HARDLINE REGIME Intel chief believes in ‘aggressive measures’ to thwart New Delhi’s influence in Afghanistan

Pakistan needs to prevent the opening of another hostile front should Afghanistan emerge as a proxy for India… LT GEN NAVEED MUKHTAR, chief of Inter-Services Intelligence agency

ISLAMABAD/NEW DELHI: Lt Gen Naveed Mukhtar, the new chief of the powerful InterServices Intelligence agency, believes Pakistan could resort to “aggressive measures” to undermine India’s role in wartorn Afghanistan to prevent Kabul from becoming a “proxy” for New Delhi.

Mukhtar was named director general of the ISI as part of a major shake-up of the Pakistan Army top brass by the new chief, Gen Qamar Bajwa. He isn’t a newcomer to spycraft as he earlier headed the ISI’s counter-terror wing.

He is known for his low profile and professional demeanour, say those who have met him. As ISI chief, Mukhtar will have to handle Pakistan’s deteriorating relations with Afghanistan and India.

For the second time in a row, a general overseeing security in the financial hub of Karachi was picked to run the ISI, which has often been criticised for meddling in politics and its links to several militant groups.

In a paper titled “Afghanistan — Alternative Futures And Their Implications” that he wrote five years ago while studying at the US Army War College, Mukhtar emphasised that Pakistan has to take steps to counter India’s influence in Afghanistan.

He also wrote that “moderate” Taliban factions should be accommodated in the government in Afghanistan before US troops withdraw.

Noting that Islamabad’s fate is closely linked with Kabul, Mukhtar wrote that “Pakistan needs to prevent the opening of another hostile front should Afghanistan emerge as a proxy for India. Consequently, Pakistan will closely follow India’s efforts to influence Afghanistan and may take aggressive measures to undermine India’s efforts in this regard.”

Mukhtar’s views on the Taliban and India are largely in line with the thinking among the Pakistan Army brass. For a long time, the top generals in Rawalpindi have favoured an accommodation with the Afghan Taliban, whose leaders have sheltered in the Pakistani province of Balochistan for years.

Pakistani generals also believe a government in Kabul incorporating Taliban elements is their best bet to prevent India increasing its influence in Afghanistan. Mukhtar wrote in the paper that New Delhi is concerned about the “perceived dangers posed by a return of a Taliban-controlled Afghan government that sponsors terrorism threatening India”.

“India strongly opposes any accommodation with the Taliban in the governance of Afghanistan in that it perceives a nexus between the Taliban, al Qaeda terrorists, and jihadist groups operating in Pakistan that are all hostile to India,” he wrote.

Mukhtar, commissioned in the Armoured Corps in 1983, concluded that “India could still move to be a major destabilising force if it perceives that a return of a radicalised Taliban government is likely”. Mukhtar replaced Lt Gen Rizwan Akhtar, who did not complete the three-year term for an ISI chief. Akhtar was made president of the National Defence University

Observer Research Foundation fellow Manoj Joshi (right) and defence analyst Rahul Bedi during a talk organised by the Indian Ex-servicemen Movement in Panchkula on Saturday. Tribune photo: Manoj Mahajan

Tribune News Service

Panchkula, December 10

The first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, had little understanding and liking of the armed forces and consequently he did not take the military’s advice as he should have done.Stating this here today while delivering a talk on “Evolution of India’s Defence Policy under Pandit Nehru” as part of the Veterans Day Commemoration organised by the local chapter of the Indian Ex-servicemen Movement, Dr Manoj Joshi, fellow, Observer Research Foundation, said while Nehru had his shortcomings on the military front, the military too did not come up with any strategic plan or vision. As a result, appropriate advice was not available to Nehru and he committed mistakes and ad hocism prevailed.Dr Joshi said Nehru had reposed great faith in the United Nations (UN) giving a fair play in sorting out the post-Independence India-Pak imbroglio, but that did not happen as some countries like Britain backed Pakistan.Stating that while Nehru had made significant contributions to the national cause, he faced vast challenges and after the death of the then Home Minister, Sardar Patel, he had no equal among his political peers, which led to him developing a personality cult and devising his own way of doing things unilaterally.They also discussed various aspects of India’s national security issues pertaining to the Nehruvian era.

Following are the excerpts from Gen VP Malik’s inaugural lecture, “Defence at 70”, under the aegis of the Tribune National Security Forum, on Saturday, December 3, 2016.

INDIA’S  defence report card of the past seven decades is more positive than negative. But the credit for that goes less to our policies and grand strategies; more to those responsible for operational planning and execution on the ground. The baptism started soon after Independence.

Yesterday

Barring the 1962 war with China, India’s national defence has been ensured in all military engagements. But many a time, we have failed to convert-hard-won with much sacrifices-operational achievements into long-term politico-strategic successes. There is a need to analyse this aspect at this juncture. In hindsight, these reflect on India’s poor strategic vision, guidance and directions, and lack of coordination amongst civil and military leaders. Let me end this part by stating, rather sadly, that the lack of political guidance on important security-related issues, its excessive dependence on bureaucracy in PMO, MEA, MoD, IB, RAW, and marginalisation of professional and critical stakeholder’s military advice at the highest level of decision making, continues to be a major handicap even after 70 years.

Today

Externally, both our neighbours have established a very strong strategic nexus. Internally,  although threats have declined the vulnerabilities persist. They persist due to polarising, violent, identity politics and contempt for constitutional norms.

Tomorrow

In this new age of heightened nationalism and unpredictability, no one can give an assurance of nuclear and high-level conventional wars. But recent trends show that there is a greater likelihood of sub-conventional, hybrid and limited border wars. Information technology has made the battle space larger, more inclusive and faster. The entire command-and-control mechanism depends on space satellite facilities. Cyber-attacks on civilian infrastructure would have far more significance than any damage to military installations.

Defence management

The separation between tactical, operational and strategic levels of warfare has blurred. A small military action becomes an issue for consideration and decision making at the highest level. We have a situation where a junior military officer is expected to understand political considerations, and the political leader to know the tactical and operational considerations.Therefore, defence management requires greater, direct politico-military interface covering national security strategy, defence policy and planning, budgetary economy and common personnel and logistics. This requires a major overhaul of the Ministry of Defence and the higher defence-control system.

The roadblock

We have neither delivered a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) nor addressed many organisational problems. By keeping the Integrated Defence Staff headless, it has failed to provide an integrated and joint paradigm; much less give integrated advice to the Defence Minister, Prime Minister or the CCS. My feedback shows that there has been no change in the responsibilities, accountability and procedures, or in the attitude of civilian officers in the Ministry of Defence.  Inter-Services cooperation remains weak. The bureaucratic wall between the political executive and the professional service chiefs has converted the concept of “civilian political control” into “civil bureaucratic control”. There is an urgent requirement to reorganise the Ministry of Defence and its business rules. The CDS appointment has become indispensable.

At others’ mercy

The Kargil war made me realise the importance of being self-reliant in arms and equipment. During that war, every country that we approached, either refused or took us for a ride by trying to sell their old weapons, ammunition and equipment at a high price. That situation is not very different today. We also carry the dubious distinction of being world’s largest importer of defence equipment. Despite the latest changes in FDI, defence purchase norms and the PM’s push on “Make in India”, it will take 20-25 years to make up deficiencies in our arms and equipment. This delay is unacceptable.

The to-do list

The strategy should include (a) facilitating the domestic defence industrial houses to expand their hi-tech base soonest (b) creation of skilled worker base (c) ensuring a level playing field for public and private defence sectors (d) an unambiguous export policy, and, most importantly, (e) sufficient defence budget for capital purchases.We must place some orders for complete items as in the case of 36 Rafael fighters aircraft, lest we are caught in another Kargil war-like situation.

People count

The man behind the gun is more important than the gun. In last 70 years, there has been a steady denigration and erosion of the soldiers’ status within the government, and therefore in civil society. This is reflected in the qualitative and quantitative dilution of the military rank and file, despite being the most dependable brand in the country. Honour, izzat, and comparable status in the government and society have sustained the armed forces and enabled them to draw the right kind of leadership. By taking away its pride and status, making the career unattractive, and not getting required weapons and equipment, the military is no longer a prime choice today. Next, it will affect their morale and fighting spirit. Our political leadership must introspect and correct this aspect sooner than later.

No silos

National security decision-making and higher direction of military conflicts require multi-disciplinary vertical and lateral consultations, and much faster decision-making. We need many changes in the national security structures, processes and procedures which can make it more efficient, resilient, and speedily responsive. I hope we will pay serious attention to our strategic policies, higher defence-control organisation, forces’modernisation, capacities, and military morale. It is only then that we can be secure internally and externally, fully prepared to take on the role that we see for ourselves. The writer is the former Chief of the Army Staff

The government will install laser walls and other technologically advanced systems on the India-Pakistan border to thwart any infiltration bid from the neighbouring nation, Union minister Kiren Rijiju said here on Sunday. He said the work will be completed in a year.

The minister of state for home affairs was here to pay tributes to Shaheed Ram Parkash on his martyrdom anniversary at Qadian town in the district.

The laser walls or fence are being monitored by the Border Security Force (BSF), which guards the Indo-Pak International Border in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat. A dozen laser walls have been made operational already along the border in Punjab to plug the porous riverine and treacherous terrain and keep an effective vigil against intruders and terrorists exploiting the frontier areas to cross over.After the Pathankot terror attack in January, where it was suspected that terrorists crossed over from Pakistan by breaching the IB from Bamiyal area in Punjab, the Union home ministry and BSF have sped up the deployment and activation of these walls along the border.

The south end of the Rohtang Tunnel at Dhundi, 23 km from Manali. Photo by writer

MC Thakur

MANALI, DECEMBER 2

With winter setting in and anticipated snowfall closing the 13,050- foot Rohtang Pass, gateway to Lahaul- Spiti, every year for almost six months, the Rohtang Tunnel Project work like every year has almost come to a halt at North Portal near Sisu in Lahaul Valley. There will be no work at the North Portal till May 2017 when the Rohtang Pass is likely to open again. However, the work will continue from the South Portal near Dhundi throughout the winter, said Brig DN Bhatt, Chief Engineer Project Rohtang Tunnel, today.As of now the excavation at the North Portal has been completed for 3.7 km, from South Portal 3.8 km while 1.3 km remains to be excavated.The Chief Engineer further said that South Portal has encountered fractured and weak rock. However, the project work is going round the clock overcoming the challenge. The Chief Engineer confirmed that all efforts are being made to ensure that the breakthrough is achieved in July-August 2017 as planned.Brig DN Bhatt also informed that the project has seen unprecedented progress. The excavation in 2016 has reached 2161 m as against the highest progress achieved earlier in 2011 of 2077 m. It is expected that excavation by December 31, 2016 will reach 2,250 m mark. Similarly, other activities like benching, emergency tunnel, etc, have also progressed considerably to achieve the completion target by the second half of 2019.Brig DN Bhatt further said that construction of this tunnel has not been easy. Whatever challenges thrown have been met successfully. Worst was the water and muck ingress in Seri Nullah fault zone, emission of hazardous gases, encountering of high pressure entrapped gases in the rock and frequent encounter with loose and weak rocks needing additional supports to be installed. Ventilation also became a challenge.Brig Bhatt also emphasized that strict quality control for material and workmanship is being maintained at both the portals. Labs with required testing equipments are being maintained at both portals and regular tests on materials are carried out.

Even as the Indian Army failed to strengthen its defences in time, junior officers and soldiers valiantly won the war on the western front, with significant contribution from the Indian Air Force

WINNING LAP: Maj Kuldeep Singh Chandpuri and his company successfully held back Pakistani armour and infantry through a harrowing night in the Rajasthan desert in the famous Battle of Longewala

Dinesh Kumar

Click here for a larger view of Looking back 1971 War

In keeping with its strategic thinking that the defence of East Pakistan lay in India’s Western Theatre, Pakistan launched an offensive on December 3 evening with aerial attacks on 11 air bases across Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan. This was followed by an Army assault at four places across Jammu and Kashmir (Poonch and Chhamb), Punjab (Fazilka) and the deserts of Rajasthan that same night and early next morning.Although the surrender at Dhaka and dismemberment of East Pakistan has been the focus of all writings in this war, the harsh reality is that the conduct of the war on the western front was marked by low competence levels and offensive spirit, faulty planning and a mediocre display of leadership by generals (barring very few exceptions) on both sides. The Indian posture was largely defensive and the Army seemed content on maintaining status quo.India faced reverses at two key places. It lost Chhamb for the second time in six years, the first being during the 1965 War. Chhamb was then returned to India as stipulated by the January 1966 Tashkent Agreement. But in 1971 not only was the Indian Army unable to defend Chhamb a second time despite advance intelligence, made no worthwhile effort to retake this militarily critical portion in the Jammu area even after the Pakistani army ceased further operations on December 10 following the death of their Division Commander in a helicopter crash. The Army did, however, manage to prevent the Pakistanis from securing a bridgehead on the Munawar Tawi.A second reverse was suffered in Fazilka-Ferozepur where Pakistan captured the Hussainiwala enclave and the Fazilka agriculture belt, enabling it to establish a foothold on the Sabuna distributary which provided them depth to defend the Sulemanki Canal Headworks located 1.5 km from the border.Overall the Indian Army captured more territory from Pakistan (about 3,600 sq km) compared to 126 sq km by the Pakistani army on the Western front. But except the few high altitude tactical features wrested in Ladakh and a portion in the Jammu-Poonch area, the territory gained elsewhere was of little military significance. The largest territorial gains were in the desolate uninhabited desert area of Rajasthan. The more tactically important gains were made in the capture of a major portion of the Shakargarh bulge and the ‘chicken neck’ in Jammu area where India launched an offensive. It also captured some high altitude key features in Ladakh that included Turtuk and mountain peaks overlooking the Leh-Srinagar highway. Much later, in April 1984, Turtuk was of tactical importance in the capture of the 110 km long Saltoro ridge located at the head of the Siachen glacier. The Army did well to defend the assault on Poonch, but made no attempt to retake the Haji Pir bulge as was done in 1965.The two armies on the western front had near parity in armour and artillery although India had a much larger Infantry. India had two regional commands — Western Command with three Corps and a Southern Command with two Divisions — pitted against two corps of Pakistan. In maintaining a strategic defence on the western front, India may have maintained the moral high ground of not being termed the aggressor. But India reflected little strategic thinking and lost out on a major opportunity to possibly militarily settle the J&K issue or at least make significant militarily gains in the state by taking advantage of Pakistan’s initiation of the war. Clearly, the Western Theatre was a case of a wasted opportunity.

Lt Col Mitali Madhumita

Vijay Mohan

Tribune News Service

Chandigarh, November 30

The only woman officer in the Army to have been decorated for gallantry, Lt Col Mitali Madhumita, has won a legal battle to continue in service. The Supreme Court today dismissed an appeal filed by the central government challenging earlier court orders ruling that she could seek permanent commission.Lt Col Madhumita from the Army Education Corps had been decorated with the Sena Medal for saving at least 19 lives during the February 2010 terrorist attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul.She had joined the Army as a short service commission (SSC) officer and later, for personal reasons, declined to opt for permanent commission (PC) in September 2010. On her return from Afghanistan, she changed her mind and sought to withdraw her request for leaving the Army on completion of her SSC term, but the Army refused to comply with her request.She moved the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) which in February 2014 quashed the communication of the Union of India by which her application for withdrawal of her earlier unwillingness for grant of permanent commission was rejected. The AFT had observed she had withdrawn her option well before her actual term in office came to an end. Her application for withdrawal of her earlier unwillingness had been duly processed and strongly recommended through proper official channel.The Union of India contended that grant of permanent commission to Madhumita would interfere with the policy and cadre management with regard to grant of permanent commission of SSC officers. Her release from service was stayed when she had sought judicial redress.The Supreme Court Bench, comprising Chief Justice of India TS Thakur, Justice DY Chandrachud and Justice Nageswara Rao, held that Lt Col Madhumita was an outstanding officer and had been awarded the Army Commander’s Commendation even after her service had been protected and continued by the Supreme Court vide its interim order in October 2015.Close to 1,500 women officers are serving in the Army and about 350 have been granted permanent commission after the government introduced the same for some select branches such as the Army Education Corps and Judge Advocate General’s Department a few years ago. The Air Force and Navy followed suit.

SC dismisses Centre’s appeal

• Lt Col Mitali Madhumita (pic) from the Army Education Corps got the Sena Medal for saving 19 lives during a 2010 terror attack on Indian embassy in Kabul
• The SSC officer declined to opt for permanent commission in 2010. On her return from Afghanistan, she sought to withdraw her request, but the Army refused
• She moved the Armed Forces Tribunal, which in 2014 quashed the government communication rejecting her application for withdrawal of her request
• The SC on Wednesday dismissed an appeal filed by the Centre challenging earlier court orders ruling that she could seek permanent commission

Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, after months of speculation and suspense, has finally made his choice (record fifth time) for the Pak Chief of Army Staff (COAS). He has chosen the ‘dark horse’ and the junior most general as the next Chief. Gen Bajwa has been preferred over the senior most Gen Zubair Mahmood Hayat who has literally been kicked up-stairs.  The other two in the probable list included Lt Gen Ishfaq Nadeem Ahmed, GOC of Strike Corps at Multan, who enjoyed wide popularity due to his professional acumen in shaping operational plans and policies leading to successful operations during Raheel’s tenure.  However, his being out spoken and high profile may have gone against him.  The fourth one in the race, an early favorite, Lt Gen Javed Iqbal Ramday, may have lost out despite family ties.  Did it have something to do with the leaking of information to Cyril Almeida? They will have to be  found some sinecures or may resign. This will lead to five apex level changes: Chief of General Staff (CGS), two Corps Commanders, IG Training and Evaluation besides DG ISI.  The current process has also seen some very interesting trends.  The first one is that the process entailed suspense and even intrigue till the `dark horse’ was nominated, that too after all the mandatory ceremonials of the outgoing incumbent were over. Nawaz, after disregarding seniority, would hope that the new incumbent will buck the trend and remain loyal unlike his previous appointees. This last minute nomination and secrecy reflects insecurity and may impact continuity especially as the CGS is to be changed.The choice of Gen Bajwa has led to some Indian Jats suddenly discovering links with Muslim Jats of Sialkot region.  We may recount that Gen Zia was a Mohajir blessed with liberal education at St Stephens. But he turned out to be a “Maulana General” who set the Pak army on the path of Islamisation.  The other Mohajir, Gen Mushrraf tried to prove himself more Punjabi than the real Punjabis. The obvious lesson is not to stereotype Pak generals based on their background. Gen Bajwa may also want to live down his relationship with Ahmadiya relatives though  his connections may have been played up by a rival.  This may also free him of the shackles that Nawaz may have planned to keep him in check.Another complexity is that their responses are shaped by the deep state including the ISI, driven by its own interpretation of Pak national interests. Every new Chief goes through a normative process and may even display two to three character profiles depending on the length of his tenure.  Musharraf-I was a hardliner with Kargil as his signature statement, Musharraf-II seemed to be yearning for a place in history and came very close to anchoring a possible solution in Kashmir, wanting to possibly match up to Vajpayee and Manmohan in statesmanship.  Like Raheel, Gen Bajwa steps up from a low profile job, yet brings hands-on experience of 10 Corps  with responsibility of PoK and LoC.  Initial reports of his easy going in style need to be taken with a pinch of salt. Pak media’s attempts to project him as a pro-democracy general seem to be part of an orchestrated campaign that only the passage of time can validate.  As regards his UN experience  under an Indian GOC, the advice of his erstwhile [Indian] boss that projection in an international environment is different needs to be factored to rule out skewed profiling.Transformative Chiefs  are becoming rare. Powerful ones have generally tended to be “roguish” and led Pakistan on dangerous pathways.  Gen. Zia’s Islamisation drive and Gen. Musharaff’s Kargil misadventure are two such obvious examples. Gen. Raheel was also set on this dangerous path with BAT actions; one possible lesson is that no general should be allowed to start a private war for his own ends and especially towards the end of his tenure. Let us hope Gen. Bajwa respects civilian hierarchy that will pave the way for cooling down on LoC. Luxury of this window may not be for very long as with time Pak Chief is likely to become more assertive and autonomous.In sum, there is a now a new movie with a new hero and a new cast. Yet the story and script may remain the same as the deep state remains the ghost writer. The next Pak army chief is likely to remain focused on these interests and more importantly insecurities. Like they say more things change, more they remain the same.  The challenge is to help Pak civilian structures to re-assert their supremacy in this narrow window before the Army starts asserting itself again.The writer was former GOC, Western Command, Indian Army

SPIKE At least 75 militants entered state this year, compared to 30 in 2015

THERE WERE 90 SUCH INFILTRATION ATTEMPTS IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 2016, OF WHICH 54 WERE SUCCESSFUL

Harinder Baweja

NITIN KANOTRA /HTSoldiers stand near the encounter site at Nagrota, about 25 km from Jammu, where militants opened fire at an Army camp on Tuesday.

NEW DELHI: Infiltration of trained terrorists from Pakistan into Jammu and Kashmir is up by more than one hundred per cent in 2016.

According to the multi agency center (MAC)—which collates inputs from the army, paramilitary forces and the intelligence agencies— at least 75 terrorists have entered the state as compared to 30 militants in 2015.

Even according to the figures tabled by MoS (Home) Hansraj Ahir in the Rajya Sabha, there were 90 such attempts in the first six months of 2016, of which 54 were successful. Since July 15, the Army has foiled at least 14 such attempts. In comparison, 2015 saw 31 successful attempts.

The infiltration attempt at the Samba sector on Tuesday is a confirmation of the Army’s assessment that the snows are not likely to deter terrorists from making their way into Jammu and Kashmir.

Heavy snowfall makes for a formidable trek across the LoC but Lt Gen Satish Dua, Corps Commander, 15 Corps, told HT, just before demitting office, “We expect a more difficult winter because of the heightened state of alert after the surgical strikes and are prepared for any misadventure from Pakistan.”

The increase in infiltration numbers is only a part of the problem the security forces are gearing up for. “Pakistan is sending in trained militants not only to exploit the ground situation in Kashmir, which is still locked down after four months of protests, but is also consistently targeting the forces along the Line of Control and in the hinterland,’’ a senior intelligence officer said. Apart from ceasefire violations, the state has also seen terror attacks, including the one at Uri in September that killed 19 soldiers and another at the Nagrota camp in Jammu on Tuesday.

As indicated by defence minister Manohar Parrikar, terrorists are training their guns, not on civilians, but on security forces. The army, deployed along the line of control, has been particularly targeted since the surgical strikes on September 29.

Much against the skeptics’ expectations, the change of guard in the Pakistan army has been free from rancour. There was none of the earlier suspense about whether the previous chief will quietly hang his boots. Gen Raheel Sharif duly walked into the sunset after putting in three years as Pakistani army chief. The succession was equally smooth. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, as should be the norm in any democratic country where civilian authority is supreme, dined out General Sharif and announced the selection of Gen Qama Javed Bajwa as his successor. What does the new appointment mean, if at all, to India?Apart from the flutter of excitement in Punjab because many Sikhs share his surname, India can draw solace from the cordial civil-military relations that have ensured the smooth transition. General Bajwa superseded four Generals, but both the military and civilian leadership had agreed that those seniors were already out in pasture. That left Bajwa and three others with the same seniority. Again there was no difference of opinion on the edge enjoyed by Bajwa for having led Pakistan’s largest formation, the X Corps. Otherwise, the army chief, or for that matter any army chief in any country, will be guided by his country’s interests.The apparent supremacy of the civilian leadership in the takeover process offers both India and Pakistan a chance to talk peace and normalisation. Theoretically, the army should be on the same page as Nawaz Sharif if he arms Sartaj Aziz, when he visits Amritsar next month, with proposals to defuse the tensions with India. Pakistan’s envoy in India has started putting out feelers in this regard and the tempo of cross-border fire has also abated. General Bajwa will likely pursue Pakistan’s core internal security interests — wiping out recalcitrant militants from south Punjab and ensuring the security of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. He will naturally pursue its two core external interests as well — Kashmir and Afghanistan. Both pit Pakistan’s security managers against India. Armies know only the idiom of confrontation and violence. Only diplomats and politicians can rewrite a new grammar.