The gang, which helped candidates cheat during the online examination for the post of airman in the IAF, had fixed special ‘codes’ to provide help to the aspirants. Photo for representation only
Sonepat, July 19
The gang, which helped candidates cheat during the online examination for the post of airman in the IAF, had fixed special ‘codes’ to provide help to the aspirants. The gang was busted on Saturday.
The gang members struck deals with officials at computer labs at 50 per cent commission per candidate of the total money they took from each of the candidates.
Inspector Anil Chhiller, in charge, CIA-3, said the accused had fixed some codes based on the supervisor’s body language to tell the answers to their paid candidates in the computer lab.
Before sending the aspirants to the lab for taking the exam, they trained them about the codes, he added.
“If a supervisor puts his single hand into his pocket, it means ‘A’ is the answer of the question. If he puts both hands in his pockets, it means that option ‘B’ is the correct answer. If he ties his hands at the back, ‘C’ is the answer. If he ties his hands at the chest, then ‘D’ is the answer. If he claps after rubbing both hands, it means go to the next question,” Chhiller said. —T
The MoD’s obsession with securing an ever higher percentage of indigenous content for its locally manufactured equipment is counterproductive, predicated as it is to the expectation that this would render it cheaper, thereby effecting savings. But no independent studies are there to corroborate this assumption.
Halting affair: Delay in modernisation hampers operational efficiency of the defence forces, which can compromise security. Reuters
Amit Cowshish and Rahul Bedi
Ex-Financial Adviser (Acquisition), MoD and Senior journalist
The Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) interminable deadlines in concluding procurements of urgently-needed materiel is not at all surprising in a country that prides itself on timelessness and where the word for today and tomorrow — kal — is paradoxically the same.
The equally enigmatic timelines of parson and tarson — the day after or the third day or thereabouts — remain similarly nebulous when it concerns the MoD’s snail pace in concluding pressing defence equipment buys. This, in turn, adversely impinges on the military’s operational efficiency and its long-postponed modernisation.
Instead of swiftly vindicating its acquisition responsibilities within its own stated deadlines, the hidebound MoD expends inordinate effort in publicly iterating its revised procurement measures that, too, have sadly failed to deliver. Conversely, the services, too, continually stress their competence in formulating realistic qualitative requirements for assorted materiel they are seeking and in conducting timely trials for it.
But somehow, there is little that is tangibly achieved. It forced the MoD to abruptly execute Rs 20,000 crore worth of ‘emergency procurements’ last year when the Chinese military challenge erupted unexpectedly in Ladakh.
The list of projected military equipment under MoD negotiations is immense, but column space forecloses the option of tabulating even a fraction of these.
However, four long-pending procurements, which the MoD has frequently dubbed as ‘low-hanging fruit’, highlight the broader malaise of its Byzantine acquisition procedures, bureaucratic procrastination, financial constraints and allegations of wrongdoing in awarding contracts.
These include the Russian Kamov-226T ‘Hoodlum’ light utility helicopters (LUH) for the Indian Army (IA) and Indian Air Force (IAF), Kalashnikov Ak-203 assault rifles for all three services and heavyweight torpedoes (HWT) for the Indian Navy’s (IN) six licence-built Kalvari (Scorpene)-class diesel electric attack (SSK) submarines.
Negotiations for all these four have been going on for years, bedevilled by issues of cost and transfer of technology for local manufacture. These have recently been further complicated by the nebulous goal of securing atmanirbharta or self-reliance in defence equipment needs via a scheme that is still a work in progress.
Both the Ka-226Ts and Ak-203s were badly needed to fill operational voids, presently being managed through emergency imports or via creative jugaad or innovation, at a time when the military is facing enduring challenges on its disputed northern frontier. The Kamovs are also intended to replace the Army’s and IAF’s obsolete and accident-prone licence-built legacy, Chetak and Cheetah helicopters, dating back to the sixties.
The projected Ka-226T deal was initiated in 2014, following which the India-Russia Helicopters (IRHL) joint venture (JV) was constituted in which Russia’s Rostec Corporation had a 49.5 per cent stake and the state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) the remaining 51.5 per cent. The JV was projected to deliver 200 Ka-226Ts, of which 60 were to be directly imported, 40 locally assembled and another 100 built by the IRHL.
But over the past seven years, differences have emerged that threaten to imminently derail the Ka-226T programme. These include its overall cost and the quantum of technology Russia was willing to transfer to the IRHL. Besides, the per unit cost of 140 indigenously produced rotorcraft would be nearly double that of 60 similar platforms that are to be procured in flyaway condition. The price of each indigenously produced twin-engine Ka-226T via a technology transfer is estimated at around $11 million apiece, compared to around $6 million for one manufactured in Russia.
The same confusion prevails over the Ak-203 7.62×39-mm assault rifles project. In March 2019, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had inaugurated an ordnance factory facility at Korwa, near Amethi, to licence-build some 750,000 Russian Ak-203 assault rifles with collapsible stocks. The JV to implement the project followed an inter-governmental agreement between Moscow and New Delhi, in which the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) had a 50.5 per cent stake in the IRPL, the Kalashnikov group 42 per cent and Russia’s state-owned arms export agency Rosonboron export, the remaining 7.5 per cent.
The intent was for the IRPL to import some 100,000 Ak-203s for around Rs 81,000 apiece followed by the licensed production of the remaining 6,50,000-odd units. But again, price differences emerged. The Russians were reportedly demanding a $200 royalty per Ak-203 rifle produced by the JV, making it an astronomical licence fee of $130 million for 6,50,000 units, in addition to the cost of erecting the plant, the bulk of which would be borne by the OFB.
Furthermore, the OFB is believed to have cost each licence-built Ak-203 rifle initially at around Rs 86,000, amortised over time to average around Rs 80,000 per unit. Embarrassingly, the import of a repeat import order for 72,400 assault rifles from the US-based Sig Sauer in early 2019 was considerably cheaper. Hence, the Ak-203 rifle contract remains in limbo, compelling the bulk of Army personnel to field inefficient indigenously designed Indian Small Arms System (INSAS) rifles. Frontline units deployed on counter-insurgency operations were dependent on imported rifles.
The HWT requirement was even more operationally critical as the Navy has already commissioned three Kalvari-class submarines without the torpedoes, leaving the SSKs toothless. In 2016, the MoD had initiated moves to acquire alternates torpedoes, following the termination of the $300-million tender for 98 Black Shark torpedoes from Italy’s Whitehead Alenia Sistemi Subacquei (WASS), but no progress had been made.
In conclusion, the MoD’s obsession with securing an ever higher percentage of indigenous content for its locally manufactured equipment is counterproductive, predicated as it is to the expectation that this would render it cheaper, thereby effecting savings. But no independent studies are available to corroborate this assumption. The three measures needed to achieve better results — composite indigenisation policy focused on major equipment and platforms, an overarching organisation to coordinate these efforts and an adequate funding mechanism — are missing.
Besides, the MoD continues to function more like an industry-development agency, rather than fulfilling its primary responsibility of developing India’s military capability speedily within the available financial resources. This obligation entails undertaking difficult and opportune decisions to resolve hold-ups, which, somehow, the MoD seems unable or unwilling to accomplish.
Central Asian countries are standing by the government
Together: It’s vital for everyone to keep their nerve and take on the challenge. Reuters
Manoj Joshi
Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation
The US walked away from Afghanistan in the dead of the night. That was an understandable manoeuvre to prevent any Taliban grandstanding attack on them. Instead of the dramatic photos of the evacuation of the Saigon embassy, all we have as a visual is a frame of the detritus of the American civilisation left behind in Bagram, their biggest base.
The developments in Afghanistan pose an agonising challenge for India. Since 2001, it has operated in the country, mainly in executing development programmes under the US/NATO security umbrella. Now the latter have walked away, and we along with many others are scrambling for a strategy.
India would be advised to measure its steps carefully. Minus security, it cannot, obviously, operate the way it did for so long in Afghanistan. India hardly has the capacity to take up the US burden. Indeed, there could be a good argument for simply walking away from the whole mess. It would be a cold-hearted decision, but the situation there is not of our making, and we have been tertiary players anyway.
For more than a decade after defeating the Taliban, the US discouraged any Indian military involvement in Afghanistan, deferring to the primacy of Pakistan in its calculations. By the time the US got around to accepting the need for Indian military assistance, the situation had deteriorated significantly.
The Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) was constituted in the early 2000s and in the first decade, the US and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was careful in limiting its size and capabilities so as not to offend Pakistan. Unlike regular militaries, they were deliberately kept deficient in artillery and air power. They were viewed as a support element whose primary task was counter-insurgency.
Since 2012, when President Obama spent just six hours on a visit to Kabul, it has been clear that the US would leave Afghanistan. Even though it signed a strategic partnership agreement with Kabul at the time, it did not quite spell out what that meant in terms of financial and military commitments.
In 2013, President Karzai turned to India to provide artillery and military transport aircraft, but New Delhi, too, balked, not wishing to annoy Pakistan. As per a strategic partnership agreement signed in 2011, India had promised to assist in the training, equipping and capacity building of the ANSF, but hesitated in supplying the equipment. In 2015, India did begin a programme that led to the Afghan Air Force getting eight Mi-35 attack helicopters.
In the past decade, however, the US and the ISAF put in a systematic effort to build up the ANSF. But their goal was to train a force with counter-insurgency capability, and not the capacity to militarily disrupt or block the Taliban supply chain leading to Pakistan.
Since 2014, the US began providing some artillery, helicopters and armoured vehicles, but the ANSF’s biggest weakness is in the air force. The US has limited their close air support capacity to some 20 A-29 Super Tucanos and 10 AC-208 Cessna. These are light fighters and can be lethal for the Taliban, without worrying Pakistan. However, there are simply not enough of them. The bigger problem the ANSF faces is in maintaining this equipment.
There is little point in crying over spilt milk. The US and ISAF could have done better, and so could India. All is not lost. If the ANSF is crumbling in parts, the Taliban, too, are not the kind of force that fought in the 1990s. The surge of attacks we are seeing are essentially psychological warfare, aimed at paralysing the ANSF and the government in Kabul. It is important for everyone to keep their nerve and take on the challenge.
It would be foolhardy to underestimate the Taliban. But the ANSF are numerically superior to the Taliban, and perhaps through trial and error, they will find their own set of strategy and tactics and let go of those taught to them by the Americans and the NATO. What they need is unambiguous support.
As of now, the US has promised to provide $3 billion to support the ANSF, which is about 75 per cent of its requirement. The Europeans, too, need to spell out their commitment. Countries like India can play an important supporting role in assisting the Afghans in ensuring the serviceability of their equipment and training their personnel.
Geopolitically, too, things are not bleak. All the Central Asian countries are standing by the Afghan government. The Chinese, too, have cautiously expressed their support for Kabul. Turkey has said it is willing to have its forces defend the Kabul airport.
Perhaps the most important player here can be Iran which shares a large border with Afghanistan, and through whose Chabahar port, India can access the country. The recent visit of External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar to Tehran is not without significance here.
A Taliban Afghanistan is not a threat to Kashmir. Afghan jihadis have been there earlier and failed. India needs a strong, stable and independent Afghanistan to prevent Islamabad from being tempted to use the country as its ‘strategic depth’ area.
Contrary to the popular adage, history does not usually repeat itself. There is no certainty that the Taliban will prevail in Afghanistan. If the US and NATO countries step up with financial assistance, which they can easily provide, effective regional diplomacy and Afghan determination can lead to another, more positive outcome for the unfortunate country.
Rs 2.15-lakh cr defence proposals for domestic industry, says govt
The government on Monday informed the Rajya Sabha that in the past three financial years it had accepted the necessity for 119 military equipment making proposals worth Rs 2,15,690 crore and these are to be made domestically.
Acceptance of necessity is a technical term used by the Ministry of Defence, it defines the first stage of the proposal.
The information was part of the written answers the Ministry of Defence submitted to querries of MPs. The reference was the period commencing April 1, 2018, to March 31, 2021 — that is three financial years.
According to the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP), priority has been accorded to capital acquisition and significant projects, including 155 mm artillery gun system “Dhanush”, bridge laying tank, thermal imaging sight for T-72 tank, Light Combat Aircraft Tejas, Akash surface to air missile system, submarine ‘INS Kalvari’, ‘INS Chennai’, anti-submarine warfare corvette (ASWC), Arjun armoured repair and recovery vehicle, landing craft utility, etc have been produced in the country under ‘Make in India’ initiative of the government in last few years.
In response to another question, the MoD said it had been decided to earmark an amount of Rs 71,438 crore for procurement from domestic sources out of the total allocation of Rs 1,11,463 crore acquisition. — TNS
HIGHER DEFENCE REFORMS: NEEDED, A PHILOSOPHY IN INDIAN CONTEXT
Our force structure has to be specific to our requirements and cannot be based on any external model by Lt Gen Daljeet Singh, PVSM AVSM VSM (Retd) Recent comments by the CDS General Bipin Rawat and the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal RKS Bhadauria has kickstarted a series of debates and discussions on different platforms on issues related to the Theatre Commands proposed to be set up in the country. Several highly respected defence experts have expressed their views on issues related to reforms at the higher command structure in the Indian armed forces. These debates and discussions have articulated varying aspects, contradictory at times. There is however a common thread that binds them together. All agree that future conflict scenarios are going to be different from those of the past. Optimisation of force capability in an effective manner, in time and space, is going to be a battle winning factor. Such optimization needs to incorporate cutting-edge technologies to the extent possible. It is also an accepted fact that the current force structure of the armed forces warrants a review and consequent corrections made to effectively orientate the nation’s force capability towards the present and future national security demands. The main issue for discussion therefore is to analyse and identify the way forward in an effort to go about such force organisational and structural reforms. A look at the past efforts at force modernisation would be an essential first step in such endeavours. Post the conflict with China in the early 1960s, several measures were put in place to upgrade, modernise and expand the nation’s armed forces. Results of these efforts were visible in the 1965 war with Pakistan and even more effectively during the 1971 war. Incidentally, the latter is one of the most successful campaigns in the history of warfare worldwide. It was swift and more effective than the Yom Kippur war of 1973. Several lessons at the operational and strategic levels, the level at which we are planning to restructure, must be revisited and extrapolated to the present and future context. Similarly, our operations in Sri Lanka and the Kargil War should be evaluated and the rights and wrongs taken a note of. Throughout the 1970s, 1980s and to the present day, there have been continuous efforts towards modernisation of our armed forces. Excellent recommendations were made by highly respected military leaders of the day. These include the post Kargil and political-level studies too. However, for several reasons they were not implemented in their entirety. In the process, some modernisation did take place but it was not sufficient enough to cause a change in the basic philosophy of operations. These upgradations thus got absorbed into the existing doctrine. At best piecemeal and partial reforms served to improve and make the execution of the existing doctrine more efficient. The basic doctrine remained unchanged. The very purpose of modernisation was thus defeated. Economic aspects played a major role in this state of affairs. There was just not enough money to carry out the recommended changes. An important lesson, we must undertake only those reforms that the nation can afford and optimise our force effectiveness from within that. Affordability is an essential input. It would not be out of place to conclude that the present doctrinal outlook of our armed forces is somewhat dated. Probably that is the reason behind the efforts aimed at the creation of the theatre commands and may also be the logic behind the statements of the CDS and the Air Chief. Based on the theories of war enunciated by the likes of Clausewitz, who drew his conclusions from the Napoleonic campaigns and later by military thinkers like Liddell Hart and Fuller, many wars have been fought successfully all over the world and over time in the past. However, the foundations of these theories have undergone dramatic changes. Perhaps we have not been able to keep up with such changes. The very aim and purpose of war has changed. Capture of territories, carving out nations and countries and so on are not possible anymore. The aim and purpose of use of violence today is to get a people and a nation to conduct themselves in a desired manner or face consequences. Look at Balakot from this perspective. India sent a strong message to Pakistan through the application of precise destruction power with little collateral damage. The message was clear and needs no reiteration except that it was backed by a firm will and perceivable capability to escalate if required. Attrition therefore has given way to coercion. No longer is war conduct of policy by other means as enunciated by Clausewitz. It is a now an integrated effort between the political masters, armed forces, diplomats, economic factors including the security of financial markets and last but not the least media including social media. As a result, many new terms have come up that do not find a mention in the classical theories of war. Economic embargos, collateral damage, peace keeping, peace enforcing are only examples. Use of media as a force multiplier has moved to its use as a weapon of war. This was effectively employed by Ho Chi Minh during the Vietnam War. He managed to bring a nation as mighty as the US to its knees. His target was not the US forces on ground but the minds and psyche of the people of US. What followed is history. Closer in time the Arab Spring that shook the Middle East in 2011 is another example of the power of social media. One can thus conclude that the basic concepts have moved from nations at war to people at war. This is one lesson the Americans learnt the hard way in the Middle East. No longer is it enough to overrun a nation state and set up a desired governance system. The people that make up the target nation are equally important. So much can be discussed about this aspect, but it would be best to conclude here that destructive power can only go that far and no more. The sphere of warfare has expanded. Information technologies have become central to the nature of future wars. Maybe it is because of this understanding that China has spent a major effort to catch up with the US. As a result, today the US has lost its ability to practice IT hegemony the world over as it has been doing here to fore. Put together, warfare has moved radically away from the old notions of armed conflict and moved away from military power fighting military power. It has permeated across people, moved into space and outer space and sunk itself into all aspects of a nation’s affairs. A first look at recent operations the world over would serve to highlight the present nature of expression of military power by nations. The recent exchanges between Israel and Hamas, the US Seal operation deep into Pakistan to liquidate Osama Bin Laden and our own surgical strikes deep inside Pakistan in response to the Uri episode and Balakot as mentioned earlier. Add to this the increasing role of drones, the availability of precision guided missiles and counter systems and one will get a clearer perception of future conflict scenarios. We have not cranked in nuclear, chemical and biological aspects here. The Israeli raid at the Entebbe airport in 1976 to rescue hostages is a good example of such operations highlighting the vast and diverse nature of such missions. It all boils down to a measured application of destructive power to achieve the desired effect, send a message, so to say, to the target population and nation. This does not render the conventional force capability redundant. Far from it. The conventional capability is equally important as a backup and reinforcing strength to above operations. In our case a strong conventional capability for reason alluded to later, is an imperative must. In effect the nation has to take the ground realties into consideration while designing its force structure and capability. Complete integration and cohesive force capability, not only within the armed forces but at the national level is an absolute must for achieving such missions. The Indian armed forces have demonstrated such capability from within the present structure twice successfully in recent times. The aim must now be to further enhance capability through a refined doctrine, introduction of cutting edge technologies and above all nurturing their greatest asset, the soldier. The vast and diverse nature of such operations envisages extreme flexibility and adaptability in all its connotations and at all levels. To say that one service is organised and structured to support another is a dated concept. There may be missions where the Air Force supports Army operations, while at other times the Army may be called upon to support Air Force operations under varying circumstances. The Army, Navy and the Air Force must become an integral part of mission-oriented force capability. The lower the level at which such integration is effected, greater will be force cohesiveness, while higher levels of integration would result in greater flexibility in employment of resources. The planners will thus need to strike an appropriate balance and levels of integration and flexibility. These are no doubt conflicting requirements. Efforts aimed at creating an effective and pertinent force composition and orientation must begin at the highest level of the nation. The political masters should define the tenets of the nation’s security concerns and national interests. It is on these basic enunciations of national security doctrine and strategy that the armed forces can draw their own military doctrine and design their force structure accordingly. The armed forces cannot do so in isolation by themselves. Several allied aspects would need to be factored into this process. India has a major commitment of military resources in fighting insurgencies in different parts of the country. It has thousands of kilometres of border which is not recognized internationally. These areas have to be guarded round the clock. The troops doing so need to be supported; some in very hostile environment. Such aspects need consideration and taken a note of. The US has an organisational structure based on theatre commands. They have divided the world into theatres and structured their commands and military presence accordingly. Another aspect is that in over 200 years of independence the US has been at total peace for approximately 15 to 20 years only. Rest of the time it has been in conflict with someone or the other in some part of the world. India on the other hand is a peace-loving nation and is focused only on its own national security. Our requirements are specific to our own security concerns. Our theatre commands will have to be orientated on these. Thus, our force structure has to be specific to our requirements and cannot be based on any external model. Of equal importance is our force location and infrastructure to support likely operations. The armed forces need to be optimally dispersed to be able to respond in a balanced manner to an emerging situation in time and space. A number of factors would thus need consideration while giving a futuristic shape to our armed forces. The idea of integrated theatre commands is a step in the right direction, theoretically for now. Creation of such commands should never be at the cost of the frontline capability, the cutting edge. To the contrary they must serve to enhance the nation’s capability to apply and develop pertinent combat power in a decisive and a proactive manner in a developing conflict situation. We must guard against spreading ourselves thinner on the ground. The idea of theatre commands could be considered when we have built and consolidated our resources of man and machine to an optimal level and we have got a clear vision of our force requirements. Let us get it right this time.
DEFENCE MINISTRY EXTENDS EMERGENCY POWERS TO ARMED FORCES AS INDIA-CHINA STAND-OFF CONTINUES
New Delhi: The Defence Ministry has granted yet another extension of the emergency powers, which were accorded to the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force last year, for emergent revenue procurements and works, amid the stand-off with China at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh. According to top defence sources, the emergency powers for revenue procurements —through the fast track procedure —have been extended till 31 August. Last month, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh-headed Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) had also extended emergency powers of the defence services for capital acquisitions till 31 August 2021. The emergency capital and revenue procurement powers were first extended up to March 2021. Capital procurement powers pertain to the acquisition of capital assets, weapons/weapon systems and other operationally critical equipment which leads to permanent enhancement of operational capabilities of the defence forces. Revenue procurement powers relate to the procurement of critical spares and ammunition required to sustain or maintain these assets. “Invoking of emergency powers for both revenue and capital procurement indicates the government’s intent to enhance our fighting and engaging capabilities to the next level and also sustain them through the long term,” a source in the government said. After the Galwan Valley clash in June last year, the defence ministry had, for the first time, given emergency capital procurement powers to the armed forces to procure weapon systems of up to Rs 300 crore on an urgent basis without further clearances to cut short the long and tedious procurement cycle. Prior to that, emergency powers were granted to the services after the Balakot airstrike in February 2019 and the 2016 Uri surgical strike covered only revenue procurements. CDS Cited Operational Readiness of Armed Forces In Ladakh Top defence sources said that before Rajnath Singh approved the extension of the emergency powers, the Chief of Defence Staff, General Bipin Rawat, cited high operational readiness of the forces in Ladakh for the move. The CDS had noted that it is unlikely that the situation at the LAC will ease anytime soon and that would require the armed forces to be at peak operational readiness in the region, and he thus cited the need for extending the emergency powers both for capital and revenue procurement, the sources added. In the last one year, India has deployed nearly 50,000 additional troops in the Ladakh region and deployed a large number of ground and air assets for any contingencies. Spares, HAMMER Under Emergency Powers Sources said that apart from some major capital purchases, a number of spares and other smaller items will be purchased under the emergency revenue procurement powers. “Aside from some major capital purchases, there is also a number of spares and other smaller items required to be purchased for maintenance of our assets deployed in the frontlines, its overhauls and refits,” a source said. Some of these emergency revenue procurement powers will also be helpful in building large-scale infrastructure such as roads and bridges in eastern Ladakh. Among the major capital procurements initiated by the defence ministry are anti-drone systems being procured by the Army which can jam the communication and navigation signals of a rogue drone or spoof it. Defence sources also said that the IAF is planning to buy another lot of HAMMER air-to-ground precision-guided weapon system for its Rafale fighter jets using the emergency powers. The Highly Agile and Manoeuvrable Munition Extended Range costs around Rs70 lakh and consists of a guidance kit and a range-extension kit fitted on a standard Mk 82 bomb of 250 kg. Other procurements include armour-piercing fin-stabilised discarding sabot (APFSDS) ammunition fired by the T-72 and T-90 main battle tanks, additional Heron drones, loitering munition, Spice Bombs, and Man Portable Air Defence System (MANPADS).
NOT A BRICK IS PLACED IN THE CONTESTED AREAS ALONG THE LAC IN LADAKH AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH: ARMY CHIEF GENERAL M. NARAVANE
Indian Army Chief General Mukund Naravane in an exclusive interaction with the BW Businessworld’s Manish Kumar Jha, denied that there was any reinforcement across in the contested part of LAC and at the buffer zone across the border along Arunachal Pradesh. He put his strong worded statement: “Not a brick has been placed in the part of contested areas” Indian Army Chief General Mukund Naravane in an exclusive interaction with the BW Businessworld’s Manish Kumar Jha, denied that there was any reinforcement across in the contested part of LAC and at the buffer zone along the border of Arunachal Pradesh. He put his strong worded statement: “Not a brick has been placed in the part of contested areas.” China has been building concrete military post right next to the unsettled conflict zone at LAC in Ladakh along, artificially building settlements in the sensitive buffer zone like in Arunachal Pradesh. Isn’t it a cause of major concern? What is Indian army’s strategy to neutralize such vicious tactics by PLA? “Both sides have gone back to agreed position. There is not settlement in the disputed areas—buffer zone either in eastern Ladakh at LAC or in Arunachal Pradesh”, said Chief of Army Staff. He added that there is a misinformation about such reports. Reports from different media have caused ripples that China’s PLA is closing in across the hotly contested part of eastern Ladakh at LAC. Adding to the fire is the report from the Arunachal Pradesh that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is building up concrete structures along the buffer zone. It is no guess that in the world of army what it means— a breaking boundary and that calls for immediate confrontation. While Chief has not denied that that China has been reinforcing along the line with permanent military establishment, added: ‘that can do so within their territory.” Military Positions So far, India and China have disengaged from the contentious Pangong Tso area in March. But despite the Note verbale and agreement (Moscow agreement) by China in last year, Chinese troops are still holding the other contested areas of Hot Springs and Gogra Post and Depsang Plains. While China was the aggressor and responsible for the situation, India also agreed to pull back its troops as Indian army had to deploy military against the PLA’s gross violations. During that meeting, India and China had come up with a so-called ‘Moscow Agreement’ under which a five-point agenda was agreed on easing tensions along the border that have now lasted for over a year. Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) reaffirmed such agreement as that took place in Moscow between EAM S. Jaishankar and his Chinese counterpart and State Councillor Wang Yi said: “Recalling their last meeting in Moscow, in September 2020, the External Affairs Minister emphasized the need to follow through on the agreement reached then and complete the disengagement, resolving the remaining issues along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh at the earliest.” Jaishankar and Wang are currently in Tajikistan capital Dushanbe for the SCO foreign ministers’ meeting and the conference on SCO Contact Group on Afghanistan. India and China have held 11 round of the military corps commander level talks. The schedule for 12th round meeting between the corps commanders is being worked out. In June, at a virtual meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on border affairs, India and China agreed to hold the next round of military talks at an early date to achieve the objective of complete disengagement in remaining friction points. On the side of Arunachal Pradesh, China is ramping up its infrastructure on war footing. Recently, China operationalised its first fully electrified bullet train in the remote Himalayan region of Tibet, connecting the provincial capital Lhasa and Nyingchi, a strategically located Tibetan border town close to Arunachal Pradesh. The 435.5-km Lhasa-Nyingchi section of the Sichuan-Tibet Railway is seen as the built up towards carrying military deployments and logistics bordering Indian States — Arunachal Pradesh. Nyingchi is prefecture-level city of Medog which is adjacent to the Arunachal Pradesh border. In November, Chinese President Xi Jinping had instructed officials to expedite construction, instigating the PLA to build up constructions sites near the border. It led to believe that China will begin the push-over as they did at LAC in Eastern Ladakh by breaking the sanctity of the border settlement mechanism with India. It is no secret in the maritime world that China has been frequently breaking the well-established norm under UNCLOS in the waters of South China Sea. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is an international treaty which was adopted and signed in 1982. Over 160 countries follow the UNCLOS except China. South China Sea though belongs to many countries in around China but China claims all illegally and often Chinese navy pushes the civilian fishing boats of nearby country which they have the rightful claim –even within the set norms of 200 nautical miles. China has already refused to abide by the unanimous decision taken by the international Court of Justice which says the South China Sea must be shared by all these neighbouring countries, including Vietnam and Philippines. The South China Sea is the reflection of what China intends to do with India on the land border. It has been nearly six decades since the 1962 War, and three decades since negotiations began, but the issues remain unresolved. Over the years, China has built up intensive infrastructure, especially metalled roads right up to their perception of LAC. While India too has taken immense steps and built up military and civilian infrastructure to tackle any possible aggression by the Chinese military. The strengthening of positions has taken place at all levels in the armed forces including both the Indian Army and Air Force. Indian Military is well placed for such troops movement in the various strategic locations across Zojila pass, the world`s new highest motorable road Umling La, Marsmik La, or Khardung La among others areas inside the Indian territory. The Air Force has established two major bases in Leh and It has deployed troops at the forward locations all along the eastern Ladakh sector including the Nyoma advanced landing ground and the air field in Daulat Beg Old.
Why induction of American MH-60 Romeo choppers is good news for Indian Navy
The Mh-60 Romeo chopper | Photo by special arrangement
New Delhi: India Friday formally received the first two of the 24 MH-60 ‘Romeo’ anti-submarine helicopters at the San Diego’s Naval Air Station North Island in the US, which the Indian Navy said will enhance its “three dimensional capabilities”, i.e. on the surface, in the air and underwater.
The handover is a sign of growing relations between the US and India — the two aircraft are from the US Navy’s stock, given to India to ensure faster induction.
According to sources in the Indian defence and security establishment, the first batch of the helicopters, also known as ‘submarine hunters’, will land in India only mid next year. This is because the helicopters will be used for training an Indian crew in the US.
More will be handed over to India in the coming months under a USD 2.4 billion deal.
The Mh-60 Romeo chopper | Photo by special arrangement
FMS is the American equivalent of the government-to-government contracts India has carried out with Russia for various systems and with France for the Rafale fighter jets.
The helicopters will also be modified with several equipment and weapons unique to India, the Navy said in a statement.
Sources said these relate to the sensors and specialised weapons package, which includes Hellfire air-to-surface missiles and Mark 54 anti-submarine torpedoes.
ThePrint had reported in April that these helicopters will be delivered in July despite the Covid-19 pandemic.
Hamid Salim, vice president, Sikorsky Maritime & Mission Systems, which was bought over by Lockheed Martin, said the delivery of the first two MH-60R Romeo helicopters to the Indian Navy marks the beginning of a new era of collaboration and partnership between the United States Navy, the Indian Navy and Sikorsky.
William L. Blair, vice president and chief executive, Lockheed Martin India, said, “MH-60R is the most advanced maritime multi-mission helicopter in operation — deployed globally, and its mission performance by far, second to none. We stand committed to making this program a tremendous success in partnership with the United States Navy and the Indian Navy.”
The 24 Romeo, ordered by India last year, is meant to meet the immediate requirement of the Navy which currently relies on its P-8i aircraft for anti-submarine operations amid China’s increasing forays into the waters around India.
This will replace its fleet of the ageing British-built Sea King helicopters, which is now mostly used for transport rather than its actual role — anti-submarine warfare.
The Boeing P8i aircraft, that is currently deployed, operates from land and is used to keep vigil on enemy submarines and for reconnaissance missions.
The Navy, though, is in dire need of ship-borne helicopters. It is also pursuing a separate programme for 123 Naval Multi-Role Helicopters (NMRH) under the ‘Make in India’ initiative. However, the programme has not made much headway.
The Romeo choppers also have anti-surface warfare capabilities, which means they will be capable of detecting surface threats and taking action against enemy ships too.
Besides tracking submarines and engaging them, these choppers are also capable of performing other maritime roles such as search and rescue, logistics support, personnel transport, medical evacuation and surveillance.
The AL-55I engine successfully powered an Indian HJT-36 combat trainer that took to the skies during demonstration flights at the Aero India international aerospace show in February 2021 MOSCOW: Russia’s United Engine Corporation (part of the ROSTEC state tech corporation) delivered two AL-55I turbojet engines to India’s HAL Corporation for the final stage of certification tests of the Indian HJT-36 combat trainer plane, the ROSTEC press office announced on Wednesday. The United Engine Corporation carried out work to bolster the potential of the two engines that had logged over 5,000 hours of operation during bench tests. The customer’s representatives were present at the acceptance/delivery trials, the press office said in a statement. “The plans also envisage conducting similar work to boost the potential of 16 AL-55I engines already supplied to HAL Corporation. Besides, considerable work has been carried out to arrange the licensed production of AL-55I engines at HAL’s enterprises,” the press office quoted United Engine Corporation Deputy General Director Yuri Shmotin as saying. The AL-55I is a double-circuit turbojet engine developed on order from India’s HAL Corporation for HJT-36 jet trainer planes. The engine features a modular design that ensures its high performance efficiency and a low cost of operation. The engine’s advanced digital control system ensures safe piloting and easy maintenance, the statement says. The AL-55I engine successfully powered an Indian HJT-36 combat trainer that took to the skies during demonstration flights at the Aero India international aerospace show in February 2021. The AL-55I engine will be showcased on the display stand of the United Engine Corporation at the MAKS-2021 aerospace show that will run in the suburban town of Zhukovsky outside Moscow on July 20-25.
Why setting up integrated theatre commands should not be rushed — former service chiefs explain
Former Navy chief Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd), former IAF chief Air Chief Marshal Fali H. Major (Retd) and former defence secretary NN Vohra were among the experts debating the theaterisation process.
File photo of Indian Army, Navy and Air Force personnel paying tributes to field Marshal SHFJ Manekshaw on his 12th death anniversary in June 2020 | ANI
New Delhi: Setting up of the integrated theatre commands should not be a rushed affair, even as bringing about jointness among the three defence services on various aspects should remain a priority, top defence and security experts said as they debated India’s national security challenges Friday evening.
The webinar on challenges in higher defence management reforms was organised by India International Centre.
The panellists included former Navy chief Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd), former Indian Air Force (IAF) chief Air Chief Marshal Fali H. Major (Retd), former Northern Army Commander Lt Gen. D.S. Hooda and former Chief of Integrated Defence Staff Lt Gen. Satish Dua (Retd).
N. N. Vohra, former defence secretary and governor of the erstwhile state of Jammu & Kashmir, also participated in the session.
However, the services, particularly the Indian Air Force (IAF), and Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) Gen. Bipin Rawat have not been on the same page over the role of the IAF in theatre commands.
This became evident earlier this month when Gen. Rawat labeled IAF as a support arm to the ground forces — likening it to the role of artillery and engineers in the Army. In response, the IAF chief said air power has a huge role to play in any of the integrated battle areas and is not an issue of support alone.
Aside from discussing the contentious issue of dividing air assets in the theaterisation process, the experts also discussed the roles of the service chiefs and the Department of Military Affairs and how different elements of the security apparatus, such as the paramilitary forces and the Indian Coast Guard, will fit in the theatre commands.
During the discussion, Vohra said there should be no tearing hurry in setting up of the integrated theatre commands.
“If we do anything in a hurry or leave some element of dissatisfaction amongst the stakeholders, then this venture may not meet with total success, and it is important that it does,” he said.
On the issues coming to the fore in establishing theatre commands, Vohra said there should be a clarity on what the defence minister should do in case of an operational contingency — will he speak directly with the theatre commanders or with the service chiefs or only with the CDS. He also said clarity is needed on the role of the defence secretary.
He further said there needs to be an assessment of how the internal and external security will be managed under the theatre commands, given that there are lakhs of paramilitary personnel and the Indian Coast Guard.
Lt Gen. Dua noted that modern warfare is getting increasingly complex with a multitude of threats, and so there is a need to shorten the decision loop.
“We are in the process of reorganising the military into theatre commands that will exercise operational control over the assets of three services, enable joint planning in warfighting and lead to resource optimisation,” he said.
However, Admiral Arun Prakash said the aim was to enhance jointness, and added that theaterisation could have come later.
He emphasised that there should be no limit of three years in establishing theatre commands. “There should be no rush to create theatre commands until there is complete consensus.”
ACM Fali H. Major said the very concept of an integrated theatre command is lost if one service is given primacy.
“This is the bone of contention — the ownership and supremacy issues,” he said.
He said an integrated theatre command should be a true joint tri-service command, where the theatre commander is appointed on rotation from the three services.
He further said that instead of excluding the Army’s northern command from the theatre commands, it should be the first theatre command to be raised, as a testbed, given that it has been a conflict zone historically.
Agreeing, Lt Gen. Hooda added there is a need for integration in joint warfighting and for that integrated structures are needed.
Once there is a joint warfighting doctrine in place and greater integration has been achieved at lower levels, integrated theatre commands could be established then, Lt Gen. Hooda said.
ACM Major said the IAF is not used to a term like ‘allocation of resources’, referring to the division of air assets between theatre commands.
If the IAF wants to “beef up a squadron of aircraft in a conflict zone in the north from east”, it is done seamlessly as each command and squadron knows the deployment plans.
Once the IAF resources are allotted to the eastern sector, they can be pulled out anytime, but to pull out a brigade from the north will take a month, he explained.
He said the idea of an air defence (AD) command was never mooted by the IAF.
Air defence, he emphasised, is the primary task of the IAF — the air defence of the Indian skies, contiguous areas and littoral states — and that is an ongoing 24×7, 365-day job that has to be carried out, irrespective of whether it’s times of peace or war.
There are 7,500 aircraft and other flying objects crisscrossing the Indian skies on a daily basis and the IAF, along with civil surveillance radars, make sure there are no intrusions, he said.
This task is possible as they have placed all their AD assets carefully and strategically, ACM Major said. If Army and naval AD assets are integrated during war, what happens during peace, he asked.
“Air defence command is a no-brainer, since many advanced countries such as Russia and the US created them and disbanded them because they were not working out,” he said.
Admiral Prakash said air power has been an issue of contention not just in India but also other countries.
“The IAF has been quite insecure about placing its assets under any other command of any other service.
The veterans agreed that it is for the three chiefs to sit down together with the CDS and the defence minister to discuss and resolve the issue.
Lt Gen. Hooda said a joint warfighting doctrine can for instance, decide what is the best employment for air power.
The defence experts agreed that there should also be a joint doctrine on national security and that the political leadership should be more involved in defence planning.
