The CDS will not exercise any military command, including over the three services chiefs, so as to be able to provide impartial advice to the political leadership.

Army Chief Gen Bipin Rawat, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, Defence Secretary Ajay Kumar in New Delhi, Tuesday. (Photo: PTI)

The Union Cabinet Tuesday approved creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) as principal military advisor to the government. In line with the landmark announcement made by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his Independence Day speech, this fulfils a long-standing recommendation for higher military reform, recommended by various expert committees and group of ministers, more so after the 1999 Kargil War.

The CDS will not exercise any military command, including over the three services chiefs, so as to be able to provide impartial advice to the political leadership.

The CDS will be a four-star General, at par in military rank, salary and perquisites with the three services chiefs, and will head the newly created Department of Military Affairs in the Ministry of Defence and function as its Secretary.

Making the announcement, Union Minister Prakash Javadekar said, “CDS will have all powers of a Secretary-level officer. The files need not go through the Defence Secretary and the CDS will be empowered to send to it directly to the Defence Minister.”

Apart from being the head of the Department of Military Affairs, the CDS will also be the Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. He will act as the Principal Military Adviser to the Defence Minister on all tri-services matters. In a clear delineation of roles, the three services chiefs will continue to advise the Minister on matters exclusively concerning their respective services.

The Department of Military Affairs, headed by the CDS, will deal with the armed forces — the Army, Navy and Air Force; works relating to the Army, Navy and Air Force; and procurement exclusive to the services except capital acquisitions. His mandate will also include promoting jointness in procurement, training and staffing for the defence services through joint planning and integration of their requirements; facilitation of restructuring of military commands for optimal utilisation of resources by bringing about jointness in operations, including through establishment of joint/theatre commands; and promoting use of indigenous equipment by the services.

The CDS will administer all the tri-services organisations in the ministry, including those related to cyber and space. He will be member of the Defence Acquisition Council and Defence Planning Committee, besides functioning as the Military Adviser to the Nuclear Command Authority. His task will be to implement Five-Year Defence Capital Acquisition Plan (DCAP), and two-year roll-on Annual Acquisition Plans (AAP), as a follow up of Integrated Capability Development Plan (ICDP), besides assigning inter-services prioritisation to capital acquisition proposal.

The CDS will also bring about reforms in the functioning of three services aimed at augmenting combat capabilities of the Armed Forces by reducing wasteful expenditure, while ensuring optimal utilisation of infrastructure and rationalising it through jointness among the services. He has been given a period of three years to bring about jointness in operation, logistics, transport, training, support services, communications, repairs and maintenance, etc of the three services.

Nagaland Governor RN Ravi, chosen interlocutor of the Prime Minister, has a Plan B and that is to deprive the NSCN (IM), the major group the Centre has been engaging following the 1997 Ceasefire Accord, of the sole representative status. The NFA was brokered by Ravi with this group in 2015 and he started engaging with the NNPG only in 2017 to widen the dialogue for more flexibility.

Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta (retd)

Military commentator

THE tsunami of protests over the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the National Register of Citizens (NRC) has drowned the claimed resolution of the Naga political issue. Emboldened by the pyrrhic victory in Jammu and Kashmir by nullifying Article 370 on August 5 this year, Prime Minister Narendra Modi on August 17, served his chosen interlocutor — Governor of Nagaland, RN Ravi — a deadline on the Naga Framework Agreement (NFA), to complete the peace process by October 31 and clinch a final settlement with the Nagas. In turn, Ravi issued an ultimatum to the NSCN (IM) to set aside the demand for a separate Constitution and flag while stressing that the accord will be signed on October 31, with or without them. National People’s Front leader and former chief minister of Nagaland, TR Zeliang, remarked that the government cannot set a deadline on negotiations to settle differences and urged Ravi to find the formula for a flag and Constitution. Five rounds of talks were held in October, the last on October 31 with NSCN (IM), which were reportedly inconclusive, though Ravi claimed that the NSCN (IM) agreed to sign the agreement after having reached an acceptable solution for flag and Constitution with Greater Nagalim set aside.

The optimism expressed by Ravi was not matched by the NSCN (IM) leaders who were loath to accept any compromise on the flag and Constitution. Anthony Ningkhan Shimray, the military commander of NSCN (IM), noted that the last round of talks ended without accepting or rejecting the terms of settlement. Standhope Varah, representative of the NSCN (IM) on the Ceasefire Monitoring Committee, along with the Centre’s Lt Gen Shauqin Chauhan, said: “Government should not mistake us for Kashmir.”

As the threatened deadline approached with no signs of a compromise, armed rebels of the NSCN (IM), numbering around 5,000, reportedly started exiting their camps in Nagaland and Manipur for Mizoram, Bhutan and Myanmar. The Naga National Political Group (NNPG), a conglomerate of six rebel factions, with whom Ravi opened talks in 2017, has approximately a cadre of 200-300 and their whereabouts is not known. Like in Kashmir, people in Manipur and Nagaland began building their stocks of ration as 15 companies of the Central Armed Police were airlifted to Nagaland and the Assam Rifles was mobilised. But unlike in Jammu and Kashmir, no lockdown was imposed.

Ravi’s Plan B is to deny the sole representative status to NSCN (IM), a major group the Government of India has been engaging following the 1997 Ceasefire Accord. The August 2015 Naga Framework Accord was brokered by Ravi with the NSCN (IM) leadership. He started engaging with the NNPG only in 2017 to widen the dialogue and put pressure on the NSCN (IM) to be more flexible on its demands. Defections engineered from the NSCN (IM) helped to weaken its resolve and prop up the NNPG as a foil. But the August 2015 agreement was signed between the Centre and the NSCN (IM) in the presence of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. It would be strange if the final settlement was done with another entity — an afterthought group of rebels when for 22 years the Government of India has been negotiating with NSCN (IM).

Since the 2015 Naga Accord has been kept under wraps, both sides have been making contradictory claims. Ravi informed a parliamentary committee on Home Affairs that the NFA was signed in 2015 after the NSCN (IM) gave up the idea of sovereignty and agreed for a settlement within the Indian federation. NSCN (IM) supremo Thuingaleng Muivah, on the other hand, has been repeatedly demanding a separate flag and Constitution. Nagas are sceptical about Ravi’s assurances on the special status conferred on Nagaland through Article 371A in 1960 after the Governor of J&K Satyapal Malik, two days before Article 370 was neutralised, assured former chief minister Omar Abdullah that no withdrawal of special status was planned. Later, Ravi added fuel to fire by saying that ‘removal of Article 370 was correction of a sin’, adding ‘there is no question of a flag, Constitution and Greater Nagaland’.

Statements attributed to Ravi cannot be confirmed since both sides have used the print media creatively. The balls in the air went like this: Article 371 could be extended to Naga-inhabited areas in Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. An alternative to Nagalim is through the autonomous territorial councils in states where the Nagas reside, but this will have to be negotiated with them. Nagas are to decide the use of flag — on social and cultural occasions as legitimised by the Naga Peoples Council. NNPG ideas on the Naga Constitution are like there was never any written or codified system of law and order or administration of justice, except under the Indian courts. In cases involving Naga traditional and customary issues, all courts, including the Supreme Court, usually referred cases back to the customary tribal courts. The NSCN (IM) has a more detailed concept of a written Constitution which they wish to implement.

Although the NSCN (IM) did not sign the final draft agreement, which NNPG did, by the deadline of October 31, both sides agreed to continue talking. Concurrently, preparations were on for a full and final settlement of the Naga question on December 11 near Kohima during the 20th Hornbill Festival where Modi was to do the honours with both the NSCN (IM) and NNPG as signatories. It seems the ruckus caused by the CAA in the North-East stole the limelight, depriving Modi of an opportunity to sign the historic accord and end the world’s oldest insurgency.

Instead of Modi, Ravi inaugurated the Hornbill Festival and announced, “Nagaland is on the cusp of history and a new dawn”. Nagaland Chief Minister Neiphiu Rio, a few days earlier on the state’s 57th Statehood Day, said: “Negotiations between the Naga political groups and the Centre have concluded and the people of the state are set to witness history very soon.” Last week, Eastern Army Commander, Lt-Gen Anil Chauhan, while commenting on the situation, post-CAA in Assam and Tripura, where the Army was deployed, said, “The government is keen to conclude the Naga talks but the impact on Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh is being assessed.”

Is there something that Ravi and Rio know that we do not? That NSCN (IM) has accepted the final draft of the Naga accord, sans flag and Constitution? Or have IM been forced to pick up the crumbs? At Hebron near Dimapur — Muivah’s citadel — the emperor will be without clothes, 22 years wasted in shadowboxing. Only the final accord will reveal who has got what and whether the mother of all insurgencies will erupt again.

Defence acquisition is a mission for committed professionals and not for administrative generalists or indeed for uniformed specialists working on rotating assignments, burdened with other chores and pressures. In the US and elsewhere, it is a profession where people train, specialise and work full-time. The US even has a Defence Acquisition University.

Air Marshal BD Jayal (retd)

Mmilitary Commentator

Arecent panel discussion on ‘Make in India and the nation’s security’ featured General VP Malik, who was the Army Chief during the Kargil war. Few will forget his promise to the nation, when faced with a herculean challenge, of ‘we will fight with what we have’, also discreetly conveying the message to the civil leadership that the defence management, procurement and production systems had failed to deliver, leaving the Army to fend for itself. Not surprisingly, during the panel discussion, he again cautioned the people that unless India becomes self-reliant in defence, its security forces would continue to be vulnerable.

Another panellist, who had been a senior member in the defence acquisition system, suggested a dedicated and overarching organisation to deliver on defence needs and the panel moderator reflected on the irony that the country has launched ballistic missiles but is unable to make the INSAS rifle. If these are the sentiments of those who have been practitioners, then clearly the self-reliance in defence production, that has been an avowed objective of governments since independence, continues to evade us.

It is worth revisiting recent history to fathom why indigenising defence production is proving to be so challenging to successive defence ministers, all of whom mean well, and of late, appear to have taken positive steps towards this end. In 2015, the government appointed the Kelkar Committee to study the public-private partnership concept and make recommendations. This was followed by the Dhirendra Singh Committee which looked at the Make in India concept in the field of defence manufacturing and recommended a strategic partnership model wherein the government would select Indian private enterprises to exclusively make designated military platforms.

Consequently, the ninth version of the Defence Procurement Procedure or DPP-2016 devoted a chapter to strategic partnership, which followed soon after. Whilst the idea evokes optimism amongst most stakeholders because of the dynamism that the private sector will bring, as subsequent events including the drawing of the Rafale controversy into the political arena showed, any attempt to involve the private sector in the defence procurement and production domain will continue to be a challenge.

This is borne out by a recent media report highlighting how in six years, no major Make in India defence project has taken off because of bureaucratic bottlenecks, commercial and technical wrangling and a lack of requisite political push. These shortcomings have a historical reason, some going back decades and unless we attempt to understand and address these, our Make in India vision will continue to stagnate. That the Defence Minister has formed yet another committee to review the DPP-2016, indicates that formulating newer and more complex procedures appears to have become an end in itself rather than merely a means to an end.

The first challenge is to understand that defence manufacturing is in a special category and needs to be treated as such. This is best exemplified by what Jacques S. Gansler, who steered such consolidation in the US, had to say in their context: “In order to understand the economic operations of the US defence industry, it is first absolutely essential to recognise that there is no free market at work in this area and that there cannot be one because of the dominant role played by the federal government. The combination of a single buyer, a few large firms in each segment of the industry, and a small number of extremely expensive weapon programmes, constitutes a unique structure for doing business.” Drawing from this experience and applying our own conditions both in the public and private sector, we first need to arrive at our own ‘unique structure’ of doing business in the field of defence production which must have unanimity across the political system for it to succeed.

The second challenge dates back to the Bofors scandal of 1987 and the attendant political controversy that resulted in a defence procurement eco-system where procrastination has become the mantra. The Services have termed this as the Bofors syndrome, a mindset where few in the decision-making chain would venture to take decisions for fear of falling prey to the shenanigans of others in the complex chain of decision-making.

The unique feature of this syndrome is that it works smoothly where government-to-government procurement contracts are concerned, but goes into deep freeze when faced with an open tender purchase. But with the recent political controversy surrounding the government-to-government agreement for the purchase of Rafale aircraft, this avenue may also become a victim to the Bofors Syndrome.

The next challenge is to recognise that defence acquisition is a complex process involving multiple stakeholders and involves diverse resources and decision-making systems and should aim to provide on-performance, on-time and on-cost capabilities to the armed forces. This is a mission for committed professionals and not for administrative generalists or, indeed, for uniformed specialists working on rotating assignments, burdened with other chores and pressures. In the US and elsewhere, defence acquisition is considered a full-time profession where people train, specialise and work full-time. The US even has a Defence Acquisition University committed to creating acquisition professionals.

In the foreword to the DPP-2016, Manohar Parrikar said, “The DPP is not merely a procurement procedure, it is also an opportunity to improve the efficiency of the procurement process, usher in change in the mindset of the stakeholders and promote growth of the domestic defence industry.’ The biggest challenge to the Make in India aspect in defence production, hence, remains the outdated mindset.

Whatever the official claims, to impartial observers, the underlying spirit of successive DPPs is no longer ‘delivering and sustaining effective and affordable war-fighting capabilities to users within a specified time frame’. Instead, each successive version is being driven by a procedural, legal and defensive mindset where following the book appears to be an end in itself, leaving the armed forces bereft of modernisation and left to ‘fight with what they have.’

Akash Ghai

Tribune News Service

Mohali, December 23

A total of 81 illegal structures that have come up within the restricted 100 metres around the Air Force station here after the deadline of March 3, 2011, would be razed without any compensation within two weeks.

Using powers of collector under the Works of Defence Act, 1903, Mohali Deputy Commissioner Girish Dayalan issued the orders in this regard today.

Confirming the development, Dayalan said earlier a total of 98 structures were identified, which had come up in the restricted area after March 9, 2011.

“Of the total 98 owners of these structures, 16 owners were able to adduce evidence that their structures were existing prior to the set deadline of March 9, 2011, while one owner gave evidence that his property was not situated in the restricted area of 100 metres around the Air Force station. So now, all 81 structures are raised in contravention of the law, therefore, they are liable to be demolished since their action of raising the same was illegal. I have issued orders to demolish these structures within a period of two weeks,” said Dayalan.

Dayalan added that the demolition order had been issued following the directions of Punjab and Haryana High Court after giving adequate time to the owners to plead their case, and carrying out proper legal procedure. “No compensation for structures will be given to the owners of these buildings rather they might be liable to pay the cost of demolition. If they want compensation for their plots, they can approach the authorities concerned, who will decide on it,” said Dayalan.

The Government of India Notification of January 23, 2010, had imposed restrictions on use, enjoyment of land in the vicinity of the Air Force station, Chandigarh, situated at Mohali and ordered that such land may be kept free of buildings and other constructions.

“Directions are also issued to the SSP, Mohali, to provide adequate force for ensuring the demolitions peacefully in coming days,” said Dayalan.

GEN Bipin Rawat knows how to separate the wheat from the chaff. Days before his retirement after a three-year tenure as the Army Chief, he has told us, without naming anybody, who the country’s real leaders are and who aren’t. Speaking at a health summit in the Capital and sounding like a management guru, he stated that leaders led people in the right direction, not in inappropriate directions. It wasn’t hard to guess that he was referring to the ongoing protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the National Register of Citizens (NCR). By apparently taking a stand in favour of the powers that be, the General not only waded into a minefield called politics but also drew flak, undermining the authority and sanctity of his office. Even though the protests across the country have been unmistakably leaderless, the Army Chief claimed that some people were leading crowds to carry out arson and violence — virtually echoing the government’s point of view that Opposition parties were fanning the flames.

The Army’s clarification on Gen Rawat’s remarks was more of a damage-control exercise: ‘He has not referred to any political event, personality. He was addressing future citizens of India who are students… In the Kashmir valley, youths were misguided first by people whom they trusted as leaders.’ Notably, the Army mentioned the K-word, betraying a desperate attempt to overstate the point that Gen Rawat was not referring to the CAA-NRC agitation. This, too, hints at the malaise of politicisation of the armed forces which is best avoided.

The ruling party rode on the poll plank of national security after the Pulwama terror attack and the Balakot air strike to secure a second successive five-year term. During campaigning, the PM himself hinted that the country was safe only in his hands, while UP CM Adityanath had the cheek to dub the Army as ‘Modiji ki sena’. Amid the political grandstanding, the onus is on the defenders of our borders to uphold their glorious tradition of staying apolitical. After all, they have always fought for the nation, not for any party. And it’s here that the forces need true leaders.