dominate several heights, giving India strategic hold over Reqin Pass and Spanggur Gap in the hills in the Chushul sector.

Sources in the defence and security establishment described the Indian move as a “precautionary deployment”, and underlined repeatedly that the forces had not crossed the LAC, even though inputs said ‘Black Top’ across the LAC was also a scene of action.

ThePrint had reported earlier that Indian troops had to resort to “tactical warnings” to the incoming Chinese soldiers to dissuade them.

Also read: India is being responsible but don’t doubt our ability to defend, Rajnath tells China

How the events unfolded

Sources said at about 11 pm on 28 August, an Indian surveillance team first noticed the movement of some Chinese armoured personnel carriers (APCs) in Moldo.

This was followed by drone surveillance, and the People’s Liberation Army troops’ movement indicated they were going towards the LAC, and to a specific feature. Sources refused to identify the feature, citing operational reasons.

They said at this moment, specialised Indian units raced for the heights and dominated them — going even quicker than what had been worked out when multiple scenarios were being studied.

Then, it was noticed that the Chinese soldiers were carrying equipment meant to set up holding positions. This is when the Chinese were given the first tactical warning, and they stopped.

Realising that the Indians had understood their tactics, the Chinese called in additional vehicles as back up, so the Indian side issued additional warnings to dissuade them. “They realised the Indians meant business,” a source said.

“In total, 40 to 50 vehicles were there, including APCs. Each vehicle is believed to have 30-40 PLA personnel. So, the Chinese were easily over 1,000 strong,” the source said.

India then decided to dominate more hill tops in the area, and ended up doing just that over 50 km of unoccupied territory. Soldiers of the Mountain Strike Corps and a specialised elite unit raced for the passes, and dominated them with back up provided by certain other fighting arms.

Sources said specialised teams had already been deployed in the area in wake of the crisis that began in May, and were acclimatised and aware of the terrain and different routes to be taken. These troops specialise in carrying out covert operations behind enemy lines.

Around the same time, Nyima Tenzin, a Tibetan-Indian from the elite covert paramilitary unit Special Frontier Force (SFF), stepped on a 1962-vintage anti-personnel mine and was killed in action. His last rites were conducted Monday.

Also read: All about Special Frontier Force, the secretive Indian unit in news after Ladakh clash

New Delhi: The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) Monday successfully test-fired the Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV), making India the fourth country in the world after the US, China and Russia to develop such technology.

Monday’s test, carried out from Abdul Kalam Island (formerly Wheeler Island) off the coast of Odisha, came a year after the DRDO had first tested the futuristic technology. But it had not met all the parameters then.

The successful test Monday will pave the way for missiles that can travel at six times the speed of sound. India will reportedly make its first hypersonic missile in the next five years.

ThePrint delves into what the HSTDV means for India, and which hypersonic and other missiles are available to major militaries across the world.

What does test firing of HSTDV mean for India? 

The HSTDV is an unmanned scramjet demonstration aircraft for hypersonic speed flight. Hypersonic flight means a speed greater than five times the speed of sound (Mach 5).

Apart from being used as a vehicle for hypersonic and long-range cruise missiles, the HSTDV is a dual-use technology that will have multiple civilian applications, including the launch of small satellites at low cost.

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh tweeted that the HSTDV used the indigenously developed scramjet propulsion system, which is an improvement over the Ramjet engines which work efficiently at supersonic speeds of around Mach 3 (three times the speed of sound).

The DRDO said Monday’s test also demonstrated capabilities for highly complex technology that will serve as the building block for NextGen Hypersonic vehicles in partnership with industry.

Hypersonic nuclear missiles

Hypersonic missiles travel at speeds faster than 3,800 miles per hour or 6,115 km per hour, much faster than other ballistic and cruise missiles. They can deliver conventional or nuclear payloads within minutes.

They are highly manoeuvrable and do not follow a predictable arc as they travel. They are said to combine the speed of ballistic missiles with the manoeuvring capabilities of cruise missiles. The speed makes them hard to track compared to traditional missile tech.

In March this year, the United States announced it had successfully tested an unarmed prototype of a hypersonic missile.

According to reports, China and Russia are also vigorously pursuing hypersonic weapons, though Russia is reportedly not developing or considering them for use with a nuclear warhead.

In July, Russian President Vladimir Putin said his country’s Navy vessels would be armed with hypersonic nuclear strike weapons and underwater nuclear drones, which, he said, are in the final phase of testing.

Also read: Hypersonic nuclear weapons Russian Navy is getting and why they are unrivalled

Cruise and ballistic missiles

A cruise missile either locates its target or has a preset target. It navigates using a guidance system — such as inertial or beyond visual range satellite GPS guidance — and comprises a payload and aircraft propulsion system.

Cruise missiles can be launched from land, sea or air for land attacks and anti-shipping purposes, and can travel at subsonic, supersonic and hypersonic speeds.

Since they stay relatively close to the surface of the earth, they cannot be detected easily by anti-missile systems, and are designed to carry large payloads with high precision.

Ballistic missiles, meanwhile, are launched directly into the upper layers of the earth’s atmosphere. They travel outside the atmosphere, where the warhead detaches from the missile and falls towards a predetermined target. They are rocket-propelled self-guided weapons systems which can carry conventional or nuclear munitions. They can be launched from aircraft, ships and submarines, and land.

ICBMs

Intercontinental ballistic missiles or ICBMs are guided missiles which can deliver nuclear and other payloads.

The Federation of American Scientists is quoted as saying that ICBMs have a minimum range of 5,500 km, with maximum ranges varying from 7,000 to 16,000 km.

Only a handful of countries, including Russia, United States, China, France, India and North Korea, have ICBM capabilities.

In 2018, India successfully test-fired nuclear-capable ballistic missile Agni-V, with a strike range of 5,000 km, from the Abdul Kalam Island.

Anti-satellite missiles

Anti-satellite missiles (ASAT) can incapacitate or destroy satellites for strategic military purposes. Several nations possess operational ASAT systems.

Other anti-satellite weapons include ground-based jammers to disrupt the signal from navigation and communications satellites.

The United States, Russia, and China are among countries pursuing anti-satellite weapons.

India had successfully test fired an ASAT on 27 March last year, knocking off one of its own satellites 300 km in space.

DRDO chairman G. Satheesh Reddy had ruled out future ASAT missile tests in the lower Earth orbit, but hinted at keeping the options open for possible experiments in higher orbits.

Also read: China has a super weapon the world must beware of — an electromagnetic railgun

China’s moves in Ladakh and the South China Sea are based on a historical construct. If a Green Line crafted in 1960 by then paramount leader Mao Zedong is the People’s Liberation Army’s objective in Ladakh, it is the 9, 10 or 11 dash line (depending on political convenience; the concept has dubious historical basis in the Sino-French war) that is the target of the Red army in South China Sea.

The PLA’s main enemy in the South China Sea is a competing super-power, the US, which is backing Taiwan, even as the members of the ASEAN look the other way. Its adversary in Ladakh, adjoining sensitive and restive Tibet and Xinjiang, is a rising power, India whose neighbours Have all become increasingly cozy with Beijing in recent years .

Although the ambitious western theatre commander of PLA, Zhao Zongqi, portrayed the Indian Army as an aggressor or a war monger after Monday’s clash at the Rezang La — Rechin La ridgeline, the fact is that Indian troops are only preventing the Chinese from reach their outrageous Green Line claim in the south of Pangong Tso. The Indian Army did the same on August 29-30, and at the same spot. It is quite evident that there is a short-term and a long-term context to the latest clash, both of which are familiar to commanders on the ground.

Also read: India refutes China’s LAC allegation, says Chinese soldiers fired in the air

Clearly, the latest PLA aggression is aimed at teaching the Indian Army a lesson for using the Special Frontier Force, largely comprising Tibetans-in-exile, on the front line in the August clash. What has upset Beijing the most is that the sacrifice of a Tibetan SFF JCO Nyima Tenzin in the battle on August 29-30, something that has become a rallying point for Tibetans all over the world and sparked a new life to the resistance against the Chinese occupation of the region. To make matters worse, the SFF proved its worth in high mountainous terrain.

However, the long term objective of China is to destabilize India by putting continuous pressure along the 3488 km Line of Actual Control (LAC), fully knowing its impact on Indian polity and on the image of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. On August 12, 2013, Shyam Saran, a China expert and then Chairman of National Security Advisory Board, submitted a report to the Prime Minister’s Office that PLA had grabbed more than 640 square kilometres of land in Ladakh by first denying India patrolling rights, and then occupying the territory by advancing the perceived LAC. Saran mentioned that the loss of territory was in Depsang, Chumar and Pangong Tso and pointed out that after the April-May 2013 PLA incursions, Indian troops could not patrol four points (10 to 13) in Depsang Bulge. The Saran report said that PLA had built a road to Raki nullah in the Depsang plains, and taken 70 km of territory in Pangong Tso over the previous months. This leaves the Narendra Modi government no option but to militarily contest the PLA nibbling of the LAC or lose political equity by ceding territory to Communist China.

India is facing a triple whammy from China. First, its economy has shrunk 23 per cent in first quarter due to the coronavirus pandemic that originated in Wuhan, China. Second, the economic cost of putting the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force on war-like alert with emergency purchases is significant and mounting each day. It is quite evident that the Chinese economy can afford this deployment, and Beijing would like to tire out the Indian Army and economically bleed India till such time status quo ante is restored in Ladakh. The PLA is an expert in tiring out the enemy since the Korean war. Third, the country it is using its all-weather ally Pakistan to provoke India on the Line of Control (LOC) through cross-border firing and terrorist infiltration. Had it not been for umbilical ties between India and the Nepalese army, Beijing may have well been successful in activating a fourth dimension to bleed India.

While the PLA’s attention is today diverted on two fronts with the US activating the Indo-China front, with Australia and Japan, India will feel more military pressure in Ladakh should the US position change after the country’s presidential elections in November. Europe is still to understand the rise of China, which has close economic ties with EU powerhouse Germany. The big picture for India appears to be grim at the moment in context of China but the country will be in pole position if it can ride over this round of Chinese checkers.

The main connectivity with Ladakh, instead of through the Kashmir valley, should now be via Himachal Pradesh. To that end, the existing road via Kullu-Manali needs to be double-laned and work on tunnels across all the three passes along this route should be fast-tracked. The extension of the railway line from Joginder Nagar to Leh should be expedited and the line from Shimla be extended to Keylong.

Lt Gen Harwant Singh (retd)

Former Deputy Chief of Army Staff

China’s moves in eastern Ladakh point to a definite purpose and are part of its penchant for long-term planning, more so for this vital region. The road linking Tibet with Xinjiang runs through Aksai Chin for 167 km and the road recently built by India, connecting Leh with Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO), can facilitate a quick build-up of forces in this part of Ladakh and consequently, gives India the capability to take back Aksai Chin. Such an action by India can terminate China’s link with Xinjiang. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) are initially linked to this road to Xinjiang. CPEC later passes through PoK as well. Such an apprehension by China was perhaps heightened by the Indian Home Minister stating in Parliament that India will take back Aksai Chin and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK).

It would be reasonable to assume that China’s moves in the Pangong Tso, Galwan Valley, Hot Spring and Depsang plain, and more recently, south of Pangong Tso are consequent to this apprehension that India may at some future date make an attempt to capture Aksai Chin with all its drastic consequences for China. These moves by China in the Galwan sector etc give it the ability to intercept the Leh-DBO road and stall such an action by India. Therefore, the ongoing stand-off in the region may continue indefinitely.

Considering China’s possible hope, that at some future date, the state of J&K may fall into the lap of Pakistan, it will then be possible to run CPEC through it and that would substantially reduce the distance for the economic corridor between the two countries. Else, China, at some point, may attempt to take the Karakoram Pass, and run both the BRI and CPEC across it and beyond through the Shaksgam Valley; essentially to shorten the distance for BRI and CPEC, but more so for the latter.

Here onwards, what is likely to happen in Ladakh is going to be somewhat similar to what happened at Doklam, where China has constructed a road up to almost where they had come. China has also put up permanent structures and continues to occupy this Bhutanese territory. China is currently putting added pressure on Bhutan to occupy more of its territory.

In Ladakh, at best, China may follow the policy of two steps forwards and one step back. Equally, we may not have adequately deciphered China’s long-term plans for the Ladakh region.

While we need not dwell on a military solution to this intrusion into Indian territory, the possibility of China pulling back to pre-May 2020 positions through diplomatic efforts appear bleak. Efforts to delineate and mark the India-Tibet border through diplomatic parleys has made little headway all these years. India needs to consider where we are at a tactical advantage, to occupy areas across the LAC to later act as quid pro quo to make China vacate its ingresses in Ladakh.

In all probability, it is going to be a long haul, which seems to suit China.

The current state of deployment and maintaining these troops in this far-off region, over a long period, imposes a heavy financial burden on India, though it gives India the confidence that its supposedly strong leadership and the present state of its military is enough to stare China down and as such there is no immediate need to upgrade it. This is precisely what China would want India to continue believing.

With Ladakh being designated as union territory and a Chinese move into this area, there is a need to relook at the infrastructure required for better connectivity with this region. The main connectivity with Ladakh, instead of through the Kashmir valley, should now be through Himachal Pradesh. To that end, the existing road via Kullu-Manali needs to be double- laned and work on tunnels across all the three passes along this route should be fast-tracked.

The extension of the railway line from Joginder Nagar to Leh should be expedited and the railway line from Shimla be extended to Keylong to join the one from Joginder Nagar. The existing Kalka-Shimla road should be extended from Lasar to Demchok and then on to Upshi.

With this threat developing from China in the Ladakh region, and reports of a new set of roads being built opposite Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, and recent news of Chinese soldiers’ cellphone signals emanating from within a few kilometres of the Indian territory in Himachal Pradesh, there is perhaps a compelling requirement to rework the military infrastructure, particularly along the border with Tibet. When we had built the road to Lipulekh Pass, we should have occupied this pass. Equally, there is a need to reorganise the overall defence along this border, with capability for limited offensive at a number of places.

Considering the extent of border with Tibet and the type of terrain along it and the fact that it is not marked on the ground and does not have similar markings on the maps of both countries, it is possible that China’s ingress into Indian territory might have taken place at some other places as well. Therefore, there is the need to thoroughly check the ground situation along this long border. There is also the requirement to deploy additional surveillance resources and improve manning of this border.

For the present, China seems to be quite satisfied in having achieved its aim in letting India believe that its supposedly strong leadership and existing military capabilities are enough to deter China from taking any offensive against India and as such there is little requirement to upgrade these. This is what eminently suits China, as part of its long-term plans. At the other end, it carries the risk of India falling into this trap and continuing to neglect the imperatives of upgrading military capabilities.