Maj Gen Jagatbir Singh (retd )

Geostrategy is an important aspect of relations between countries and has greater relevance when it comes to neighbours. India and Pakistan have fought four wars since Independence. Each of these had been initiated by our adversary in a different manner and area. Pakistan has been handed a crushing defeat in all the contests, even though some analysts feel that the 1965 war had ended in a stalemate. The last war between the two nations was fought on the icy heights of Kargil 20 years ago, soon after both the nations had demonstrated to the world that they were nuclear powers. We have also been involved in an ongoing proxy war with Pakistan as it continues to support terrorist activities on our soil.

We have been building our relationships both in our neighbourhood and across the world based on the issues of convergence and shouldering greater global responsibilities. However, our stand on taking the next step forward in our relations with Pakistan has correctly been linked to its cessation of support to terrorism

After Kargil, Pakistan has had four army chiefs — Gen Pervez Musharraf, Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Gen Raheel Sharif and the current chief, Qamar Javed Bajwa, with all except one serving extended tenures. India, on the other hand, has had nine Army chiefs in the same period, including the current chief, Gen Bipin Rawat. It shows the influence of army in Pakistan. It was reiterated when Pakistan’s Law Minister recently resigned for a day to represent Gen Bajwa in the Supreme Court for his extension.

India may have had the upper hand in all the conflicts, but have failed as a nation to use this advantage while bargaining for a better deal. This is evident in India agreeing to take the Kashmir dispute to the UN in 1949 and hold an internationally-supervised plebiscite, which is yet to take place. In 1965, we gave up most of the tactical advantages secured after the sacrifice of our valiant soldiers. Also, in the Simla Agreement, we merely agreed to changing the name of the Ceasefire Line to the Line of Control, and leaving ambiguity regarding the area North of Pt 9842, resulting in Operation Meghdoot in Siachen in 1984 and our physical occupation of the Saltoro Ridge. Our troops continue to fight in the highest battlefield of the world.

This is the region where India, Pakistan and China share boundaries, links Pakistan to China and Afghanistan, and overlooks the Silk Route and is the source of immense reserves of water. Three rivers, namely the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab, flow through this region. It also connects the resource-rich region of the Middle East with the manufacturing region of China, and gives China the access to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Epicentre of tension

The location and geostrategic significance of Kashmir is directly linked to the interest taken in it by our neighbours. The Line of Control remains the epicentre of tensions between India and Pakistan. We need to do a quick security scan of this region. The US is in the process of pulling out of Afghanistan. This will create a vacuum for the ISI-backed Taliban reasserting itself. They will, however, have to guard against the rise of Al Qaeda and the ISIS as Pakistan will not want to see the US troops returning. The other danger lies in the rise of militias as was seen during Najibullah’s time after the Soviet pullout due to fiscal reasons. The economic sustenance of Afghanistan is important, otherwise the region will again witness instability and the direct fallout will be the increase in foreign terrorists in the Valley.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, it believes nuclear weapons give it the shield to carry out sub-conventional warfare as a tool of its policy. It feels it can carry out its policy of inflicting thousand cuts without evoking a reaction from India owing to its nuclear umbrella. It is continuing with Operation Topac, the brainchild of Gen Zia in 1988, but the fencing post Operation Vijay has helped in reducing infiltration. It feels its strategy of patronising terrorism can result in the breakup of India. Its government continues to be a puppet in the hands of the army and the ISI remains the instrument for all its activities.

Strong Pak-China ties

The Pakistan-China ties continue to remain as strong as ever and the creation of the CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) and the development of Gwadar has only deepened the relationship. The CPEC, which runs through this area, not only gives China access to markets and a route for the transportation of resources but can also give it access to the agricultural lands of Pakistan in case there is a grave water crisis.

The other important aspect is water. Tibet is the water reservoir of the area — six of Asia’s largest rivers originate here, namely the Indus, the Brahmaputra, the Yangste, the Mekong and the Yellow river. Water is the most important resource, and unpolluted waters from the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab flow across the LoC into Pakistan. The 1960 Indus Water Treaty weighs heavily in favour of Pakistan — India can access only 19.48 per cent of this water. Pakistan has the world’s largest contiguous canal network, fed by the rivers that flow across Kashmir. Here, the hydropower generation potential is immense. Pakistan’s agriculture and economy is dependent on these rivers, and hence they are of vital importance to our neighbour. However, population growth, urbanisation and climate change are placing increased pressure on water.

China on the move

This is the only area in the world which is a triangular junction of three nuclear powers. China has developed infrastructure in the region and has the ability to move its troops swiftly. There have been three distinct phases in India-China relationship — bhai-bhai, bye-bye and now buy-buy. Under President Xi Jinping, China is striving to be the most powerful nation and is hardening its engagement terms. It has long-term strategic interests that are clearly defined and pursued. Pakistan continues to remain of great relevance to its strategy.

Today, China is India’s biggest trade partner, with the balance of trade tilted heavily in its favour. Our trade has grown from $200 million in 1992 to $94 billion. While we have areas of convergence such as trade, investments and climate change, the major area of disagreement remains the issues of unresolved borders as our perceptions vary. Deep-seated beliefs take time to change. We need to come to an understanding that will elevate our relationship to a different plane and that will overcome the Pakistan-China threat on our northern borders. The recent summits in Wuhan and Chennai are a pointer in this direction. Our borders need to be tranquil and the legacy issues need to be resolved. Both sides must understand each other’s concerns and be accommodating. The benefits of two countries, with the largest populations and among the largest economies, narrowing down their differences are immense. It will have global implications.

How should we overcome these challenges? We need to develop our infrastructure in the region, re-balance and modernise our forces based on the emerging threats, increase our strike capability and deal with internal issues. There needs to be greater prosperity for our people living in these areas.

Since the nuclear explosion of 1998, we have defeated Pakistan in 1999, generated enough economic growth to be of global relevance and have worked with multiple countries on different issues. India has grown closer to the US and signed the US-India nuclear deal in 2005. At the same time, we have dealt with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. India’s threats in this region are both internal and external. The removal of Article 370 has helped in integrating this area with the rest of the country; Article 370 gave the feeling to certain elements that the Instrument of Accession gave them a window for independence. While we have been building our relationships both in our neighbourhood and across the world based on the issues of convergence and shouldering greater global responsibilities, our stand on taking the next step forward in our relations with Pakistan has correctly been linked to its cessation of support to terrorism.

Three recent events demonstrate a new resolve with regard to our intentions. The first was our ability to stand up to China in Doklam till the issue was de-escalated, second was the surgical strikes post Uri, and the latest being the air strike at Balakot on February 26. The use of air power has the ability to quickly escalate and de-escalate the situation. We showed we were willing to climb the escalatory ladder and had the capability to do so. We can no longer be seen as a nation reluctant to use hard power.

We need to understand and deal with the new realities of the 21st century. The future lies in our growing strength as a nation, the resolve of our leadership and the public mood. We must continue to focus on greater prosperity, inclusive socio-economic growth and enhancing the strength and capability of our armed forces in securing our borders. The pursuit of national interests in the changing global dynamics needs to be done. This will no doubt increase our influence not only in the immediate neighbourhood but also in the world.

Brig MP Singh (retd)

The Army Day is celebrated on January 15. The day marks the completion of Indianisation of the army by appointment of a native Indian officer, Lt Gen KM Cariappa, as C-in-C of the Indian Army on January 15, 1949. Cariappa replaced the last British C-in-C, General Francis Robert Butcher.

The struggle for Indianisation was long and arduous. Pandit Nehru recorded in his autobiography, Discovery of India: “All key positions were kept in the hands of Englishmen and no Indian could hold the King’s Commission. A raw English subaltern was senior to the oldest and the most experienced Indian Non-Commissioned Officer or those holding the Viceroy’s Commissions. No Indian could be employed at army headquarters except as a petty clerk in the accounts department.”

Throughout World War I, Indian leaders supported the war effort in the hope that for the acquisition of freedom and democracy, it was necessary to back the British in their struggle. But the British were unscrupulous towards Indians. Consequently, the tempo of hatred of the British rule rose.

The highest rank obtainable by an Indian in the army was that of Subedar, and that too was given at a ripe age of 65 to 70 years. In the third session in December 1887, the Congress demanded that the military service in the commissioned grades should be opened to the natives of the country and that the government should establish military colleges in the country where natives could be trained for a military career as officers of the Indian Army. General Frederick Roberts, C-in-C, rejected the proposal on the ground, saying: “No rank that we could bestow upon them could cause him to be considered equal by the British Officer, or looked up to by the British soldier in the same way that he looks up to the last joined British subaltern.” Paradoxically, Roberts was full of admiration for Rajputs, Sikhs, Dogras, Jats, Gorkhas and select Mohamedans. Brigaded with British troops, he said, “I would be proud to lead them against any European enemy.”

Under constant pressure from freedom fighters, a proposal was put up according to which Indians of higher classes were to receive commissions in only two regiments, one of cavalry and the other of the infantry. The scheme was rejected by the Secretary of State, the Earl of Kimberlay, who recommended that two local regiments might be raised and located on the Baluch frontier for the protection of Dera Ghazi Khan and Pashin. The Indian officers appointed to these units were required to be placed under the supervision of British officers, which was not accepted. Another scheme in which Indians holding commissions were to be given all privileges, except the command, was considered. The Secretary of State accepted the scheme because of its modesty, for, bestowal of a mere honorary rank of high grade was in reality to be lower than Second Lieutenant which emphasised its inferiority. Honorary commissions were granted for ‘honoris cause’ to a few VCOs of exceptional ability, but, they were not counted among the effective strength of the King’s Commissioned Officers.

Yet another proposal of Indianisation of the army was put up in 1900 by Lord Curzon, the Governor General. He proposed the formation of an Imperial Cadet Corps of about 20 to 30 men, drawn from princely and noble families of India. As a result, in 1905, a special form of King’s Commission in His Majesty’s Native Land Forces was instituted for Indians who had qualified through the Imperial Cadet Corps. The commission only carried the power of command over Indian troops, and those who held it were not to rise above the rank of Major. The arrangement was frustrating as only men from princely classes could obtain it. The number of officers holding these commissions was only seven in 1917, and was increased to nine by the end of World War I.

The struggle continued

Throughout WWI, Indian leaders, notably Gandhiji and Lokmanya Tilak, supported the war effort in the hope that for the acquisition of freedom and democracy, it was necessary to back the British in their struggle. They pledged unstinted support to the war. But the British were unscrupulous towards Indians. Punjabis settled in the US asked Indians abroad to return to India and free their homeland from colonial government. Termed Ghadarites, seven of them were hanged to death on November 16, 1916. Such incidents raised the tempo of hatred of the British rule. To calm the Indians, on August 20, 1917, Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, announced in the House of Commons: “The policy of His Majesty’s Government is that of increasing association of Indians in every branch of administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British empire.”

The Montagu-Chelmsford report tabled in November that year was full of praise for the gallant and faithful services of the Indians during the war, which rendered Indians eligible to hold King’s Commission in the army. As a result, 10 vacancies at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, were reserved annually for Indians with good family background, which was undoubtedly an important step in so far as it served as a breakthrough for their appointment as Commissioned Officers. The measure, nevertheless, fell much below the Indian aspirations. They considered that against a loss of 53,485 dead, 64,350 wounded and 3,762 missing Indians during the war, the reward of 10 vacancies yearly at Sandhurst was too modest.

WWI ended on November 11, 1918 and the sacrifices by Indians were rewarded by Jallianwala Bagh Massacre on April 13, 1919, which changed the attitude of the freedom fighters from supportive to aggressive. When the Legislative Assembly met in February and March 1921, the Indian members pressed their demand for greater association of Indians in defence forces and Indianisation of the officer cadre. Consequently, a committee headed by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru was appointed and its report was submitted on March 21, 1921. The three resolutions that concerned Indianisation were: 1) Not less than 25 per cent of the King’s Commissions granted every year should be given to His Majesty’s Indian subjects to start with; 2) Adequate facilitates should be provided in India for the preliminary training of Indians to fit them to enter the Royal Military College, Sandhurst; 3) The desirability of establishing in India a military college such as Sandhurst should be kept in view.

Speaking in the Legislative Assembly, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru said: “To my mind the Indianisation of the commissioned ranks of the army is even more important than any question of immediate constitutional advance. Without an efficient Indian Army, officered by our own nationals, self-government for Indians must be a very unreal and shadowy thing…”

The pressure led to the establishment of the Prince of the Wales Royal Military College at Dehradun. This institution was intended to impart preliminary training to Indians preparing for entry into Sandhurst. The institute opened on March 13, 1922. Arrangements were made to enable 70 boys to be trained for six years.

Another step forward was the setting up of the Military Requirements Committee under the chairmanship of the C-in-C, Lord Rawlinson, who agreed with the recommendations of the Sapru Committee. In January 1923, the Viceroy conveyed to the Secretary of State a scheme of Indianisation which outlined the procedure for complete Indianisation in three stages of 14 years each and opening of an Indian Military College. The Secretary of State was very annoyed on reading the proposed scheme and telegraphically said: “Reports of a widely held belief, not only among Indians but among Englishmen, are being constantly received in England that our mission in India is regarded by us as drawing to a close and that preparations are being made by us for retreat. Such an idea if it exists is a complete fallacy, and its continuous existence can only lead to intensified challenges to our authority and a decline in morale among services…. We regret we cannot sanction your recommendation for Indianisation.”

Simon Commission

After prolonged correspondence, General Rawlinson in a speech to the Legislative Assembly announced the intention of the government to Indianise eight units. The Indian member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council called the 8-unit scheme ‘unsatisfactory and insulting’. In June 1925, a new committee called Indian Sandhurst Committee or Skeen Committee was appointed. This committee recommended that the number of vacancies at Sandhurst be increased from 10 to 20, Indians be made eligible as Kings’ Commissioned Officers in Artillery, Signals and Engineers too and that a military college be opened in India. The government did not accept the recommendations of the Skeen Committee in full but agreed to increase the vacancies reserved for Indians at Sandhurst from 10 to 20 per year.

Reacting to the new scheme, Pandit Motilal Nehru pointed out that “the whole thing is that there is no intention of putting India on her feet at an early date. He went on to address the Legislative Assembly: “I may say at once that the word Indianisation is a word I hate from the bottom of my heart. I cannot understand that word. What do you mean by Indianising India… The army is ours, we have to officer our own army, there is no question of Indianising there. What we want is to get rid of Europeanisation of the Army…”

Simon Commission arrived in India in 1928. Relying on the British argument that independence or dominion status could not be granted to India till it had its own national army officered and manned by Indians, a committee under the chairmanship of Pandit Motilal Nehru demanded ‘stepping up of the Indianisation of the army, specially by providing opportunities for military training in the country’. The Committee considered it obligatory on the government to establish military training schools and colleges in India. A cadet college was established at Indore where KM Cariappa was trained to be an officer.

The military college

The political situation of the country was such that the demand of the Indians for Indianising the army at a rapid pace could not be withheld for long. As President of the Indian National Congress, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru hoisted the national flag of India on January 26, 1930 and passed the memorable resolution on the establishment of a sovereign independent republic of India. Finding the Indians adamant about a National Army of their own, the British were obliged to appoint on May 23, 1931 a committee under the chairmanship of the C-in-C General (later Field Marshal) Sir Philip Chetwode in order to work out the detail of the establishment of a military college in India to train candidates for commission.

The Chetwode Committee recommended the establishment of an Indian military college with a training course of three years, the age of entry being 18 to 20 years. The college, named the Indian Military Academy, was opened at the Railway Staff College building in Dehradun on October 1, 1932.

The first batch of 40 cadets, which included Sam Manekshaw, arrived at the IMA on September 30, 1934. They called themselves ‘Pioneer’ and they passed out in December 1934. An officer senior to the Pioneers was Cariappa, who after schooling in Coorg and graduating from Presidency College, Madras, joined the Cadet College at Indore where he did extremely well. He was sent to Royal Military College, Sandhurst, and commissioned in 1919 as 2/Lt. After active service in Iraq, Syria, Iran and Burma during World War II in 1946, he was promoted to Brigadier. During the Kashmir War of 1947-48, he assumed charge of operations and got two quick promotions. On January 15, 1949 he was appointed C-in-C Indian Army, which completed the process of Indianisation. Since then, January 15 is celebrated as Army Day.

Book Excerpt

By Our Special Representative

‘Vini, Vidi, Vici,’ said Julius Caesar, describing his conquest of England. I went, I saw and I shot, said General Dyer today describing his performance at Jallianwala Bagh before the Disorders Enquiry Committee. It was a ghastly tale that he told — a tale of premeditated, cold-blooded and deliberate shooting of several hundreds of people.

The General’s fame had drawn in a very large crowd as it had got abroad that he was to appear before the Committee today. The hall was packed to its utmost capacity before 10 and many had to go away for want of room, even the side-entrances to the hall being occupied. A pretty large number of European ladies had assembled to hear the hero of Jallianwala Bagh and they seemed to follow his evidence with keen interest.

The hall was packed to its utmost capacity before 10 and many had to go away for want of room, even the side-entrances to the hall being occupied. A pretty large number of European ladies had assembled to hear the hero of Jallianwala Bagh .

As soon as the members took their seats, General Dyer stepped into the witness’ chair. Every eye was at once turned on him. Somewhere between 50 and 55, of medium height, with a very red face, a short snub nose, small eyes, dressed in military uniform, booted and spurred, the General looked like any ordinary British officer.

In giving evidence General Dyer affected a frankness, provoking in its cynicism and repulsive in its brutality. He was thoroughly unrepentant of his conduct and seemed to be glorying in his deed.

With a callousness which would have been difficult to believe had not one seen it, he went on with his tale of restoring peace and order in the Punjab by flogging, by making people crawl on all fours, by compelling them to salaam every British officer, by arresting them wholesale, by heaping all sorts of indignities on their heads and lastly by firing on an unarmed gathering of several thousands of people and killing hundreds of them. And how were these people shot down? Without any warning, without any notice. When firing continued people began to run for their lives towards the narrow exits, some tried to jump over the walls, others lay down on the ground but they could hardly escape the eyes of the General, who, as he very gallantly said, himself directed the fire. There were children and boys, there were young men and old men but all this made no difference.

Such was the story in short which the General told amidst grim silence today. The feelings of pain and agony of Indians present can better be imagined than described. Of the members of the Committee, Lord Hunter was visibly distressed and Mr Rankin was not a little sore, as his questions showed, over the crawling transaction and to use his own expression, the ‘frightfulness’ indulged in at Jallianwala Bagh, while all the Indian members were evidently much pained and none gave greater expression to it than Pandit Jagat Narayan.

A word about the demeanour of the witness before the Committee. Deeply respectful to the president and other European members of the Committee who examined him, his manner towards the Indian members, particularly Pandit Jagat Narayan, was, to say the least, distinctly discourteous and at times almost offensive. He seemed to resent the Pandit’s probing questions and showed it openly.

Examination by Lord Hunter:

Lord Hunter (LH): Did you ascertain whether the military forces had been sent from

Jullundur to Amritsar?

General Dyer (GD): Yes.

LH: When was that?

GD: On the night of the 10th and 11th. It was 1 o’clock in the morning of the 11th as a matter of fact.

LH: Prior to that a small force had been sent?

GD: Yes.

LH: On the 10th did you receive a telegram from Lahore that trouble had arisen in Amritsar?

GD: Yes, sir.

LH: In consequence of that a force was sent?

GD: A force was sent.

LH: That force consisted of one hundred British and two hundred Indians?

GD: Yes.

LH: Is that somewhat in excess of what had been asked for?

GD: As far as I remember a hundred in excess.

LH: One hundred more Indian troops?

GD: Yes.

LH: Why was it sent in excess?

GD: I had a large force at Jullundur which could be spared easily and I thought there would be no harm in sending more than was asked for. Amritsar was also under my command at the time.

LH: A little after 5 did you get a further telegram explaining the situation at Amritsar and informing you of the murder of certain Europeans?

GD: Yes.

LH: After that I think troops left at 1 o’clock in the morning?

GD: I think it was 1 o’clock the morning.

LH: That was after both the telegrams were received?

GD: Yes, after both.

LH: At the time the troops left in what state was the communication between Amritsar and Jullundur?

GD: We had to go in roundabout way. As far as I remember, the ordinary telegraph line was out and we had to go in a roundabout way.

LH: On the 11th at 2 p.m. you received a telegram asking you to proceed personally to Amritsar?

GD: Yes.

LH: With what object?

GD: It was under my command and the Divisional Commander thought that perhaps I ought to be there.

LH: Did you see the Commissioner at Jullundur?

GD: Yes, I consulted him.

LH: After consultation you came to the conclusion that you ought to be there?

GD: Yes.

LH: Did you go by cart?

GD: Yes.

LH: When did you arrive there?

GD: I think at about 8.30 night time anyway.

LH: That time the headquarters of the Amritsar garrison was at the railway station?

GD: Yes, sir.

LH: Did you see Mr Irving and Mr Plomer?

GD: They were all at the railway station.

LH: Did you have conference with them?

GD: Yes, at the railway station.

LH: What information did you receive from Mr Irving?

GD: He said he could not deal with the situation any longer, that it was beyond all civil control and that I should take matters in hand.

LH: I would like you to explain what you understood your position to be in consequence of Mr Irving’s statement?

GD: Roughly civil law was at an end and that military law would have to take its place for the time being.

(General Dyer had deposed before the Hunter Commission on November 19, 1919)