Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal on dharna at the LG’s office. (File) 

The unending Delhi saga of “full statehood” versus “partial statehood” has less to do with constitutional correctness and more to do with the political compulsions, instincts and pettiness. The dissonance over Delhi’s status dates back to the Sheila Dikshit era. Relations between the then chief minister and lieutenant general were tense even though the Congress held office at both the state and the Centre. It has not changed. The principle of special sensitivities for national capitals (for example, Washington DC, London, Paris etc.) on account of their national and international importance, geographical location and strategic significance has been consistently invoked to make a case for Delhi’s claim to “full statehood” to be treated differently from that for Goa, or even a more empowered “partial statehood” in Puducherry.

The result is a fractured arrangement of power-sharing, with law and order, land and services residing with the central government. This arrangement has always been contested by the state government. Such constitutional arrangements militate against the preferences of the “elected government”, which is accountable to the citizens. Political parties that endorse the “full statehood” demand in manifestos, however, fall silent on winning power at the Centre. The state government’s frustrations are understandable. The AAP formed the government after winning 67 of the 70 seats in the 2015 Delhi assembly elections. The formation of the government was followed by the LG’s office imposing more constraints like disabling the power of the state government to transfer employees, ordering vigilance probes on complaints or proceeding against corrupt officials.

These questionable restrictions also came in the backdrop of unprecedented theatrics. A perfectly legitimate grouse about the timing and the intent of these notifications was soon lost in the personalised, combative and anarchic retaliation from the party in power in the state. The expanding political ambitions of the AAP, which went beyond Delhi, may have also contributed to the widening of the Centre-state divide. The Centre successfully and, perhaps unfairly, checkmated the state government. Meanwhile, the party running the state government took the battle to Varanasi and Punjab. The forays were unsuccessful, leaving the party even more frustrated. Even on the current issue of the “strike” by Delhi’s bureaucrats, the essential character of the protests has been theatrical and obstructionist. The IAS association has refuted the allegations (that the bureaucrats are hampering the work of the government) as “unwarranted and baseless”. The association points to the passing of the state budget and the accompanying budget session as proofs of a working machinery. The sense that bureaucrats have been “agitated” following the alleged attack on the Delhi chief secretary has sullied the environment.

Trust between the political class and bureaucracy is necessary for good governance. The impasse in Delhi suggests a total breakdown in the relations between the two sections. It also implies that the entire administrative staff is against the state government. This is not possible given the diversity and scale of the administrative machinery. The government must introspect and adopt a more mature approach to the bureaucracy. Slandering the entire administration as corrupt may rouse the cadres, but yields diminishing returns in the long term.

The state government is well within its moral right to demand the inclusion or exclusion of any official on basis of apolitical and professional considerations, as opposed to intemperate, whimsical and blanket aspersions cast on the entire “system”. The means and expressions of the current protest reflect reciprocal pettiness and diminution of constitutional sobriety. Unintentionally, the case for more empowerment of the Delhi state government — not “full statehood” — may have further stalled with the repeated optics of the “sleep-in” at the Raj Niwas waiting room: It is reminiscent of the AAP’s 2014 street protests outside Rail Bhawan. Delhi with its commitments to international confabulations, transit infrastructure, inter-intra dependence on neighbouring states and stately ceremonies cannot risk fanciful drama. This round of LG-CM spat has further diminished the nobility of constitutional offices, without achieving the desired corrections.

What should worry India is Pakistan army’s irrationality, not its capability

CHANDIGARH:A district court sent a Shimla man to three months of rigorous imprisonment for failing to file his income tax return on time.

The court of chief judicial magistrate Akshdeep Mahajan also imposed a fine of ₹8,000 on the convict, Sanjay Kumar Sood, for wilfully failing to furnish return of his income.

Deputy commissioner of income tax Laganpreet Sandhu had moved a complaint against Sood, mentioning that Sood had not filed tax return worth ₹13.8 lakh on the due date for the assessment year 2012-13, which was September 30, 2012.

The complaint mentioned that Sood, without any reasonable cause, had instead filed the return on April 2, 2013 (beyond the deadline).

Accordingly, a show-cause notice dated February 5, 2014 was issued to him, in a reply to which he claimed that he had deposited the tax voluntarily as March 31, 2013, was a Sunday and April 1 was a bank holiday relating to assessment year 2012-13.

Sood’s reply claimed that the belated return was voluntarily submitted within time allowed under section 139(4) of the Income Tax Act, so there was no intent on his part to evade tax before any notice was issued.

However, the complaint said the notice was issued only after obtaining the requisite sanction under Section 279 (1) of the Act.

Meanwhile, Sood’s counsel had submitted that instant prosecution against the accused was illegal, and on account of ulterior motive by the officers of income tax department.

It was also contended that Sood had filed the return for the assessment year 2011-12 in time and that for 2012-13 was also filed in time with tax on the delayed period.

Vijay Mohan

Tribune News Service

Chandigarh, July 21

Almost a decade after a general court martial (GCM) awarded the first-ever conviction to a woman Army officer for alleged professional misconduct, the Armed Forces Tribunal has upheld the verdict but reduced the quantum of sentence from dismissal from service to a severe reprimand.In July 2009, Capt Poonam Kaur of the Army Service Corps was tried on 10 charges under the Army Act for disobedience of lawful command, acts unbecoming an officer, levelling false accusations with an intent to defraud.The GCM had held her guilty on seven charges, but acquitted her on three charges pertaining to disobedience and intent to defraud. Almost a decade after a general court martial (GCM) awarded the first ever conviction to a woman army officer for alleged professional misconduct, the verdict has been upheld by the Armed Forces Tribunal, but has reduced the quantum of the sentence from dismissal from service to a severe reprimand.The AFT’s Chandigarh Bench held that the punishment awarded to her was not commensurate with the charges. The Bench has ordered that she be notionally reinstated in service and deemed to have been discharged from service on the completion of her term of engagement.  As a short-service commission officer, she had completed three years and nine months of service and had one year and three months’ service left for her term to end.Poonam had been posted to an ASC battalion in Kalka, near Chandigarh. In 2008, she had levelled allegations of physical and mental harassment against her superior officers, but the subsequent court of inquiry held her blameworthy of professional and personal misconduct.

Partial relief  

• The tribunal ordered that Capt Poonam Kaur of the Army Service Corps be notionally reinstated in service and deemed to have been discharged from service on the completion of her term of engagement
• Though she will be entitled to terminal benefits, she will not receive any salary for the intervening period from the trial to the notional date of discharge

Suhail A Shah

Anantnag, July 17

A high-level meeting of top Army and police officers was held in Kulgam town on Tuesday to “get acquainted with the ground realities” and find ways and means to tackle the rising graph of militancy in south Kashmir.The meeting comes amid a rise in militancy in south Kashmir. As per official figures, a total of 70 youth have picked up gun in the four districts of south Kashmir till June-end.The meeting held at the office of the Superintendent of Police in Kulgam was attended by General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the 15 Corps Lt Gen AK Bhatt, Director General of Police SP Vaid and Inspector General of Police SP Pani.Following the meeting, the officers held a brief interaction with mediapersons.Vaid told the media that the meeting was held to get acquainted with the ground realities.“The aim was to meet the officers at the ground level and take stock of and review the ongoing situation. We wanted to assess whatever help was needed from the headquarters to make the situation better in the Kashmir valley,” Vaid said.Asked about the rising militancy and repeated infiltration bids on the Line of Control, Vaid asked Lt General Bhatt to answer the question. “In an ongoing operation, an infiltration bid has been foiled,” Lt General Bhatt said.Asked how the graph of rising militancy could be brought down and the youth who have picked up arms could be brought back to the mainstream, the GOC said the purpose of the meeting was to discuss all these things. “All of us had assembled here to ponder over all these things,” the GOC said.90 youths have picked up gun this yearOf the 90 youths who have picked up arms in the Kashmir valley since January this year, around 70 belong to south Kashmir. Anantnag has the lowest share of militant recruits at 12, while Shopian has the highest at 21. Kulgam district has a total of 16 youths who have picked up arms this year, while 20 youths have joined militant ranks in Pulwama district.

A suggestion for an Indian government in the future oriented towards reconciliation could be to take a bold step in following South Africa’s example of establishing a truth and reconciliation commission.

Pritam Singh
Professor, Oxford Brookes University, UKJUNE 6 marks the 34th anniversary of Operation Bluestar. With one-third of a century on, how do we describe this action, and what meaning do we attach to it? Do we describe it, as the Congress ideologists did then, as a holy task undertaken by the Indian military to clear the temple of the militants who had taken control of it? Or do we describe it, as some Indian nationalists and Leftists do, as a sad and necessary action to defeat an imperialist conspiracy to disintegrate India? Do we celebrate it, as some Hindu nationalists do, as a successful assertion of India’s Hindu supremacy against the Sikh minority’s separatist aspirations? Or do we condemn it, as Sikh and Punjabi nationalists do, as a genocidal attack on Sikh dignity, assertion and identity? Perhaps, we decry it, as most human rights defenders and Leftists do, as a tragedy resulting in the deaths of thousands of human beings — pilgrims, priests, Sikh combatants and Indian army men?The contesting descriptions of Operation Bluestar and the meanings attached to it are reflections of serious fault lines in the Indian society and polity. To say that there would never be a consensus on how to describe and signify this military action may be unreasonable and ahistorical. But to say that there is little likelihood of a consensus in the foreseeable future would be alluding to an uncomfortable truth about the fractured nature of Indian nationhood. However this operation is described and whatever meaning is subsequently attached to it, one thing is clear: one day, everyone else might want to forget it — and,  might succeed in doing so — but this will never be true of the Sikh community.

The third ghallughara

Operation Bluestar has become an integral part of the Sikh collective historical memory. It has become the third ghallughara (holocaust) in Sikh history — the first referring to the massacre of some 10,000 Sikhs in 1746; the second to the even larger massacre of Sikh men, women and children in 1762, when 30,000 (nearly 50 per cent of the population) were slaughtered in Punjab. Today, the available evidence suggests that many (though not all) gurdwaras in India and abroad include references to the third ghallughara in their daily ardas, or prayers.The most reliable estimates of the total number of deaths during Operation Bluestar are anywhere from 5,000 to 7,000. Yet, a crucial difference between the third ghallughara and the previous two is that this massacre occurred in the Golden Temple, while the first two took place on open battlefields. This gives an added religious dimension to the significance of the military action: a much larger number of Sikhs died during Partition, but the 1947 deaths are not seen in terms of attacks on and in defence of religion. In religious terms, the largest Sikh loss in 1947 was the fact that the Nankana Sahib gurudwara — marking the birthplace of Guru Nanak, the founder of the faith — was suddenly located in Pakistan. This, too, was a loss that today figures in the daily ardas.

Human rights approach

What should be the human rights approach in dealing with the complex situation of destruction, loss and pain associated with Bluestar? It could be to put forward a position of truth, accountability and justice as a methodology to study and a tool with which to deal with this painful situation. One can hope that truth and justice can heal the wounds, and there can be sound grounds based on an understanding of human history that such a hope is not wholly unfounded. However, one is also simultaneously troubled that the truth may never be allowed to come out and that justice may never be done because of the complicated conflicts of competing nationalisms implicated in this tragedy. Another dimension of human history which creates pessimism is that history is also full of intractable conflicts and continuing injustices.As for how to think about Bluestar, first and foremost, it was a massive human tragedy. It was a tragedy that could have been avoided if — and that is a big if —- Indira Gandhi had had a larger vision to reach a political settlement with the moderate Akali leadership. Most Akali Dal demands — regarding federal decentralisation, river water rights, territorial readjustment and the transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab as its capital — could have been negotiated. In 1985, Rajiv Gandhi agreed in the Rajiv-Longowal Accord to each of these demands, plus many more. It is a different matter that he implemented none.Indira Gandhi’s political calculations — those of using the ‘Hindu card’ for electoral victories — led her to deliberately choose a dangerous path of confrontation, first with the Akalis and eventually with the entire Sikh community. She paid for this miscalculation with her life, but still left Punjab and India communally scarred and polarised. Sikh nationalism was defeated militarily, but Hindu nationalism was unleashed so powerfully that the Hindu nationalists succeeded within a few decades to capture the Indian state.Regarding the demands that led to the Akali agitation of the early 1980s, the situation today remains where we were back then. As far as accountability for atrocities committed during Bluestar and subsequently during the conflict between the Indian state and the armed opposition Sikh groups is concerned, one suggestion for an Indian government in the future oriented towards reconciliation could be to take a bold step in following South Africa’s example of establishing a truth and reconciliation commission. No one wants history to be repeated. The least anyone can do today is to remember those thousands — pilgrims, priests, politicians, traders, militants, policemen and soldiers — who became victims in the tragedy of the third Sikh ghallughara.

NEW DELHI: 

“When it is an unprovoked attack, the army was given the right to retaliate… We honour the ceasefire but a margin was given to us when there is an unprovoked attack,” Ms Sitharaman said at a function to mark her ministry’s achievements in Delhi today.

Amid repeated terror attacks in Jammu and Kashmir and repeated ceasefire violations by Pakistan at the border, the government had announced that the security forces will desist from anti-terror operations in Jammu and Kashmir.
Last month, data collated by the home ministry, however, showed that the number of terror attacks in the Valley has been on the rise and civilians have been facing the brunt of it. While four incidents of terrorist violence were reported in the valley a week before the initiative was announced on May 16, the number rose to 13 a week after.

Over the last four days, 10 attacks have taken place in the Valley. In the last one, which took place yesterday, 14 civilians and two police officers were injured. Terror group Jaish-e-Mohammed has claimed responsibility for the attacks.

The defence minister said it was not her ministry’s role to “assess whether ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir has been successful or not”.

But she made it clear that unprovoked attacks even at the border will not go unpunished. “It is our business to guard the border and we won’t stop if we’re provoked. We shall be alert that no unprovoked attack goes without us responding. It’s our duty to keep India safe,” she said.

Peace initiatives on LoC, and internally in J&K, must be enthusiastically welcomed, but not taken at face value

Peace initiatives on LoC, and internally in J&K, must be enthusiastically welcomed, but not taken at face value.

At 6 pm on May 29, the Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMOs) of India and Pakistan reportedly spoke to each other as part of the weekly Tuesday call and agreed to effectively implement the informal November 26, 2003, ceasefire at the Line of Control (LoC) in J&K. While there is much debate about who made the first move, that is irrelevant. All one should do as the first response is to welcome the move while being circumspect about it.

There has been destruction and loss of lives of civilians and soldiers on both sides. A few days ago in a television programme, in the wake of large-scale violations by Pakistan, I said that either there is peace or India should undertake vertical and horizontal escalation to draw Pakistan into a war of attrition at the LoC, including deploying the army at the Jammu international border (IB). We should be glad that the idea of peace has prevailed.

The move towards proper implementation of the informal ceasefire of 2003 should not come as a surprise. It is, however, important to note some facts about the 2003 ceasefire and its history through the subsequent 15 years in order to get a clearer perspective of the current decision and its possible effectiveness and longevity. In November 2003, there were backroom parleys which led to the much-touted Musharraf initiative; India allowed the credit to go Pakistan’s way. Infiltration attempts were still rife and the proxy conflict in J&K was sustained through the numbers that successfully penetrated the Indian dragnet at the LoC.

The ceasefire facilitated the construction of the Anti-Infiltration Obstacle System (AIOS) in a quicker time frame. In November 2003, the war in Afghanistan had been on for about two years. Pakistan was not under any international pressure except to support the US operations. Unfriendly terrorists had not yet appeared on Pakistan’s internal security radar. It is generally believed that Musharraf risked it but it was motivated by seriousness to pursue his four-point formula with then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. However, it lacked the support of Pakistan’s powerful corps commanders.

Musharraf’s intent was timed with then Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed’s serious effort to bring into effect his “healing touch” policy; a humanitarian effort to calm the internal environment in J&K. It was preceded by PM Vajpayee’s April 2003 initiative, urging treatment of the people of J&K with greater compassion.

The ceasefire lasted in letter and spirit as long as Musharraf was in power. Even before the Mumbai attacks, violations had begun. The effectiveness got progressively diluted till it hit a nadir this year. For Pakistan, in the face of the waning effectiveness of its capability to calibrate the hinterland situation in J&K, tension at the LoC became an instrument to remind the international community of the existence of the J&K issue.

Surprisingly, the ceasefire along the 750-km LoC held effectively in the Kargil and Siachen sectors of the Ladakh division and only sporadic violations occurred in the Kashmir segment where, except for Uri and occasionally Tangdhar, the LoC remained peaceful. An age-old notion that ceasefire violations occurred primarily to aid infiltration was also laid to rest as infiltration attempts continued primarily in Kashmir although a few attempts were also made in the Jammu division and along the IB. The targeting of the Hindu population in the Jammu division, including the IB sector, was generally ascribed to Pakistan’s intent to cause greater communal dissension within the people of J&K and fracturing of the polity to aid the turbulence it aimed for in the hinterland.

So what has changed and why should keen observers have sensed something in the offing towards the current peace move? First, the situation in Pakistan is none too stable. Financially, Pakistan has just borrowed a billion USD from China to sustain its forex reserve and avoid having to go to the IMF. Its forex reserve has fallen to $10.8 billion. Second, it is on the back foot with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) which is due to review its grey listing to see whether Pakistan has fulfilled obligations to prevent terror financing. A blacklisting would place Pakistan in the dock. Third, for some time now, the security establishment in Pakistan has been playing games to test the environment — the Bajwa Doctrine with its vagueness, backroom talks between the National Security Advisors and a couple of Track 2 dialogues in which the Indians remained non-committal due to the trust deficit.

The Indian decision to stick to a robust response at the LoC/IB was creating problems notwithstanding the Pakistani bravado with which the civilian areas were targeted. Fourth, the cessation of operations in J&K was received positively by the people with Pakistan acting as the spoiler at the border. With the FATF watchful, Pakistan was muted on the Indian initiative, although terror groups rejected it outright. It was perhaps a combination of factors in which the tentative political environment of Pakistan, too, played its part.

Although peace initiatives at the LoC or internally in J&K must receive enthusiastic welcome, they must never be taken at face value. Unless matching add-ons accompany such initiatives, they at best remain uncertain. What needs to be pursued holistically is a follow-up to get the DGMOs to meet, free of political baggage and in a proper format quite unlike the flag meeting format adopted the last time in 2013.

Enablers to formalise the ceasefire through drawn up rules of engagement must be equally pursued; that was an agreed weakness the last time. Alternate hotlines need to be established at lower levels in identified sectors to allow lower commanders to speak without hesitation and clarify local misgivings. Pakistan, on its part, must desist from supporting infiltration — the single issue which can upset the applecart.

India needs to take the ceasefire and the cessation of operations in the hinterland together and create an environment of hope, notwithstanding the maverick elements who will continue to act as spoilers. Perhaps the J&K chief minister’s words of wisdom, that the decisions need to be taken one step at a time, is a good mantra. These should be examined for their individual and combined worth and efforts undertaken to strengthen them even as other efforts are made to try and bring about some trust to sustain the situation and improve on it.

Ravi Dhaliwal

Tribune News Service

Pathankot, May 26

Nine used rocket launcher shells found from the bushes near the Pathankot Cantonment railway station created a scare in the city following which the cops called in GRP personnel to remove them.Initially, there were rumours that some live bombs had been found. However, SSP Vivek Sheel Soni dispelled the rumours by holding an impromptu press conference in which he clarified that “the shells which were found from near the rail track were used ones”.In army parlance they are known as ‘Training Practice Tracers’. Army and other paramilitary forces often train their personnel in the area in the use of rocket launchers. The ‘empties’, as the used shells are called, are then collected and handed over to junk dealers.It was a late night phone call to the SSP which alerted the cops.The GRP was immediately informed and efforts were on to call in army experts but once it became clear that the shells were indeed ‘empties’, the army was asked to wait.“My personnel and those of the GRP reached there in large numbers after we received a call on Friday night. Since we were not in a position to take risk in light of the infiltrations from across the border, which is nearby, we sealed all important installations like the ammunition dump, Mamun cantonment and the Air Force base. Searches near the bus stand and the railway station were intensified. However, the need to divert or stop rail traffic did not arise,” said SSP Soni.On January 2, 2016, four militants had laid siege to the Air Force station. The terrorists were killed after a 24-hour gun battle. On July 27, 2015, 5.2 kg of RDX was found on the railway track near Dinanagar, 20 km from Pathankot.    An officer claimed that since a part of Pathankot district is near the border, they took no chances.“Whenever such shells are found it is imperative on our part to launch an investigation to know how and from where these shells came,” he said