Ambika Sharma

Tribune News Service

Solan, April 1

Shimla Lok Sabha seat is all set to witness an interesting contest with a former Army officer taking on an Air Force personnel as both the Congress and BJP have fielded ex-servicemen from this constituency.

The Congress has chosen a septuagenarian Col DR Shandil (retd), a sitting MLA from Solan. The BJP has fielded former Senior Non-Commissioned Officer from the Indian Air Force, Suresh Kashyap (47), sitting MLA from Pacchad.

Shimla Lok Sabha seat, a known Congress bastion earlier, was wrested by the BJP in the past two occasions.

Shandil is also a two-term MP where he had won the first Lok Sabha election on Himachal Vikas Congress’ ticket in 1999 but went on to join the Congress and won in 2004. However, he suffered defeat in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections. But he went on to win two successive Vidhan Sabha elections from Solan. Armed with adequate experience, Shandil might be the best bet for Congress but he is haunted by a sizeable anti-incumbency.

The BJP on the other hand appears to have done its homework well by choosing a new candidate in the form of Suresh Kashyap as the sitting MP Virender Kashyap had failed to perform as per the party’s survey. Though Kashyap will have the advantage of receiving good support from Sirmaur as this is the first occasion when the party has given ticket to a candidate from this district, but being new he is yet to be introduced to the electorate in Shimla as well as Solan districts.

The fact that polls are slated to take place at the last leg of the polling season on May 19, it will serve as an advantage for this new candidate to tour Shimla and Solan districts extensively.

With the BJP having already begin its campaign with women, youth and SC sammelans taking place in all districts and even Chief Minister Jai Ram Thakur having addressed public meetings in Solan, Shimla as well as Sirmaur to introduce Suresh Kashyap, his campaign has begun well. The Congress was yet to put its house in order as it was yet to even finalise candidates for two of the four seats.

The elite Special Force units have resorted to stripping de-commissioned battle tanks or using weapons recovered from militants in the absence of the equipment to be procured from the US.

The Indian Army is miffed by delays in Rs 1,000-crore equipment proposal to buy urgently required equipment for its nine Para-Special Forces (Para-SF) battalions from the US. Disagreements within the ministry saw the proposals to acquire new assault rifles, night vision devices and machine guns being dropped from the agenda of a March 20 meeting of the Defence Acquisition Committee.

A contingent of Indian Army’s parachute regiment, including special forces, doubles past the saluting dais on Republic Day in Delhi. (Photo: PTI)

Top Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials want the equipment to be purchased through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route from the US, to be broken up into smaller procurements of Rs 300 crores and acquired by the Army under its own financial powers. This process, sources say, could further delay acquisitions by another six months.

The shopping list includes 715 Mk 48 Light Machine Guns (LMGs), 1,050 FN Scar (H) 7.62×51 assault rifles, 1,400 FN Scar (L) or HK-416 assault rifles, 110 .50 Cal Browning heavy machine guns (HMG), 400 helmet-mounted night vision systems, 600 combat free fall parachutes, 100 Barret M107 A1 heavy sniping rifles and 20 million rounds of ammunition for all of these small arms. The proposals are part of fast-tracking of Para-SF buys initiated after September 29, 2016, cross-border raids on terrorist launch pads in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). It is the most comprehensive re-equipping of the Para-SF in over two decades.

Army Para Special Forces Requirements

Indian Army’s SF units drew the list based on evaluations done after joint exercises with the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Each acquisition fulfils a critical void. The .50/ 12.7 mm HMGs are meant to be fitted on the Light Strike Vehicle (LSVs) being procured from Pune-based Force Motors over the next three months.

The 7.62 x 51 mm FN Scar, made by a US unit of Belgium’s FN Herstal, is required to upgrade the firepower of SF operators in dense jungles of the Northeast and Myanmar. The case for a new lightweight belt-fed 7.62 x 51 machine gun to replace 50-year old OFBmade ‘1B’ LMGs, has been pending since 2005. The LMGs are critical squad support weapons giving the small six-unit teams of the Para-SF units heavy firepower.

Procurement of arms from the US for the Indian Army SF is still in the pipeline. (Representational image: Reuters)

In their absence, SF units resorted to stripping machine guns from de-commissioned battle tanks or using weapons recovered from militants. This procurement is part of a larger upgrade which includes Finnish Sako sniper rifles, Carl Gustaf Mark-4 rocket launchers and Beretta pistols and LSVs.

The last major acquisitions for the Para-SF a decade ago were also FMS procurements from the US.

(Courtesy of Mail Today)

Also see: To Russia with love: Undeterred by looming threat of US sanctions, why India is going ahead with joint ventures with Russian arms firms

In a major fire-power boost for the country, four indigenous ‘Dhanush’ Howitzer guns were inducted to the Indian Army on Tuesday at a ceremony held the Ordnance factory in Jabalpur.

The Dhanush guns have been tested to withstand extreme conditions like rainfall and snow, and have also been built for use in multiple terrains, from plains, to sand and especially in hilly areas

Amit Yadav, a Defence expert, said,” It is not fair to compare the ‘Dhanush’ guns to Bofors as the former are far more technologically superior to Bofors due to the modifications made to the barrel to help improve its accuracy.”

What is the ‘Dhanush’ Howitzer gun?

The Dhanush gun system is based on designs of the Bofors howitzer which was inducted in the Army in 1980s and would be the third type of artillery gun to be inducted into the force after the K-9 Vajra and the M-777 ultra-light howitzers, as per inputs.

The 155mm x 45mm calibre artillery gun is capable of firing projectiles at a relatively higher angle with a steep angle of descent.

Army To Induct Dhanush Artillery Guns, Air Force To Commission Heavy-lift Chinook Choppers In Service Next Week

While the Army had placed an order for 110 guns with the Ordnance Factory, it has been waiting for clearance from the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) for three decades until 18 February, 2019, when OFB finally got clearance for bulk production of the ‘Dhanush’ artillery Gun System, as per inputs.

PRO, Ordnance Factory Board tweeted:

“The ‘Dhanush’ Howitzers and the Indian Army are ready and fully equipped to protect India from any kind of military threat from its enemies” reports Satavijay Singh.

ndia must recalibrate its approach, to enable a firmer and enduring outreach, to the populace, as also the institutions of Afghanistan. The Afghan National Army and National Police, who are in the forefront, despite all odds, need a more robust support. Legitimate Afghan national aspirations must be supported far more energetically.

Lt-Gen Sanjiv Langer (retd)
Former Deputy Chief of Armed Forces

While normalcy continues to elude Afghanistan, a web of initiatives is under way. Negotiations of US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and the Taliban are reportedly making progress. Stand-alone negotiations with Afghans in Moscow are being conducted. Pakistan is sparing no effort to remain significantly central to the outcomes.  Two aspects, however, in all these are startling.

First, is the absence of the Afghan Government from any of the negotiations, as though there is a negation of the last 18 years of the constitutional process.

Secondly, the statement of the NATO chief that the war cannot be won militarily, but the situation needs a political solution, seems surreal in the light of the security situation in Afghanistan.

Taliban attacks in March 2019 — March 11 on the Army: 16 killed and 40 captured in Herat; March 7 on a presidential candidate in Kabul, leaving three dead; March 6: 17 personnel of a construction company killed; March 1 in Helmand province: 25 Army personnel dead.  The UN has recorded that 2018 was the deadliest year since 2009 for civilian casualties.

After almost 18 years in Afghanistan, the US, confronted with the consequential outcomes of its wavering policies, seeks to change tack and sail away. Moscow, on the other hand, wants to assert that it is back in the game, and as Minister Sergei Lavrov stated, resents US monopoly in the peace talks. The Afghan authorities also want an end to the foreign military presence, but as Minister Abdullah Abdullah says, the military presence is essential to win the war. This is a view that can hardly be faulted. In contrast, Pakistan seeks to nurture an outcome that will give it continued centrality, and fully marginalise India. Notwithstanding the statement of the Pakistan Foreign Minister last year, acknowledging India’s role, it is the Pakistan Army and ISI that are driving the Afghan project.

What is germane in this whirlpool is the strategic outcomes that will impact Afghanistan and India. Historical and socio-cultural linkages apart, for India the air bridge through Kabul, our initiatives in and around Afghanistan, and the considerable Afghani diaspora in India give Afghan issues significant credibility. Indian reconstruction and humanitarian aid is considered by the population to be most effective and has generated goodwill. Stability and normalcy in Afghanistan have importance for India.

Pakistani design in the Af-Pak region, however, is a major consideration. Pakistan has been unable to integrate its North West Frontier (erstwhile NWFP, now Federally Administered Tribal Areas, FATA) since Independence. Fiercely independent and socio-culturally distinct, convergence of population across the infamous Durand Line in the border provinces has remained inviolate.

Afghanistan, for its part, has had such limited opportunities for integration, that the Af-Pak region which was a socio-cultural realism, is today a ‘Geo-Security Actuality’. Pakistan’s windfall came when it became the bridgehead and frontline state for the US campaign against the Soviet occupation, predicated on support to the Afghan Mujahideen. Pakistani ISI had taken proactive steps as far back as 1974.

However, momentum was gained when the US’ covert engagement with the Mujahideen commenced in March, 1979. Afghan refugees and the convergence of Pakistani, US and Mujahedeen priorities gave privileged access and unique significance to Pakistan. Synergised with President Zia’s agenda, terrorist nurseries were awash with recruits, weapons, and sustained finance, all of which facilitate Pakistani design to date. Despite the US vagaries, Pakistan has tenaciously furthered its insidious interests.

It is, therefore, not surprising that Pakistan was indispensable to the Mujahedeen and later Taliban led by the Quetta Shura. It is today a facilitator and exploiter, while simultaneously being subjected to attacks from that region. On the one hand, it released Mulla Barader, co-founder of the Taliban, from a Pakistani jail last October, to participate in the talks with the US, and on the other, at the same time, it is viciously targeted by the Pakistan-centred Taliban.

Consequently, the strategic space that Pakistan seeks is, first, based on control and influence over this turbulent region at any cost, through any stratagem to ensure its own security. Secondly, the Pashtun dependency ensures its influence in Kabul. This also falls in line with its Sunni-centric Islam. Thirdly, this region is ideal for parking Pakistan Army proxies. Fourthly, it gives it the ability to attack Indian-created assets as well as entities in Afghanistan. Fifthly, the Pakistan deep state seeks the control from the opium trade amounting to a massive $4.1 to 6.6 billion. Sixthly, given the ongoing negotiations, Pakistan sees itself well poised to fill in the impending vacuum in the politico security space created by the US and foreign military departure. Caught in the vortex  are the Afghan populace, who are denied peace, ravaged by conflict, and find their futures compromised.

The present negotiations with the Taliban originate from the politico-military developments of 2011-2014. In the five-phase US, NATO, ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), transition support plan, termed ominously INTEQAL, its terminal Phase 4 and 5 (2013-14) targeted the integration of the eastern provinces. This left the most conflict-ridden and difficult region for the end.

Simultaneously, President Obama announced a troop surge, bringing the combined strength of 48 nations to 1,32,500, in June, 2011, while also stating that the final drawdown would commence and terminate (initially) by end-2014. In strategic terms, these were a set of contradictory parameters creating operational dichotomy that would encourage poor outcomes.

So has been proved, by the extant situation. The troops, though downsized, could not withdraw while ISAF claimed it had completed its mission by end-2014. Contrary to plans, however, we find the Taliban capturing legitimacy and occupying unassailable politico-military space. Another fact must not escape our attention: the Afghan National Army and National Police were created. The ANA was, however, only equipped for counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. It was denied the capability of a conventional Army. It cannot retake the Taliban-dominated areas, or defend its borders.

As events hurtle on, what pre-cognition is possible? The US success in crafting a suitable deal is distant. Outcomes of Moscow’s efforts presently are indeterminate. The Taliban is unlikely to have a long-term commitment to any player except itself. Internally, it is far from monolithic and can diverge or factionalise, based on issues, leadership and tribes. They will, however, continue to expand and firm in on their geographic, security and political spaces. The elements in their shadow, Daish/ISIS, Al Qaida and the new Avatar ISKP (Islamic State Khorasan Province), will reassert in time. Pakistan’s orchestrated strategy rebounded viciously post its assaults on the Lal Masjid, in July, 2007. While its influence and agenda with the Afghan Taliban is likely to endure, it will continue to be targeted by the Pakistan-centred Taliban, whose resilience despite full-scale Pakistan air-land attacks is remarkable.

For India, we need to recalibrate our approach, to enable a firmer and enduring outreach, to the populace, as also the institutions of Afghanistan. The ANA and the ANP, who are in the forefront, despite all odds, need a more robust support. Legitimate Afghan national aspirations must be supported far more energetically. Facing endemic insecurity, with insidious interests across the border, driving and sustaining political duality and Taliban centrality, the plight of the Afghan populace remains challenged.

At Aaj Tak’s Suraksha Sabha, former Army Chief General Bikram Singh has emphasized the need to strike Pakistan again and hit them where it hurts. He reiterated that the Pakistani Army uses terrorists to wage a proxy war against India.

General Singh said, “We should remember that terrorism will continue in Jammu & Kashmir. You have seen how the Pakistani Army, their government and their Prime Minister protects terrorists like Hafiz Saeed. Pakistan will keep making claims but will do nothing.”

The General stated further, “The Pakistani Army has sheltered these terrorists. But now, they have become so powerful that they are a law unto themselves. A significant section of the Pakistani population even respects them. Because it is a poor country and they have opened facilities like schools and hospitals and they pay them money for picking up the gun. Terrorism is a form of employment in Pakistan.”–

He emphasized that unless we are able to target the root cause of cross-border terrorism, things will not get better. “The Madrassas which are being run and the climate of immunity that has been granted to terrorists by Imran Khan and the Pakistani Army, unless we are able to stop them, things will not change. They will continue attacking us and we will continue to bleed. We have to conduct operations against them in their soil which we have done recently. If we stop this now, they will attack with us reinvigorated force.”

He added, “I think for a while they will not target military installations. They will attack our civilian institutions to show that they still have the capability. Unless we attack their headquarters where they receive their training, this will not stop.”

General Singh further added that we have stepped on the tail of the snake, there’s a need to smash its very skull. He said, “It’s a beehive. Throwing a stone at it and killing some bees will not be enough. We will have to burn the beehive to the ground. For that, we need an enduring strategy. We need to create pressure on the Pakistani Army which is the real villain in this entire scenario.”

Former Chief of Air Staff Air Marshall AY Tipnis also echoes similar sentiments. He said, “People think we are being attacked by terrorists. These are not acts of terrorism, these are acts of War. Pakistan has been waging war against us, not from recent times, but ever since it came into being.”

“In the past 20-30 years, a novel way of waging war they have come up with is terrorism,” he said, “They don’t attack us from the front, they use terrorists and claim that these people are fighting for Azadi. These are all lies. Unless we recognize this, we can’t move forward.”

New Delhi, March 11

The indigenously developed Pinaka guided rocket system was successfully test fired on Monday at Pokhran desert in Rajasthan, in a boost to artillery capability of the Army, the defence ministry said.

The weapon system is equipped with state-of-the-art guidance kit comprising an advanced navigation and control system.

“The indigenously developed guided Pinaka, developed by DRDO, will significantly boost the capability of the artillery to make precision hits,” the defence ministry said.

About the tests, it said the weapon systems impacted the intended targets with high precision and achieved desired accuracies.

“Telemetry systems tracked and monitored the vehicle all through the flight path. All the mission objectives have been met,” the ministry said. — PTI

India needs an implementable, sustainable, and above all, affordable non-military war strategy against Pakistan. The push for war goes against India’s painfully constructed image of a pacifist and defensive defence policy. Recent initiatives such as the revocation of the MFN status and the proposal to divert waters indicate that we do have tools to launch a ‘war by other means’ and test Pakistan’s resilience

Bhartendu Kumar Singh
Indian Defence Accounts Service

AFTER the Pulwama attack, India’s hotchpotch national security discourse has drifted towards talk of war, hitherto a declining trend in international relations. There has been rising demand for waging a ‘war against Pakistan’. Buoyed by the Balakot air strike, many Indians assume that a frontal onslaught on Pakistan would bring it to its knees. They blissfully forget that Pakistan is a middle power having comparable resources and would deny an outright victory to India. India needs an appropriate, implementable, sustainable, and above all, affordable non-military war strategy against its neighbour.

Before 1971, Pakistan had nearly one-third to one-fourth of India’s resources and was a ‘big’ State. Probably, that is why the wars of 1948 and 1965 did not lead to an outright victory for India. While Pakistan’s capabilities to wage wars against India decreased after the 1971 dismemberment, it still has roughly one-fourth to one-fifth of all kinds of resources that India has. According to globalfire.com, a website on comparative military power, while India is four th on the ‘most powerful’ military powers’ list, Pakistan is 17th — ahead of North Korea, Australia, Taiwan and Saudi Arabia. Further, the asymmetry is not well defined (India’s military power index is 0.417, Pakistan’s 0.368). Probably, that explains Pakistan’s capacity to provoke India every now and then.

India also does not have the luxury of 1971-type diplomatic treaties and assurances, despite its rising profile in international relations. On the contrary, Pakistan has a tacit understanding with China, convertible into a military understanding or agreement, leading to a formidable balance of military alliance against India. Chinese investments into Pakistan, best reflected in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), make Beijing very attentive to Pakistan’s security calculus. The nuclear factor also brings a semblance of power parity between India and Pakistan that could make wars mutually damaging.

Finally, despite a seven-decade-old war history with Pakistan, we are yet to institutionalise studies like the Correlates of War (CoW) Project launched in the US to study the factors that lead to war. As such, not only are we indifferent to the probability of war between the two countries, but also clueless about victory in hypothetical wars with Pakistan due to an absence of proliferated lab-based simulation exercises. The Indian armed forces do conduct war exercises, either on their own or in partnership with foreign militaries. However, derivative lessons from such exercises are yet to be studied and tested in the academic sense.

India has a three-fold security dilemma on the Pakistan front. First, Pakistan is waging a proxy war with minimal financial and military investments but causing maximum impact. Islamabad has spent barely a fraction in provoking India compared to the Indian response that has come at a heavy cost. New Delhi is compelled to deploy a significant proportion of its armed forces in J&K to rebut Pakistan-sponsored terror activities. Second, a full-fledged war is ruled out since there would be a stalemate (unless India goes the whole hog), apart from being a costly proposition. Moreover, the push for war goes against India’s painfully constructed image of a pacifist and defensive defence policy. Third, India is also in the midst of building a comprehensive national power (CNP) focusing on developmental aspects of security. At least in the foreseeable future, India may not prefer to be distracted by war-like activities.

It emerges, therefore, that India has to explore non-military and affordable options in dealing with Pakistan. Perhaps the most desirable choice would have been a smaller Pakistan with reduced propensity to wage proxy wars against India. If only Pakistan were of the size of, say Iran, it would have been looking up to India (for security assurances) than indulging in provocative games. A smaller Pakistan would have been no ‘flag-bearer’ for secessionist forces in Jammu and Kashmir. While another division of Pakistan may not happen in the near future, the dominant position of Punjab is being resisted by other smaller provinces, most notably Sindh and Balochistan. This internal contradiction needs to be championed on informal platforms.

Another option could be to expose Pakistan’s ‘fictitious’ identity, mobilised largely on anti-India semantics. Pakistan has failed to progress as a civil society, with insignificant gender and minority rights; the military will reigns supreme and democracy is in name only. Even in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), basic civic rights do not exist and the region remains impoverished. Pakistan bartered away a portion of PoK in the Gilgit region to China in 1963. Pakistan is increasingly known as a rogue State promoting terrorist forces within and around it. These representative constructs need to be exposed through the exclusion of Pakistan from all possible forums. For example, in recent years, India has successfully marginalised Pakistan within the South Asian fraternity, best evident in SAARC. It would be prudent to move ahead on a SAARC vision minus Pakistan. That would be a loss of face for Pakistan since it cannot assimilate in the alternative West Asian or Arab imagination.

The military option against Pakistan would be costly and should be exercised as the last resort. Recent initiatives like the revocation of the MFN status, proposal to divert waters etc. indicate that we do have tools to launch a ‘war by other means’ and test Pakistan’s resilience. Historically, great powers have successfully used it. We certainly need to proliferate our non-military options.

Views are personal

teev Sharma

Tribune News Service

Jammu, March 4

Uncertainty looms over Asia’s longest bidirectional Zojila tunnel, connecting Kashmir’s Sonmarg with Gumri area in Ladakh’s Kargil district, after the Centre terminated contract with the beleaguered executing agency, IL&FS Transportation Networks Ltd.

Though the Union Ministry of Road Transport and Highways has gone for rebidding of the 14.31-km tunnel project, there is every possibility of losing an entire working season in completing the exercise of awarding the project to another company for execution.

“This is the most difficult and challenging contract not only in India but in the entire Asia. We have retendered the project and it will take some time to complete the process of evaluating financial as well as technical bids. The possibility of losing a complete working season in this process can’t be ruled out,” said a senior official of the National Highways and Infrastructure Development Corporation (NHIDCL).

The NHIDCL had sent the letter of contract termination to IL&FS on January 15 and the project was offered for rebidding on February 13. The last day for submission of online bids is March 6. The IL&FS was awarded the contract on January 19 this year.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi had laid the foundation of the project on May 19 last year. The 14.31-km tunnel project holds strategic and socio-economic importance for the Ladakh region. It will help India to keep a check on the growing influence of China and Pakistan in Ladakh. Besides, the project will not only meet the strategic requirements of the nation but also reduce travel time to cross Zojila from 3.5 hours to just 15 minutes.

“Over 30 major avalanches have been reported in the Zojila region in recent months while there is still 3 to 4 metres of snow accumulated. So, it is not an easy job to execute work under such challenging climatic conditions. Yet, IL&FS executed nearly 7 to 10 per cent ground work,” the official said.

He said the government would fix the responsibility of IL&FS for abandoning the project by imposing a penalty on it. “As per the terms of the agreement, if it (contract) is terminated due to defaults on the part of IL&FS, the company will not only forfeit its security deposit but also won’t get any amount from the NHIDCL,” he said.

The construction period of the project was 2,555 days ie seven years, which was to be reckoned from the date of commencement of construction.

Tribune News Service

New Delhi, March 4

IAF Chief Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa today avoided the ongoing political controversy, saying the IAF does not count casualties but the airstrike at Balakot had hit the “target”.

The IAF had struck a terror camp of the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) in Pakistan on February 26 and since then neither the IAF nor the government has listed the number of casualties. However, the media has been saying that nearly 300 terrorists were killed.

EDIT: Going ballistic over Balakot

The IAF Chief was speaking at Coimbatore in Tamil Nadu for the first time since the attack at Balakot in Pakistan’s Khyber Paktunkhwa province. “We don’t count human casualties. We count what targets we have hit or not hit,” the IAF Chief said.

“The bomb damage assessment only calculates the target that has been hit or not hit,” he said, adding: “We can’t count how many people have died. That depends on how many people were there.” He said a statement on the number of terrorists killed would be made by the government.

On reports suggesting the bombs were dropped away from the target, he said: “Had the IAF dropped bombs in a jungle, there would have been no need for Pakistan to respond. If we plan to hit the target, we hit the target.”

On the MiG-21 still being used, the IAF Chief said: “The MiG-21 Bison is in our inventory, why not use it? It has been upgraded. It has got a better weapons system, better radars and better air-to-air missiles.” The IAF Chief refused to be drawn into a commentary on what difference the Rafale could have made, saying: “The Prime Minister has made a statement. I will not comment on that.”