New Delhi, July 7

Former Jammu & Kashmir Governor NN Vohra on Wednesday said the Galwan incident in June last year had shown that India must remain prepared as the Chinese meant business.

A bloody clash had ensued between the armies of India and China at Galwan along the Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh.

Several important steps have been taken in the past few years in terms of military preparedness, but the country needs a publicly known national security policy. —NN Vohra, former J&K Governor

Referring to the growing threat from China, Vohra said if nothing else, the neighbouring nation would attempt to keep “nibbling away, making India spend more on defence and keeping pressure on its economy and political system”.

The former J&K Governor, who remained the Defence Secretary from March 21, 1990, to April 6, 1993, was speaking at the launch of a book, “The Concept of Active Defence in China’s Military Strategy”, authored by Dr Amrita Jash, research fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), a think tank.

The book examines China’s national and core interests and the aspects of its implementation to assess China’s strategic intentions and the implications of its military capabilities.

Vohra said several important steps had been taken in the past few years in terms of military preparedness, but suggested that the country needed a publicly known national security policy. “From the policy will emerge a national security strategy, which will pave way for a military doctrine and it will lead to connectivity and integration of our three forces,” he said.

China, he said, had quietly built its economy and military strength. He said the Chinese were highly methodical and had spent 30 to 40 years building up a strong economy.

On ongoing debate on integrated theatre commands, the former J&K Governor said, “There is a long way to go.”

A proposal is being discussed to have 5 unified or theatre commands that will help in better planning & military response, and aim to have unified approach to fighting any future war.

New Delhi: India is in the process of carrying out the biggest military reforms it has ever seen — theaterisation.

The plan is to have five unified or theatre commands, which will help in better planning and military response, and aim to have a unified approach to fighting any future war.

However, the process, which is being led by Chief of Defence Staff Gen Bipin Rawat, has expectantly not been a smooth one — as military theorist and historian, Sir B.H. Liddell Hart, famously said: “The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get the old one out.”

Internal differences over the structure and scope of the theatre command came out in public last week with Gen Rawat terming the Indian Air Force as a “supporting arm” like the Artillery and the Engineers and the Air Chief Air Chief Marshal R.K.S. Bhadauria pointing out that there is much more to air power.

While the creation of theatre or unified commands was the decision of the government, CDS was mandated to bring it to fruition.

With various questions relating to structure, command and finer aspects remaining unanswered, a committee has now been set up on the orders of Defence Minister Rajnath Singh so all issues are completely thrashed out.

Here is everything you want to know about theaterisation and what India hopes to achieve from it.

Also read: PMO can help theatre command take off by finding a politician with defence background

Theaterisation has its origins in World War I

The dictionary meaning of a theatre of war is “the entire land, sea and air areas that is or may become involved directly in war operations”.

The word ‘theatre warfare’ became more prominent during World War II with the battles being fought across continents.

During World War 1 too, battles were fought across the world, but the major ones took place in what was then known as the European theatre.

In World War II, new theatres emerged with multiple fronts — Nordic Front, Western Front and Eastern Front. There was also the Pacific-Asian Theater, Africa and Middle East Theater.

These theatres referred to the geographical grounds of the battle and all deployments — army, navy and air force — happened accordingly in a unified manner.

Depending on what kind of operations was being undertaken, officers from specific services took over the command even though it was largely led by the Army.

As of now, almost all major countries like China, Russia, the US, the UK and France work on a theatre command concept. However, most of this theatre is based on its global outlook and part of their expeditionary character.

China is the latest entrant to a theatre concept and comes at a time when it has ambitions to play a larger role in the world.

Also read: Maritime Theatre Command could bring Coast Guard ships under its control

Why India seeks theatre commands

India currently has 19 military commands with 17 of them service-oriented. While both the Army and the Air Force have seven commands each, the Navy has three.

India also has a Tri-Service Command — Andaman and Nicobar Command — besides the Strategic Forces Command (SFC), which looks after the country’s nuclear stockpile.

The aim is to bring all the 17 individual commands into four or five unified or theatre commands. It might also have two more functional commands for training and logistics.

The rationale being this will help in better planning and military response and also bring down cost.

While the cost may go up in the immediate future since all theatres would have to be armed with sufficient systems, it will prove to be cost-effective in the long term as all acquisition will be a unified one.

The classic example for the perils of not having a unified approach to acquisition is the procurement of the Apache attack helicopters from the US. While the Indian Air Force got 22 Apaches, the Army has also placed orders for six of these choppers. The end result — loss of at least Rs 2,500 crore and haphazard operational planning.

The other aim is to have a unified approach to fighting the future wars. Sources said China’s theaterisation move has had an effect too.

“One thing that we can say about China is the uniformity in response, be it in the East or the Ladakh in the north. This is so because China’s Western Theater Command looks after the entire borders with India unlike us where we have multiple Commands and structures to respond with different officers at the helm,” the senior officer told ThePrint.

The need for a unified approach to war fighting was brought out in the deliberations after the 1999 Kargil battle.

The Kargil Review Committee and the then Group of Ministers besides the Naresh Chandra Committee had called for structural changes in higher defence management.

It was the Shekatkar committee, headed by Lt Gen. (retd) D.B. Shekatkar, which had recommended the creation of the post of CDS and theatre commands.

Until this committee, every other panel had only spoken about the need for unified planning.

While the Army and the Navy are on board on the issue of theatersisation, the IAF while supporting the move says there can’t be multiple theatres. They argue that a single theatre is what is needed.

Also read: What is Shekatkar report, defence ministry’s first order of business after lockdown

Theatre proposals

According to the current proposal that was discussed during last month’s meeting, there will be five theatres — Northern Land Theatre (Jammu and Kashmir, Ladakh and Central sector) Western Land Theatre (Pakistan centric), Eastern Land Theatre, Maritime Theatre Command, and Air Defence Command.

However, Gen Rawat Friday said the Northern Command will not see any change and will remain in its present form for the time being since it is operationally sensitive as it has China and Pakistan besides internal security to look after.

The first two that would be rolled out are Maritime Theatre Command (MTC) and Air Defence Command (ADC).

As reported earlier, the MTC will see a merger of the eastern and western naval commands, besides getting elements from the Army and the Air Force.

The MTC will be headed by a three-star Naval officer and will also have one two-star officer from the IAF and a three-star officer from the Army.

Similarly, the ADC will be headed by a three-star IAF officer, along with a three-star Army officer and a two-star Naval officer.

The other theatres planned will be headed by three-star Army officers with elements from the IAF and the Navy.

Also read: Expert panel to fine tune military theaterisation plan after stakeholders differ on key issues

Giving wings to his dreams: Adesh Parkash Singh Pannu of Tarn Taran got his primary education from a pvt school at his village

Adesh Parkash Singh Pannu

Gurbaxpuri

Tarn Taran, July 5

Son of a marginal farmer from Chaudhariwala village (Naushehra Pannuan) in Tarn Taran district has been commissioned as a Flying Officer in the Indian Air Force.

Adesh Parkash Singh Pannu is a student of NDA preparatory academy Nishan-e-Sikhi, Khadoor Sahib, Tarn Taran. He belongs to a marginal farming family. His father Amarbeer Singh Pannu serves in the SGPC and mother is a government schoolteacher. He got his primary education from a private school in the village. The proud father said: “My son is quite mature and had the zeal to serve the nation at a very young age. I have been proud of him and will always be.”

Colonel Kulbir Singh Puri, a retired group officer of the academy, said Adesh, apart from clearing his Class XII, was trained at Nishan-e-Sikhi Institute of Science and Training (NDA preparatory wing).

The 19-year-old boy was commissioned as a Flying Officer in the Indian Air Force during the combined graduation parade held at the Air Force Academy, Dundigal, on June 19.

Adesh cleared the NDA exam in March 2017 for the Air Force and joined the National Defence Academy, Khadakwasla, Pune, in May 2017 as course batch 138. The passing-out parade was held on May 30, 2020, after the completion of the three-year training.

He joined the Indian Air Force Academy, Dundigal, Hyderabad, Telangana, in June 2020, for further training, where he was commissioned as a Flying Officer. Nishan-e-Sikhi, Khadoor Sahib is being run under International Environmentalist Baba Sewa Singh, head of the Kar Sewa sect.

UPSC guidance at Nishan-e-Sikhi soon

Nishan-e-Sikhi, under the chairmanship of International Environmentalist Baba Sewa Singh, head of Kar Sewa sect, Khadoor Sahib, is going to start a preparatory centre for the civil services at Khadoor Sahib village with an aim to prepare students for the UPSC-related examinations.

Avtar Singh Bajwa, secretary of the institute, said the sect has been working in the field of education since 1970 with several educational institutions. Admissions to the course is going on and final date for the registration is July 11. Nishan-e-Sikhi also runs an NDA wing, from where 19 students were selected in the armed forces as officers. With the new initiative, the civil services aspirants will get the much-needed study material at their doorstep.

The furore over the latest arms procurement scandal in India — this time over the Rafale deal should have led to calls for greater indigenisation of the military industrial complex in the country
The furore over the latest arms procurement scandal in India — this time over the Rafale deal should have led to calls for greater indigenisation of the military industrial complex in the country. Unfortunately, we don’t prefer it. All that we prefer is politicking around the same. Why is there always a corruption cloud surrounding our deals with foreign countries? We should also remember that the problem is not foreign suppliers alone, but a defence marketplace where domestic industry produces low-quality weapons at great cost.
Excluding foreign sellers only reduces the number of players and externalises the problem; it does not stop corruption. As a rising power, India is better off buying technology rather than stealing it. It is better off inviting the world to participate in its rise than keeping the world outside and suspicious. There is a tremendous transparency in the country’s development in this aspect. India does not make the world suspicious at all. India also does not mind sacrificing its secrecy. What is required is reforming our procurement system rather than winnowing down the market.
Whenever India buys weapons from foreign suppliers it not only develops military capacity but also builds relationships with other key countries that facilitate its rise. In spite of this, it always throws up a question as to whether it knows that economic efficiency in the market and pricing does not hold good when we are talking about armaments. Weapons in the same category made by different manufacturers are not readily comparable, especially at the higher rungs of the technology ladder. There are too few sellers and even fewer buyers to make a truly competitive market.
Further, the value of a particular weapon-system in the context of a national security strategy is hard to calculate. As defence experts say, figuring out whether missiles or attack aircraft have greater utility is not that easy. India’s defence market faces these challenges and more. Apart from adopting their political stands, our leaders seem to be disconnected from national objectives when they talk of armed forces. We expect our services to define their threat perceptions and prepare for their wars.
To top it we have our service rivalries. Only during crisis time they seem to unite. The problem is exacerbated by the lack of military expertise in the political and bureaucratic class. Strangely our country has a scientific advisor to the Defence Ministry who is also a head of the military labs which means he is supposed to evaluate his own work. Moreover, these dysfunctions persist behind the trope of secrecy.
Closed-off organisations generally fail to innovate; little wonder that only three per cent of DRDO scientists and engineers have PhDs. Opening up the military research and weapons procurement process to public view would reduce the potential for corruption, and it would not be worse than the present glacial acquisition process. Indian defence badly needs reform, but the recommendations of several high-powered committees — including those headed by Arun Singh, Naresh Chandra and the irreplaceable K. Subrahmanyam (Kargil review) — remain ignored by several governments. Talking of corruption alone will not help. The sooner our Netas understand it, the better.

Wrong to claim that the IAF is a ‘mere supporting’ arm to the armed forces

Counterview: The IAF has categorically made it clear that it has very different views from those expressed by General Rawat (right). PTI

Manoj Joshi

There is considerable alarm in India’s strategic community as to whether the moves towards restructuring the armed forces to create theatre commands have been sufficiently thought through. A great deal of it arises from concerns that the man chosen to lead the task in 2017, Chief of Defence Staff Gen Bipin Rawat, has never really had the intellectual heft to handle it. He proved this spectacularly last week in declaring at a seminar that the Indian Air Force was merely ‘a supporting arm to the armed forces, just as artillery support or the engineer support the combatant arms in the Army.’

In one sentence, he negated the advances in warfighting that have taken place since World War II, and raised huge question marks about the intellectual underpinnings of the process he and his team are planning to put the Indian military through.

It doesn’t take a genius to know that the next conventional war will, in all likelihood, be initiated by cyber attacks, followed by air strikes on the land and sea. To be successful, the Army, Navy and the Air Force will have to use the Indian variants of the American AirLand and AirSea battle doctrines. There will be no room for single service ego trips here; ignore the compulsions of fighting on an integrated war plan, and you lose the war.

The purpose of creating a theatre command is the need for a structure that can fight an integrated battle. This is not about ordering a platoon on parade to make a right or a left turn. It is about taking a million-and-a-half-strong, somewhat archaic, war machine and putting it through new paces. The danger is that bits and pieces of that machine may fall off, be forgotten, or be incapable of meeting the new demands.

The IAF has categorically made it clear that it has very different views from those expressed by General Rawat. These were put forward at the same seminar by Air Chief Marshal RKS Bhadauria. In such circumstances, it would be foolhardy for the military to undertake the leaps being envisaged.

Decisions taken without careful study could unbalance the armed forces which, in India’s case, are half-mobilised all the time. For this reason, the Naresh Chandra Task Force of 2011-2012, recommended that a CDS-like figure be appointed immediately, but the process of creating theatre commands be carefully fleshed out through experimentation based on paper studies and joint exercises to debug issues relating to command and control and joint logistics.

There are other reasons for caution as well. In 2001, India created the Andaman & Nicobar joint services command, hoping that its experience will show the path towards more geographic joint commands. Few will deny that the experiment has been a failure.

India has a long history of dysfunctional jointness of its military. Even though combined arms operations were a legacy of World War II, the Indian military never quite took to them. One of the biggest fiascoes of the 1965 war was when the IAF was not even informed that the Army was launching an attack towards Lahore. The Army’s designation of the 1999 Kargil operation as ‘Op Vijay’ and the IAF’s nomenclature as ‘Op Safed Sagar’ in 1999 tells their own story.

It is easy enough, and General Rawat intends to show us, to issue the orders and create the theatre commands. But it will be quite another level of challenge to get these to work as intended. The process of taking forces that have been used to fighting their individual battle and getting them to work with others is not easy. It requires not just paper orders, but large-scale war gaming and simulation, training and exercises on the ground at various levels of complexity. Only when a certain structure becomes viable should it be incorporated into the war plans. The issue is not theatre commands but their shape and the sequential timeline of their creation.

The structure of a theatre command also requires a foundation of jointness in a range of other areas. For example, the need for seamless communications between fast moving combat aircraft, slower armoured and ground force units. It may be a better idea to first put in place a series of functional commands — a joint logistics command, aerospace command, a cyber warfare command — to lay the groundwork for the geographic theatre commands.

Even greater is the need to establish their intellectual underpinning through joint operations doctrines. One such document was issued in 2017, it was widely criticised for its shortcomings. Just as you need a map to figure out the best and easiest way to reach your destination, so, too, you need a doctrine to first set a goal, then provide a guide that will enable the many parts of the system to work along the commonly agreed path. For practical reasons, doctrines are the intellectual product of collaboration of the different component services. To work effectively, they must be consensual documents, rather than a diktat.

The making of all these military moves without first articulating a national security strategy (NSS) is truly to put the cart before the horse. A changed military posture must be based on a larger politico-military guidance from the political leadership as to what is expected of the military. The task of crafting an NSS was assigned in 2018 to the National Security Adviser, as the chairman of the powerful Defence Planning Committee. Since then, there has been radio silence.

It has just been one year and six months since the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) was set up on 01 Jan 2020
Airpower is a crucial contributor to accomplishing any military mission and is considered pivotal to win a war. Indian Air Force (IAF) in the present configuration has carried out its duties of not only defending the Indian skies throughout the history of independent India, but also ensured that the air assets are fighting fit and contemporary.
However, it is now being considered to absorb the professional arm of IAF into various Theatre Commands (of Maritime and Indian Army), for reasons still incomprehensible to experts.
While the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and his department are yet to define the Theatre Command concept clearly to satisfy the military experts, the re-distribution of a crucial fighting air arm based on incomplete appreciation of modern warfare has fanned controversy.
“IAF in the present form has carried out its duties of not only maintaining a fighting fit air asset, but also defended Indian skies efficiently despite the shortages of air squadrons,” opined a former senior IAF officer who wished to remain anonymous.
Financial Express Online has been regularly reporting on the multiple roles being played by the IAF in peace time, and has always been in a high demand due to the exceptional abilities it has to carry out Human Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) etc. It is well known that Indian skies are safe only because of the dedication and capabilities of IAF. The role of the Air Force world over has been understood to be for the offensive to win a war.
“Theatre Commands being formed with lesser understanding on principles of jointness, is akin to leaving each service on their own fate within the Theatre Command, with a hope that at some stage in future some sort of equilibrium is reached,” the officer quoted above stated.
Theatre Commands And IAF
It has just been one year and six months since the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) was set up on 01 Jan 2020. Military experts consider it too early for DMA to be non-service biased and independent enough to take a decision which influences all the Armed Forces, specifically setting up of Theatre Commands by reducing the efficacy of IAF.
The first CDS appointment itself was a historical step for India, and establishing Theatre Command within the tenure of the very first CDS seemingly looks over ambitious drive to achieve some end-goal which is militarily incomprehensible by most experts.
For a large Armed Forces like that of India, first CDS would have been expected to initially streamline the closer inter-services interactions, with joint training plans or enhanced active role of Integrated Defence Headquarter. The Armed Forces are yet to achieve interoperability within their own services, let alone inter-services.
“Instead of first upgrading the Indian Army through systems like the scrapped Battlefield Management Systems, DMA has somewhat compensated for these inadequacies by making IAF relinquish their advanced technologies like fighter-jets and helicopters,” observed another officer.
As per aviation experts, “Indian Army is not even geared to integrate IAF, let alone taking control of the Theatre Commands with modern era fighter jets. The grooming and training of senior level officers first need to be carried out for tri-services operations at least for next five years, before we have senior level officers with a deep grasp of each service’s tactical role.”
“Unfortunately, CDS himself simply changed positions from being a Chief of Army Staff (COAS) to Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) the very next day, without having any tri-services operational role experience. While on-the-job experience is always essential in the complex field of Army, Navy and Air Force, each Service Chiefs reach the specialized position at senior level after about four decades of work experience. A gap here is glaring, especially with no Service Chief with an operational Theatre Command experience, taking a decision for the IAF,” observed another officer.
As reported by Financial Express Online earlier, Multi-Domain Operations is an art and technology not yet known to India and it forms the basis of Theatre Commands world-over.
Concerns of IAF
There are concerns raised especially on the risk of the long term degradation of IAF’s efficient service. The more worrying aspect being highlighted is that those taking a decision today to dis-assemble IAF assets surely are not going to be there to see the next war India faces. Hopefully, those in a rush to dismantle IAF may not be held responsible by history. A war never has a replay button.
Expert View On The Comments By The CDS On The Process Of Establishment of Theatre Commands
Sharing his views with Financial Express Online, Col RS Sidhu, Indian Army veteran, “The remarks by Gen Bipin Rawat, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) at a seminar held on July 02, 2021, comparing the Indian Air Force (IAF) operations akin to the operational support role played by the Corps of Engineers and Corps of Artillery, has raked up controversy on the process of reorganizing the Armed Forces into Theatre Commands.”
“The CDS is also attributed to have remarked that the establishment of a Maritime Theatre Command (MTC), an Air Defence Command (ADC), and two geographical Theatre Commands against China and Pakistan have Government sanction and would be created in a time bound manner whether the IAF likes it or not. The existing Northern Command of the Army, is likely to remain untouched as it is actively involved in fighting a cross-border fuelled insurgency. Speculation is rife that an official announcement on establishing all or some of the above Unified Theatre Commands may be made by 15 August 2021.”
“The issue at hand is not the view of CDS on IAF, but the more serious aspect of adopting a harmonious process for the most comprehensive ever and long overdue reorganisation of the Indian Armed Forces by setting up of Theatre Commands. Here I see a jumbled mindset,” Col Sidhu opines.
According to him, “On one side the justifiable two Maritime Theatre Commands, Eastern and other Western, are likely to be amalgamated into one Maritime Theatre Command for such a vast maritime region. On the other hand, one Northern Theatre Command along Tibet frontier is deemed to be too large and the thought process is to carve out two Theatre Commands. Incidentally, China’s South Western Theatre Command is responsible for the entire frontier from Myanmar to Kazakhstan.”
“As per the initial Government Order (GO) on CDS and DMA, the appointment was not meant to be in the operational chain. The Theatre Commanders were to be directly under the Government, through RM, for operational matters.”
“Having two Theatre Commands opposing Tibet frontier willy-nilly necessitates a coordinating mechanism over them. Thus surreptitiously assigning operational roles to CDS & DMA. So we’ll be back to square one! It smacks of empire building and cutting IAF and Indian Navy to size,” the army veteran opines.
In conclusion he says, “The Theatre Commands are being used as ‘SPV’ to circumvent the GO! This is a specific case of well-intentioned reforms likely to be hijacked through bureaucratic machinations, with active connivance of military hierarchy.”

On a cold November day in 1991, a 25-year old laid his life in action after sustaining injuries while pursuing the enemy from across the border at a forward post in Jammu & Kashmir. It had been only two years since Capt Gurjinder Singh Suri was commissioned in the Army.© Provided by The Indian Express

On July 4, nearly 22 years later, his father Lt Col Tej Prakash Singh Suri (Retd) made a special journey from Mohali in Punjab to a remote post on the Line of Control (LoC) in J&K to inaugurate a memorial to his son’s sacrifice. July 4 was also the birth anniversary of his son who was awarded with the Maha Vir Chakra posthumously.

Lt Col Suri travelled to the forward location, situated at a height of more than 10,000 ft, along the LoC to accomplish his dream of visiting the battlefield, where his son had made the ultimate sacrifice during a raid on Pakistan Army post.

An alumnus of National Defence Academy and commissioned in the Army Ordnance Corps in June 1997, Capt Suri had been serving with 12th Battalion of The Bihar Regiment when he died in action.

Named Operation Birsa Munda, the action was a punitive raid conducted against the Pakistani post in November 1999, at a time when Kargil conflict had drawn to a close.

“This was the time when Operation ‘Vijay’ had drawn to a close, but the LoC was still active with sporadic incidents of trans-LoC violence. In a swift and meticulously planned operation, the entire Pakistani post was destroyed, killing 17 Pakistani soldiers,” defence spokesperson Col Emron Musavi said in a statement.

Lt Col Suri, and Lt Gen GS Chandel, (Retd), the then CO of 12 Bihar, participated in a solemn ceremony at the forward post in Gulmarg sector where the memorial dedicated in memory of the soldiers who died in the operation has been set up. An urn containing the soil from the post was also presented to Lt Col Suri.

A few years back, Capt Suri’s MVC medal was stolen from his parent’s house in Mohali in a burglary. Despite his parents’ strenuous efforts and appeals it could not be recovered. The Army later presented a replica of the medal to the parents.

Citation for award of MVC to Capt Suri

Captain Gurjinder Singh Suri was the Ghatak platoon commander and was located at forward-defended locality in Jammu & Kashmir. On 9 November 1999, the enemy launched an attack on own post, which was successfully repulsed, and the enemy retreated.

Seizing the opportunity, the Ghatak platoon was ordered to pursue the fleeing enemy. Captain Suri immediately deployed his support group to take care of any reinforcement or interference and set out to clear the bunkers one by one. When he saw that one comrade was grievously injured in the process, he quickly moved on with his buddy, to clear the bunker.

He killed two enemy soldiers with his AK rifle and silenced the machine gun. However in the process he received a burst in his left arm. Unmindful of his injury, Captain Suri continued to inspire his men to accomplish the task. He then lobbed two hand grenades into a bunker and entered inside spraying bullets with his AK rifle killing one enemy soldier instantly.

At this point he was hit by an enemy rocket propelled grenade and was critically wounded. He refused to be evacuated and continued to exhort his men till he breathed his last. Inspired by his leadership, the Ghataks fell upon the enemy with vengeance and annihilated them.

Captain Gurjinder Singh Suri, thus, displayed conspicuous bravery and junior leadership of the highest order in the face of the enemy and in the process made the supreme sacrifice.

Chinese supplied CH-3 (badge named Burraq by Pak) combat capable drone
New Delhi: Pakistan enhanced its unmanned strike capabilities — procuring armed drones from Turkey and China extensively — when India was caught in border disputes with China, sources said on Monday.
The security threat from armed drones allegedly coming from Pakistan in the border areas of Jammu and Kashmir has increased, and the drone attack at the Indian Air Force station in Jammu on June 27 is the best example of that, sources said.
India and China are involved in border disputes for some time now and so far 11 rounds of diplomatic and military-level talks have taken place to resolve issues.
Chinese supplied drone and AKD-10 anti-tank missile named Burraq and Barq respectively (Note the Pakistanis have even got their own name of the missile wrong, spelled Burq instead of Barq) 😁

However, apart from de-escalation at Pangong Tso — a glacier at 14,000 feet in Eastern Ladakh — disputes still remain at the other friction points like the disputed areas of Gogra, Hot Springs, Demchok and Depsang along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh.
Intelligence agencies said that the Pakistan Army is carrying out training of mini unmanned systems group, Supercam S-250, one of the best unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in terms of tactical and technical characteristics, in the border areas.
These Supercam S-250 mini UAVs are being utilised for Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) exercise.
“As part of the exercise, all formations have been instructed to forward a detailed report regarding the employability of mini UAV S-250 for Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance during various phases and operations of war,” the source said.
On June 24, Pakistan had planned to conduct test firing of a missile from a UAV. The missile and UAV are assessed to be Barq laser guided missile and Burraq UAV. Burraq is an unmanned combat aerial vehicle developed and built by the National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM). Personnel from Strategic Command, National Development Complex (NDC), Air Force Strategic Command (AFSC), Air Weapon Complex (AWC) and National Engineer and Scientific Commission (NESCOM) were involved in the test, the source said.
Sources also said that a joint delegation of Pakistan Army and Strategic Plans Division Force led by Director General, Inspection and Technology Development, had visited Turkey between May 31 and June 11, 2021.
During the visit, the delegation attended a technology briefing and took a factory tour of MS Bayktar. Post the visit, the delegation proposed two models of Bayraktar UAS for joint production in Pakistan which include Bayraktar VTOL UAS and TB2 UAS.
Further, the Drone Regulatory Authority of Pakistan is in the process of procuring a drone detection system named ‘Aartos’ from Aaronia, Germany.
This system primarily monitors drone/UAV traffic and is also equipped with navigational jamming capability.
The Pakistan Air Force is also exploring the possibility of integrating ‘Aartos’ with an indigenously developed wide band receiver. It has planned to install this system at five most sensitive and important places in and around Islamabad.
Further, a joint delegation of Pakistan Army, Pakistan Navy, Pakistan Air Force and the Strategy Planning Division (SPD) is presently in China to visit the NORINCO facility.
The Pakistan Air Force team will also evaluate the advanced High to Medium Altitude Air Defence System (HIMADS) with China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation (CATIC).
CATIC has a plan to deliver Wing Loong-II UAVs to Pakistan in 2021, 10 J-10CE fighter aircraft in 2023 and 10 Z-10 armed helicopters in 2024-25.

Restoration of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir became a talking point as Prime Minister Narendra Modi met the leaders of parties from the state in the Centre’s first political outreach following the abrogation of Art.370 in August 2019. Former J&K chief minister Omar Abdullah said it cannot be expected that Art.370 would be restored, but a former deputy chief minister of the state, Muzaffar Hussain Baig, suggested that the Centre could use Art.371 to extend special provisions to J&K, including on permanent residents of the state. Although J&K’s special status was unique in India, Art.371 does include special provisions for 11 other states, mostly in the Northeast. Here’s a look at how the Indian Constitution has extended special provisions to different states.
What Is Article 371? How Is It Different From Art.370?
Both Article 370 and 371 are included in Part XXI of the Constitution of India, which deals with ‘Temporary, Transitional and Special Provisions’. However, Art.370 was specific to J&K while the various clauses of Art.371 cover separate states, from Maharashtra to Mizoram and Assam to Andhra Pradesh.
Art.370 was a part of the Constitution right from when it was inaugurated in 1950 and was included as a result of negotiations between Kashmiri leaders led by Sheikh Abdullah, the father of former J&K CM Farooq Abdullah, and the the Indian PM Jawaharlal Nehru. Among the key provisions it enabled was for J&K to have its own constitution and, resultantly, to make its own rules regarding permanent citizens of the state via Art.35A.
But with the abrogation of August 2019, J&K lost its special status and all articles of the Indian Constitution now apply to the state and the privilege conferred by Art.35A, too, stands abolished.
Art.371 does not have the same wide ambit as what Art.370 did vis-à-vis J&K and only contains specific provisions that mainly recognise social, cultural and religious practices in the different states.
What’s The Modi Govt’s Take On Art.371?
Following the abrogation of Art.370 Union Home Minister Amit Shah had clarified that there were no plans to remove the special provisions for other states enshrined in Art.371. Removal of Art.370 was a long-standing aim of the BJP and also found mention in the party’s manifesto for the 2019 Lok Sabha polls.
“I have clarified in Parliament that this (scrapping of Art.371) is not going to happen and I am saying it again… that the Centre will not touch Article 371”, Shah had said in Guwahati weeks after the abrogation of Art.370. While Art.371 itself concerns special provisions for Maharashtra and Gujarat and was part of the Constitution right from its inception, the remaining clauses dealing with the other states were added later through amendments.
Which States Have Special Provisions Under Art.371?
The earliest of the special provisions under this article were extended to the states of Maharashtra and Gujarat. It allows the President of India, among other things, to ask the governor of the states to issue a special order for “the establishment of separate development boards for Vidarbha, Marathwada (or, the rest of Maharashtra) or Saurashtra, Kutch and the rest of Gujarat” and ensure “equitable allocation of funds for developmental expenditure over the said areas”.
Art.371A has detailed provisions for Nagaland. The jey feature is that the Parliament of India cannot legislate on any matter touching upon the “religious or social practices of the Nagas, Naga customary law and procedure, administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to Naga customary law, (and) ownership and transfer of land and its resources”, unless the Nagaland Assembly votes to accept it.
Art.371B covers Assam and allows the President to order the formation of an Assembly committee, or multiple committees, consisting of members elected from specific tribal areas.
Art.371C says the President may call for the creation of “a committee of the Legislative Assembly of the state consisting of members… elected from the Hill Areas of that state”. Also, “the executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of directions” to Manipur regarding the administration of the Hill Areas.
Art.371D concerns Andhra Pradesh and, after its bifurcation, to Telangana as well and empowers the President to provide for “equitable opportunities and facilities for the people belonging to different parts of the state, in the matter of public employment and in the matter of education”. It further allows the President to make “different provisions… for various parts of the state”. The President may also ask the state government to set up different local administrative cadres “for different parts of the state”. Art.371E says that the “Parliament may by law provide for the establishment of a university” in Andhra Pradesh, which was done in the form of the Hyderabad Central University in 1974.
The Sikkim Assembly is not allowed to have “less than 30 members” under Art.371F, which pertains to the state.
For Mizoram, Art.371G says that no Act of Parliament will apply to the state without the assent of the state Assembly if it seeks to regulate the “religious or social practices of the Mizos, Mizo customary law and procedure, administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to Mizo customary law, (and) ownership and transfer of land”. The provisions for Mizoram are akin in this respect to that governing Nagaland. Art.371G also says that the Mizoram Assembly shall consist of “not less than 40 members”.
Art.371H confers “special responsibility with respect to law and order” on the governor of Arunachal Pradesh and also says that the state Assembly shall have a minimum of 30 members.
The Goan Assembly, too, has its strength mandated by a special provision with Art.371I saying that it “shall consist of not less than 30 members”.
With Art.371J, Karnataka is the last state that enjoys special provisions. Under this Act, the state government can establish a separate development board for the Hyderabad-Karnataka region.

Consensus eludes plan to integrate theatre commands

Chief of Defence Staff Gen Bipin Rawat. File photo

Halfway into the three-year time span granted to implement the biggest military reform in independent India, it is clear that the stakeholders are far from reaching a consensus on the creation of integrated theatre commands. In early 2020, soon after taking over as the first Chief of Defence Staff, Gen Bipin Rawat had stated that the Indian armed forces would complete the theaterisation process — integration of the capabilities of the Army, Air Force and Navy — by January 2021. But the process is not moving smoothly, as is clear from the protracted deliberations and comments by the parties involved. On Friday, Gen Rawat said: ‘Air Force is required to provide support to the ground forces… Do not forget that Air Force continues to remain a supporting arm to the armed forces…’ Air Chief Marshal RKS Bhadauria, speaking at the same seminar, said: ‘It is not a supporting role alone. The airpower has a huge role to play. In any of the integrated battle areas, it’s not an issue of support alone.’

The Indian military has 17 single-service commands across the country — the Army and Air Force have seven each, and the Navy has three commands. The Andaman and Nicobar command, based in Port Blair, is the sole tri-service command. The theaterisation model being considered involves setting up of at least six new integrated commands, after the merger of the existing commands. However, sharp differences have emerged — the Army and Navy are in favour of the theaterisation model but the Air Force has concerns over the division of its air assets and the nomenclature and leadership of the commands. There are concerns also about the reduction of the powers of the Chiefs of Staff.

Even as the deliberations continue, it is evident that concerns over one’s turf are hampering progress. The Air Force’s anxieties would not have been soothed by Gen Rawat terming it a ‘supporting arm’, which seems ill-advised because air power is the primary tool to achieve tactical gains in warfare. The existence of inter-services competition can’t be denied; due to this reason, the massive project of theaterisation should not have been left only to the three services — a more holistic approach, with involvement of Parliament and relevant ministries, was needed. What we are witnessing is a public clash of ideas, which must be avoided at all costs.