The promotion of Gen Asim Munir to the rank of Field Marshal is very clearly an indication of the consolidation of the military’s position in Pakistan.
TCA Raghavan
THERE is something about epigrams, coined for different contexts and geographies, and the explanatory and analytical capacity they show with regard to Pakistan. The elevation of General Asim Munir to Field Marshal status readily evokes French political philosopher Voltaire, who, in describing central Europe in the 18th century, had noted: “Some states have an army, the Prussian army has a state.” For those who study Pakistan, this seems unusually apposite to describe a Prussian-type entity from the mid-20th century South Asia.
Similarly, British historian AJP Taylor, characterising Germany during the 1848 “revolutions” in Europe, had noted of that conjuncture: “German history reached its turning point and failed to turn.” Again, this seems a tailor-made analysis of our western neighbour and the numerous times that it has continued on a particular path, notwithstanding all expectations that it was on the threshold of change. Thus, quite regardless of its breakup in 1971 or numerous other traumas such as the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in 2007, Pakistan’s tryst with the military and with terrorism has continued undeterred.
Natwar Singh, former High Commissioner to Pakistan, former Foreign Minister and a gifted litterateur and writer, also realised the value of epigrams to capture that frustrating and enigmatic quality of India-Pakistan relations. “The future lies in the past,” he once cryptically noted about the inner dynamic of India-Pakistan relations.
Has the recently ended 17-day crisis in April-May 2025 caused by a most egregious terrorist attack on innocent tourists altered that dynamic? Some novel elements do stand out in the otherwise sterile and repetitive world of India-Pakistan relations. The announcement regarding keeping the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance fans a key Pakistani anxiety. Its message is equally clear — providing sanctuary and support to terrorist groups means that no aspect of the India-Pakistan interface will be left untouched.
For most, perhaps all, Pakistanis, this announcement is the ultimate act of bad faith and the conviction that its lower riparian rights are being trampled upon. To many Indians, this was a long overdue measure and its delayed invocation only underlines the latitude Pakistan has enjoyed to provoke and harm India.
The May 7 strikes on Muridke, Bahawalpur and other locations also represent a change. In the past, as in the case of the 2016 surgical strikes or the 2019 Balakot air strike, the targets were either adjoining the border or the LoC or relatively remote places.
The May 7 locations were hardly that. The underlying message is also self-evident — that India’s counter-terrorism response would henceforth cover the whole of Pakistan and no part of its territory can be considered safe sanctuary for terrorist groups.
How strongly have these messages registered? It is tempting to think that the alacrity with which Pakistan accepted the cessation of hostilities suggests that it has understood a new reality has emerged. But such a conclusion may also be premature.
To many Pakistanis, India has behaved in much the same way as it always has and nothing therefore has changed. Insofar as the mood in Pakistan can be read, it appears bellicose about having stood up to “India’s aggression” both militarily and diplomatically.
To a narrower but still significant section, the fact that the United States has spoken at the highest levels about mediating in the Kashmir dispute and that the IMF tranche release went through without a hitch despite India’s opposition suggests that Pakistan has come out on top from the April-May crisis.
This may well be delusional, but a certain amount of this kind of thinking has always had deep roots in Pakistan. In any event, there is so far little sign of it being chastened or introspective about where its policies are leading the country. If there are contrary sentiments, for the moment at least, they remain deeply buried and are not visible to the outside world.
That the two countries can read a particular set of events completely differently is also not new. Indian and Pakistani narratives about 1965, 1971, Kargil, and in fact of each of the crisis situations that have occurred in the past, remain radically opposed.
So what has changed, given the long history of acrimony, conflict and markedly different readings of the same event that has been so representative of the India-Pakistan interface? Perhaps, the most significant change is the mood in India, with a willingness to go further than before in inflicting punishment on Pakistan for its repeated transgressions.
This new mood may be the result of different factors and forces. One of these certainly is the confidence which has emerged from the consistently growing asymmetry between the two countries over the past quarter century. This asymmetry is political, economic and strategic. Its overall quality and presence is self-evident and that it will also express itself increasingly to an even greater extent in short-term calculations is inevitable. Pakistan’s long crisis, which now manifests itself as periodic poly crisis, is the obviously causal factor. But it is also useful to pose a qualifier that strategic asymmetry does not translate immediately into tactical military advantage.
Alongside this, it is also of use to recall another basic feature in the India-Pakistan interface: India has always loomed larger than life in the Pakistani mind and psyche. To that extent, the impact of its numerous fault lines, internal crisis and the poor state of its economy all retreat into the background in the face of an Indian threat — real or imagined.
The promotion of General Asim Munir to Field Marshal rank is very clearly an indication of the consolidation of the military’s position in Pakistan and, to that extent, it means that its dented reputation has to a great extent been salvaged in popular esteem.
So, to return to epigrams from other contexts, it is useful to recall another one: “Russia is never as strong or as weak as she appears.” Attributed variously to different authorities, from Bismarck in the 19th century to Winston Churchill in the 20th, perhaps this applies to the most recalcitrant of our neighbours also.
TCA Raghavan is former High Commissioner to Pakistan.
