Lt Gen VR Raghavan (retd)
The latest wars are now merely instruments of politics
LAST year the world commemorated the hundred years after the First World War, which lasted four years and was fought on a scale with armament systems and economic effort only possible for industrial nations. It was thus called the World War, or Great War and more appropriately the First Industrial War. The character of war has changed immensely since. A new geopolitical era has begun with the asymmetric use of technology to strike at major military powers. An alternative view of history interprets the century from 1914 as the period of a Long War. This Long War included the First and Second World wars, the Cold War, post-Cold War and other wars to date. This view sees the 1914-2014 years as a continuum of military campaigns for ascendancy amongst ideologies of capitalism, communism, socialism and of religious identity.
There have been many military campaigns in the last 40 years, led by developed nations with the most modern technology and kinetic power. Such operations have led to regime change, and scattering of the adversary military. These operations were followed by long occupation in which the populace remained sullen at best and hostile at worst. The occupation resulted in the rise of armed groups and militias with local and foreign support, making the occupation increasingly costly in human terms leading to the loss of support of the home population in countries which waged these campaigns. The political cost of foreign interventions have become untenable in all countries, notwithstanding the successes of their militaries. ‘Putting boots on the ground’ is no longer a choice either for Presidents Obama, Putin, Hollande or Chancellor Merkel. The haunting images of people risking all in migrating over the seas in rubber boats and braving barbed wire barricades, are evidence of the failure of the purpose for which such wars were waged. No decisive outcomes were obtained by the wars of shock and awe.
The last few years have seen the emergence of a discourse on ‘new wars’ as opposed to the conventional ‘old wars’. The premise of the new war discourse is that such wars need a different strategic approach. While such conflicts were present in the past, the scope and capacity of such wars is now substantial. These have been termed as wars of the era of globalisation. The differences between old and new wars are in the varied actors, indeterminate goals, methods and the economic basis of such wars. New wars are fought by different combinations of states and non-state actors. These include regular armed forces, militias, mercenaries, private security contractors, jihadists, paramilitaries and warlords. While old wars were conducted for ideological or geo-political goals, new wars are fought for ethnic, religious or tribal identities. The goal is to gain the power of the state rather than implement particular policies. The decisive battle which defined old wars is replaced by control of territory through political means and by population displacement. As for finance, new wars are backed through diaspora support, smuggling of raw material like oil, and through clandestine state-based support through money and weapons transfers, etc. While old wars were centralising and autarchic, new wars are an open, globalised and decentralised phenomenon. These differences change the character of war, wherein while conventional war led to all-out efforts to win and end the war, new wars extend in territory and duration, and tend to persist and recur as either side(s) gain in political and economic terms.
New wars have thus become instruments of politics instead of policy. Since political interests of the warring group/s become salient, they deliberately violate the rules and norms of war. The inner tendency of such wars has been termed as not war without limits, but war without end. And so, such wars have a self-perpetuating interest, in which enemies become useful towards sustaining the conflict.
The response to new wars from the developed world, whose militaries fought but gained no traction from it went through many phases. There was intense public scrutiny and debate, in which legislators and senior military leaders often disagreed with policies. There was widespread media critique, which in some cases, led to coverups and disinformation that eroded the credibility of governments. Later, there were surges in military numbers and also changes in military commanders to hasten the end of conflict. Finally, it led to a military pullback, resulting in leaving the countries, regions and populations to the mercy of the new actors of new wars. Major military powers are experiencing ever greater constraints on their freedom to use force in areas of societal support, parliamentary consent, and ever greater legal challenge.
The military response to new wars from developed countries is limited to air strikes and UAV strikes. These have been derisively termed as ‘gesture politics’, a way of looking tough, more often timed with domestic crises. The US military strategy against the IS has been described as a fourfold concept: degrade, defeat, of limited air attacks and of military aid. Degrading of forces is a vague concept and the adversary force can recover; defeat is not easy to determine as per new parameters; air attacks have limited impact; and as for military aid, it has failed to generate success anywhere. It is no wonder that a force like the IS or other militias in Middle East and Afghanistan continue to expand their territorial control.
Future wars will see a simultaneous unfolding of overt and covert armed action, cyber attacks on non-military targets, international financial and economic pressures by a combination of countries, and attacks by unidentified armed groups. ‘Hybrid war’ captures this landscape vividly. An example of this is the Israeli experience in Gaza and Lebanon, which has blurred the difference between front lines and rear areas. This made every place, whether in towns and villages, or in open spaces, a combat zone. Israeli forces incurred more casualties than anticipated. The conclusions drawn from it was that combined arms firepower and manoeuvre with responsive air, artillery and UAV systems were critical for success, in addition to heavy forces with tanks and infantry. Ukraine has, of late, been subjected to this hybrid form of warfare. Russian military units without insignias allegedly operated as guerrilla forces inside Ukraine, and were able to take over good amount of territory. The offensive could only be halted when the full weight of regular conventional forces were employed.
New wars add complexity to the conventional war environment. These neither obviate the need for a full-scale conventional response, nor can these be won decisively. The paradox of modern military power being unable to obtain a decisive outcome from wars is likely to remain the defining feature of our times. The price in tragic and colossal terms will continue to be borne by the helpless populations in the war zones.
