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Soldier killed in truce violation Two Pakistani soldiers gunned down in retaliation

Soldier killed in truce violation

Naik Krishan Lal

Shyam Sood

Rajouri, July 30

Within 24 hours of killing of a 10-day-old baby in mortar shelling from Pakistan in Poonch district, a soldier attained martyrdom in a skirmish along the Line of Control (LoC) in the Sunderbani sector in Rajouri district on Tuesday.

The soldier has been identified as Naik Krishan Lal (34), who was a resident of Ghagriyal in Jammu district. The soldier is survived by his wife Shashi Devi.

Defence sources said the Indian Army retaliated strongly, killing 2 Pakistani soldiers besides inflicting an extensive loss on infrastructure across the border.

In a tweet, Northern Command chief Lt Gen Ranbir Singh and all ranks saluted the supreme sacrifice of Naik Krishan Lal and offered their deepest condolences to the martyr’s family. “The Pakistan army resorted to unprovoked ceasefire violation along the LoC in the Sunderbani sector which was retaliated befittingly by the Indian Army,” said the PRO, defence.

“A heavy damage to Pakistan posts and casualties have been inflicted by our troops,” said Lt Col Davender Anand, PRO, defence.

On July 22, Rifleman Mohammad Atif Sahfi Alam Khan of Gujarat had attained martyrdom in the Sunderbani sector.

For the last two or three weeks, the Pakistan army has been targeting Indian forward posts and civil areas, injuring border residents and damaging houses, in Rajouri and Poonch districts.

 


20 years after Kargil Mounting challenges, renewed resolve

20 years after Kargil

There are moments in history that define a nation, its resolve, its character. Kargil Vijay Diwas, July 26, stands out. As India pays tributes to soldiers who drove out enemy forces and reclaimed Kargil heights 20 years ago, it is also a time to reflect on the mounting challenges. Like Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan’s ‘glaring admission’, as New Delhi described it, a couple of days ago that there were ‘30,000 to 40,000 armed people’ in his country ‘who have been trained to fight in some part of Afghanistan or Kashmir’. India has demanded ‘credible and irreversible action’ against terror groups, but what exactly was Khan alluding to? With the FATF breathing down its neck, possibly a message that considering how far Pakistan has come on the terror highway, expecting it to retrace steps while dangling the stick won’t work.

On his return after his visit to the US, an exultant Pakistan premier had this to say: ‘Feels as if I’m coming home after winning the world cup.’ From Khan’s point of view, it’s been nothing short of a diplomatic coup by managing to regain a foothold in Washington, and staring at the opportunity to play its hand on the Afghanistan table considering Donald Trump’s desperation to exit the war-torn country. Twenty years after Kargil, a moment of truth again for India. Something spelled out abundantly while paying tributes to the bravehearts. In Parliament, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh minced no words: ‘Our neighbouring country (Pakistan) cannot fight a full-fledged war or a limited war with India. It is fighting a proxy war.’ And Eastern Army Commander Lt Gen MM Naravane: ‘Some people just don’t learn their lessons; you have to keep teaching them till they learn.’

Any mention of the victory in 1999 should start and end with the daring junior leadership. Here’s the IMA’s tribute: ‘The raw courage of Indian jawans at the tactical level and the swift execution of tri-services military strategy will remain legendary. We rejoice by celebrating the victory in Kargil and renew our resolve to safeguard the honour of the Tricolour.’


Pakistan won’t dare spring a nasty surprise’

Kargil was a blend of military, political and diplomatic victory. We worked in a synchronised manner.
The geo-strategy has changed in last 20 years. There is a visible proactive stance being adopted today at the political level. India has absolutely called Pakistan’s nuclear bluff. We have raised the threshold. To remain at that level, we have to be better prepared and improve our defences and offensive capabilities.

The understanding between the civil and military authorities has not come about so far as the jointmanship was envisaged by the Kargil Review Committee. The chief of defence staff has not happened even after it was accepted by the cabinet years ago. This is affecting our military strategy doctrine. The services are fighting their own turf wars.

From page 01 In the roller coaster history of India-Pakistan relations, 1999 stands out as the year when the separated-at-birth neighbours dramatically veered off from hosannas – at an unprecedented carnival of bus diplomacy at Wagah border on a crisp February 18 morning – to hostilities in Kargil just three months later. Twenty years after he, as the then army chief, led India’s war machine, General Ved Prakash Malik, 79, now retired and settled in Panchkula, is full of vivid memories of the 60-day conflict – from the strategy confabulations in New Delhi to his impromptu gesture of gifting whiskey bottles and watches to brave soldiers on ground zero.

■ REMEMBERING KARGIL: Gen Malik (Retd) interacting with HT at his Panchkula residence.A day before he left for Kargil to pay tributes to the fallen soldiers on the July 26 Vijay Divas, Gen Malik, admired for his military scholarship and geniality, spoke to Executive Editor Ramesh Vinayak on the Kargil war, the lessons learnt and their impact on India’s military doctrine. Excerpts:

How do you reflect on Kargil after 20 years?

It is a major event in the history of the country and that of the armed forces. Going through the war was both a privilege and an honour. The fact that at the end of it we were able to change that adverse situation into a victory gives you a lot of satisfaction. You remember the people who sacrificed their lives in fighting but we were to able to achieve the political objective and teach Pakistan a lesson. Since then, they (Pakistan) haven’t dared to do something like Kargil again.

As a limited conventional war, how did the Kargil conflict impact India’s defence doctrine?

At that time, many people, definitely in Pakistan, thought that after the neighbours became nuclearequipped nations, conventional war is not possible and that both have to become responsible. In fact, that is what led to the Lahore Declaration in February 1999. But after the Kargil war, it became evident that there is space below the nuclear threshold. We may not go for an all-out war but a limited conventional war is possible. That was a big lesson. Now both India and Pakistan are quite prepared to fight — I hope they don’t — but that has come into our doctrine.

Is India better prepared now ?

Definitely. The geo-politics and geostrategic dynamics keep changing. In 1990, we shifted 8th Division from this area (Kargil) to Kashmir, which had flared up. Another brigade was moved to the Valley. That left a void. The distance between the forward posts on the Kargil-Drass axis was long. That is what Pakistan was able to exploit in 1990. The first thing we did after the war was to plug those gaps. The 8 Mountain Division that had participated in the war is still deployed in that area. The density of troops has now gone back to what it used to be before 1990, and the gaps are smaller. Post-1999, we brought in 14th Corps at Leh to look after the Line of Control (LoC) beyond Zoji La to Siachen, relieving the Srinagarbased 15th Corps, which has been engaged on the anti-insurgency grid. There has been a major shift in command and control of that area. Third, and most importantly, our weapons and equipment, particularly the surveillance stuff, has improved. Today, we have all kinds of radar, UAVs and gadgetry. The road network and accommodation for troops in snowbound areas has become better.

Does Pakistan still have the potential to spring a nasty surprise?

The potential is there. But will they dare to do it? I don’t think so. Pakistan knows India’s response will be heavier and stronger.

There has been a lingering debate on the high toll of 527 men that the Indian Army suffered to regain our own territory.

That was the result of two factors. One, the political objective given to the armed forces was to throw the Pakistani intruders out of the area without crossing the LoC. There was no question of capturing their territory. To undo what Pakistan had done, we faced challenges such as a difficult terrain, lack of intelligence and poor surveillance. There were shortages all over. Quite a high number of casualties were suffered between May 5, when the intrusions were first detected in Batalik, and May 21. That was because initially the intruders holding the high features on our side of the LoC were thought to be ‘mujahidins’ ( militants). So, the troops which were hastily moved in and tasked to push them back followed the same tactics and rules of engagements that they generally do in anti-militancy operations in the Valley. It was only afterwards when I started questioning the identity of intruders that it became evident to us on May 22 that they were Pakistani regulars. That is when I briefed the Cabinet Committee on Security that we were up not against militants but the enemy and said that all three of us (the army, air force and navy) need to operate together. Then the whole thing changed. Despite those challenges, we were able to recapture the area without crossing the LoC. That itself was an achievement. The circumstances of war were such that we suffered high casualties.

But, Pakistan did succeed in putting Kashmir in the international limelight, a key objective behind the Kargil gambit.

That was one of the objectives. The other was Siachen. Ever since we captured and occupied the glacier in 1984, General Pervez Musharraf (Pakistan army chief in 1999) had been involved in that. As a brigadier, he had tried to capture some of the posts that are with us, and failed. Siachen has always been a thorn on their side. It has been a psychological drain for the Pakistan army all along. They wanted to interdict the road going from Srinagar to Kargil and Siachen. Pakistan’s gameplan was to give a fillip to militancy that had subsided substantially in 1998.

What was the turning point in Kargil?

The capture of Tololing in the second and third week of June was the breakthrough as this hill feature dominates the Srinagar-Kargil road. Then, we took Point 5140 on the same ridgeline where Captain Vikram Batra did a good job. It was followed by the capture of Point 5203 in Batalik . After that we never looked back. When Tiger Hill and Point 4857 were captured in the first week of July, that was the beginning of the end for the Pakistanis. They fell like nine pins.

How did New Delhi’s behind-the-scene diplomatic push help?

Kargil was a blend of military, political and diplomatic victory. We worked in a synchronised manner. At one stage, I told Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, ‘suppose if we can’t undo the intrusion here, then we will have to go across elsewhere. What will be your answer? ’ He understood that. Soon after, national security adviser Brajesh Mishra told TV channels that ‘not crossing the border holds good today, we don’t know about tomorrow’. In the meantime, our military strategy was unfolding on other fronts with the deployment of the infantry and strike formations on the rest of the western border. The navy had moved its fleet in the Arabian Sea. The air force had also taken action. When Mishra met his American counterpart, Sandy Berger, in Paris in the middle of June, he bluntly told him, “Look, we can’t keep our armed forces on the least anymore.” Berger took that message to then US President Bill Clinton. (The then) Pakistan prime minister Nawaz Sharif first visited China but failed to get any support. He was in a panic mode when he travelled to the US and met Clinton on July 4. That very day, our army had captured Tiger Hill. The writing was on the wall.

In hindsight, how prudent was it to not to cross the LoC or international border?

Let’s not forget that after the 1998 nuclear tests, India was in the doghouse. There were global sanctions against us. That was the primary reason why the political leadership told us: ‘Don’t cross the LoC’. But, if we had not been able to succeed the way we did, then we may have got permission to go across. The second handicap was that there was shortage of equipment. The sanctions did not permit us to procure it from abroad.

But all that has changed after India’s surgical strikes and the Balakote bombing.

That is because the geo-strategy has changed in 20 years. There is a visible proactive stance being adopted today at the political level. India has absolutely called Pakistan’s nuclear bluff. We have raised the threshold. To remain at that level, we have to be better prepared and improve our defences and offensive capabilities. You can’t take 40 or 50 casualties in one stroke. After all, the political leadership is questioned by the people who have elected them. This is what happened after Pulwama.

After Kargil, you rued the lack of strategic culture in the country. Has that changed?

Not much. Over the years, there is a slightly better understanding in the public mind, thanks to the media. The political authority now knows that it will be questioned seriously over security issues. But, overall , the culture has not changed because we still have not got the kind of rapport that should be there between the political and military authorities. To be able to live up to that culture, you need greater understanding at the top level, which is not there even today. Policy-makers are more bureaucrats than the military people. We need a greater dialogue with each other and should be prepared so that we don’t get surprised when something like Kargil happens.

The Kargil Review Committee, led by K Subrahmanyam, had made a slew of recommendations. What about their implementation?

Many of them have been implemented but not in the spirit in which they were recommended. The understanding between the civil and military authorities has not come about so far as the jointmanship was envisaged. Certain important recommendations remain unimplemented. For example, the chief of defence staff (CDS) has not happened even after it was accepted by the cabinet years ago. This is affecting our military strategy doctrine. The services are fighting their own turf wars. They didn’t integrate the ministry of defence. The atmosphere in the ministry continues to be civil versus military. That trust is lacking. That’s why there are problems when it comes to the management of the army and the budget.

What are the most important lessons from Kargil?

You can never predict when there will be a war. The nation has to be prepared to fight always. For national security, you have to have your own weapon systems without being dependent entirely on foreign countries. That is why the push to make in India. But it has still not taken off even five years after the government decided to bring in the private sector in defence manufacturing. There is lethargy and nexus in the ministry of defence, between ordnance factories and public sector undertakings. I wish these things become faster. The budget is also not enough. Suddenly, you find that the defence budget has been going up by 5% to 7% every year because of the gross domestic product (GDP). But, as per the share of the GDP, it has not really gone up. The revenue budget has spiked due to increase in pays and one rank one pension (OROP). So, the budget for modernisation and capital expenditure has got reduced. That is not giving the right message to manufacturers. The defence industry requires a lot of investment. These imbalances need to be corrected.

What is your searing memory of Kargil?

It is a mix of happy and sad memories. The most important thing for me was going to the front. In South Block, whether I was meeting politicians or bureaucrats or my colleagues, I found long faces. There were questions and ‘hoga ki nahin hoga (will it, won’t it) ’ kind of mood. The morale was brittle initially. But every time I went to the war zone, almost every sixth day, I never saw that kind of mood. Despite casualties, the morale was high. My officers would tell me, “Don’t worry sir, we will do it.” The positive attitude, the bravery and sacrifices I saw there raised my morale. I came back more confident that we will beat Pakistan. The other memory is about meeting young soldiers, many of who are no more. I remember patting Capt Vikram Batra and giving him a bottle of scotch after he captured Point 5140. A few days later, he made the supreme sacrifice that earned him the Param Vir Chakra.


Kargil War Musharraf’s major folly: Gen KJ Singh

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Tribune News Service

Chandigarh, July 24

To mark the 20th anniversary of Kargil Vijay Diwas, PU Department of Defence and National Security Studies organised a panel discussion on ‘Kargil War: Lessons Learnt ‘ at the ICSSR Seminar Hall here today.

The discussion was organised in collaboration with the Gyan Setu Think Tank and the NCC Army Wing, Panjab University.

Capt Abhimanyu Singh Sindhu, Minister for Finance, Haryana, graced the occasion as chief guest, while Lt Gen PM Bali AVSM, VSM, Chief of Staff, Western Command, Chandimandir, was the guest of honour. Brother of Kargil martyr Vikram Batra, Vishal Batra, and Lt Gen KJ Singh (retd), participated in the event as panellists and Prof Raj Kumar, Vice Chancellor of Panjab University, presided over the event.

Lt Gen KJ Singh (retd) highlighted how the war proved out to be a major folly by Gen Musharraf where he failed to consider the implications of this operation. He also explained how the war was a major challenge as India was facing reduction in international sanctions because of the nuclear tests conducted the previous year.


Kargil laid bare hard truths by G Parthasarathy

1999 conflict made it clear that Pak army won’t forget its 1971 humiliation

Kargil laid bare hard truths

Supreme sacrifice: India lost 527 personnel in the conflict.

G Parthasarathy
Former diplomat

PRECISELY two decades ago, three battalions of the Indian Army were tasked with attacking and recapturing Tiger Hill, the highest peak in the Kargil sector. Tiger Hill is located at the commanding heights over the vital highway connecting Srinagar to Ladakh. The operations, which commenced in the last week of May 1999, and were accompanied by a battle for the adjoining peak of Tololing, ended successfully on July 3-4, 1999. Control of the high peaks of Tiger Hill had enabled Pakistani forces to monitor the movement of our forces and disrupt supplies to our troops in Siachen. Coinciding with these events, then Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif paid a hurried visit to Washington and agreed to pull back his forces in Kargil on July 4 — America’s Independence Day!! This happened after then PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee had rejected US President Bill Clinton’s offers of mediation.

The Kargil conflict took place when India and Pakistan were under economic pressure from UN-backed sanctions after their nuclear tests in May 1998. The Clinton Administration was determined to ‘curb, roll back and eliminate’ India’s nuclear weapons programme. Pakistan took advantage of the prevailing situation. Infiltration by the Pakistan army into the Kargil sector reportedly commenced around the same time as the N-tests. While the Nawaz Sharif government was initially unaware of these developments, it backed its army’s actions whole-heartedly once General Pervez Musharraf briefed it. Contrary to popular perception, Nawaz was briefed on more than one occasion on what was happening, including at the Pakistan army’s Regional Headquarters in Skardu.

India’s intelligence services learnt of the infiltration only around a year later, resulting in an ugly blame game over who was responsible for a serious intelligence failure. PM Vajpayee had meanwhile decided that one way to deal with America-led international pressure was to try and make peace with Pakistan. It was decided that as a ‘grand gesture’, Vajpayee would visit Pakistan by bus to inaugurate the Lahore-Delhi bus service. Vajpayee was unaware of what was happening across the Line of Control in Kargil when he arrived in Lahore. Arriving in Islamabad a few months before Vajpayee’s visit, I found the atmosphere marked by Pakistani duplicity. Nawaz’s close aides such as Information Minister Mushahid Hussain were inciting Sikh pilgrims from across the world, even as Mushahid and the Punjab Governor were in touch with Lashkar-e-Taiba leader Hafiz Saeed.

Vajpayee, who was and remains widely respected in Pakistan, was warmly received. The Service Chiefs did not receive him on arrival, but called on him at the Governor’s residence in Lahore, where he was staying. He delivered a masterly speech at a civic reception in Lahore, which moved the audience. The Pakistan military and significant sections of its political establishment appeared to think otherwise. The intentions of the Pakistan establishment were evident during Vajpayee’s visit, even in negotiations for finalising the Joint Declaration. Vivek Katju, who then headed the Pakistan Division, handled these negotiations firmly and skilfully. There was also no respite from terrorist strikes in J&K in the months preceding and following Vajpayee’s visit.

The Indian Army, particularly its young officers and jawans, deserve the nation’s gratitude for the valour they showed in battle after climbing high peaks in Kargil. Eleven years later, Pakistan acknowledged that 453 of its soldiers were killed in the conflict. They could afford to obfuscate as the soldiers killed were largely Shias from Gilgit-Baltistan. Indian casualties were 527 killed and 1,363 wounded.

Vajpayee visited the Army operations room in the third week of May 1999 for a briefing by the Army Chief, General VP Malik, which I attended. The Army Chief gave a detailed account of Pakistani infiltration and assured Vajpayee that the Army would throw out all intruders. General Malik alluded to the need for air support, a proposal Vajpayee accepted the same day, with the condition that IAF aircraft should not cross the LoC.

I was told to return immediately to Islamabad as airstrikes were commencing the next morning. The IAF was confident that its MiG-29s and Mirage 2000s could take on the PAF, equipped with American F-16s. The PAF stayed away from coming too close to the LoC. Two IAF aircraft were brought down by Pakistani surface-to-air missiles: a MiG-21F piloted by Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja, who lost his life, and a MiG-27L piloted by Flight Lieutenant Nachiketa, who was captured. The Pakistanis sought to play their usual games by arranging a huge media event to showcase their ‘generosity’ during a conflict, offering to release Nachiketa in my presence at the Foreign Office. I refused to attend the proposed ‘release’ function, describing it as a ‘media spectacle’ demeaning the dignity of an IAF officer captured in combat. The International Red Cross then handed Nachiketa over to us inside the Indian High Commission the same evening.

The Kargil conflict brought home many hard truths for us. The Pakistan army, which rules the country, is not going to forget its 1971 humiliation. It will try and take some form of revenge, whenever it can. Enmity towards India is essential for its very existence and for it to continue as de facto ruler of the country. With Vajpayee’s approval, we continued issuing visas to Pakistanis liberally during the Kargil conflict. The Lahore Bus Service and the Samjhauta Express functioned normally. While Pakistanis were being misled by screams of imminent victory and azadi for Kashmiris, calm and determined Indians were going about their normal lives.

Let us mark the 20th anniversary of the Kargil conflict soberly and appropriately, with national tributes to General VP Malik and his brave soldiers, as also to Air Chief Marshal Anil Yashwant Tipnis, the fighter pilots and others in the IAF.

 


The border war with drugs

The recent heroin haul in Amritsar has once against put the spotlight on Pakistan’s continual pushing of narcotics into the country. It is as much an economic and strategic issue as it is a societal concern

The drug problem in Punjab is not about drugs. It is about Pakistan’s ‘war of a thousand cuts’ against India. It is about national security, writes Ajai Sahni 

532 kg of heroin, worth an estimated Rs 2,700 crore, and another 52 kg of assorted narcotics, in a single seizure in Punjab — the largest recovery of drugs ever in India. This massive payload came unmolested across the Attari border, despite the fact that the Pakistani side has sophisticated truck scanners for the detection of contraband — bags of heroin would stand out like a sore thumb in a consignment of salt.

Read also: 

The seizure of this enormous consignment of drugs has provoked the usual and contemptible political circus in the State, sparking partisan attacks on the present regime by its predecessor. Ironically, Punjab saw a decade of neglect and steadily worsening indices under the Akalis. The Badal government had, in fact, told the Punjab & Haryana High Court in 2009 that 75 per cent of Punjab’s youth and 65 per cent of all families had been affected by drug addiction; and that 30 per cent of all inmates in Punjab’s jails were accused under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act.

Partisan political conflict over the drug trade, mutual acrimony and a focus on smuggling networks and the contraband itself, detract from an essential and far more important reality that has largely been ignored: the drug problem in Punjab is not about drugs. It is about Pakistan’s ‘war of a thousand cuts’ against India. It is about national security.

More than 717 kg of heroin have already been recovered by authorities in Punjab in the current year, in addition to 285 kg of opium, 18,702 kg of poppy husk (a major source of a range of opiates), and significant quantities of other drugs. The year 2018 saw the recovery of 384 kg of heroin, 391 kg of opium, and 40,598 kg of poppy husk, in addition to other drugs. Similarly, in 2017, 192 kg of heroin, 558 kg of opium and 42,631 kg of poppy husk, among other drugs, were seized in Punjab. Normally, seizures reflect a very small fraction of the drugs in circulation, and the narcotic flows across the border into Punjab would be many multiples of these recoveries. At such a scale, the injection of drugs into the State is no less than an act of war, a lethal assault against the people of Punjab. On its own, this may still have been dismissed as criminal activity at a gigantic scale, but what we have here is the use of narcotics in a broader strategy of covert and unrestricted warfare. Narcotics are only one instrumentality that is being deployed by Pakistan against Punjab — and, indeed, India — with terrorism and financial instruments such as fake Indian currency notes (FICN) combining to devastating effect in the past, and with tremendous potential to inflict harm in the present and future.

These are not unconnected streams, but are components of an integrated, planned and sustained strategy of attrition. At the peak of Khalistani terrorism in Punjab, the entire drug trade was controlled or facilitated by the various terrorist groups that dominated the border areas, even as the principal flows from Afghanistan through Pakistan and across the border into India were managed by Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence. After the collapse of terrorism in Punjab, Afghan opium continued to be processed in factories in Pakistan and actively pushed across the border into Punjab in a conscious strategy to continue with Islamabad’s ‘war by other means’ against India.

The terrorism-narcotics linkage, as well as the ISI’s not-so-hidden hand, shows up in a number of joint seizures of drugs, weapons and, in some cases, FICN. For instance, in a succession of interlinked cases between December 2018 and May 2019, drugs and weapons, including pistols and grenades, were transferred from Pakistan to receivers in Punjab. One of the telephonic contacts in Pakistan was traced back to Harmeet Singh aka PhD, ‘chief’ of the Khalistan Liberation Force. Similarly, in May and June 2017, in two related cases, a number of weapons, including AK series assault rifles, an MP-9 modified rifle, several revolvers and pistols, ammunition and quantities of heroin were recovered, and nine persons were arrested. According to the FIRs registered in this cluster of cases, the consignments had been arranged by Lakhbir Singh Rode of the International Sikh Youth Federation and Harmeet Singh aka PhD, both under the ISI’s protection in Pakistan. The transaction was allegedly mediated by Gurjit Singh aka Gurjiwan Singh, a resident of Canada. A stream of such cases, too many to recount here, involving the combined transfer of drugs, FICN, weapons, ammunition and explosives, documents these flows over the years.

Punjab has been targeted from multiple directions, and not just across its own border with Pakistan, with drug and weapons’ flows coming from Gujarat, Rajasthan and Jammu & Kashmir as well. It is significant that, in the Attari seizure, one of the two accused is from Handwara in Kashmir.

These complex patterns and linkages are sometimes spoken of as ‘narco-terrorism’, but what we are witnessing is much worse, and infinitely more dangerous. Narco-terrorism often refers to terrorist groups that engage in drug trafficking activity to fund their operations. This is not the case with the Pakistan-based Khalistanis, who are fully supported by the Pakistani state. And while Pakistan uses drug revenues to bolster its terrorist campaigns in both India and Afghanistan, there is no necessary dependence here. Pakistan’s malfeasance would continue with or without drugs, part of its insidious strategy of protracted and unrestricted warfare against its neighbours.

Despite the very long tradition of, and substantial literature on, these patterns of war, the Indian strategic community, and certainly the country’s political executive, remain largely unfamiliar with their principles and risks. This is “warfare that transcends all boundaries and limits”, and that breaks down the distinctions between military and civilian spaces, instruments, technologies and methods. While some of these instruments can be identified, there are a range of others that meld seamlessly into the uncertainties and disorders of our time, and the insidious and coordinated energies behind these are difficult to discover and counter.

Drugs, terrorism, radicalisation, fake news, social media manipulation, disruptive conspiracies such as the ‘sacrilege’ cases – these are already part of the complex our adversaries visibly employ to bring ruination to the people of Punjab. There are other instrumentalities that an alert administration will need to uncover and respond to.

Crucially, it is now necessary to recognise this insidious way of war, and to understand that the networks of collaborators within Punjab are no less dangerous than terrorists with bombs and bullets. Unfortunately, their impact and role in devastating the State remain largely unacknowledged. Tens of thousands of petty smugglers have, no doubt, been arrested over the past years (6,622 already arrested this year; 13,959 in 2018). But the ‘big fish’, the masters of the game, remain beyond the reach of enforcement agencies. In 2014, K.P.S. Gill wrote, “powerful political patrons and controllers of the drug trade in the State have remained outside the ambit of state reprisals.” This remains the case even today. This is not just Punjab’s problem. It is a national crisis.

— The writer is executive director Institute for Conflict Management


Rajnath may have to adopt a balanced approach

NEWDELHI: A few days after Rajnath Singh took over as defence minister, the government reversed its earlier order of suspending rations to officers in peace stations. Civil-military relations, which had been fraying for a raft of reasons, improved with the underlying message that the government cared. “It is our major focus and concern,” said a close aide of Singh on condition of anonymity.

But soon, another order to tax pension, which comes with disability benefits if the soldier has not been invalidated, generated a challenge . Criticism mounted because irrespective of whether a solider has been invalidated or served a full term, pensions with disability benefits have not been taxed since 1922.

These two episodes reflect, partly, the opportunities and challenges that the defence ministry will face.

Singh is an experienced and oldschool politician. In his previous avatar as Union home minister, he ensured the Central Paramilitary Forces (CPMF) had all they needed. His interventions eased the life of an ordinary soldier. In the process, he endeared himself to them.

The first four weeks in his new role show that Singh is likely to continue down the same road. His maiden visit as defence minister was to Siachen – the highest battlefield in the world. “The minister has taken a keen interest in the welfare of troops, attending long briefings to understand the nuts and bolts,” said a senior ministry official who did not want to be named.

But this is only one part of his role. India’s defence has been crying for modernisation, with longstanding complaints about shrinking budgets and slow acquisition process. Singh may not be able to do much in this regard.

As much as 31 per cent of India’s total capital expenditure is allocated to defence. The scope of it going up any further is bleak. He will have to work out a fine balance between the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force. With rising tradeflows, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is also becoming increasingly militarised; at any point in time, there are over 100 warships, an unknown number of submarines of different countries in the IOR. The Navy needs more muscle.

At the same time, the air force — which is down to 30 fighter squadrons as against the required 42 – has shown that it can deliver quick retribution with minimal cost. Similarly, the Indian Army needs new weapon systems.

The choice before the minister, therefore, may be difficult. Does he opt for more fighters for the IAF, or Multi-Role Helicopters – popularly called flying frigates because they are tasked with anti-submarine warfare, surface antiship attacks, early warning and electronic warfare – of which the Navy has none? Or does he decide to replace the army’s decades-old air defence system?

On the revenue side, dealing with rising pension costs will be a tough act for Singh. “Modernisation of the defence forces is clearly the priority, increase in funding combined with more efficient use of resources appears to be the focus,” said a second defence ministry official.

India continues to be the biggest importer of weapon systems and equipment, a point Prime Minister Narendra Modi referred to in his speech in Parliament last week. Getting “Make in India” for defence manufacturing moving is another area of concern for the minister.

“It is a medium to long term goal, the ecosystem will have to grow, hurdles removed and ensure there is a right kind of environment for foreign equipment manufacturers to feel comfortable to share technology with Indian companies,” a third senior ministry official said.

Defence diplomacy will be another area that will need Singh’s able handling.

In sum, from modernisation to balancing the needs of the forces, from welfare of soldiers to dealing with a fluid global international climate, from giving a push to domestic defence manufacturing to finding resources, Singh will have his hands full.

But as one of the senior-most ministers


Punjab CM Amarinder Singh greets new Navy chief Admiral Karambir Singh

Punjab CM Amarinder Singh greets new Navy chief Admiral Karambir Singh

Chief Minister Capt Amarinder Singh. Tribune photo

Chandigarh, May 31

Punjab Chief Minister Amarinder Singh on Friday greeted new Navy chief Admiral Karambir Singh, saying it was a proud moment for the state.

“Congratulations to Admiral Karambir Singh for taking over as the new chief of the Navy. Proud moment for Punjab, Grey Eagle!” he tweeted.

View image on Twitter
  Born to an Indian Air Force officer in Punjab’s Jalandhar town, Karambir Singh is one of the most decorated Admirals.The Grey Eagle—senior-most serving naval aviator—of the Navy, Karambir Singh is the first helicopter pilot to become chief of the Naval Staff. — IANS

Army backs soldiers, says no altercation took place

A WOMAN HAD ALLEGED THAT COLONEL GAIKWAD ALONG WITH ARMY JAWANS PLOUGHED THE DISPUTED LAND AND DAMAGED CROPS

PUNE:The army’s Southern Command on Tuesday denied that any “altercation” between soldiers and villagers had taken place at Gulani in Maharashtra’s Nasik district three days earlier.

It said a “few affluent people” of Gulani involved in a land dispute with colonel Kedar Vijay Gaikwad’s family had lodged a First Information Report in this regard.A woman had filed a police complaint alleging that Col Gaikwad brought 30-40 Army jawans in military trucks to the disputed land on June 22 and ploughed it with a tractor and damaged crops. Police had said that the woman is a relative of one Sunil Bharne, who is involved in a sub-judice dispute over the disputed plot with the Gaikwad ‘s brother. “No altercation took place between the villagers and army personnel, and the party of army personnel had halted for lunch at colonel Kedar Vijay Gaikwad’s house while heading to Nashik,” the Southern Command said in a statement on Tuesday. It added that an ammunition collection party comprising one JCO and 13 other ranks along with four army vehicles proceeded to Dehu Road for collection of ammunition on June 18.

“The same party was to move from Dehu Road to Devlali field firing range in Nashik for training activity,” it said.

“On June 22, after collection of ammunition, while on the move from Dehu Road to Nashik, the party halted for lunch at the house of the Commanding Officer Colonel Kedar Gaikwad, who was on leave, in Gulani village,” the statement said. It added as per the standard procedure, the ammunition collection party had an armed escort, which continued to stand near the ammunition loaded vehicles and the remaining party moved for lunch to the house of the army officer, which was 500 metres away. “After lunch, the party left for Nashik. No altercation or interaction reportedly took place between the villagers and the army personnel,” said the statement.


Ammo dump blast: Lt Col’s widow moves HC

Tribune News Service
Chandigarh, April 13

Almost three years after 19 persons had lost their lives in a massive fire that had broken out at the Central Ammunition Depot (CAD), Pulgaon, it has now emerged that the Army had made multiple requests to the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) for removing defective anti-tank mines from the depot but no action was taken on the requests.

A petition filed before the Punjab and Haryana High Court by the widow of Lt Col RS Pawar, herself an Army officer hailing from Rohtak, has averred that the Army had in strong terms put on record that the matter was being “delayed deliberately” and “dragged unendingly,” thereby posing a serious threat to safety and security of personnel and endangering the establishment.

No effective action whatsoever was taken by the OFB, ultimately leading to the tragic blast in depot, one of the largest in Asia, on May 31, 2016 because of defective mines. Two officers, including Lt Col Pawar, who was posthumously decorated for gallantry, and 17 others were killed and a huge stockpile of ammunition was destroyed.

Taking cognisance of the petition filed by Maj Reenu Ohlan, the High Court has issued notices to the Department of Defence Production (DDP) and the OFB. Besides seeking compensation “as the court may deem fit” from these two establishments, she has also sought action on the directions passed by the Defence Minster for fixing accountability and culpability in the incident and also for ensuring time-bound removal of all defective ammunition to prevent any such catastrophe in the future.

It was the mandate of technical experts from the OFB and the Quality Assurance directorate to remove the mines categorised as defective. The Army, which controls the CAD, is not authorised to handle such ammunition. In fact, there was another blast at CAD, Pulgaon in 2018, in which six persons were killed.

Pointing out that the though the Army and the Department of Defence (DoD) in the MoD are supporting her, she has averred that there has been total apathy, negligence and indifference on part of the DDP and OFB.