he knowledge of nuanced differences between the two Punjabs may support efforts towards conciliation. Apart from the unpredictable nature of the civil-military relationship in Pakistan, the existence of India-centric extremist groups in Pakistani Punjab and recent developments in India, such as the invocation of Pakistan for electoral dividends, are some of the macro-impediments to creating an amicable environment for dialogue.

Luv Puri

Journalist and author

Internationally, the opening of the Kartarpur shrine is seen through its potential to be a catalyst for Indo-Pak conciliation. This is signified by the forthcoming visit of United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres to the shrine during his visit to Pakistan beginning Sunday. Over 45,000 Indian pilgrims have travelled through the Kartarpur corridor to pay obeisance at the shrine since the opening of the route on November 9, 2019.

The opening of the Kartarpur corridor situated in Pakistani Punjab’s Narowal district is particularly important for the Punjabis. For the Punjabi Muslims, the opening of the shrine is an occasion to reclaim an important component of their identity. An exhibition of paintings done on Sikhism and its related themes curated by the Lahore-based Fakir Khana Museum at the shrine reflects that. Within the shrine, there is a presence of local Muslims, mostly agriculturists, hailing from the nearby villages of Pakistan’s Punjab.

In quantitative terms, Punjab on both sides was the prime recipient of refugees from either side in 1947-48. On either side, memories of trauma caused by forced migration have been passed on from one generation of Punjabis to another. That is why Punjab and Punjabis are seen to be at the heart of an Indo-Pak conciliation. However, the corridor’s potential for conciliation requires a nuanced understanding of the two Punjabs, both from a historical and contemporary perspective.

Pakistani Punjab with a population of around 110 million is nearly four times in terms of the population of the Indian Punjab. In cultural and linguistic terms, it is mainly the eastern and central parts of Pakistani Punjab which are akin to the Indian Punjab. There is also a greater diversity in terms of dialects of Punjabi on the Pakistani side. Areas like Rawalpindi and Islamabad are in the Pothwari-speaking northern belt of Punjab and they border the Hindko-speaking areas of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The Pothwari area of Punjab is linguistically akin to the Pakistan-controlled Jammu and Kashmir, which is the non-Kashmiri speaking area of the undivided Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). On the other hand, the Saraiki-speaking southern Punjab areas of Bahawalpur and Multan are distinct from the rest of Punjab in cultural and linguistic terms.

A large portion of the present-day urban and rural agricultural Pakistani Punjab is a byproduct of the canal system built of the rivers by the British in the late 19th century that resulted in claiming of the land for agricultural use and also setting up of urban settlements in the process. A 2018 paper —Constructing ‘Hydraulic’ Society-1 in Lower Chenab Colony: A case study of Toba Tek Singh (1900-47) — points out that in the 1891 Census, the total population of the Lower Chenab Colony was 0.1 million and in 1911, the population increased to 1.1 million, ‘including 5,48,207 immigrants, born outside the colony.’ ‘The Lower Chenab Colony comprised whole or parts of the tehsils of the three districts of Jhang, Lahore and Gujranwala.’ The paper mentioned that the ‘grantees for the project of Lower Chenab Colony were taken from seven districts: Ambala, Ludhiana, Jullundur, Hoshiarpur, Amritsar, Gurdaspur and Sialkot.’ Except Sialkot, which is in Pakistani Punjab, all other places are now in the Indian Punjab. The grantees were mainly Sikhs, who migrated to rural areas for agriculture, and Hindus going to newly developed urban centres. So, for many Sikhs and Hindus, the 1947 displacement was the second one, though it was involuntary the second time.

This is not to understate the human impact of the Partition. A 2008 paper — The demographic impact of Partition in the Punjab in 1947 — reveals that ‘over 5.2 million (in thousands — 2,199 in India, 3,084 in Pakistan) of these Partition-related migrants moved from one part of the divided Punjab to the other, another 2 million (in thousands — 175 in India and 1,825 in Pakistan) persons moved either from other parts of India into West Punjab or from other parts of West Pakistan into East Punjab, and a further 1.85 million (in thousands — 1,209 in India and 645 in Pakistan) persons moved from East or West Punjab to other parts of West Pakistan or India, respectively.’

In sharp contrast, by December 1947, as per an estimate, the Sindh province of Pakistan, including Pakistan’s first capital, Karachi, had settled only 0.24 million displaced person. The migrants from the Indian side of Punjab mostly settled in Pakistani Punjab. Sikh and Hindu migrants from Pakistani Punjab, many of whom were from urban areas, apart from the Indian Punjab, settled in larger numbers in places like Delhi. The loss of human life on both sides of Punjab was also colossal.

The post-1947 trends also need to be studied closely. In contrast to other provinces such as Sindh, Pakistani Punjab’s provincial politicians did not clamour for official recognition of the Punjabi, language, mainly on account of following the lead of Pakistan founders who wanted no other language to emerge parallel to Urdu. The Pakistani Punjab followed some of the colonial practices, namely giving lands, particularly agricultural, to retired soldiers and army officers.

Alongside the opening of the Kartarpur corridor, a lot more needs to done by the two countries to put into practice Guru Nanak’s universal and everlasting message of humanism.

In this context, knowledge of some of these nuanced differences between the two Punjabs may support efforts towards conciliation and infuse more realism. Apart from the unpredictable nature of the civil-military relationship in Pakistan, the existence of India-centric extremist groups in Pakistani Punjab and other recent realities in India, such as the constant invocation of Pakistan for electoral dividends are some of the macro-impediments to creating an amicable environment for dialogue.

n modern aerial warfare, perception is as important as the kills and destruction. There are lessons surely for the IAF and other military top leadership in the entire gamut of how a military operation is to be orchestrated. It is to be hoped that we would consider sharing, at least on a ‘need-to-know basis’, important lessons from this operation. We don’t have the luxury of time to learn from mistakes.

Group Captain Murli Menon (Retd)

Defence analyst

It is a year since two key bread-and-butter calls for the IAF — strike and air defence — were put on international display and appraisal after the Pulwama terror attack. The suicide bomber, Adil Dar, was like other new entrants into Kashmir militancy — educated, with a financially stable family background.

We need to address the social sanction given to violence and militancy in the Valley. Though stone-pelting incidents appear to have reduced, vulnerable youths need to be more closely monitored by the agencies and more efforts made to deradicalise and reorientate their impressionable minds. Local tactical intelligence-gathering, of course, needs to be revamped.

Read also:

• India crossed Rubicon with Balakot air strike

As for the military aspects of the Pulwama-Balakot aftermath, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) reprisals on our Army formations at Mendhar need to be re-assessed to see why no ground-based weapon systems could be brought to bear on them. More so, when they were in a heightened state of readiness. Were there, as reported elsewhere, any issues on the MiG-21 Bison as regards radio-jamming interference, affecting effective control of interceptors by our fighter controllers or was that just a bogey? Was the performance of the Phalcon AWACS (airborne warning and control systems) and Netra AEWCS (airborne early warning and control system) aircraft as expected? Were any of the new low-level tactical radars of the IACCS (Integrated Air Command and Control System) or any Aerostat radar involved in these operations? Why did such a large PAF attacking force (24 by one account) escape with just a single casualty?

Several such questions abound about the whys and wherefores of the IAF aerial engagements. Sans any authentic declassified historical data so far from Air Head Quarters, our analysis would, perforce, have to be based on plausible logical explanations. From the statement of IAF Chief RK Bhadauria himself, we know that the IAF has accepted its tactical folly in the Mi-17 ‘ blue-on-blue’ incident.

What is still in the realm of conjecture, however, are the nitty-gritty of Wing Commander Abhinandan’s aerial engagement (if the mechanics of his kill on the F-16 are indeed true, why no attempt was made to turn his MiG-21 Bison towards friendly territory as his No. 2 apparently did, what actually crippled his plane etc.) and the modalities of the Mirage strike at Balakot (how many Spice bombs were released, from what ranges were they launched in fully autonomous modes, could any other formation members vouch for the accuracy of the launches?).

We still don’t know if Abhinandan was indeed shot down by a PAF fighter, as alleged, or by an enemy SAM or yet whether he encountered other issues such as running out of fuel and flaming out over enemy territory. These are things that sometimes happen in the ‘fog of war’, but would qualify to be called poor airmanship. Whatever be the reason for his downing, the need for turning a stricken fighter towards friendly territory and the need for a viable Combat Search and Rescue capability need not be over-emphasised.

Abhinandan was fortunate to have returned unscathed, more thanks to the happenstance of international pressure triggered by social media videos. More so, knowing our adversary’s penchant for shoddy treatment of its PoWs. Now that the IAF has more advanced and capable attack helicopters in its inventory such as the AH-64-E Apaches (with some other light- and medium-armed versions being indigenously made), these need to be utilised in conjunction with other fighter platforms and even C130-J gunship versions for CSAR (Combat Search and Rescue).

As for the Mirage strikes, we need to look at other imponderables, such as possible weapon failures or pilot errors in targeting, if indeed the Spice-hit accuracies are suspect as they appear to be.

Expensive sensitive aerial weapons, such as the Spice bombs, call for very stringent storage conditions in terms of air-conditioned facilities and periodic servicing and checks. Were these adequately available in the heat and dust of the Gwalior air base (from where the Mirages supposedly took off for the mission)? Any shortfall here would tell on the efficient functioning of the weapon system. Accurate flying and launch parameters are, of course, a given for these kind of missions and can only be ascertained by the pilots themselves or the senior supervisors in the strike formation.

We need to establish exactly why the Crystal Maze missile apparently refused to leave the launcher, denying the mission important BDA (Battle Damage Assessment) input through its TV guidance facility: Possibly, on account of flaws in pre-launch drill?

Then again, why did the Spice bombs apparently miss the intended target (possibly launched out of range, causing problems for the guidance system to work accurately)? The weather picture over the target area was well known, so the planners ought to have built in redundancies in obtaining BDA.

In modern aerial warfare, perception is as important as the kills and destruction. There are lessons surely for the IAF and other military top leadership in the entire gamut of how a military operation is to be orchestrated. For instance, would the IAF be content to carry on with its doctrinal triple-level prosecution of an air war strategy or should we be looking at a more dynamic top-down Air HQ-led orchestration of the air war, especially for high-profile counter-terror air operations? (As, indeed, our adversaries do — the PAF Chief runs the air war himself from his Air HQ. We, on the other hand, have a traditional command-heavy orchestration).

Extraneous factors such as national elections or other political considerations cannot be allowed to interfere with the planning and conduct of aerial or other military operations. Also, what was the tearing hurry to call off operations? India has traditionally balked at the timely release of its war histories.

It is to be hoped that we would consider sharing, at least on a ‘need-to-know basis’, important lessons from this operation which came our way two decades after the Kargil War. We do not have the luxury of time to learn from mistakes. Like they say, we cannot be in danger of being prepared for yesterday’s war, but have to get set for tomorrow’s, including the inevitable drone warfare to come.

Pulwama-Balakot timeline

• Feb 14, 2019 Forty CRPF jawans killed in Pulwama terror attack as suicide bomber rams a car laden with explosives into a CRPF bus
• Feb 19 Jaish-e-Mohammed claims responsibility
• Feb 20 NIA takes over Pulwama case
• Feb 26 IAF bombs Jaish base in Balakot, Pakistan
• Feb 27 IAF jet shot, Pakistan captures the Indian pilot, Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman
• Feb 28 India gives proof of Pak aggression
• March 1 Wg Cdr Abhinandan returns home after being released from captivity by Pakistan
• June 26 No intelligence failure in the case of Pulwama attack, Centre tells Lok Sabha
• July 3 Four of five terrorists involved in Pulwama attack killed and one arrested, Centre tells Parliament

Chandigarh, February 16

A day after four children were charred to death in a fire tragedy involving a ramshackle van in Punjab’s Sangrur, police slapped murder charges against the driver and the owner-cum-principal of the school to which the vehicle belonged.

Confirming it, Sunam DSP Sukhbinder Pal Singh said school owner-cum-principal Lakhwinder and van driver Dalbir were arrested on the murder charge on the complaint of a girl’s father.

Meanwhile, a tearful adieu was given to the children at their native place in Sangrur on Sunday.

“The complainant has stated that on previous occasions, too, the school principal and the driver had been warned about the condition of an auto-rickshaw which they had provided for ferrying children,” the DSP said over the phone.“The complainant alleged that when the school van was provided, it was even riskier than the previous vehicle and the deliberate act on the part of the accused endangered the lives of children,” the DSP added.

When asked that the van was stated to be very old, the DSP said they have sought all records from the regional transport authorities.

“These should be available on Monday,” he said.

Earlier, police had booked the principal, school management and the van driver on charges of causing culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code. The murder charge was added later.

Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, the apex religious body of Sikhs, has announced Rs 1 lakh to the next of kin of the each victim.

SGPC chief Gobind Singh Longowal demanded strict action against the officials whose negligence led to the plying of unfit vehicles on roads.

The children, who were charred to death inside the vehicle, included a nearly three-year-old girl visiting the school for the first time, police had said.

“She was fond of ‘paranthas’ and I had packed them in her tiffin,” said her inconsolable mother on Sunday.

The petrol vehicle, stated to be a 1990-model, fitted with an LPG cylinder, was bought by the school authorities on Friday and deployed to ferry children for the first time on Saturday.

The accident took place on the Longowal-Sidsaachar road, police had said, adding that 12 children were in the van at the time of the incident.

While eight children were rescued from the burning van by people working in nearby fields, four, including the three-year-old girl, were burnt alive, they added.

Punjab Chief Minister Amarinder Singh too had ordered a magisterial probe into the incident while ordering the state Transport Department to launch a statewide checking of the road worthiness and fitness of all school buses.

He also ordered an ex gratia of Rs 7.25 lakh to each of the victim families. — PTI

Read: Punjab CM commends 14-year-old for rescuing 4 kids from burning van

According to police, the incident took place around 11 am at Sharifda village when Akash Kumar Koitiya (22), a jawan with the military police wing of the Army, started on his wedding procession.

A Dalit, Koitiya had recently finished his training in Bengaluru and was about to join his posting at Meerut. He was on leave for his wedding.

Despite police protection, the wedding procession of a Dalit Army jawan in Gujarat’s Banaskantha district was on Sunday pelted with stones by a group of people, allegedly from another community because the groom rode a mare.

According to police, the incident took place around 11 am at Sharifda village when Akash Kumar Koitiya (22), a jawan with the military police wing of the Army, started on his wedding procession. A Dalit, Koitiya had recently finished his training in Bengaluru and was about to join his posting at Meerut. He was on leave for his wedding.

“Earlier, we received threats from a few people from the Thakor Koli community that they would not allow the procession to pass through the village if the groom rode a mare. We gave a written request for police security after which 6-7 police personnel were deployed to accompany the wedding procession. However, after the procession started moving, a group of people started throwing stones. The groom narrowly escaped an injury and was taken to the police control room van. However, three of our relatives, including two women, were injured in the stone-pelting,” said Vijay Koitiya, the elder brother of Akash. Vijay, too, is with the Army and is posted in Jammu and Kashmir.

Following the incident, multiple police teams were rushed to the village. “At least 50-60 policemen joined the wedding procession as security convoy so that the groom and other baratis could reach the bride’s village, Sundha, in Palanpur taluka. The wedding went on without any incident,” said Dalpat Bhatia, a Dalit rights activist based in Banaskantha.

Taking cognizance of the complaint lodged by the groom’s family, an FIR has been filed at Gadh police station in Banaskantha against 11 people belonging to the Thakor Koli community.

The accused have been identified as Senji Koli, Shivaji Koli, Deepak Koli, Tushar Koli, Bhavan Koli, Vinod Koli, Ramaji Koli, Deepak Ishwar Koli, Bai Koli, Manju Koli and Jeetu Koli.

“The groom and his procession were attacked with stones by a group in the village who objected to him riding a mare. We provided security in advance and after the incident, more personnel were deployed. We have booked 11 accused under Indian Penal Code sections 323 (assault), 337 (causing hurt by rash act) 294 (obscenity), 506 (criminal intimidation) 147 (rioting) and 148 (rioting with deadly weapon) along with sections of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities Act),” said P G Rajput, officer in charge of Gadh police station. No arrests have been made yet, police said.