Ban Ki-moon

United Nations, September 19

Condemning the militant attack on an Army camp in North Kashmir’s Uri town that killed 17 soldiers, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon hoped the perpetrators of the crime will be brought to justice and re-establishing stability and preventing any further loss of life will be the priority of “all involved”.

“The United Nations is following developments closely and shares the concerns of people living in the region for peace,” a statement issued by Ban’s spokesperson here said.

Ban expressed hope that the perpetrators of the attack will be brought to justice and all stakeholders will meet their responsibilities to maintain peace and stability.

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“The Secretary-General hopes that the perpetrators of this crime will be identified and brought to justice,” it said.

He “hopes that all involved will prioritise the re-establishment of stability and prevent any further loss of life. The Secretary-General encourages all stakeholders to meet their respective responsibilities to maintain peace and stability,” the statement said.

Condemning the “militant attack”, Ban expressed his “deepest sympathy and condolences” to the families of the soldiers who lost their lives and to the government of India and wished a speedy recovery to those injured in the attack.

Meanwhile, Venezuela President Nicolas Maduro, who succeeded Iranian President Hassan Rouhani as the head of the Non-Aligned Movement, also expressed solidarity with the people of India “who have suffered a terrorist attack.” “We are committed along with our brotherly people of the world to get into the depth of this problem that has generated proliferation of terrorist movements, which doesn’t respect life and the need for coexistence of people,” he said at a press conference after the summit in Margarita Island yesterday.

In one of the deadliest attacks on the Army in recent years, 17 soldiers were killed and 19 others injured as heavily armed militants stormed a battalion headquarters of the force in North Kashmir’s Uri town early yesterday.

Four militants involved in the terror strike were killed by the Army.

The attack comes two years after militants had carried out a similar type of attack at Mohra in the same area. Ten security personnel were killed in the attack that took place on December 5, 2014. — PTI

A soldier near the attack site.

Azhar Qadri

Tribune News Service

Srinagar, September 18

The small units of highly trained and heavily armed militants that storm into security installations like the one which stormed an Army base in north Kashmir’s Uri sector this morning are the most lethal discovery of Kashmir’s decades-old insurgency.These militants, known as fidayeen, carry an important advantage — the element of surprise, which allows them to choose the location, timing and inflict damage in the initial assault before they are detected and killed.The introduction of fidayeen in Kashmir insurgency came in the aftermath of the 1999 Kargil war and instantly changed the arithmetic of the conflict. Fewer militants who made up a fidayeen unit mounted heavy casualties on security forces. They attacked anywhere, almost everywhere.The first fidayeen attack was launched on a BSF camp in July 1999 and a Deputy Inspector General and four soldiers of the paramilitary force were killed. In August 1999, three fidayeen attacks were launched in which a Colonel, Major, two Junior Commissioned Officers and six soldiers were killed.In 1999, at least 11 fidayeen attacks shook the counter-insurgency grid as militant units stormed into fortified symbols like the Army’s Srinagar-based Headquarters and the main base of the Jammu and Kashmir Police’s Special Operations Group in which 12 personnel, including an officer, were killed.The Lashkar-e-Toiba, one of the few foreign groups to operate in Kashmir, was the pioneer in carrying out fidayeen attacks in the Valley. The Jaish-e-Mohammed soon followed and also introduced suicide bombers, the first among whom crashed an explosive-packed car into the gate of the Army’s Srinagar-based Corps Headquarters.As Pakistan banned the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the US, several fidayeen attacks were owned by the little-known outfits like the Shuhada Brigade, Medina Regiment, Al Mansoorian and the Al Nasireen. Most of the fidayeen militants are foreigners, mainly Pakistanis and at least one British, and a few have been from Kashmir. The fidayeen militants continued to attack security installations in Jammu and Kashmir through the early years of the last decade even as they launched several attacks outside the state, one unit targeting the Red Fort, another associated with the Jaish-e-Mohammed which attacked Parliament.A retired Army officer, who has served in Kashmir, described the fidayeen as part of a “hybrid war, where the whole intention is to cause exasperation”. “Fidayeen are small teams who want to do something and who have the initiative,” the officer said.

WHAT NEXT? Army personnel at the brigade camp in Uri on Sunday. PTI

THE focus till a few days ago was on the move of the Army’s five battalions into South Kashmir to occupy what I had called the moral and physical space to stabilise the area most hit by the stone-throwing agitation, post the killing of Burhan Wani. However, in all such situations and without a direct connect to them, is a rogue space which exists in the hybrid conflict. Pakistan has chosen to exploit that space to attempt to counter the effectiveness of our Operation Calm Down in South Kashmir.Calming down the situation or stabilising it does not lie in Pakistan’s interest. Therefore, it had to choose a strategy on how to prevent this from happening and the Indian Army walking away with the accolades. It employed the theory of indirect approach. The need was for a couple of high-profile strikes against recognised targets, show the Indian Army in poor light and demoralise it just as it was attempting to gain the moral high ground in South Kashmir. To execute this it needed strength in the hinterland, which it lacked. Its two previous attempts in Baramula and Handwara to target the Army’s convoys resulted in marginal success, not large enough to draw the eyeballs of the world. Infiltrating a special group to achieve this on an objective in the hinterland is close to impossible, as planning, movement and execution would take the better part of three weeks with no degree of assurance for success. It chose the next best option: the proximity of the LoC itself. The operation had to be launched before the speech of the Pakistan Prime Minister in the UN General Assembly; that permitted a shallow infiltration and choice of objective even closer to the LoC. Pakistan’s Deep State, which plans and executes that nation’s rogue operations, has done this earlier too. Last year it targeted the HQ of the Tangdhar Brigade, which was thwarted by the Indian Army. Last week, it attempted a sneak attack on the HQ of the Poonch Brigade, which was foiled in time with some loss to us. The level of desperation was obviously very high as the Uri attack has come just a few days after the attempt at Poonch.Should we have expected it at Uri? Intelligence agencies gave a broad warning about the possibility of a spectacular action. That is usually done every year. Professional minds would have analysed it exactly as I have done. It had to be near the LoC and it had to be a high-profile target, preferably within the Valley. There is no other objective as starkly evident as Uri. Its garrison is not walled and civilian access is through and through. The access from the south is just 6 km, although robust counter-infiltration layers have to be crossed. So Uri it was.It is unfortunate that circumstances acted in favor of the terrorists as an entry was made into an area where there were freshly inducted troops accommodated in tents, which caught fire, resulting in greater casualties.All these years that Pakistan has relentlessly pursued its campaign in J&K, its position was never weaker than it was around June this year. Low terrorist strength and little excitement among the populace were not contributing towards any of its objectives. The killing of Burhan Wani and the unexpected energy of response by the youth and the public in general spurred Pakistan back to life, sensing great opportunity. However, in the Uri attack and its success beyond expectation it has erred in crossing the Rubicon, the threshold of India’s limit of tolerance. Social media is agog with public response. This response is not going to be informed or rational; it is of the knee-jerk variety, demanding instant action and retribution. No one can explain to the public that these events are to be seen as part of a campaign and not standalone. Since the perception prevails that India has been at the receiving end far too long without adequate response, the pressure on the government and the Army will be tremendous. The emotion may not be as intense as 13/12 or 26/11 but the cumulative effect of perceived inaction will be high.What options do we really have? Firstly, a hot pursuit kind of operation across the LoC has always been the favorite of the strategic community without identification of terrorist facilities. If it’s the Pakistan army that has to be targeted, then we need to be sure that there will be response and an escalation. Secondly, if it is just the abrogation of the ceasefire, then LoC duels can be played out by both, although we do have advantage at most places. Is it in our interest to escalate and draw attention of the international community to an issue which it is tending to largely ignore? That is a moot point for the consideration of the political authority. Thirdly, the public may not find the more prudent and smarter ways of retribution easily acceptable with consequent effect on the reputation of the government and the leadership. However, what Mr Modi commenced with his reference to Baluchistan in the Independence Day speech may just be the appropriate steps to ratchet up the response. In any case, the embers of the fires at Uri have yet to cool and decisions taken when passions dictate the mind are not always the best. Political leaders have made the right noises in terms of recommending shedding of restraint and Pakistan would have to be careful about a quid pro quo from India that is not rational and not in keeping with conventional Indian military thinking. Already online commentaries are examining options, including proactive strategy.Nawaz Sharif and the Deep State may have succeeded in drawing attention to Kashmir prior to a major annual international diplomatic event but have clearly not read the mood of the world. That mood looks upon nations such as Pakistan with deep suspicion and anything in the sub-conventional domain is unlikely to be supported. The Indian Army will do well not to get distracted from the main task of stabilising South Kashmir, although such a grievous loss of its soldiers is not easy to accept.

Air Vice-Marshal Harinder Jeet Walia inspects a guard of honour during his visit to the No. 48 Squadron in Chandigarh on Saturday. A Tribune photograph

Tribune News Service

Chandigarh, September 10

Air Vice-Marshal Harinder Jeet Walia, Additional Director General, NCC, and the Commodore Commandant of IAF’s No 48 Squadron, visited the squadron at its home base in Chandigarh today. This is his first official visit to the squadron as the Commodore Commandant.On his arrival, he was received by the Air Officer Commanding 12 Wing, Air Commodore Arun Saklani, as the Squadron’s Commanding Officer, Group Captain Khushpal Singh Lambha and was presented a ceremonial guard of honour.Later, addressing the squadron personnel, he asked them to keep themselves updated in all aspect of their profession. Emphasising on welfare, he said each individual should be aware of various government policies and schemes issued for service personnel.Walia was commissioned in the IAF’s transport stream in June 1981 and has over 5,000 hours of varied flying experience in the Eastern and Northern Sectors. An alumnus of the National Defence College, he had served with 48 Squadron in 1988.

Tribune News Service
Dehradun, September 6
Justice L Narsimha Reddy (retd) today met ex-servicemen to know about their views on the implementation of the One Rank, One Pension (OROP) scheme.
Justice Reddy was accompanied by Maj Gen Baldev Mehta, GOC, Uttarakhand Subarea, at the meeting held at the Rashtriya Indian Military College (RIMC) here.
Brig RS Rawat (retd) gave a presentation on the OROP and the problems faced by Army personnel.
Justice Reddy carefully listened to and replied to the problems put across by 15 senior officials led by Lt Gen OP Kaushik (retd). Brig KG Behl, patron, Dehradun Ex-Services League presented the vote of thanks.
He thanked Maj Gen Baldev Mehta and his staff officers for arranging the presentation and making all administrative arrangements.
He thanked the RIMC Commandant for sparing his hall and premises for the function. Justice Reddy thanked all ex-servicemen organisation for participating and presenting their views.

Army man among 3 burglars held

Tribune News Service

Dehradun, September 6

The city police have arrested three persons, including an Army man, for stealing electronic items from hostels and houses.A police team led by SP, city, Ajay Singh solved the case which was reported at Premnagar police station a few months ago.The team had kept cellphones of suspected individuals on surveillance to trace the burglars.Acting on a tip-off, the team arrested the burglars when they were striking a deal with a customer to sell stolen electronic items near the Mohanpur powerhouse.The accused have been identified as Ashish, a resident of Meerut (UP), Naveen, a resident of Patel Nagar, and Vipin Rawat, a resident of Garhi Cantt.The police have also seized two laptops and one LCD from them. They are being interrogated.Sources said Vipin was posted in an Army unit at the Garhi Cantt CO (City).

Prime Minister Narendra Modi (R) reviews the guard of honour with his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Xuan Phuc during a welcoming ceremony at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi, Vietnam, on September 3, 2016. Reuters

Hanoi, September 3

India on Saturday extended $500 million line of credit to Vietnam for facilitating deeper defence cooperation with the southeast Asian nation, as the two countries elevated their ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership to respond to emerging regional challenges.

“Our decision to upgrade our strategic partnership to a comprehensive strategic partnership captures the intent and path of our future cooperation. It will provide a new direction, momentum and substance to our bilateral cooperation,” Prime Minister Narendra Modi said after talks with his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Xuan Phuc here.

He said the two sides recognised the need to cooperate in responding to emerging regional challenges.

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Vietnam had earlier comprehensive strategic partnership only with Russia and China.

Modi, who arrived here yesterday on his maiden visit to the country, described his talks with Vietnamese counterpart as “extensive and very productive” and said they covered the full range of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

“I am also happy to announce a new Defence Line of Credit for Vietnam of $500 million for facilitating deeper defence cooperation,” he said.

“Our common efforts will also contribute to stability, security and prosperity in this region,” he said.

The two countries signed 12 agreements in a wide range of areas covering IT, space, double taxation and sharing white shipping information.

An agreement on construction of offshore patrol boats was also signed by the two sides, signalling a step to give concrete shape to defence engagement between the two nations.

“The range of agreements signed just a while ago point to the diversity and depth of our cooperation,” Modi said, adding that the agreement on construction of offshore patrol boats is one of the steps to give concrete shape to bilateral defence ties.

He said as the two important countries in this region, India and Vietnam feel it necessary to further their ties on regional and international issues of common concern.

Modi also announced a grant of $5 million for the establishment of a Software Park at the Telecommunications University in Nha Trang.

“We agreed to tap into the growing economic opportunities in the region,” said Modi, the first Indian premier to visit the country in 15 years.

Noting that enhancing bilateral commercial engagement is the strategic objective of the two nations, he said, “For this, new trade and business opportunities will be tapped to achieve the trade target of $15 billion by 2020.”

Besides seeking facilitation of ongoing Indian projects and investments in Vietnam, Modi said he has invited Vietnamese companies to take advantage of the various schemes and flagship programmes of the Indian government.

“As Vietnam seeks to empower and enrich its people, Modernise its agriculture; Encourage entrepreneurship and innovation; Strengthen its Science and Technology base; Create new institutional capacities for faster economic development; and Take steps to build a modern nation, India and its 1.25 billion people stand ready to be Vietnam’s partner and a friend in this journey,” Modi told his Vietnamese counterpart.

Speaking about the framework agreement on Space Cooperation, he said it would allow Vietnam to join hands with Indian Space Research Organisation to meet its national development objectives.

Hoping for an early establishment and opening of the Indian Cultural Centre in Hanoi, he said, “The Archaeological Survey of India could soon start the conservation and restoration work of the Cham monuments at My Son in Vietnam.” He also thanked Vietnam’s leadership in facilitating inscription of Nalanda Mahavihara as a UNESCO World Heritage site earlier this year.

Noting that ASEAN is important to India in terms of historical links, geographical proximity, cultural ties and the strategic space that the two sides share, he said, “It is central to our ‘Act East’ policy. Under Vietnam’s leadership as ASEAN Coordinator for India, we will work towards a strengthened India-ASEAN partnership across all areas.” Modi also expressed the need to “stay focused to keep up the momentum” in bilateral ties and invited the Vietnamese leadership to India. — PTI

Prime Minister Narendra Modi being received on arrival at Hangzhou Xiaoshan International Airport, in China on Saturday. PTI

Hangzhou, September 3

Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Saturday flew into this Chinese city for the crucial G20 summit and talks with top world leaders, including Chinese President Xi Jinping on irritants in bilateral ties like India’s NSG bid and the CPEC, which runs through PoK.”Hello Hangzhou! PM lands in China to attend the G20 Summit,” Modi tweeted, along with a photo showing Modi shaking hands with officials after landing.External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Vikas Swarup also tweeted about the Prime Minister’s arrival in China, saying: “Morning in Hanoi, night in Hangzhou.”Modi, who reached here after a two-day maiden visit to Hanoi, begins his programme tomorrow morning by holding talks with Xi, in their second meeting in less than three months.The two leaders had last met on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit in June in Tashkent.Tomorrow’s meeting is viewed as important in the backdrop of steady decline in the bilateral relations over a raft of issues, including the $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor which runs through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).The two leaders, who enjoy a good rapport, would discuss contentious issues, which will also include listing of Pakistan-based terrorist organisations in the UN and China stalling India’s membership at the elite Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).This would be followed by a meeting of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) leaders ahead of the G20 summit, which would begin later in the day.Modi will also hold bilateral meetings with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman.He will attend the G20 summit that begins tomorrow with this year’s theme of “Strengthening Policy coordination and Breaking a new path for growth” followed by a number of cultural programmes organised by the Chinese government.On Monday, he will take part in the second and concluding session of the G20 and hold bilateral meetings with British Prime Minister Theresa May and Argentinian President Mauricio Macri before returning to Delhi.In all, he would reside in this picturesque city for about 48 hours, officials said.A meeting between Modi and US President Barack Obama is, however, not on the cards during this trip, they said. — PTI

Tribune News Service

Amritsar, August 26

The two-day defence pension adalat was inaugurated by the Controller General of Defence Account, SK Kohli, at the Army cantonment auditorium here today.The event was organised for on-the-spot redressal of pension- related problems of ex-defence personnel.A defence pension camp to create awareness among pensioners about various schemes available for them was also organised at Satkar Palace in Tarn Taran today.Ex-servicemen from Amritsar, Tarn Taran, Gurdaspur and Pathankot districts attended the lok adalat at the Army cantonment here today.Speaking on the occasion, Kohli said the purpose of the event was to ease official work for pensioners. He, however, added that legal disputes pertaining to pensions or its various heads were not considered as pensioners were free to appeal with the competent authorities.

RANGRETH: At a time Kashmir’s youth are raging against the Indian state, a small group has donned the khaki-and-olive green of the army and pledged to fight for the country.

WASEEM ANDRABI/HT PHOTOA Kashmiri father kisses his son who graduated as an army soldier at a military base in Srinagar.

On a bright, clear Thursday, 308 soldiers participated in a passing-out parade to join the Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry (JAKLI) — an exclusive regiment of soldiers drawn from the state. Of the 308, 116 were from the Valley and Muslim dominated areas of Jammu. Their families travelled in the stealth of night to watch them take the salute and fly the tricolour at the Rangreth Centre in Budgam district — mindful of the tension outside its walls. A 41-day curfew keeps a fragile peace after violent clashes between young Kashmiris and security forces that have left 66 dead and thousands injured.

Most of the recruits from Kashmir and their families weren’t keen to discuss why they joined the army.

Asked why he had sent his son to the army, Ghulam (who refused to reveal his full name) said, “The situation is very bad. It is not easy to talk.” The farmer hails from south Kashmir’s Anantnag, which has seen the highest number of killings (18) in the ongoing unrest that is a result of the people’s anger against the killing of a militant commander.

“We are poor families. That is why we send our children to the army. We know the sentiment of the people (against the army) is not favourable,” said a woman from the same district, who had come to cheer her cousin

The USI National Security Lecture

‘A Comprehensive Strategy to Counter China-Pakistan Collusion’

 An Over view: India’s Bilateral Relations with Pakistan and China

Since Independence, India’s relations with Pakistan have fluctuated but always remained below the friendly level. Pakistan has never shed the animosity and employed various means to pursue its feud through direct military aggression, supporting insurgencies, stoking communal tensions, infiltration and use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy. It has used foreign collusion against India, whenever and wherever it could get strategic advantage over India. Pakistan Army, which drives Pakistan’s security and strategic policies, has always endeavored ‘strategic parity’ with India.

China occupies Aksai chin (40,000 Sq Km), which de jure is part of India’s Jammu and Kashmir (J & K). It keeps asserting claim on Arunachal Pradesh (92,000 Sq Km). The Line of Actual Control (LAC), which came into existence after India-China war in 1962, remains disputed and un-delineated. Since 1962, there have been two incidents of military fire fight on the LAC; in 1967 (Natu La) and 1986 (Wangdung). China has now improved military infrastructure and capability in Tibet substantially. Despite several high level agreements to maintain peace and tranquility on the LAC, and many rounds of negotiations to work out a frame work to resolve the border dispute by the Special Representatives, border confrontations, where even a slight miscalculation can spark off a limited border war, keep occurring frequently.

China, which received Shaqsgam Valley by Pakistan from the Gilgit-Baltistan region of J & K in 1963, treats India’s J & K and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir on different footings; apparently challenging Indian sovereignty over J & K.

China has also positioned itself in the rest of South Asia. It has been increasing its economic and military footprints in India’s immediate neighbourhood-Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives-and its maritime interest and assets in the Indian Ocean.

Despite the strategic challenges mentioned above, India and China have been able to maintain political, diplomatic, economic and military dialogues. There have been regular high level state visits and rapid improvement in the trade (Expected to touch $100 bn by 2015) despite an ever increasing trade deficit for India.

An important factor in China- Pakistan- India security relationship is that all three nations are nuclear weapons equipped nations. This has an impact on the possible nature of conflict.

There are reports that Pakistan is developing/has developed tactical nuclear weapons. As per current Indian nuclear doctrine, our response to all types of nuclear, chemical, or biological strike would be a massive counter strike.

Definitions: Collusive and Collaborative Threats

‘Collusive threat’ from China and Pakistan to India implies both countries acting in secret o achieve a fraudulent, illegal, or deceitful goal’ or being engaged in secret or hidden avowed goals vis a vis India.

‘Collaborative threat’ implies a joint threat by working together. Basically, that would cover overt as well as covert threat to India from the China-Pakistan nexus.

History of China-Pakistan Collusion and Collaboration

Pakistan was the first non-communist, Islamic country that broke relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) to recognize Peoples Republic of China and establish diplomatic relations with it.

The China-Pakistan collusion started soon after India China 1962 war. In 1963, China and Pakistan signed a Boundary Agreement to formally delimit and demarcate the boundary between China’s Xinjiang and the contiguous Northern Areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.  With this delimitation, Pakistan ceded the Shaksgam Valley to China. Both countries extended their common boundary up to Karakoram Pass. China was careful. Article 6 of the Agreement states that after the settlement of Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, the ‘sovereign authority’ will re-open negotiations with the Chinese Government so as to sign a formal Boundary Treaty to replace the Agreement.

Cooperation in Nuclear, Missiles and Arms Industry

China has played a major role in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure.[1] In 1990s, China designed and supplied heavy water Khushab reactor, which plays a key role in Pakistan’s production of plutonium. A subsidiary of the China National Nuclear Corporation contributed to Pakistan’s efforts to expand its uranium enrichment capabilities by providing 5000 custom made ring magnets, which are a key component of the bearings that facilitate high-speed rotation of the centrifuges.

When China joined the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group in 2004, it ‘grandfathered’ its right to supply Chashma 1 and 2 reactors.[2]

Despite growing threats of Pakistani terrorists acquiring material to make nuclear devices, in March 2012 China re-affirmed that it would continue to support Pakistan’s civilian nuclear programme. Currently, Chinese state-run companies are in talks to build three 1000 megawatt plants in Pakistan-two at the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant and the third at the Chashma Nuclear Power Complex.

 On the missiles front, it is well known that the Chinese sale of 34 complete M-11 ballistic missiles around 1990 was in contravention of the Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines. China also built Pakistan’s missile plant at Tarwanah, near Rawalpindi.

In the last 20 years, China and Pakistan have been involved in several joint ventures to enhance military and weaponry systems. These include the JF-17, K-8 advanced training aircraft, AWACS, Al Khalid tank, Babur cruise missile, and so on.

Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-Neighbourly Relations

Of all the treaties and agreements signed between China and Pakistan, the China-Pakistan Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-neighbourly Relations, ratified by both the sides in 2005-06, is the most significant in China Pakistan collusion and collaboration. It binds the two nations to desist from ‘joining any alliance or bloc which infringes upon the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other side’. It also forbids both countries to conclude a similar treaty with a third country. Then Chinese President Hu Jintao had described it as ‘an important legal foundation for the Strategic Partnership’. While Pakistan considered significance of the Treaty in terms of protecting its security and a hedge against India[3], the Chinese downplayed the security aspect but laid stress to the importance of the document in preventing Pakistan go back to the US camp[4].

China and Pakistan have signed several agreements for development of communications along the Karakoram Highway, and railway and oil pipe line from China to Gwadar Port (of Pakistan), which has been constructed by China and is being managed by their company. Optical Fibre Cable is being laid along the Karakoram Highway. Recently, China has committed $45.6 bn for ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ and for various energy and infrastructure projects.

China and Pakistan have also signed several agreements for the military usable infrastructure in Gilgit-Baltistan and POK. A Chinese Company is building/to build 165-km long Jaglot-Skardu road, and the 135-km long Thakot-Sazin road. China Mobile has set up cell towers in the area. There are some intelligence reports of (a) 22 tunnels being constructed, which could be used for stocking missiles, and (b) about 1000 Chinese working on the Neelum-Jhelum hydro-electric project and on Muzaffarabad-Athmuqam road project. These include elements of the PLA to provide security to the Chinese engineers and workers on these projects.

In March 1997, I was invited by the Chinese PLA for a friendly visit. When I called on the Defence Minister General Chi Haotian, our conversation was mostly about the need to improve military to military relations and implementation of the agreements signed by China and India in 1993 and 1996. I suggested that Chinese and Indian divisional commanders on either side of the LAC should meet each other. He agreed promptly and said that the first such meeting could be held in Leh. Several months later, after I had taken over as Chief of the Army Staff, a date was fixed mutually for the meeting of division commanders of both sides in Leh. At the last moment, the PLA sent word that the Chinese division commander will not be able to go to Leh and that the meeting should be held in New Delhi. I felt that such a meeting in New Delhi will not serve the intended purpose. We therefore called off the proposed meeting. The reason behind this change was not Chinese accessibility to Leh, but because Pakistan did not like a senior Chinese officer visiting J&K.

In 1999, after Kargil war, when all foreign defence attaches were invited to visit Dras and Kargil, only the Chinese defence attaché did not avail this invitation. Later, when I asked him the reason, he told me informally that they did not want to hurt feelings in Pakistan.

In May 30-31, 2011, during Siachen talks between India and Pakistan in New Delhi, Pakistan pushed for China to be represented during negotiations on the ground that Beijing controls the Shaksgam Valley.

On 13 Dec 2011, in an Urdu Daily, Tufail Ahmed wrote ‘Chinese Military Taking over Gilgit Baltistan: Pakistan Considering Proposal to Lease the Dispute Region to China for 50 years’.

The Disputed Border Length

Our Army HQ and MoD claim the length of India-China border to be 4056 km which includes boundary/LAC with J & K and Gilgit-Baltistan, including the Shaqsgam Valley. Beijing declares the length of the border with India to be about 2000 km, which obviously excludes J & K and Gilgit-Baltistan. The strategic implications of this move can be: (1) China has become a new factor in the India-Pakistan debate over J & K. (2) the India-China boundary dispute may get divided into two parts. While the eastern and middle sectors remain a bilateral issue between India and China, the western sector becomes a trilateral issue involving India, China and Pakistan. (3) Repeated references to the length of the India-China border as 2,000 km may impact future global discourse on J & K relating to subjects like construction and international loans or financing of development projects. (4) China can now question India’s locus standi to discuss the western sector, while its own territorial integrity and authority over Shaqsgam Valley and Aksai Chin remains unquestioned and therefore secure. (5) In the security scenario and defence planning for the western sector, Indian armed forces would now have to seriously factor in the collusive, two-front China-Pakistan threat.

Manifestation and Dimensions of Collusion on the Military Front

The dimensions of a China Pakistan military collusion could vary from (A) collusive support without direct military intervention, to (B) activating a second front militarily. The transition from (A) to (B) could also occur seamlessly.

Collusive Support without Direct Military Intervention

This activity, as noted earlier, is already happening. It is likely to increase manifold in an India- Pakistan conflict scenario. Its probability is higher as it is easier to deny, and will accrue high benefits compared to the efforts put in. Such support could take the forms such as:

(a) Military Material Support China has been providing military material support to Pakistan for decades. This is likely to continue. In a combat, it may enhance Pakistan’s weapons and equipment reserves, force re-generation and war duration capability. Support in the nature of high end technological weapons and equipment can become a major advantage for Pakistan.

(b) Locating Extra Forces in Tibet In an India- Pakistan war situation, mere positioning of extra PLA forces in Tibet (from within or outside the military regions) can influence Indian armed forces’ decision to move any dual tasked formations and other military assets from the India-China front.

(c)  Cyber Warfare Support China has potent cyber warfare capability, which if shared with Pakistan, can cripple India’s crucial networks, including strategic forces assets, command and control systems, air defense, and civil support structures like the railways, civil aviation, power grids, banking sector, and so on. It can impact India’s deterrence and war fighting capability very adversely.

(d) Information Warfare Support.  China can support Pakistan’s strategy to shape the world opinion against India, in the UN and other world forums.

(e) Internal Destabilization China in the past has shown capability to exploit India’s internal fault lines and instigate ethnic strife, particularly in the North East. It would result in diversion of India’s war effort.

Collusive Support with Direct Military Intervention

An interventionist military collusion could come about in different scenarios (a) Pakistan led or China led. (b) Either state may take advantage of an adverse situation for India brought on by the other.  (c) It could be part of a grand design between China and Pakistan to bring India down to its knees.

Historically, full scale activation of a second front has never occurred despite the collusion being in place since the 1960s. However, in view of the updated military infrastructure development in Tibet, and by China in Gilgit-Baltistan and POK, the possibility of a two front war can not be ruled out. Let us take the Pakistan-led scenario first.

In this manifestation, China is likely to participate only if it sees some gains for itself. Otherwise, it would not be in its best interest. But then Pakistan could beg for the Chinese support even if China does not wish to be drawn in physically. In such a situation, a major offensive by China is unlikely. That would hurt its global image and scare many friendly neighbors. However, China may use the rail and road communications being developed in Gilgit-Baltistan to provide logistic support to Pakistan. It could also make moves to tie down our forces in the North and East by (a) Moving extra forces in Tibet. (b) Aggressive patrolling by the Chinese leading to provocation and minor clashes. (c) Major/minor fire assaults, and (d) intrusion of Indian airspace. India’s dual tasked formations would then not be available for deployment against Pakistan. Our offensive capability on the Western front would be affected adversely.

In a China-led manifestation, there may be an attempt to seize Tawang or other territory along the LAC, and/or to teach India a lesson. China may then initiate a limited or even a higher level conventional war, depending upon its objective(s). The latter would have to take into consideration its likely escalation into the nuclear, aero-space and maritime domain. In any such conflict, it is unlikely to bank on the Pakistani collusion or participation.

But Pakistan could try to exploit such a situation on the LoC or international border. It could make diversionary moves in Kargil or Siachen, which will result in 14 Corps (based in Ladakh) having to ‘look’ both ways. Pakistan could also upgrade proxy war conditions in J & K.

The possibility of a concerted twin strike in a ‘grand design’ by China and Pakistan has very serious implications: nuclear, aero-space and maritime dimensions. It may also involve Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh.  Such a venture would hurt China’s global image badly. India would have diplomatic support of almost the entire world. This, to my mind, is the least likely manifestation. However, if it does occur, India could initially hold China in the North, and turn its attention and weight towards Pakistan. This probability will serve as a deterrent to the Pakistani participation. As India would be the main sufferer, it could legitimately ‘hurt’ maritime interests of China and Pakistan in the Indian Ocean and even rescind its NFU of the nuclear doctrine to send warning signals to both countries.

In all these manifestations, China-Pakistan military collusion in the Karakoram Pass region can be considered as the most likely scenario.

Comprehensive Strategy to Counter Collusion and Collaboration

What should be our comprehensive response strategy to the collusive and collaborative threat from China and Pakistan?

India’s national aim is to achieve economic development without compromising its security and strategic autonomy. Thus, it would wish to avoid a war.

The objective of this strategy, therefore, would be to (a) prevent and weaken collusion to minimize its adverse impact on our security, and (b) deal with warlike or a war situation, if it occurs despite our efforts to prevent it. This will have to be a multi-faceted, multi-layered strategy, with synergized political, diplomatic, economic and military measures. These measures will have to be bilateral as well as multilateral.

When deciding on war preventing measures, and their prioritization, we need to look at the history of our relationship as well as the likely future trajectory. While China and India are expected to grow on the world stage, and increase their influencing power, Pakistan’s growth appears stunted. We must also take note of our comprehensive national power. India factors 5 to 6 times ahead of Pakistan, and about 3 to 4 times behind China. Most analysts also believe that this gap is widening on either side of India. China, therefore, requires greater focus in the collusion and war prevention measures.[5]

At the same time, an assertive militarily backed-diplomacy is imperative to safe guard our core interests. There is no need to underplay or de-emphasize the ‘China Threat’, as we have been doing in the past decade. In order to outflank China-Pakistan axis, and/or to create ‘distance’ between Pakistan and China, we should exploit the widespread regional and global apprehensions about Pakistani terrorism, and Chinese hegemony in Asia. India should not severe or compromise its connections and stakes in Tibet. The spark of China’s ‘forcible military occupation of Tibet’ could be kept alive.

A war with China (over disputed territories) can not be prevented unless we maintain active political, diplomatic and economic interactions with China.[6] Such a China India relationship can, and should, transcend bilateral scope. Where possible, it should develop regional, global and strategic significance.[7]

Political and Economic Cooperation Strategy

The desired level of cooperation, without compromising security and strategic autonomy, is already reflected in the ‘India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity Agreement’. Some of the thrust areas mentioned therein are:

• Deeper bilateral and regional economic engagement.[8] Improve trade arrangements, establish industrial zones for enterprises of both countries and explore prospects of regional economic partnership such as the BCIM Economic Corridor etc.
• Maintain peace, tranquility and improve bilateral relations on the India-China border. Border Defence Cooperation Agreement to strengthen measures to maintain stability on the border.
• Exploration of a framework for the settlement of India-China boundary question by the Special Representatives of both countries. We need to push this with greater vigour.
• Defence exchanges and military exercises to build greater trust and confidence. This should continue.
• Strengthening cooperation on trans-border Rivers, exchange of flood season hydrological data and emergency management.
• Facilitation of greater people to people contacts and exchanges, supported by sister-city relationships.
• Coordination and cooperation in multilateral forums (including Russia-India-China, BRICS, and G-20) on tackling global issues such as climate change, international terrorism, food and energy security, and in the establishment of a fair and equitable economic system.

India should also endeavor to forge and sustain strategic relations with its immediate neighbors in South Asia, the littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region including South China Sea, and major powers surrounding China including Russia, Japan, Vietnam, Myanmar, Afghanistan and Iran.

It needs to strengthen its military diplomacy in the immediate neighborhood; even reduce these nations’ dependency on the China made weapons by offering subsidized military equipment.

To cover China’s rise in immediate neighborhood, and other global issues which are likely to be affected adversely by China-Pakistan collusion, India needs to develop a measure of strategic coordination with the US in the Asia Pacific region, the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and Afghanistan. We should aim to leverage our regional and global relations to dissuade or weaken this collusion.

China being a permanent member of the UNSC, and a greater economy, is better placed in the global political and economic structure. It would be possible to neutralize this Chinese advantage to some extent if/when India is admitted to the UNSC.

Military Confrontational Strategy

As stated earlier, India’s national aim is to achieve economic development without compromising its security and strategic autonomy. It would wish to avoid a war. But we all know that there are limits to diplomacy.[9]

While continuing with cooperative strategy and measures, therefore, our military strategy should be to possess a level of military capacity, capability and ‘escalation dominance’, which acts as a ‘deterrent’ against Pakistan, and ‘dissuasion’ against China.

To some extent, the nuclear deterrence and our capability with long range weapon systems will itself act as a war preventive deterrent and/or dissuasion. And if a conflict does take place, it would be desirable to apply the limited war concepts and limit the war in space, in duration, and in its intensity.[10]

The limited war concept also implies that diplomatic channels be kept open, and government to government communication uncluttered. The communications through direct and indirect channels, and tacitly by actions manifest on the ground, would help condition the adversary. At the higher level of a conflict, an early conflict termination would be desirable for both. Localized conflicts are easier to terminate. A face saving is easier because the resources committed are less, and prestige is not staked inordinately. The limited war concept would also ensure that the NFU of the nuclear doctrine holds. Restricting the conflict to one or more theatres (Ladakh theatre, the Central theatre, Sikkim theatre, and the McMahon Line theatre) may localize the conflict. In a sense, this concept avoids the worst penalties of war to adversaries on both sides.

Limiting a conventional war also requires a certain level of ‘escalation dominance’. This can be achieved horizontally as well as vertically. Horizontally, it could mean opening other land border (s) like the Chumbi Valley and the maritime front, where we have some strategic advantage. Vertically, it implies stepping up the ladder-with high caliber conventional weapons, air power, missile strikes, and readiness to use nuclear weapons. Since there is excessive disparity on the land border, we may also consider using naval capabilities to interdict Chinese shipping on the sea lanes near the Malacca Straits and Arabian Sea.

What is important is that we do need to improve our military capacity; with greater focus on cyber, space, C4I and special operations capabilities; and rail, road infrastructure development on both fronts, which enable force mobilization with minimum delay.

I also recommend three additional, more important efforts to improve military capacity. These are:

• The need to improve intelligence gathering in Tibet and China. This is a serious limitation and can significantly affect the performance of the armed forces on the Northern front.
• A unitary control in border management. Operational command and control of para military forces deployed on the LoC/LAC (disputed border belts) should be entrusted to one agency and one ministry.
• A comprehensive operational doctrine for asymmetric war, with special emphasis on the use of Special Forces, against Chinese military adventurism. It is necessary because the desired level of our war preparedness will take years to materialize.

The Siachen Dispute

 Many people in India and Pakistan think that Siachen is a ‘low hanging fruit’ amongst India-Pakistan disputes. They are keen on withdrawal of Indian troops from the Soltoro Ridge. No doubt, in the initial stages, occupation of Siachen, apart from a military effort of Herculean proportions, involved considerable loss of lives and financial drain. The sacrifices made by the army and air force personnel on account of harsh terrain and enemy actions can never be forgotten. But over the years, with experience and ever improving technology, it has been possible to overcome terrain and sustenance problems substantially. Technological advancements in future can be expected to further offset these difficulties. Should India forego its strategic advantage due to cost-benefit ratio analyses?  Or, because not a blade of grass grows in the area! If that is to be believed then why has India put up its flag at Gangotri in South Pole?

Conclusion

The China-Pakistan strategic embrace is not likely to change in the near future. We know that a central feature of Chinese strategy is to persist with a policy of no-compromise on core issues, and to try and win a war without having to fight a battle. Ambiguity with a smile is characteristic of Chinese diplomacy.

China continues to delay delineation of the LAC and to resolve the boundary dispute. It is now becoming shrill on claiming Arunachal Pradesh now. The Chinese strategic presence in the POK, particularly in the Northern areas of Gilgit-Baltistan, which had been accepted by them as a disputed area in 1963-64, is yet another provocative joint venture.

Pragmatism demands that we do all that we can to contain our differences with China and prevent a two-front war situation.  We can continue to build economic links which have made impressive strides, and separate our bilateral differences from the global issues on which we can work together to mutual advantage.

At the end of the day, India’s ability to deal with its external security challenges will be determined by its own comprehensive national will, and tangible power in its economic and military spheres. While forging partnerships with other nations, India must build its own strength. This itself would act as a restraint on China-Pakistan muscle-flexing.

                     General V P Malik (Retd)                                

[1] When stringent export controls by the Western countries had made it difficult for Pakistan to acquire materials and uranium enriching equipment from elsewhere. The US then ignored the China-Pakistan nuclear proliferation nexus, to the point of covering it up in the A.Q. Khan’s case, when India was most affected.

[2] Under a 1991 agreement, permissible under the revised 1992 NSG guidelines. In early 2010, Pakistan ratified an inter-governmental agreement with China, which provided for Chinese funding of the reactors to the extent of 82 per cent.

[3] Hussein Haqqani once said, “For China, Pakistan is low cost secondary deterrent to India while for Pakistan, China is a high value guarantor of security against India.” According to Zardari, “Pakistan is a force-multiplier for China”.

[3] The atmosphere prior to signing of this Treaty was dominated by the US policy announcements to help India to ‘become a major world power in the 21^st century’.

 [5] In fact this is how India-China relations are panning out currently; at bilateral as well as multilateral levels. 

[6] Such relations are also necessary to be able to create ‘distance’ and cracks in the China Pakistan collusion.

[7] “India and China relations today are becoming autonomous and inclusive, moving beyond the orthodox bilateral context. Both are important powers in the current global political and economic structure. They are the two largest economies after the US and have a major impact and influence in the evolving global order. Both are attached to a range of multilateral mechanisms and bodies at regional, cross-continental and global levels, which helps them to establish new layers of engagement and power politics. The emerging layers of power politics do take the scope of their relationship far beyond the purview of bilateralism.”Dr Jagannath Panda in Review Essay, Strategic Analysis, 2014

[8] Create a condition like two boxers getting into a clinch.

[9] Admiral J C Wylie in his papers ‘Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power’ stated (a) ‘Despite whatever effort there may be to prevent it, there may be a war’, and (b) ‘we can not predict with certainty the pattern of war for which we prepare ourselves.’ It has seldom been possible to forecast the time, the place, the scope, the intensity, and the general tenor of a conflict.

[10] On October 18, 2014, the Prime Minister in the Commanders’ Conference said, “Beyond the immediate, we are facing a future where security challenges will be less predictable; situations will evolve and change swiftly; and, technological changes will make responses more difficult to keep pace with. The threats may be known, but the enemy may be invisible. Domination of cyber space will become increasingly important. Control of space may become as critical as that of land, air and sea. Full scale wars may become rare, but force will remain an instrument of deterrence and influencing behavior, and the duration of conflicts will be shorter.”