To study the sectarian divide in Islam you need to know the Middle East, one of the most complex regions of the world. You also need a degree of clarity on the geopolitical/geostrategic dynamics and the ideological fault lines which drive much of these in the region. As a backdrop to this essay a short brief on the above will help in clarity.
Besides other things which make the Middle East important it is its geographic location which sits astride the shortest routes (sea lanes) from the West to the East, the viability of having trade centres and the fact that it is the space which nurtured three major faiths of the world. The discovery of energy reserves only added to that importance which made the Middle East a crucial region for the economic and strategic stability of the world. Today it has become the hot bed of ideological and sectarian divide within Islam which is virtually holding the rest of the world to ransom.
Ideologically Islam has emerged as the dominant force in the Middle East even after the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire, the after effects of colonialism and the challenges of Israeli presence as an island within Islamic territories. Yet, the tribal hang over has never been far. Unity has been elusive and the march to modernism has only been in material terms, that too at peripheral levels. Islam remains deeply divided on political and sectarian lines robbing its people off the benefit of stability and growth. The hold of royalty and the clergy over the political fortunes of the Middle Eastern Islamic people has prevented them from achieving what could have been theirs many years ago.
It is the sectarian divide within Islam which drives much of the instability and is linked to almost all the current woes of the nations here, thus drawing in their wake competing forces from outside the region. Two aspects of the sectarian divide, the Shia – Sunni and the intra Sunni need to be understood to get a full measure of the problems.
First, the Shia versus Sunni. Where does this conflict come from? For the completely uninitiated it dates back to the death of the Prophet in 632 AD. He died without leaving a male heir. His first follower and son in law, Ali Ibn Abu Talib (Hazrat Ali) was married to his daughter Fatima and had two sons Hussain Ibn Ali and Hasan Ibn Ali. It was considered by some that the Prophet had willed that his family alone would lead Islam or in other words the first Caliph after the Prophet’s death would be Ali. Equally the Prophet spent maximum time with some of his other close followers, chief among them being Abu Bakr. Thus when it came to succession since the Prophet had left no written will or directions his followers felt that the first leader to lead the people of Islam as the Caliph should be selected (elected) from among his followers. Abu Bakr thus became the first Caliph by popular choice. Ali’s claim that only members of the Prophet’s family could assume his mantel was rejected. He did go on to be the fourth Caliph by selection but by then the fracture lines had appeared and the Prophet’s family was hounded in the ambitions of power and expansion of the Islamic empire. Broadly those who follow the lineage of Islam through acceptance of Abu Bakr as the first Caliph are the Sunnis. Those who insist that Ali being a part of the Prophet’s family was the first legitimate Caliph (although took over as the fourth after Abu Bakr) are the Shias. This is as simplistic an explanation of a really complex set of circumstances which needn’t be spelled out here.
The divide would not have been so intense or hateful had it not been for the one iconic event of Islamic history, the Battle of Karbala where the remnants of the Prophet’s family led by his grandson Hussain were butchered for his refusal to pay obeisance to those opposed to the ways of the Prophet. For 15 centuries thereafter Islam has moved on but the divide among those who differ on the authority of the lineage has never been resolved; in fact it has worsened for some reasons explained below. The modern Middle East is divided into the Shia and Sunni strongholds with Saudi Arabia (the custodian of the holy shrines at Mecca and Medina) and a host of other nations ( Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf countries) being Sunni. Iran with the Shia crescent comprising nations such as Azerbaijan, Iraq (majority) and Bahrain (ruler Sunni but populace largely Shia) leads the Shia pack. The historical process by which each came to be as it is today has long drawn explanations beyond the scope of this write up.
It would have been simple if it was just a Shia-Sunni affair. The complication comes because Saudi Arabia is not just Sunni but follows a subsequent dispensation of Islam, hugely tainted today and known as Wahabi (or Salafi) Islam. There will be many who will challenge this simplistic idea of merger of the Salafi and Wahabi. For simplicity of understanding the Wahabi belief is essentially a revivalist philosophy which seeks to take Islam to its original roots, in the way it was when founded by the Prophet, as a movement against idolatry and other supposed anti-social malpractices. The label Salafi comes from the Salaf or those who were the ideal followers of the faith the way the prophet followed it, and presumed to be the three generations that succeeded those followers. In the pre modern times the Salafi philosophy which frowned on any modern practices, such as emancipation of women or development of arts, was further developed under various thinkers creating division after division within the Sunni community. A spin off was the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt with its model of revivalism and political activism combined with Islamic charity work. While it spread its tentacles all over the Middle East its activism was shunned by monarchs and dictators whom it opposed.
The sectarian fault lines in the Middle East are extremely fuzzy and rarely sharp. Support and alliances are based on political convenience of the times rather than ideological unity and there is never any permanence in these. The geopolitics have, however, been largely dictated by the Shia- Sunni and the intra-Sunni conflict.
There was a Pan Arab/Islamic alliance against Israel which lasted many years. This was driven by a degree of passion with which there was involvement of Egypt, Jordan and Syria at the forefront and Saudi Arabia a bit player. Iran remained at the periphery being a beneficiary of US largesse during the time of the Shah. In fact both Iran and Saudi Arabia were then apparent bit players in the geopolitics of the Middle East. It is the lethal combination of oil and ideology which changed things and it all happened simultaneously.
Egypt signed off from confrontation with Israel in 1978 and Jordan and Syria could not handle it alone to the extent they could earlier. In 1979 three iconic events of the second half of the 20th Century took place which sharpened the sectarian divide and brought the early manifestation of geopolitical confrontation in their wake. First the Iranian Revolution which brought the Shia clergy to power and a reversal of Iran’s US oriented modernism. Second was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, not directly linked to the Middle East but with serious implications and opportunities. The third and lesser known event was the takeover of the Grand Mosque by the renegade Ikhwan who tried to overthrow the Saudi monarchy through claims of the arrival of the Mahdi in the form of one of its leaders. In effect it was an indirect commentary on the House of Saud that it needed to be even closer to the ideology of the Salafis.
The results of the three almost simultaneous events strengthened the sectarian divide and their impact is being felt to the day. What were the exact implications? First the power of Saudi Arabia, enhanced by the energy crisis of 1973, then considered as the resurrection of Sunni power was now matched just across the Persian Gulf by the Shia power of Iran. Saudi Arabia thus far perceiving itself as the grand flag bearer of Islam was stung awake by the feasibility of the Shia model becoming stronger and having greater geopolitical influence. Second, the Ikhwan revolt sent the House of Saud to panic stations to promote revivalism and the Salafi model not only in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East but all over the world, for its own survival as much as to negate Shia influence. This led to investment of time and money in as far away as Indonesia, Malaysia and South Asia. Third taking off from the first two issues, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought home the opportunity to Saudi Arabia to ally with the US and more importantly with Pakistan to ward off potential Iranian influence in its east and embed Salafism into one of the most populous Islamic regions of the world – Af-Pak, with potential to spread into the Muslim strongholds of India. Money power along with Arabic language and Salafi ideology moved into overdrive to contain the power of Shia revival. Pakistan was the happiest with this arrangement because it offered it sufficient scope to become a frontline state of the US and the surrogate of Saudi Sunni-Salafi revivalism in South Asia. Saudi money powered the search for nuclear capability and also the conversion of three million Afghan refugees to Salafi ideology. It sowed the seeds for the future employment of religious ideology as a weapon in J&K. Even more importantly it set the stage for Pakistan’s eventual conversion to a virtual theocratic state and thus the core centre for international radical and violent Islamic extremism. The power of sectarianism to lay waste an entire city is best exemplified by Karachi and many other urban centers of Pakistan where its substantial Shia population remains targeted. It makes Pakistan extremely wary of Iran which whom it shares a long boundary in its restive Baluchistan province. The power of sectarianism has kept the divisions in Afghanistan wide open. Iran and India supported the Northern Alliance due to it being far less radical and opposing the Taliban which was backed by the Al Qaida. The US based its war with the Taliban on the back of the Northern Alliance for the same reasons. The Hazaras are Shia but the Tajiks and the Uzbeks are Sunni of a more moderate strain. All of them were a part of the Northern Alliance.
Saddam Hussain of Iraq was a Sunni but not of the Salafi strain. His Baathist party followed the secular, socialist model but his clash of interests with Iran and Saudi Arabia were beyond ideology. His defeat and removal upset the balance of ideological power in the Gulf and thereby the Middle East. Although secular by belief Saddam’s presence gave the minority Sunni Iraqis out of proportion power. Without adequate insight into the sectarian feelings of subjugation in Iraq the US sponsored Coalition Authority permitted overwhelming power to the Shia majority of the new Iraq; it formed the government although a power sharing formula existed. This was one of the major reasons for the rise of the ISIS initially backed by the Sunni militias.
The Shia Sunni conflict which has manifested into an Iran Saudi conflict of geostrategic interests has in recent years transformed into a series of proxy conflicts dotting the Middle Eastern landscape. It is the Levant where one of the most vicious ones is in place even today drawing in multiple players such as the US, Russia and Turkey. The swathe of territory from Lebanon to West Iran scanning Northern Syria, Northern Iraq, parts of Southern Turkey where areas claimed by the Kurds lie, and touching the border of Iran. There is no distinctive stamp of Iranian Shiaism here but interests bring together Hezbollah in Lebanon, Allawite Syria (both Shia oriented) and Shia majority Iraq consolidated together in a Pan Shia conglomerate. Turkey is currently opposed to Saudi Arabia even as it is undergoing its own revolution in which the orientation of ideology remains largely uncertain; far from being Shia, it is also not Salafi. The Kurds have loyalties primarily to themselves but in alignment no one can say which way they will go; they have been hugely against any ISIS domination and have played no mean role in the defeat of the rogue non state group. The battle for the Levant has been on since the last six years and more vehemently after the advent of the ISIS which had made Northern Iraq and Northern Syria its stronghold. The rise of the ISIS was facilitated by the mistakes of the Shia dominated Iraqi regime. The subsequent vanquishing of the ISIS at Fallujah and now at Mosul has been possible because of better understanding and cooperation with the Sunni militias. Russia’s involvement arising out of its need to protect its interests in the East Mediterranean and maintain presence of boots in the Middle East, has veered off towards a pro Shia support. It is with Iran, Syria (Bashir al Assad) and the Shia majority government of Iraq.
The polarized geostrategic environment is not in water tight compartments. Both the US and Russia support the Iraqi government. However, the US appears less concerned about Russia and more about Iran. Old enmity dies hard and Iran’s propensity to be unpredictable and fiercely independent cannot find US endoresement. Its alleged nuclear arms program has drawn the ire of the West and much more of the Saudi led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Egypt. The Saudi paranoia has led it into a meaningless, costly war against Iranian proxies in Yemen in an effort to prevent the spread of Iran’s influence. The war is unlikely to conclude in victory for either side.
Experiencing the complexities of the Middle East and conscious of the reducing US dependence on Saudi energy resources, former President Barak Obama tried to follow hands off policy towards the region. In 2011 he brought about withdrawal from Iraq. However, almost simultaneously the US attempts to bolster liberal democracy among the nations of the region through support to the Arab Spring came a cropper. He attempted a softening of stance towards Iran leading to the signing of the Iran Nuclear Deal on 15 Jul 2015; this helped in de-isolating Iran and bringing a less radical President in leadership. However, it put the US on a path of dilution of its strong relationship with Saudi Arabia purely on grounds of the change in balance of power.
The above situation seems to have undergone a temporary change with the recent much heralded Trump visit to the Middle East where President Trump attended a virtual summit of Sunni nations and placed himself strongly behind them thus once again returning to a ‘Shun Iran policy’. The Shia-Sunni and the intra Sunni divide has played a major role in the awkward alignment of relationships emerging from President Trump’s apparent decisions which have reportedly been based on insufficient research of the complexities of the Middle East situation. For example shortly after Trump’s visit four nations chose to break diplomatic relations with Qatar. All four, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt are essentially Sunni (Bahrain’s ruling family is Sunni) while Qatar is also Sunni; Egypt is ruled by its Army which though supported financially by the Saudis and UAE is in power to keep the revivalist but revolutionary Muslim Brotherhood at bay. Muslim Brotherhood which has its branches all over the Middle East is supported by Qatar. The Saudis also detest the Muslim Brotherhood as it acts against royalty and does not believe in the division of mosque and state. The Saudi-Qatari rivalry is rooted in more than ideology with the Saudis unhappy with the prominent position being occupied by the Royal House of Qatar headed by Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, its racing economy, high per capita income due to the gas and oil reserves and the fact that it is hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup. The excuse put forward is that Qatar supports terror groups all over the Middle East and especially the elements of the Arab Spring through its high profile television channel Al Jazeera. The US has realized its mistake of supporting the whimsical Saudi action and even signed a 12 billion USD defence deal with Qatar thereafter. President Trump forgot that Qatar hosts a full forward base of the US Central Command, central to the US strategic presence in the Middle East. This standoff also aimed at Iran is sub sectarian in nature adding to the complexity of an already hugely complex strategic environment.
The inevitable question which should arise is about the future and the potential of any resolution of sectarian conflict within Islam. The answer can for a change clearly be in the negative. Islam has grown manifold in fifteen centuries and developed in diverse social ways in different parts of the world. However, to resolve its ideological divide it will need to shed the weight of history through a progressive, more tolerant and forward looking philosophy of existence which is not in confrontational mode with all other faiths. Such a possibility currently seems remote unless one views the current events as a churning before the forces of reformation take strength and take the faith through a unifying and self-healing exercise over a few generations. Only time will tell.
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Link to DSA article – http://www.dsalert.org/DSA-Editions/August_2017_Lt_Gen_Syed_Ata_Hasnain_(Retd).pdf
