Tribune News Service

Srinagar, September 2

The Army on Sunday paid tributes to Late Sepoy Shive Kumar, who was killed in a gunfight in Bandipore on Saturday.

In a solemn ceremony at BB Cantonment, Northern Command chief Lt Gen Ranbir Singh, Chinar Corps General Officer Commanding Lt Gen AK Bhatt and all ranks paid homage to the slain soldier on behalf of a proud nation, a defence spokesman said.

Sepoy Shivey Kumar sustained bullet injuries during the fierce operation in Danna Forests of Bandipora district in which three militants were killed. He was provided immediate first aid and evacuated to the 92 Base Hospital, but he unfortunately succumbed to his injuries.

The 32-year old soldier had joined the Army in 2005. He belonged to Karoor village of Kishtwar Tehsil in Doda district. He is survived by his wife, three children and parents.

Our Correspondent

Hoshiarpur, August 12

The police have booked two members of two WhatsApp groups and an admin over objectionable posts. An FIR has been filed against a member and the admin of a group. The case was registered on the complaint of Ranjit Kumar, a resident of City Centre. He had complained regarding posting of a message showing disrespect to Dr BR Ambedkar in a group. A case was registered against Janvir Rinku, who was accused of putting the message, and administrator Munish Agrawal for not removing the post from the group even on the request of the complainant.In another case, the police have filed an FIR against Makkhan Singh of Patiala on the complaint of Ranjit Rana, a resident of Narayan Nagar. The complainant told the police that Makkhan Singh had sent an obscene photograph of a goddess in the group. A case has been registered and further investigations are on.

The signs have been ominous for the past four years. By the time PM Modi arrived at his ‘Barack’ moment, Russia had read South Block’s signals of apathy and inked an agreement on defence cooperation with Pakistan. Meandering through a naval agreement and sale of Mi helicopters, the Russia-Pakistan security relationship has moved well past Cold War hostilities to enter a more intimate phase of training Pakistani troops in Russian institutes. Pakistan may have taken the plunge because the US, its steady pole of security cooperation, is more interested in a settlement in Afghanistan rather than shoring up Pakistan army’s arsenal.But for India’s policy planners this is a moment of reflection. Russia is not just a consistent supplier of cheap and sturdy military equipment. Both sides have taken comfort in the other’s company at times of international distress — India backed Moscow to the hilt on Afghanistan while Russia bailed out India on Kashmir with its vetoes. There was also a healthy dose of self-interest involved: Russia backed India in the 1971 war to pay back Pakistan for arranging a secret summit between Nixon and Mao. For India, Moscow provided a reliable hedge against geopolitical arm-twisting by the West during the Cold War.Indian diplomacy may be on the wrong side of history if it is steering away from Russia. Along with Iran and China, Russia has lately become indispensable in the region. In addition, much is going on with Russia to permit it to drift away. Moscow’s mediation, in fact, can prove useful in bringing together Pakistan and India on Afghanistan, which could lead to the breaking of the Indo-Pak diplomatic ice. PM Modi’s informal meeting in May with Vladimir Putin would have attempted a course correction, reflecting the unease in the Indian establishment over the current state of affairs. Russia is currently in a spot of bother; a helping hand at this juncture is likely to be more than appreciated.

The first floor of South Block, where the defence minister, defence secretary, and a host of senior officials work, froze for a few hours in the last week of June. A 35-year-old homemaker and army officer’s wife had been murdered inside the Delhi cantonment. Was she killed by an outsider? And, if so, what kind of blame would Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman have to take? After all, Sitharaman had orderedand supervised opening up cantonment roads, much to the anger of veterans and families of serving officers.

The veterans and the families had taken to social media soon after orders to open up the roads were issued, accusing the minister and the bureaucracy of having “vested interests”.

Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman had to face flak for the decision. (Photo: PTI/file)

After the murder, as phones worked overtime and messages from secure lines flashed all across, the sequence of events became clear. The woman was allegedly killed by an Army officer. While that was shocking in itself, the crime couldn’t be directly linked to the opening up cantonment roads.

Across India, there are 62 cantonments and they collectively occupy nearly 1.57 lakh acres of land — about 635 sqkm. The MoD has 17.57 lakh acres of land — about 7,110 sqkm, of which a little over 10,000 acres is encroached upon. To give perspective, Goa is spread over 3,702 sqkm and Chandigarh over 114 sqkm.

Cantonments are distinct from military stations. As the name indicates, military stations are operational in nature and are in complete control of the military. Cantonments, however, have an elected administrative body guided by the Cantonment Act 2006, which replaced the Cantonment Act of 1924.

Cantonments go back to 1600s and to the East India Company. The first cantonment came up in Barrackpore, set up by Robert Clive in 1765. It is perhaps from “barracks” that the name “Barrackpore” comes. From Bengal, as the East India Company went west towards Malawa to control the opium production there, new cantonments started coming up. Similar is the case with Sindh. Some cities and settlements pre-date cantonments and in some cases, settlements have sprung up around cantonments.

Across the country, there are about 850 cantonment roads that are out-of-bonds for civilians. Many or most of these have been closed without due process, as prescribed in the Cantonment Act of 2006. Of this, the closure of about 120-odd roads was reviewed by the MoD and around 80 roads opened up.

Although the decision was taken in consultation with the Chief of Army Staff, General Bipin Rawat, and other senior members of the army brass, senior commanders have refused to open up 17 roads. In fact, in addition to these 850, the army wants another 80 roads to be closed.

Cantonments and military stations have faced attacks even with the roads closed off. (Photo: PTI/file)

Importantly, local commanders have refused to answer queries on why 17 roads remain closed despite orders. This not only amounts to disregarding orders of the MoD, but also of the Chief of Army Staff. The fact that senior commanders have refused to acknowledge queries from the political leadership has raised eyebrows.

Opening up cantonment roads for civilians has turned out to be a bitter and acrimonious issue. Lines are sharply drawn. On one side there are the veterans and the families of serving soldiers, pointing out security issues. On the other is the Ministry of Defence, which has received petitions from Members of Parliament and civilian citizens who cite difficulties and harassment in their daily life.

Security indeed is a concern, as is the safety of soldiers’ families. Indeed, of the numerous terror attacks in India, several have been directed on cantonments and military stations. But these have happened even when the cantonment roads were closed and when the borders are heavily guarded.

Military installations are high-value targets, but so are several others across India. Does it mean we close down everything? Drawing a linear link between opening cantonment roads with security is flaky. Such arguments show that the military has little faith in other arms of the state — the police and the numerous security establishments. Surely, it is no one’s case that the various arms of the state are incapable of protecting the military and their families? This stand-off, acrimony, and air of suspicion are unhealthy.

The Indian Armed Forces and the defence ministry must take a mature approach. And the prerequisite for that is the knowledge and acknowledgement that neither is against the other.

Also read: Why unconditional access to cantonment areas is a bad move

https://www.facebook.com/DailyO.in/videos/2196690670562388/

Can Imran, the favourite of the Pakistan army, deliver on his words? Pakistan’s Prime Minister-in-waiting Imran Khan has attained both prestige and notoriety. After 22-year-long struggle, he now occupies centre stage in the political arena after the elections backed by the army, marred by terrorist violence and substantive charges of rigging. The international community has questioned the extraordinary delay in the declaration of the official results. The primary concern for us, however, is how the new government in Pakistan will be disposed towards India. Imran is the pampered boy of the Pakistan army. Pinning high expectations on him would be a mistake at the moment. During his victory speech on July 26, he took off on a right note as he spoke of improvement in ties with India and the possibility of enhanced trade between the two countries as a panacea to deal with the massive problem of poverty in 

the subcontinent.

That, he adroitly remarked, “should be the number one priority 

of any government

(in Pakistan).”

Suddenly, it appeared that the ace bowler of yesteryear was reminded that he was bowling short length and that could be hit for a boundary. So, like all his predecessors and army Generals, he regurgitated the typical Pakistani charge against India for inflicting “huge sufferings on Kashmiris” through its military presence. First, he was violating his own stand of condemning constant blame game and also ignored the fact that the Indian Army was fighting Pakistan-armed militancy. Second, he made it look as if the Pakistan army was never in Swat, Balochistan and Waziristan. Imran took full advantage of the Indian difficulties in Kashmir caused by the proxy war that Pakistan has launched since the late 1980s. And to Pakistan’s advantage, New Delhi mishandled the place with its flip-flops. Former DGP of Jammu and Kashmir Gurbachan Jagat had told the Centre during the then US President Bill Clinton’s visit in March 2000 to convey it to the visiting dignitary that “if Pakistan wanted, militancy could be over in Kashmir in 15 days’ time.”Pakistan army chief Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa had told Pakistani Senate on December 20, 2017: “The military was ready to back political leadership’s initiative for normalisation of relations with arch-rival India.” He urged “political leaders to try and improve relations with India” and promised that “their efforts would be fully supported by the army.”Former Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was seeking to do that only, but then he was not the Army’s man, Imran is. A cartoon in The Times, London, succinctly said it all about the change in Pakistan’s landscape. It depicted an oversized military General guiding a dwarfed Imran in handling the bat at the 

cricket pitch, and the

caption read: “opening partnership”.

Bluntly speaking, New Delhi cannot remain in an icy standoff state with Pakistan, though it has very valid reasons to maintain that “talks and terrorism cannot go together”. The real-time diplomacy demands that it should walk the talk but not because of those who want to put the cart before the horse. India should wait and watch how the new arrangement will pan out. This “favourite” factor can turn beneficial too as Imran has the support of the real establishment that calls the shots there. India should watch the developments closely, after all it has dealt with Gen Pervez Musharraf, who was a rare combination of military and civil power. Now, there are two faces – Imran and the Army.The word ‘reconciliation’ has to have a meaning. Let Pakistan take the first step in defusing tension, then India should not take two steps but hundreds of them to have a result-oriented round of walk the talk. There is an opportunity, but caution is necessary.

Kargil Vijay Diwas commemorated today is the success of a composite idea of India as opposed to an idea of insularity and duplicitous bravado that remains true of Pakistan two decades later

Kargil Vijay Diwas today commemorates the Indian military victory over Pakistan in the summer of 1999 as part of ‘Operation Vijay’, the only time two nuclear-armed nations had ever gone to a theatre level war. Beyond celebrating the raw courage of the Indian infantry battalions, the pulverisation done by its artillery and the dare devilry of its air warriors — the Indian victory is as much about the underacknowledged sovereign resolve and the busting of convenient Pakistani myths and theories that have sustained the Pakistani ‘establishment’, despite its inglorious track record of 1965 and 1971. Nineteen years since the bloody nose in Kargil, Pakistan has reverted back to dubious tact of its erstwhile dictator, General Zia-ul-Haq, in trying to ‘bleed India with a thousand cuts’, resulting in the vicious pattern of action-reaction, since then.

As the more conservative and exclusivist (two-nation theory) offspring at the vivisection of Independence, Pakistan is naturally more pugnacious, interfering and voluble nation as compared to moorings of the deliberately ‘inclusive’, pacifistic and democratic India — the genealogical reality has lulled the Pakistani ‘establishment’ to spin a very self-fulfilling narrative of a more martial identity. This lazy logic and irrational belief has extrapolated itself into assuming that the sovereign resolve prevailing in Islamabad (and in the garrison town of neighbouring Rawalpindi) is, therefore, more resolute and uncompromising than that in Lutyen’s Delhi.

The composition and essentialities of sovereign resolve, usually go beyond colourful optics of posturing, rhetoric or religious sanctification — and instead, are enmeshed in more mature and vapid instincts of self-control, righteousness, honour orientation and risk-responses. The Indian approach is deceptively passive, moralistic and philosophical as compared to the self-assumed stridency of the Pakistani ‘establishment’. It took the Pakistani misadventure of ‘Operation Gibraltar’ of 1965, butchery and exodus of Bengalis in 1971 and the ill-fated ‘Operation Badr’ to lead to Kargil, all with same results for Pakistan. Importantly, all three wars and victories were a reactionary response from a supposedly ‘irresolute’ Indian state.

Sheer contrast of physicality between the strapping Sandhurst-trained-Pathan, General Ayub Khan, and in the small and frail frame of Lal Bahadur Shastri, were symptomatic of the perception mirage that consumed Pakistanis. General Ayub’s plan was predicated on the absence of an Indian resolve for conflict as he noted, “Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows at the right time and place”, till a 32-year-old Grenadier Havildar Abdul Hamid (Param Vir Chakra) corrected many elements in Ayub Khan’s statement.

Similarly, in Kargil, Pakistanis miscalculated the Indian resolve, which General Pervez Musharraf himself describes in his book, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, as “unreasonably escalated Indian response.” Contrary to the popular sense in the Pakistani mainstream, situational and moral reaction of the Indian ‘national will’ in moments of such crisis in a heterogeneous India are ‘surprisingly’ more powerful and compelling for sovereign resolve than those assumed simplistically in the ‘land of the pure’. Unlike the faction-riddled ‘establishment’ within Pakistan (eg Nawaz Sharif’s turf war with Pervez Musharraf during Kargil), seamless convergence of the disparate political parties in India during the wars is a glaring differentiator that ensures a unified political resolve.

Importantly, Kargil battles were more ‘equal’ in terms of deployment of men and materials with no side with an overbearing superiority, but for the hugely advantageous position that Pakistanis had occupied prior to the Kargil war. Overcoming such geographical odds makes the Indian infantry charges go down in the annals of modern military as the most fiery, doughty and surreal operations that blasted multiple indolent myths. The old yarn of ‘one Pakistani soldier being equal to 10 Indian soldiers’ was the foremost casualty of the Pakistani propaganda. Clearly the culture of honour and motivation was intrinsically rooted in the inherent regional-religious-racial diversity of Indian regiments like the Rajputana Rifles, Naga, JAK Rifles, Grenadiers, Rajputs, Jats, Sikhs, Madras et al.

Overt religiousity embedded in Zia-ul-Haq’s regressive contribution to the Pakistani Army moto of ‘imaan, taqwa, jihad-fi-sabilillah’ (faith, piety, holy war), could not substitute for simple soldering imperatives like ‘leaving no one behind’ or ‘owning up to its own’ when the bodies of the fallen Pakistani soldiers were refused by them to cover up their complicity. The implausible theory of ‘local uprising’ to support the Pakistani efforts has entertained multiple misadventures since the first Indo-Pak war of 1948, 1965 and then in the Kargil war, only to come a cropper.

Lastly, the status of a ‘state within a state’ for the unmatchable privileges afforded on the Pakistani military has not led to any higher level of leadership for the Pakistani military. Virtually-unassailable Pakistani positions with their uninterrupted supply lines afforded by the geographical advantages were simply blunted — not just by the steely nerves of the Indian combatants but also by a decidedly higher order of military leadership. The Indian ‘officer-to-soldier’ fatality in the Kargil war was the highest in any modern battlefield. The released transcript of amateurish debriefing by Lt Gen Mohamad Aziz, Chief of Pakistani General Staff to his COAS General Pervez Musharraf is a testimony to the level of make-believe that Pakistanis have fallen for their own Goebbilian myths.

Kargil Vijay Diwas is, therefore, more than just a military victory; it is the success of a composite and complex idea of ‘India’ as opposed to a contrarian idea of insularity, religious dogmatism and duplicitous bravado that remains true of Pakistani tract, even today. An oft-forgotten nugget in the Pakistani thinking lies unread in the inherited British training manuals of both armies that suggests, ‘moral force in modern war preponderates over physical force’. Morality or the ‘high-ground’ cannot be couched and invoked in puritanical or religious contexts. Instead, it needs honesty, diligence and nobility of purpose that underlies the sovereign idea of India and that of its Armed Forces to deliver and honour, whenever faced by a ‘Kargil’.

(The writer, a military veteran, is a former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands, and Puducherry