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ED chargesheet a ‘cheap election stunt’, says Congress

ED chargesheet a 'cheap election stunt', says Congress

File photo of AgustaWestland chopper.

New Delhi, April 5

The Congress on Friday termed as “rehashed insinuations, lies, and cheap election stunt” the Enforcement Directorate’s (ED) act of mentioning names of some party leaders in their supplementary chargesheet in the AgustaWestland case and said a “panic-stricken” Modi Government will not be able to change its “exit date and fate.”

The Congress’ communications in-charge Randeep Singh Surjewala said “a single uncertified page leaked by the ED of a purported chargesheet is a cheap election stunt to divert attention from imminent defeat of the Modi government”.

“The ED has become ‘Election Dhakosla’ of a government manufacturing a lie a day,” he said.

Surjewala said the Modi government has lost all litigations against the Italy-based Finmeccanica and its British subsidiary AgustaWestland.

He said on January 8, 2018, an Italian appeals court acquitted Giuseppe Orsi, Former Chief Executive and Bruno Spagnolini, former head of the Helicopter Unit from the charges of any wrongdoing in the sale of 12 helicopters to India.

“On September 17, 2018, a higher court in Milan, Italy affirmed the order in a 322-page detailed judgment and upheld the finding of ‘no graft or wrong doing’ by any Indian official. Modi government was a party in the case and lost. Modi government has chosen to not file an appeal in the matter,” he said.

“All these rehashed insinuations and lies were bundled out earlier too through a set of pliable media. Ultimately, they failed in an international court and were rejected as trash. A panic-stricken Modi government and its puppet ED will not be able to change its exit date and fate. The Prime Minister has already been rejected by the people,” he added.

The ED on Thursday filed a supplementary chargesheet against British national Christian Michel, the alleged middleman in the Rs 3,600-crore AugustaWestland VVIP chopper deal, in which it has mentioned “Mrs Gandhi”, but not named her as an accused in the case.

The chargesheet said that Michel knew “Mrs Gandhi” since 1986.

Names of other Congress leaders were also mentioned in the chargesheet, but not as accused in the case.

The chargesheet has listed a series of “despatches” between February 2008 and October 2009 by Michel, including one dated March 15, 2008, that mentioned “Mrs Gandhi” as the driving force behind the V.I.P. informing that she will not fly any more in the Mi-8. — IANS


Personalising the Army Don’t let politicians take the forces for granted

Personalising the Army

UTTAR PRADESH CM Yogi Adityanath has a knack for renaming places. Now, he has gone a step further by referring to the Army as ‘Modiji ki sena’, as if it’s the Prime Minister, not the President, who is the Supreme Commander of the armed forces. Adityanath made the remark while campaigning for none other than former Army Chief VK Singh, a minister in the NDA government. He said: “The Congress leaders would feed biryani to the terrorists, while ‘Modi’s army’ gives them bullets or bombs.” This brazen personalisation of the Services has expectedly drawn a sharp reaction from retired officers as well as opposition parties. Former Navy Chief Admiral L Ramdas has asserted that the armed forces don’t belong to any individual but to the nation, while Lt Gen HS Panag (retd) has said such comments could lead to politicisation of the Army.

The government has been quick to extract political mileage from the exemplary work done by the defence personnel, be it the surgical strikes after the Uri attack in 2016 or the recent Balakot airstrikes in the wake of the Pulwama carnage. The ASAT missile test, a landmark in defence research, was announced with great fanfare last week and touted as an achievement of the ruling dispensation, but the Election Commission (EC) did not consider it a violation of the model code of conduct. The EC went by the rule book. But these are political minefields open to diverse interpretations.

Such lacunae embolden politicians to ‘appropriate’ national institutions for electoral gains. The EC needs to crack the whip — while acting within the ambit of the model code’s provisions — so as to discourage such practices. Irresponsible statements that denigrate the defenders of the nation can have a disturbing effect on their morale, besides straining ties between the military and political leadership. The Army, the Air Force and the Navy know their job pretty well and are known for taking decisive action for the sake of national security, no matter which party is in power. Piggybacking on the forces’ feats is not only unfair, but also unethical.


SP-rank officer to lead CRPF convoys in Valley Single motorcade won’t have more than 40 vehicles

SP-rank officer to lead CRPF convoys in Valley

Decision comes in wake of Pulwama attack that left 40 dead. file

New Delhi, March 31

CRPF convoys moving to and from the Kashmir valley will now be commandeered by a higher SP-rank officer and a single motorcade will not have more than 40 vehicles at any point of time, the paramilitary force has ordered in the wake of the Pulwama attack that killed 40 troops during a similar movement.

The new standard operating procedures (SOPs) issued by the force headquarters in Delhi for vehicle-mounted movement of troops in Jammu and Kashmir says that the ‘passenger manifest discipline’ for each vehicle in the convoy be strictly adhered to.

Among the first set of changed SOPs is the move to depute a second-in-command rank officer (equivalent to Superintendent of Police rank) of the force to lead the convoy instead of the current practice of a junior Assistant Commandant-rank (Assistant SP) officer heading the entourage. 

This is to ensure that the convoy is led by an experienced and senior officer who will have a better understanding and strategy to manoeuvre the convoy to and from the Kashmir valley, which is operationally very sensitive due to terrorist acts and IED threats, official sources said. This will also upgrade the accountability hierarchy and the new convoy commander will now directly report and co-ordinate with one of the three CRPF Deputy Inspector General (operations) based in Kashmir.

Till now, the convoy commander or the Assistant Commandant used to report through the Commandant to their higher-ups. The convoy commander usually travels in the lead in a communications gadget-fitted vehicle comprising armed troops for quick reaction.  It has also been decided that the convoy strength will not go beyond 40 vehicles in any case and “all possible efforts” will be made to essentially keep the number of vehicles in a motorcade to the least possible of about 10-20 for effective management and control, they said. 

A CRPF bus in the fifth position of a 78 vehicle convoy was targeted by a Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) suicide bomber after he detonated his explosives-laden SUV near it on the Jammu-Srinagar highway in Pulwama on February 14. — PTI

 


When Bhagat Singh sought legal aid

On March 23, 1931, Bhagat Singh, along with his associates Sukhdev and Rajguru, was hanged to death for the assassination of British police officer John Saunders. Produced here is the letter written by Bhagat Singh and his comrades on May 8, 1930, to the tribunal, seeking to avail themselves of legal help in the Lahore Conspiracy case. The Punjab Archives, Lahore, has made it public

Chaman Lal
Former JNU Professor and Honorary advisor to Bhagat Singh Archives and Resource Centre, Delhi

A Special Tribunal of three High Court judges was notified by Chief Justice of Punjab High Court Chief Justice Shadi Lal, on May 1, 1930 for the trial of the Lahore Conspiracy case. This tribunal consisted of Justice Coldstream as President and Justice Agha Haider and Justice Hilton as members. While on May 5, five comrades of Bhagat Singh wrote to the tribunal about their decision to boycott the tribunal, 10 other comrades, including Bhagat Singh, wrote on May  8, 1930, their response to avail themselves of legal help for the case.

This letter had not been found earlier. But in March 2018, the Punjab Archives, Lahore, for the first time after 1931, put up an exhibition of a few exhibits from the over 100 files related to Bhagat Singh. Ammara Ahmad, a Lahore journalist, was kind enough to send the photographs of a few exhibits, including this letter.

The Punjab Archives, Lahore, has claimed that it has now made all records of Bhagat Singh public and probably digitalised them also. It would be good if the Punjab Government in Chandigarh approached the Punjab Government in Lahore to share all records relating to Bhagat Singh and the records are put on display in Khatkar Kalan (Nawanshahr-Shaheed Bhagat Singh Nagar State Museum on Bhagat Singh). 

The following is the text of the letter:

In the court of the Special Tribunal

Lahore Conspiracy case, Lahore

Crown vs. Sukhdev & others

Charged under secs 302, 120-B+121-A, IPC

This humble petition of the accused persons Bhagat Singh & others most respectfully showeth:

(1) That the petitioners are charged with most serious offences including sec. 302 with 120B and 109 IPC

(2) That the majority of the petitioners have been lodged for the last eight or nine months in jail.

(3) That with one exception, all the petitioners as stated below belong to distant provinces and as such have no relative here to look after their defence.

1. Ajay Kumar Ghosh  — Allahabad, U.P

2. Bejoy Kumar Sinha—Cawnpore, U.P

3. Prem Dutt — Srinagar, Kashmir

4. Kamal Nath Tewary—Betiah, Bihar

5. Shiv Verma —Hardoi, U.P

6. Jai Dev Kapoor — Hardoi, U.P

7. S.N. Pande — Cawnpore, U.P.

8. Kishori Lal — Quetta, Baluchistan

9. Des Raj — Sialkot, guardian outside India

(4) That five of the petitioners are unrepresented accused defending their case themselves.

(5) That for the reasons stated above in paras 3+4, the petitioners can make arrangement for their defence only through their friends, attorneys and members of defence committee.

(6) That it is therefore prayed that in the interest of justice, the learned court be pleased to grant the petitioners following facilities-

I. Interviews with friends, attorneys, legal advisors and members of defence committee members and relatives in court during lunch hours or after the rising of the court during the one hour stay… for mutual consultation

II. Instructions should be sent to the Supdts of Borstal and Central jails for allowing interviews with the same.

III. Subject to accommodation the legal advisors of the unrepresented accused be given seats in the body of the court room.

IV. Recognition of the defence committee and permission to two members of committee to sit in the body of the court subject to accommodation.

(7) That it is prayed that in view of the large number of prosecution exhibits of this case, one of the days of the week preferably Saturday be set for the examination of the exhibits by the accused and their counsels.

Hand written and signed by-

1. Bhagat Singh

2.  Bejoy Kumar Sinha

3. Ajay Kumar Ghosh

4. SuPande

5. Jai Deva Kapor

6. Kishori Lal Ratan

7. Prem Datt Varma

8. Shiv Varma

9. Kamalnath Tewari

10. Des Raj

8th May 1930

(Official Stamp Lahore)

 


Don’t politicise national security

The Centre did not time the Balakot strike or respond so forcefully with poll gains in mind

India faces acute external threats. We have to be united within to meet them but we have become so divided that sections of the political class, the media, security experts, retired bureaucrats and members of civil society are adopting positions that in effect create distrust in the government, erode public support for military decisions taken, weaken national resolve and damage national security as a result.

India is cautious about military interventions abroad for national security reasons. We act in self-defence, and that too not always because of limited defence capabilities and external factors. We did not take military action despite the grievous provocation of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist killings, or in 2001 when our Parliament was targeted and we threatened but did not attack Pakistan. During the Kargil war we fought purely defensively, with instructions to our air force not to cross the Line of Control (LoC). In 2106, we decided to warn Pakistan that its policy of promoting terrorism through “non-State actors” will have a State response from us. But these strikes were limited in scope, consistent with our military self-restraint. The Balakot strike was a sharper warning, but with de-escalation built into it with our announcement that it was a non-military pre-emptive strike against terrorist targets, the onus being on Pakistan to escalate.

Rather than show solidarity with the government in the difficult decision it took after Pulwama and applaud the narrowing of Pakistan’s future options to bleed us with terrorism, a coalition of anti-BJP forces have questioned the authenticity of the Balakot operation, sought proof, magnified the controversy over the number of casualties, purveyed the Pakistani version of the strike and quoted foreign sources to refute government claims. By this they have exposed the divisions in the country on our hardened response to terrorism and given comfort to Pakistan.

This has happened earlier too. The 2016 surgical strikes were questioned similarly and proof was sought in the light of denials by Pakistan that they took place at all. No thought was given to the morale of those who risked their lives in the operation. In 2017, when the Doklam stand-off occurred, instead of firmly closing ranks behind the government, the narrative was sought to be changed against what the government had achieved by accusing it of a botched-up operation that has left the Chinese more entrenched on the plateau than before.

The obsessive attacks on the Rafale contract, despite the findings of no wrongdoing by the Supreme Court and the Comptroller and Auditor General of India and the public clarifications given by the top air force brass to prevent an acquisition vital for national security from being derailed, is one more instance of party politics taking priority over the country’s defence. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s remark about the Rafale changing the result of the recent operation against Pakistan has been twisted by the Opposition when what he meant was that the superior capabilities of the Rafale (see further, see better, see first) would have better countered the AMRAAM armed F 16’s .

The government did not time the Pulwama strike or respond more forcefully with electoral gains in mind. It took a bigger military risk in challenging the Chinese at Doklam, and that was not a make-believe exercise with electoral considerations in mind. The government needs praise for changing the paradigm of our response to Pakistani terrorism by the Balakot operation rather than be accused of staging a suspect show. How is the larger national purpose served by seeking to put the government on the defensive over a bold military operation against a sworn enemy?

If a BJP leader mentions a high figure of Pakistani casualties without official confirmation, he could be boosting national morale rather than violating some political and moral code at the expense of the lives of our brave soldiers. Why create a controversy over a minor matter when the air strike ordered at Pakistan proper has much larger strategic implications? This was a major political decision by the government, it bore the ultimate responsibility for it, and it can, therefore, legitimately claim political credit for the strike, without being accused of politicising national security. It is casuistry to argue that it is the military that attacked and took the risks and the credit should therefore go to it alone. Those politicising national security are primarily the Opposition political parties who have questioned the professional integrity of the armed forces, desperately want to dislodge Modi from power and fear that the BJP will gain from Balakot, the leftists who place ideology above country, the pro-Pakistan lobbies who argue that Pakistan’s behaviour can only change through a dialogue, and those who implicitly justify Pakistani terrorism by arguing that we have invited it by mismanaging the internal situation in Jammu and Kashmir.


May see Pulwama-like attack before polls: MNS

May see Pulwama-like attack before polls: MNS

Raj Thackeray, MNS chief

Mumbai, March 9

Linking Pathankot and Pulwama terror attacks to elections, MNS chief Raj Thackeray today said another “Pulwama like strike” could occur in near future in a bid to win polls.

He also slammed as “insult to jawans” Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s statement that presence of Rafale jets could have added to more firepower to the February 26 raids by Air Force on a terrorist camp in Pakistan’s Balakot.

Thackeray was addressing party workers on the 13th Foundation Day of the MNS.

Thackeray alleged that the warnings issued by intelligence agencies prior to the Pulwama attack were ignored.

“Forty jawans were martyred in the Pulwama attack. Should we still not ask questions? In December, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval had met his Pakistani counterpart in Bangkok. Who will tell us what transpired at the meeting?” he said.

Taking a dig at BJP president Amit Shah’s statement on the number of casualties in the Balakot strike, the MNS chief said whether Shah was one of the the “co-pilots” who participated in the air strike.

Thackeray claimed the Indian Air Force “missed” targets it had intended to hit in Balakot because of “wrong information” provided to them by the Modi government.

“If the Prime Minister himself says that results would have been better had the country have Rafale jets, it was an insult to our jawans,” he said.

Disputing that terrorists were killed in the air raids, Thackeray said had that been the case, Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman would not have been allowed to return home from captivity by Pakistan. — PTI

 


More doors now opened for women in all army branches

NEW DELHI: Women will from now on be eligible for permanent careers in all 10 branches of the army where they have been inducted as short-service commissioned (SSC) officers, the defence ministry said on Tuesday.

HT FILE■ The government has taken various measures to open more avenues for women in the armed forces.So far, women officers were allowed permanent commission (PC) only in two branches: Judge Advocate General (JAG) and Army Education Corps.

A defence ministry spokesperson said the eight new branches opened to SSC women officers for permanent commission are Corps of Signals, Engineers, Army Aviation, Army Air Defence, Electronics and Mechanical Engineers, Army Service Corps, Army Ordinance Corps and the Intelligence Corps.

“SSC women officers will give their option for PC before completion of four years of commissioned service…They will be considered for grant of PC based on suitability, merit etc and will be employed in various staff appointments,” the ministry said in a release.

The government has taken various measures to open more avenues for women in the armed forces, beginning with inducting them in the Indian Air Force’s fighter stream. That combat ban was lifted in October 2015.

The ministry said more avenues would be opened for women in the navy, too, where all non-seagoing branches/ cadre have been opened for women officers through the SSC. “In addition to education, law and naval constructor branch, women SSC officers have been made eligible for grant of PC in the naval armament branch, on par with male officers,” the ministry said, adding that the proposal for induction of three new training ships will provide the requisite infrastructure for training of both men and women officers. The navy is expected to induct women in all branches once the training ships are in place. HT had reported in April 2018 that the Centre was considering granting permanent commission to women SSC officers in the army. The new development is likely to end a nineyear battle in the apex court, provided the Centre withdraws its appeal against the Delhi high court’s 2010 verdict to induct women in permanent commission in the army.


Give peace a chance, Imran Khan tells PM Modi

Recalling his conversation with Khan during a congratulatory call after he became Pakistan’s premier, Modi said he told him “let us fight against poverty and illiteracy” and Khan gave his word – saying he is a Pathan’s son – but went back on it.

india-pakistan relations, indo pak ties, india pakistan bilateral relations, narendra modi imran khan, India PM Modi, Imran Khan pakistan, indo-pak relations, india news, latest news, indian express columns, indian express

Prime Minister Narendra Modi with his Pakistani counterpart Imran Khan in New Delhi. (File)

Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan on Sunday asked his Indian counterpart, Narendra Modi, to “give peace a chance” and assured him that he “stands by” his words and will “immediately act” if New Delhi provides Islamabad with “actionable intelligence” on the Pulwama terror attack.

On February 19, Khan had assured India that he would act against the perpetrators of the Pulwama terror attack if it shares “actionable intelligence” with Islamabad but warned New Delhi against launching any “revenge” retaliatory action.

India said Khan’s offer to investigate the attack if provided proof is a “lame excuse”. “It is a well-known fact that Jaish-e-Mohammad and its leader Masood Azhar are based in Pakistan. These should be sufficient proof for Pakistan to take action,” the Ministry of External Affairs said.

“The Prime Minister of Pakistan has offered to investigate the matter if India provides proof. This is a lame excuse. In the horrific attack in Mumbai on 26/11, proof was provided to Pakistan. Despite this, the case has not progressed for the last more than 10 years. Likewise, on the terror attack on Pathankot airbase, there has been no progress. Promises of ‘guaranteed action’ ring hollow given the track record of Pakistan,” it said.

Last week, China, which has doggedly blocked the listing of JeM chief Masood Azahar as a “global terrorist”, has signed off on a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) statement that “condemned in the strongest terms” the Pulwama terror attack and named Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad for the “heinous and cowardly suicide bombing”.


Military strategic challenges in India’s relationship with Pakistan By Daily Excelsior -by Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd)

Foreign policy and military strategy are often considered the two main prongs of external security. Both mutually drive each other particularly when it comes to dealing with an irksome and none too friendly neighbor such as Pakistan. India-Pakistan relations and the challenges therein are therefore largely dependent on foreign policy factors and military strategic issues which are ever prevalent in dealing with Pakistan. India has always to be mindful that Pakistan’s foreign and security policy is controlled by the Pakistan Army and much of the attitude that Pakistan exudes comes from its ‘deeper than the ocean, higher than the sky’ relationship with China. Regionally, its dynamic role in Afghanistan and the uncertain warm and cold relationship it enjoys with the US are themselves major challenges for India. Pakistan’s current economic insecurity drives it to even greater dependence on China and some Islamic countries and has potential of creating large scale internal turbulence. The security of its nuclear assets and its readiness to threaten India with the nuclear option remain areas of concern in our security considerations. Most of all Pakistan’s continuance of the proxy war in J&K without any let up and its propensity towards finding novel ways of keeping India on the defensive is often seen as one of India’s main security challenges.
Pakistan’s strategic aim while executing its India policy is primarily to prevent India achieving its aspirations/ambitions as a nation. It hurts Pakistan to see India progress and achieve respect in the world. In addition, retribution against India for the humiliating military defeat in 1971 and the loss of erstwhile East Pakistan drives its psyche. Keeping India militarily and diplomatically imbalanced and thus creating the conditions to integrate J&K to Pakistan remains one of its prime aims against India.
In order to execute its strategy to achieve its India specific aim it works constantly to prevent decisive military asymmetry in India’s favor. With a population one sixth that of India it maintains an army that is as much as half the size of India’s army. Colluding with China to pose a two front threat to India it is hopeful that in the event of a military standoff it will be able to divide Indian military deployment sufficiently to achieve a degree of advantage in force ratios on the Indo-Pak border and perhaps even in the hinterland areas of J&K. It has created a bogey of first strike in nuclear domain if threatened even conventionally, through a declared nuclear doctrine and actively uses the nuclear card to pose psychological threats. Psychological warfare is its forte to cause dissension, being fully aware of India’s vulnerable fault lines extending into faith, caste, linguistic, regional and ethnic domains. As a doctrinal guideline it prepares itself and remains ready to respond in the conventional conflict domain but employs 4th generation warfare to fight proxy war in J&K and elsewhere. It needs to be especially recognized that Pakistan has constantly managed risk and has mostly avoided crossing the threshold of India’s tolerance although it has made major mistakes as in the case of the Mumbai, Pathankot and Uri terror attacks.
Through the adoption and execution of its strategy against India, Pakistan appears to believe that it has foreclosed all options of Indian response. This belief is reinforced by the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) in its nuclear arsenal and continued projection that it will employ these as first strike against any Indian adventurism across the border. For Pakistan pro-active, full spectrum or limited war, none is to its advantage. Only proxy 4th generation war employing irregular proxies gives it an asymmetrical advantage. This combined with many other domains of non-contact warfare forms the hybrid war effort that Pakistan has been indulging in for the last three decades.
India has a range of response options against Pakistan. High end conventional war cannot be totally ruled out although in today’s international security environment it is a reluctant military concept with most nations. While China may be Pakistan’s trusted friend and ally and it may have its differences with India too there are enough mitigating factors prevalent to ensure that China will only assist Pakistan psychologically through projected border threats at the Sino-Indian border. China’s volume of trade with India, maritime vulnerability in the Indian Ocean through which its economy is sustained and the standing in the international community would constrain China from extending all out military support to Pakistan. The purpose of a potential Doklam 2.0 and beyond would be to psychologically bar India from raising its aspirations beyond a threshold from where it could pose a threat to China. If China was to consciously and proactively engage India in conflict Pakistan could be expected to also militarily engage India to support the Chinese and possibly at nearly full conventional level. This could be something akin to a worst case scenario for India but is not expected to present itself. The feasibility of China militarily engaging India on the northern and eastern borders in the event of limited Indo-Pakistan conflict appears even more remote but psychological warfare and posturing could well be options China would play out in support of its strategic partner.
There is no doubt that by doctrinally adopting the first strike nuclear option Pakistan has deterred India to some extent, in the conventional conflict domain. Doctrinally India has had to limit its earlier ambitions of a resounding victory in the conventional conflict domain. However, the limitation that India has had to adopt has also given rise to a proactive strategy in complete contrast to its earlier responsive doctrine. The proactive strategy could well be incident based (to Pakistan sponsored large scale terror strikes) or simply punitive strikes in response to the cumulative effect of a series of smaller Pakistan sponsored strikes.
Analysts have argued in favour of India’s proactive strategy with limited shallow objectives within the window of a nuclear threshold. Dr Nishank Motwani, writing in The Diplomat in Oct 2018, concludes “that small but significant shifts in Indian and Pakistani strategic thinking point to the viability of a limited conventional war under a nuclear threshold”. Indian Army Chief, General Bipin Rawat recently stated “that India would not be restrained from responding to Pakistani aggression and questioned Islamabad’s red lines for nuclear first use”. This was in response to a prevailing broad understanding that Pakistan would employ its TNWs against Indian Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) at the very outset of a possible Indian limited response. The Indian thinking now revolves around the flexibility that India has chosen to project about its own second strike which could be of the magnitude of massive nuclear response to Pakistan’s employment of TNWs. A level of deterrence against early use of the nuclear option by Pakistan may have been achieved by India making known its intent.
There is an option that exists for India in the form of limited strikes across the LoC in J&K only. This must not be confused with the surgical strikes of Sep 2016 which were never aimed at achieving deterrence but only partial retribution against terrorists. These could be calibrated higher through strikes by Special Forces against Pakistan Army deployment which aids and abets terrorist infiltration. An even higher Indian calibration to progressively mount a series of strikes against selected Pakistan Army deployment could well draw limited Pakistani response. A limited war under such circumstances could well ensue within the nuclear threshold with a decided Indian advantage through the retention of the option to extend the conflict to the international border; something Pakistan would prefer to avoid.
It can be seen that potential military standoff between India and Pakistan is characterized by an ever increasing specter of uncertainty and complexity in which an erroneous assumption could spin the conflict in an uncontrollable direction. From a military strategic point of view this is an ever increasing challenge for the Indian Armed Forces stymied as they are by the non-availability of budgetary support for their optimization to face the increasing complexity of threats.
(This is an essay based upon the speech by the author at the recent seminar of Central University of Jammu on Strategic Challenges in India Pakistan Relations)
feedbackexcelsior@gmail.com

 


Maj from Doon dies in Rajouri IED explosion

Maj from Doon dies in Rajouri IED explosion

Major Chitresh Singh Bisht

Shyam Sood

Rajouri, February 16

Major Chitresh Singh Bisht, 31, was killed while defusing an improvised explosive device (IED) in Jhangar area of Rajouri district in Nowshera sector today.   He belonged to Dehradun. Sources said his marriage was fixed for March 7.

Sources said four IEDs were detected deep inside the Indian territory. “A team headed by Major Bisht was called. One of the IEDs was neutralised but another got activated. The Major suffered grievous injuries and died,” said defence spokesperson Lt Col Devender Anand.

Major SG Naik and Rifleman Jeevan Gurung were killed in two IED blasts in the same area on January 11. In another incident, Havildar Jagdev Singh was injured in Runglidhar, Babakhori area, also in the Nowshera sector, reportedly in sniper fire across the Line of Control.

With the situation tense following the fidayeen attack on a CRPF convoy in Pulwama on Thursday, “exchange of heavy mortar shelling can’t be ruled out in the coming days”, sources said.