Tribune Web Desk
Chandigarh, October 3

Punjab Chief Minister Captain Amarinder Singh in a heartfelt post on Thursday wished his better half Preneet Kaur all the best on her 75th birthday.

Sharing a black and white picture, in a tweet, Amarinder remembered the “life-time of beautiful memories” they share.

He celebrated her being a “loving mother, compassionate leader, and strong woman.”

He wrote: “Remembering a life-time of beautiful memories today as we celebrate my wife, Preneet’s, birthday. On your day today, we celebrate the loving mother, compassionate leader, and strong woman that you are. Wish you the best of health & happiness. Happy Birthday @preneet_kaur!.”

File image only for representational purposes.

Balasore, September 30

India on Monday successfully test fired a land-attack version of Brahmos supersonic missile from Chandipur coast in Odisha’s Balasore district.

The test met all flight parameters, said a source in the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO).

The missile, with a strike range of 290km, can be fired from land as well as sea-based platforms, he said.

On March 11, 2017 the first extended version of the missile, which had strike range of 450 km, was successfully tested, the source added.

BrahMos is a joint venture between the DRDO and the NPOM of Russia.

Sandwiched between Iran, China, India and Afghanistan, Pakistan lives in a complicated neighborhood with a variety of security issues. One of the nine known states known to have nuclear weapons, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and doctrine are continually evolving to match perceived threats. A nuclear power for decades, Pakistan is now attempting to construct a nuclear triad of its own, making its nuclear arsenal resilient and capable of devastating retaliatory strikes.

Pakistan’s nuclear program goes back to the 1950s, during the early days of its rivalry with India. President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto famously said in 1965, “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own.”

The program became a higher priority after the country’s 1971 defeat at the hands of India, which caused East Pakistan to break away and become Bangladesh. Experts believe the humiliating loss of territory, much more than reports that India was pursuing nuclear weapons, accelerated the Pakistani nuclear program. India tested its first bomb, codenamed “Smiling Buddha,” in May 1974, putting the subcontinent on the road to nuclearization.

Pakistan began the process of accumulating the necessary fuel for nuclear weapons, enriched uranium and plutonium. The country was particularly helped by one A. Q. Khan, a metallurgist working in the West who returned to his home country in 1975 with centrifuge designs and business contacts necessary to begin the enrichment process. Pakistan’s program was assisted by European countries and a clandestine equipment-acquisition program designed to do an end run on nonproliferation efforts. Outside countries eventually dropped out as the true purpose of the program became clear, but the clandestine effort continued.

Exactly when Pakistan had completed its first nuclear device is murky. Former president Benazir Bhutto, Zulfikar Bhutto’s daughter, claimed that her father told her the first device was ready by 1977. A member of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission said design of the bomb was completed in 1978 and the bomb was “cold tested”—stopping short of an actual explosion—in 1983.

Benazir Bhutto later claimed that Pakistan’s bombs were stored disassembled until 1998, when India tested six bombs in a span of three days. Nearly three weeks later, Pakistan conducted a similar rapid-fire testing schedule, setting off five bombs in a single day and a sixth bomb three days later. The first device, estimated at twenty-five to thirty kilotons, may have been a boosted uranium device. The second was estimated at twelve kilotons, and the next three as sub-kiloton devices.

Kollam, September 27

A big incident carried out by terrorists from our neighbouring country on India’s coastline cannot be ruled out but we are committed to coastal and maritime security, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said on Friday.

Speaking at the 66th birthday celebrations of Mata Amritanandamayi Devi at Kollam in Kerala, Singh said India would not let anyone who bothered them “rest in peace” while referring to the air-force strike in Balakot in response to the Pulwama attack.

“We cannot rule out that our neighbouring country’s terrorists can carry out a big incident on our coastline which extends from Kutch to Kerala. As Defence Minister I would like to assure you that our country’s maritime security is absolutely strong and solidified.

“We are completely committed to coastal and maritime security,” he said.

Singh said when he was Home minister, the Pulwama incident had taken place and no one in the country would be able to forget the sacrifice of the soldiers who died in the incident.

“You know that after some days of Pulwama incident, our air force conducted airstrike at Balakot in Pakistan. We do not bother anyone, but if anyone bothers us, we will not let them rest in peace.

“The country that does not remember the sacrifice of its soldiers, it is not respected anywhere in the world,” he said.

Mandi, September 24

Director General of the Border Roads Organisation, Lieutenant General Harpal Singh reviewed the progress of work on the Rohtang tunnel. He directed officials to speed up the construction work so that the task could be accomplished within stipulated time.

The BRO has set a target to complete the task by December this year. The DG was accompanied by Chief Engineer of the Rohtang tunnel KP Purshothman and other officials of the BRO.

The Director General reviewed the electrification work on the tunnel and gave directions.

“You are doing a great job. This will give hope to the people of Lahaul-Spiti and their dream will come true. The residents of Lahaul will be connected with the state round the year once the tunnel work is completed,” Harpal Singh said, encouraging officials and workers at the tunnel.

The 8.8-km-long tunnel is an engineering marvel. Engineers are engaged in the tunnel work beneath 13,050 feet high Rohtang Pass to provide all-weather connectivity to the residents of Lahaul-Spiti. It will reduce the distance between Manali and Keylong by 46 km.

The purpose of the recent visit of General Xu Qiliang, Vice-Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, to Pakistan was to convey Xi Jinping’s support for Pakistan’s core concern (Kashmir). Xu’s meetings with top political and military leadership are reflective of the close bond between Pakistan and China since the declaration of 2013 Economic Corridor.

Pravin Sawhney 
Strategic Affairs Expert

Writing in the New York Times, Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan has demanded that India abrogate the J&K Reorganisation Act 2019 which comes into effect on October 31. Not doing so could lead to conflict. What could be the basis of his temerity? Not the support of his army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, or the latter’s assessment of India’s unpreparedness for war.

Khan’s confidence comes from the recent visit of the Vice-Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC), General Xu Qiliang, who led a powerful delegation comprising all wings of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to Pakistan two days before Khan’s ultimatum on Kashmir. How seriously should Xu’s Pakistan visit be taken, especially when Khan’s demand, sounding outlandish, got little credence in India?

Xu, as number two to Chairman, CMC, Xi Jinping, and his confidant (their association goes back a long way when they worked in the Fujian province), runs the PLA. Serving his third term as a CMC member, Xu, as deputy secretary of the CMC’s ‘reform leading group’, was responsible for the PLA’s 2015 military reforms which spurred the US to focus — after 16 years of counter-terror operations — on state-on-state wars. As the first PLA Air Force (PLAAF) head to be appointed to the CMC, Xu is responsible for the Shaheen series of annual air forces’ exercise between the PLAAF and Pakistan Air Force in north Ladakh. Coincidently, Shaheen-VII — with the purpose of building interoperability (ability to fight together on common missions) — was being conducted in the Chinese city of Holton, 300 km north of Leh, with PAF fighters taking off from Skardu in Gilgit-Baltistan, during Xu’s visit to Pakistan.

The Shaheen series started soon after December 2010 when on the eve of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India, Beijing announced that its border with India was a mere 2,000 km (India insists it is 3,488 km). China excluded Ladakh. Incidentally, north Ladakh, with poor and mostly non-existent infrastructure, is a serious vulnerability of the Indian military.

Xu’s Pakistan visit, given the timing, had two purposes. The first was to convey Xi’s full support for Pakistan’s core concern (Kashmir). Xu came to tell Pakistan that Kashmir would be Xi’s topmost agenda point when he meets Prime Minister Narendra Modi on October 11 at Mahabalipuram to take the Wuhan understanding forward. The meeting would be three weeks before the Kashmir Act comes into effect.

Xu met Pakistan President Arif Alvi, Prime Minister Imran Khan, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Gen Zubair Mahmood Hayat, Chief of Army Staff, Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa, Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Zafar Mahmood Abbasi, and Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Mujahid Anwar Khan. Meeting the top political and military leadership individually is unprecedented and is reflective of the close bond between Pakistan and China since the declaration of the 2013 China Pakistan Economic Corridor.

The other purpose of Xu’s visit was to sign 10 memoranda of understanding for the Pakistan military’s capacity building. With PLA support for capacity (war material) and capability (interoperability) building with Pakistan, the realistic threat facing India is neither one front (Pakistan) nor two fronts (Pakistan and China), but a collusive front — Pakistan military supported by PLA’s non-kinetic capabilities comprising cyber, electronic and space warfare.

The PLA could disrupt or debilitate India’s power and telecommunication grids and satellite communications —most of which use Chinese components as they are inexpensive — with its impressive cyber offensive capabilities and throw normal life completely out of gear. India is not prepared for this eventuality. Or a few PLA contingents could cross the Line of Actual Control, as they did in Depsang in 2013, and simply sit there, with hot food and logistics being provided by its rear. Evicting them physically would mean war; not doing so would amount to national humiliation.

China does not need to go to war with India since its military coercion (given the huge disparity in military powers) is enough to meet its objectives. A top Chinese objective during Xi’s visit could be restoration of status quo — what Khan is demanding — in Kashmir. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had, while meeting his Pakistani counterpart Shah Mahmood Qureshi on August 9 in Beijing, said, “China believes that unilateral actions (by India) that will complicate the situation should not be taken.” China has expressed its displeasure both at the revocation of Articles 370 and 35A, and the creation of two union territories.

Why a strong Chinese reaction was not anticipated and taken into account by Delhi is difficult to understand. Perhaps, the Modi government, believing in its own invincibility and of the armed forces, had felt that the passage of the Kashmir Bill through Parliament would be enough to make momentous changes. Moreover, China, given its numerous distractions, like the US trade war, Hong Kong, One Belt One Road etc, would, like earlier times, pay lip service to Pakistan. Also, China would not jeopardise its nearly $90-billion annual trade with India. Furthermore, once other major powers accept India’s position, China would, in its wisdom, keep quiet.

The coming second Wuhan informal summit is likely to prove India’s assessment (if one was done) wrong. On May 5, 2017, in a talk at the United Services Institution of India — Indian military’s think tank — Chinese ambassador in India Luo Zhaohui, while commenting on the Wuhan Summit (where he was present), mentioned the possibility of a trilateral China-India-Pakistan summit, some time in the future in passing. Perhaps, the future has come early.

Xi is likely to tell India that status quo must be maintained on Kashmir (in effect, asking India to reverse the move on Kashmir) so that bilateral talks between India and Pakistan could start. Whether Modi would be able to ignore Xi’s demand needs to be seen.

NEW DELHI: A social media message which has gone viral in Army circles suggesting that the annual leave of personnel could be shortened, is taxing the energies of Army Chief General Bipin Rawat.

He believes that it is “an attempt to spread disaffection” in what is one of the most disciplined forces in the world.

A flurry of tweets on Twitter in the last few days have suggested that the Army was mulling to decrease the number of annual leave period from 60 to just 30 days.

“This is a clear case of misinformation being bandied about as fact,” General Rawat said in an informal interaction with this paper, Tuesday.

ALSO READ: Army brings uniformity in uniform for officers above Colonel rank

He said the recent outburst of a section of ex-servicemen community on social media is clearly an attempt to create disaffection among the serving soldiers.

“The fact is that such a thing has never been discussed. It is pure misinformation,” he said.

The Army Chief, denying such a probability, said, “We have not even thought of this but some people are spreading false information through social media.”

General Rawat said, “Now since the idea has been forwarded, we can think over it.”

There are cases where due to operational exigencies soldiers are unable to avail the entire duration of the annual leave.  However, the Army allows accumulation of annual leave up to a maximum of 300 days (about 10 months), which can be encashed at the end of the service.

Leave for a soldier is important considering the associated stress involved with the services and the separation from their families for long durations.

There is the provision for 60 days’ annual leave and 30 days casual leave for soldiers, while casual leave allowed to officer is 20 days.

Army, Navy and Air Force Individual services among the three armed forces have their own systems, equipment, working environment, value system, training and doctrines , DNA

PM Narendra Modi’s announcement that India will, at last, have a Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) has been welcomed by the strategic community and the Armed Forces. However, it is well realised that it’s a decision which should have been taken at least 15 years ago. It is also fully known that the complexities involved in making the CDS concept work effectively are hardly likely to make the process smooth or short. Public information on the obstacles, complexities and contentious issues, being relatively poor this is an early attempt to draw interest and explain some of the basics involved.

Individual services among the three armed forces have their own systems, equipment, working environment, value system, training and doctrines. Belief in one’s own service is intense and agreeably necessary to keep high the motivation level and ‘esprit de corps’. Each is a master of his domain and believes that his service is the prime mover capable of delivering national security with some support from the other services. While the common aim of all is the security of India there is often a difference of opinion on how to achieve that. There is a high level of bickering on the allocation of financial resources and threats are perceived with a coloured eye of garnering more for one’s own. However, with development of technology and modernisation, there is an increasing need to optimise resources and jointly work towards the common aim making use of the core competency of each service jointly working in an environment of integration. The realisation about this emerged in the Second World War with single domain knowledge and capability unable to deliver in the face of the increasing complexity of war.

Temporary structures were set up for higher direction and attempts were made to create seamless systems for joint functioning. Formalisation took place 15 years later with the setting up of permanent organisations to help optimise the plethora of emerging technologies including nuclear weapons. Different nations as per the ethos of their armed forces and the threats perceived, took longer durations to change mindsets and overcome inevitable resistance from within. China’s People’s Liberation Army adopted formal structures of integrated theatre commands only as late as 2016. The US Armed Forces, the most advanced of all, were forced into the adoption of the same through legislation in 1986 after a series of failures and near-failures. The Goldwater Nichols Act provided for a single appointment to direct overall strategy, but provided greater command authority to ‘unified’ and ‘specified’ field commanders; a unique system of integrated theatre commands with different sets of responsibilities vested. The Indian Armed Forces watched the international developments, made feeble attempts at jointness at the tactical level but the real level where it was needed, the strategic remained ignored for long. This was mainly due to the reluctance to give up ‘turf’.

It’s only after the experience of the Kargil War 1999 that the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) made strong recommendations for adoption of a joint structure for functioning at the highest level with enough expression on the inevitable need for this. The Group of Ministers followed this with an endorsement. However, willingness to go the full way with an empowered CDS placed above the three Service Chiefs and available for single point advice to the government was lacking. In 2001 the government accepted a half-baked measure of setting up a Headquarters (HQ) Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) manned by personnel from all three services as an adjunct organisation to assist the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) whose Chairman was one of the Service Chiefs. The ability to rise above narrow service loyalty remained a problem as before. The KRC had also strongly recommended the induction of uniformed officers into the MoD to give it a truly integrated character and better functional capability but this failed to carry through. Two joint commands were set up with the Andaman & Nicobar Command (ANC) and the Strategic Forces Command (SFC). Later the Naresh Chandra Committee elaborated on the need for a CDS but the issue continued to languish from committee to committee.

The decision has at last been taken but the structure is yet to be elaborated. Going by the PM’s short announcement it seems as if the CDS will be placed higher to the three Service Chiefs in the pecking order; will the rank be above their four-star status is unknown. It is inevitable that the joint commands and the newly set up agencies catering to the domains of space, cyber and special forces will report to the CDS while the three service chiefs will be responsible for the operational control and logistics of their services. This arrangement is fine but to optimise the decision to its real value the entire structure of the armed forces will finally need to undergo change to integrated theatre command system. This will be a long drawn and sequential process but a decision towards that can be looked forward to now that the CDS has been approved. There are 17 different regional or task-oriented commands of the three services. Can these be integrated to create four or perhaps five? The obstacle to this reorganisation will inevitably be turf loyalty, besides the potential of losing a number of senior appointments. The last is a consideration only because of the dwindling slice of the pie of higher status than the three services enjoy. It can be overcome again with an understanding of the political community.

The role of the newly set up Defence Planning Committee (DPC) under the National Security Adviser may also require a review although with the current high status of the NSA it is only a question of making some adjustment. The concept of single point advice which the CDS is sought to provide may not really optimally work out unless he has power over the three service chiefs. However, it’s best to adopt the system as advocated initially and work towards progressive changes to create a structure for optimal integrated functioning. There will be many faults and many a heartburn but at the end of the day if the nation benefits from them everything will be worth it.