Major Leetul Gogoi . ANI file photo

Srinagar, September 18

The Army has shifted Major Leetul Gogoi, who was at the centre of the ‘human shield’ controversy, out of his unit and attached to local formation headquarters after being indicted by an Army Court of Inquiry (CoI) for “fraternising” with a local woman in Srinagar, officials said on Tuesday.

Last month, the CoI instituted by the army indicted Gogoi, an officer with 53 Rashtriya Rifles—a specialised anti-militancy force for Jammu and Kashmir, on two counts—“fraternising” with a local in spite of instructions to the contrary and “being away from the place of duty while in operational area”.  It recommended Summary of Evidence against him, a step before court martial proceedings are initiated.

The officials said Gogoi was shifted out of his unit in Budgam and “attached” to Awantipora-based Victor Force headquarters.

The officer, whose decision to tie a civilian to the bonnet of his vehicle in Kashmir on April 9 last year as a shield against stone-pelting by a mob had kicked up a huge controversy, will now face Summary of Evidence, a process similar to framing of charges. The process is likely to take three months.

Based on the Summary of Evidence to be compiled by “competent authorities”, the Army is likely to decide further action in the case which may include General Court Martial (GCM) or Summary General Court Martial (SGCM). The GCM is like a full court whereas the proceedings in SGCM are conducted in a much shorter time span and cases are disposed of quickly.

Gogoi, who was commissioned as a lieutenant in December 2008, was detained by Jammu and Kashmir police on May 23 following an altercation at a hotel in Srinagar where he was allegedly trying to enter with an 18-year-old woman.

Army Chief General Bipin Rawat had supported the young officer’s action and honoured him with the Army chief’s ‘Commendation Card’ for his ‘sustained efforts’ in counter-insurgency operations.

However, after the name of the major was embroiled in a controversy involving a girl, Gen Rawat said exemplary punishment would be given to Gogoi if he was found guilty of “any offence”.

“If any officer of the Indian Army is found guilty of any offence, we will take strictest possible action,” he had said. — PTI

India needs the best of warriors, weapons and war strategies. This necessitates a quantitative reduction and a qualitative upgradation of the services’ manpower. The historic initiative of right-sizing need to be sustained, supported and carried forward. That can, hopefully, facilitate India’s graduation towards a world class military power.

Bhartendu Kumar Singh
Indian Defence Accounts Service

Large manpower of our armed forces is increasingly becoming a concern. Uncertain impact on combat capabilities apart, sheer numbers are also leapfrogging towards huge revenue and pension expenditure. There is insufficient money for modernisation efforts. Therefore, the recent initiative by army to study ‘right sizing’ challenge is a commendable policy step since this could propel India’s tryst with Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). However, unless the study is conducted in an open and transparent environment, the intended objectives would continue to elude.

The Indian Army has seen a four-fold increase in its manpower strength since 1947. None of the great powers like the US, Russia, China, the UK, or France have had this kind of increasing trajectory. In fact, all of them had a decreasing trend after the vortex of Cold War was over. For example, the US, which had over 3.37 million total armed forces personnel at the peak of Cold War in 1967, has 13.54 million personnel now. Similarly, China, which had a manpower strength of 4.9 million armed forces personnel during Cold War days, has now around two million personnel. Numerous studies have proved that the combat capability of the Chinese PLA has indeed been enhanced due to manpower rationalisation and trimming.

In the Indian context, sporadic manpower reduction efforts in the past ccould not succeed. Many strategic experts chaffed at the idea, partially out of what Samuel S Huntington may have called as ‘confused and unsystematic set of assumptions about civil-military relationship’. No serious and acceptable reform proposals were allowed to emerge on the discussion table. Even when civilian manpower underwent reductions at every level in the government and fresh recruits guided towards the new pension scheme (NPS), the military rank and file kept proliferating. The dominant theme being propagated was that of a massive shortage of manpower in the armed forces, particularly at the officer cadre level. Strategic experts had (and still have) their own narratives of manpower shortages and why urgent steps were needed to plug the same. Such assumptions of the ‘so-called shortages’ are based on archival notions of ‘authorised versus posted manpower strength’ and blissfully ignore the contemporary realities where the services’ engagements need to be functionally reviewed so as to do away with  superfluous activities. 

This dichotomy between global trends and the Indian approach is due to many factors.

1There is a civil-military compartmentalisation in national security consciousness. Despite attempts to forge a common approach to national security in institutions like the National Defence College (NDC) for senior civil and military officers, perceptional division remains in situ. The services, partly out of their training, working culture and professional military ethics, stand for a dominating security policy. Demands for more budget and more manpower have to be understood in this context. 

2The armed forces practice conservative realism and support established values, institutional practices and functional expanse. There is an institutional reluctance to revise them and learn from best practices elsewhere. Some of these practices, like the orderly system and the involvement in basketful of non-core activities like running educational institutions, commercial complexes etc, lead to avoidable proliferation of rank and file.

3 There are few lateral mobility options for armed forces personnel in other professional fields. Media hype and hoopla notwithstanding, our soldiers have to demand respect and remain at the margins of social life. For example, despite the armed forces remaining stout champions of democratic values, very few military men have managed a political career. Such economic, social and political marginalisation deprive them an encompassing and comprehensive outlook of society to appreciate issues such as manpower reduction.

Contemporary experiences show that numerical preponderance and military modernisation do not go hand-in-hand. Manpower has been reduced in many countries to rationalise ‘teeth-to-tail’ ratio and spend the precious penny on weapons. Further, the nature of warfare is constantly changing where the physical hand-to-hand fight is being replaced by new platforms such as cyber warfare. Instead of dismantling enemy tanks, the challenge is to cripple the enemy’s functional system in critical fields. When we hypothesise a war scenario 20 years later, war techniques would have become more automated and indeed robotised. Infantry and mechanised infantry would be performing rear guard duties. Thus, the technological imperatives necessitate a technically educated manpower profile to handle the future warfare scenario. In the Indian context, unless the numbers are reduced, a qualitative pushover is difficult.

The present initiative seems to be a response to public policy calls for manpower reduction and jointness since 2015 and a look beyond the Shekatkar Committee’s recommendations on manpower reduction. One of the reasons why the Shekatkar Committee did not come up to expectations was its inability to conceptualise the issues and ask the right questions to itself. For example, the political economy of military modernisation warrants that revenue expenditure be capped to a maximum of 50 per cent of the defence budget. Such issues were ignored. Perhaps, that explains why it could not go beyond cosmetic recommendations, necessitating a comprehensive study afresh by the army.

India needs the best of warriors, weapons and war strategies. This necessitates a quantitative reduction and a qualitative upgradation of the services’ manpower. The historic initiative of right-sizing need to be sustained, supported and carried forward. That can, hopefully, facilitate India’s graduation towards a world class military power.

Views are personal

Capt Vikram Batra sacrificed his life during Kargil War fighting Pak intruders

Health Minister Vipin Singh Parmar unveils the statue of Capt Vikram Batra in Palampur.

Ravinder Sood

Palampur September 10

Health Minister Vipin Singh Parmar unveiled the statue of Captain Vikram Batra, PVC, on the occasion of his birth anniversary on the premises of Shaheed Captain Vikram Batra Degree College here on Monday. Captain Batra had sacrificed his life during the Kargil War while fighting intruders from Pakistan.

Speaking on the occasion, the Health Minister said he was fortunate to be in the institution named in the memory of the great solider, who had sacrificed his life at a the age of 20 for the unity and integrity of the country.

“It has been more than 18 years since then, but the unparalleled sacrifice and courage of Kargil heroes are still etched in the memory of the Indians and Vikram Batra is among those who will become the face of every Indian solider, who will fight fearlessly”, said Parmar.

Parmar said Captain Vikram Batra had left a message for every politician, student, employee and the common man. His message was loud and clear, “Always put the country first”. Had he wanted to come back after the triumph over Point 5140 in the Kargil sector, he could have, but he decided to go further and capture Point 4875, where he eventually attained martyrdom.

Speaking on the occasion, Girdhari Lal Batra, the martyr’s father, said Vikram left his job in the Merchant Navy only to serve his country. After his son attained martyrdom, he interacted with many soldiers, who had participated in the Kargil War. They told him how Vikram received bullets on his chest and head while saving the life of an injured soldier.

“He was always keen to accept challenges. He always wanted to be in the forefront. I still remember several instances of my son’s life when he volunteered to be posted on the frontline”, said Kamal Kant Batra, the martyr’s mother.

Earlier, the Health Minister Vipin Singh Parmar presided over an annual prize distribution function of the college. He said the state government had planned to spend Rs 7,044 crore to strengthen the education system. He asked the students not to take to drugs, which had become a matter of serious concern. Later, he also inaugurated a basket ball court in the college complex.

China remains the biggest arms exporter to Pakistan. According to a report by RAND, Pakistan accounts for nearly 42% of China’s total arms sales. On the contrary, Pakistan’s arch-enemy India remains the biggest economic partner of China in the region with bilateral trade expected to touch $100 Billion.

China has emerged as a key supplier of major weapons to South Asian countries especially Pakistan and Bangladesh. Sales to both the nations amount to over 53% total Chinese arms sales between 2000-14.

The most notable Chinese sale Pakistan was of JF-17 fighters followed by an agreement to build the fighter jets in Pakistan under a joint venture.

China has continued to provide significant defence assistance to Pakistan including assisting develop the country’s nuclear program. During the mid-1970s Beijing covertly assisted Islamabad’s nuclear ambitions to counter New Delhi, according to the RAND report.

“In 1988, China agreed to supply and train Pakistanis to operate the M-11 solid-fuel rocket, with a 185-mile range and carrying a 1,100-pound warhead. In succeeding decades, China has sold Pakistan hundreds of fighter jets and signed agreements to sell frigates and submarines to Pakistan,” the report read.

China maintains strong defence ties with Pakistan and it is to check what Islamabad states as Indian belligerence. of late. According to the document, close ties with Pakistan, “the linchpin of China’s South Asia policy”, are based on three factors: ensuring China’s internal stability, balance against India and defending China’s growing economic interests.

At the same time, China-India economic ties are soaring at a rapid pace. India is China’s largest trading partner in the region and the bilateral trade between 2000 and 2013 was estimated to be at $65 billion (compared to a modest $14 billion between China and Pakistan). By 2020, India-China trade volume is widely speculated to touch magical $100 Billion.

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Vijay Mohan

Tribune News Service

Chandigarh, September 8

Following communication intercepts, the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) have sounded an alert over a person, believed to be a foreign intelligence agent, posing an a Major in the Army and calling up CAPF establishments and eliciting sensitive information.

“It is learnt that an ISI agent impersonating as an Army officer called up a control room in a Shashtra Seema Bal (SSB) establishment and has been able to obtain certain sensitive information,” a signal received by SSB units this week states. The SSB is responsible for the peace-time management of the Indo-Nepal and Indo-Bhutan borders. India and Nepal share an open border of 1,751 km, where the main challenge is to check misuse of the open border by terrorists and criminals for illegal and anti-national activities. Pakistan’s ISI has a large presence in Nepal and is known to stage operations against India from the Himalayan kingdom.

Asking all unit commanders to urgently sensitise personnel manning control rooms and telephones against sharing any information with unidentified or unauthorised persons without approval from the competent authority, the signal states that disciplinary action should be initiated against personnel involved in such security breaches.

Calling up security establishments while posing as Indian officers to elicit information has been a long-standing ploy of Pakistani operatives due to similar phonetics and accents. Last year, a stenographer posted in UP was arrested on the charge of espionage after it emerged he was passing details of correspondence between civilian and military authorities on matters such as clearance for field firing ranges, names or officers and units etc, to his handlers.

In March 2017, the MoS (Home) said in Parliament that in 2016-17, 33 persons were arrested for spying for Pakistan, highest from Rajasthan, followed by Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir.

THE 10 hours of tête-à-tête between PM Modi and Xi Jinping have been a watershed in Sino-India ties that have oscillated between polite indifference and barely-concealed animus since the thaw exactly three decades back. Since then, Modi has also jetted to Russia for a similar but shorter conversation with Vladimir Putin, but it was the overflowing Sino-India bucket list that needed greater attention. New Delhi has taken care not to be seen as cosseting the Dalai Lama or vigorously endorsing the US position on the South China Sea while Beijing has reciprocated with promises of greater market access to Indian goods and services. And now an Indian Army delegation will cross over to China to carry forward the Wuhan spirit that, among other postulates, promised a less fractious border.  The need to lower political temperatures suits both regimes. Xi welcomed a respite from Indian activism with the US in the South China Sea after Trump initiated a trade war while the North Korean situation remains fluid. With one-third of its total trade deficit accounted for by China alone, India realises that the recent offer of market access is of symbolic value when viewed against complete Chinese incalcitrance since this problem ballooned. The ties are now poised for a break-out moment when both need to shed long-held notions and apprehensions about each other to move to the next level of partnership.More than any other vector, a smooth trajectory of Sino-Indian military relationship is necessary to increase the domestic constituency for improved ties because in addition to the residual animus of the 1962 War, anti-China sentiment has been used to score domestic political points. For the first time after the Cultural Revolution, China too resorted to rabid anti-India outpouring during the Doklam standoff. The military bonhomie, denoting that both sides have agreed to turn the page on the recent acrimony, should set the stage for “clarification” of the border, a step that would eliminate confusion about overlapping claims on a dozen patches of the LAC leading to confrontation between patrols. India needs to harness the current thaw for visible progress on the border question.

Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping The termination of the Doklam stand off has been classified as an act of maturity on the part of both countries in keeping with their mutual interests , AFP

Just a little over a year ago the Indian Army and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China were in a serious face-off across the trijunction of the Indian, Chinese and Bhutan borders near Doka La at the Doklam Plateau which lies in Bhutan. The 72-day stand-off involved induction of additional PLA troops and the advancement of India’s Siliguri-based 33 Corps’ operational alert by about eight weeks. This alert involved a large scale mobilisation of troops to positions of operational deployment. The latter saw a clear indication on the part of India not to be coerced by a virulent propaganda blitz by China to psychologically force an Indian pull back from Doklam, where the illegal Chinese road construction activity had been stopped by the Indian Army.

From a military strategic angle there were two prime issues here. First, the road under construction at Doklam would have given the PLA access to the proximity of the Indian post of Doka La, enabling the PLA to build up strength and logistics to target that post right at the trijunction which too is disputed by China. Second, although the trijunction lies squeezed at the southern tip of the Chumbi Valley between Bhutan and the Indian territory of the state of Sikkim, it is only a crow flight distance of 40-50 km to the south, to the narrow Chicken’s Neck or Siliguri Corridor which connects West Bengal to the Northeast.

Developing military operations through the Chumbi Valley by the Chinese was operationally imprudent due to the squeeze effect from east and west and would have been unlikely. However, in military strategy, it is not necessarily the actual launch of operations but a demonstrated intent to do so which ties down troops, in this case Indian troops. The risk could not be taken. In my assessment, a year ago, I had highlighted that the Chinese had chosen to play a military psychological game with no terminal aim, at a point on the Sino-Indian border where their ability to be in control of the situation would always be suspect. Yet the psychological message would be strong.

For long, China had focused on intimidation in Ladakh and in Arunachal Pradesh. The India-Bhutan-China trijunction had its own connotations and the threat to the Siliguri Corridor would create some amount of panic in New Delhi. However, it’s a different issue that there was little panic. The Chinese intent was well read by India and appropriate measures were taken which led to the stand down. The Indian media adopted a mature approach in response to the Chinese media’s caustic efforts to force a premature Indian pull back.

A year ago I had also assessed that repeated Chinese intimidatory attempts were never aimed at physical occupation of disputed territory nor dispute resolution. Those were designed to force India to focus its threat perception on the northern Himalayan borders and continue to give priority to its land forces. This is an issue which needs to be understood in context; the context is China’s strategic vulnerability which lies in the oceans. The reason for this is its trade and energy, both dependent on the long sea lines of communication (SLsOC) stretching through the Western Pacific and the entire stretch of the Indian Ocean. On these maritime highways has depended China’s phenomenal growth rate. The growth process has to continue albeit even at the current much lower rate because China’s realisation of its dream lies in extending the fruits of growth to its hinterland by continuing its low-cost manufacturing revolution. If India develops its navy to the required levels on the basis of correct security perceptions, China will have much to worry about. Although it is impeding freedom of navigation in the South China Sea (SCS) through construction of artificial islands and laying claim to exclusive economic zones on basis of new island territories, its strategic interest is enforced by coercing freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean.

The termination of the Doklam stand off has been classified as an act of maturity on the part of both India and China in keeping with their mutual interests. The turn of events since then have further reinforced the mutual perception that border tension would only have a retrograde effect on the larger intent of economic cooperation between the two highly populated nations which was the priority in their larger strategic interests too. The international strategic environment was also altering course and a reset in the world order was being sought without any clear direction, except that hardened groupings were being perceived as intimidatory. The Indian diplomatic establishment was quick to correctly realise this, thus setting forth a subsidiary reset in the region too. Prime Minister Modi’s foreign policy initiatives took him to three important destinations — Wuhan, Sochi and Qingdao — which were a reflection of promoting Indian strategic interests post Doklam.

Attending the Indian Ocean Conference 2018 at Hanoi, Vietnam, from where I am writing this analysis, it is amply clear that China continues to play to its Indian Ocean interests. There have been interventions by Chinese delegates in line with the age-old argument that the Indian Ocean is not owned by India, that it should be renamed and that India must not object to the presence of other states whose interests clearly lie within its waters and its ports and island territories. This is fully in line with the broad Chinese strategy which focuses on forcing India on the defensive with regard to its interests in the Indian Ocean region. Establishing naval facilities at the string of ports and harbours that it has acquired access to is its way of securing the SLsOC. With that endeavour, China will continue its strategy of psychological helming in of India along the Himalayan belt so that Indian security perceptions remain rooted there. However, Doklam clearly established that any overstepping through this strategy would be resisted by India.

With lessons learnt from Doklam, China will seize every opportunity to re-emphasise its 2003 strategy of Three Warfares — media, cyber and legal; all of them contributing to the larger psychological game towards coercing the minds of the Indian leadership. Thus far, the leadership has done well to understand it. The Chinese strategy will be dynamic and calibrated to which Indian response will have to remain nimble, fleet footed and demonstrative of resolve. Calibrated intimidation is going to be order of the day despite the regional reset.

he author commanded the 15 Corps in J&K and is now the Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir. Views expressed are personal.

THE Law Commission’s consultations with political parties on the feasibility of holding simultaneous Lok Sabha and state elections made for some unusual allies. The BJP, the principle proponent of the idea, has been backed by the Samajwadi Party and the Telangana Rashtra Samiti — the former its principal rival in UP while the latter subscribes to an ambiguous position. The Trinamool Congress and the Left, who do not see eye to eye in West Bengal, are on the same page in opposing the concept. But when push comes to shove, the SP and TRS will turn into rivals, if only to ensure the BJP does not appropriate and profit from the arguments of lower poll expenditure and better governance.But the Law Commission’s draft working paper on the subject outlines several difficulties that are far greater than the current political contest for public perception. At least a dozen laws need to be amended including changes to the basic structure of the Constitution that may well be a bridge too far because of the Supreme Court’s Kesavananda Bharati judgment. As proposed by the Parliamentary Standing Committee, this goal is possible in two phases: coinciding elections of half the states to the 2019 Lok Sabha polls and the rest with the 2024 edition.The immediate impact of this two-phase approach will be deferring elections to Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan Assemblies and clubbing them with the 2019 Lok Sabha polls. This strategy suits the Modi government because any erosion in the BJP’s support base here — as looks likely in Rajasthan and is a possibility in the other two — could put wind in the sails of the opposition for the 2019 polls. The opposition is unlikely to pass up the chance to turn these elections into a semi-final as well as try out mini gathbandhans. This is a better strategy than risk standing up to a Modi juggernaut in 2019. Federal institutions — the Election Commission and the Law Commission — may go through the motions, but it is doubtful if other parties will permit tactical advantage to the BJP for next to nothing in return.

Islamabad, September 4

Dr Arif Alvi, one of the founding members of Prime Minister Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party, was elected as the new President of Pakistan on Tuesday, according to media reports.

Alvi defeated Pakistan Peoples Party candidate Aitzaz Ahsan and the Pakistan Muslim League-N nominee Maulana Fazl ur Rehman in a three-way contest to become the 13th president. Of the 430 votes cast in the National Assembly and Senate, Alvi received 212 votes, Rehman bagged 131 and Ahsan garnered 81; six votes were rejected, DawnNews reported, citing unofficial results.

Alvi secured 45 of the 60 votes cast by the Balochistan’s newly elected lawmakers, it said.

In the PPP-dominated Sindh Assembly, Ahsan got 100 votes, while Alvi bagged 56. Just a solitary vote was cast in the favour of Rehman.

In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly, Alvi received 78 of the total 109 votes, while Rehman and Ahsan got 26 and five votes respectively.

In Pakistan, the President is considered as a symbol of the federation and head of the state and exercises all powers on the recommendations of the prime minister.

Outgoing President Mamnoon Hussain’s tenure ends on September 8.

A dentist by profession, 69-year-old Alvi is one of the founding members of PTI. He served as the party’s secretary general from 2006 to 2013.

He won the National Assembly elections from NA-247 (Karachi) during the July 25 polls. He was also elected member of the National Assembly in the 2013 general election. – PTI