Chief of Defence Staff Gen Anil Chauhan, in an address at the Savitribai Phule Pune University, rejects criticism against him for acknowledging that India lost an unspecified number of combat jets during the initial phase of Operation Sindoor
Professional militaries are not affected by temporary losses as the overall outcomes are much more important than such setbacks, Chief of Defence Staff Gen Anil Chauhan said on Tuesday.
The top military commander said that Pakistan has been following an approach of bleeding India by thousand cuts but New Delhi drew a completely new redline against cross-border terrorism by conducting the Operation Sindoor.
In an address at the Savitribai Phule Pune University, Gen Chauhan appeared to reject criticism against him for acknowledging that India lost an unspecified number of combat jets during the initial phase of the operation.
“When I was asked about losses on our side, I said these are not important as results and how you act are important,” he said.
It would be not very correct to talk about losses and numbers, he said, responding to a question.
In war, even if there are setbacks, you need to maintain your morale, he said adding losses are not important but outcomes are.
The Chief of Defence Staff highlighted various elements of war including politics and violence and noted: In Operation Sindoor too, war and politics were happening as a parallel kind of phenomenon.
Gen Chauhan also made a mention about Pakistan Army chief Gen Asim Munir “spewing venom” against India and Hindus just weeks before the Pahalgam attack to emphasise that Islamabad’s approach has been to “bleed India by thousand cuts”.
What happened in Pahalgam was profound cruelty towards victims, he said.
The thinking behind Operation Sindoor was that state-sponsored terrorism from Pakistan has to stop and that country should not be able to hold India hostage to terrorism.
India is not going to live under the shadow of terror and nuclear blackmail, Gen Chauhan said.
On India’s military offensives, he said Indian armed forces carried out very deliberate precision strikes on Pakistani targets and some of them were as narrow as two metres.
Explaining the process of the understanding on cessation of hostilities, he said Pakistan planned to carry out its counter operations against India for 48 hours but it folded up in about eight hours.
And they wanted to talk, he said, highlighting the impact of Indian strikes.
Pakistan’s decision to talk to India on May 10 stemmed from realisation that it will suffer more if its operation continues, Gen Chauhan said.
Around 1 am on May 10, Pakistan aimed to get India to its knees in 48 hours as multiple attacks were launched, he said.
Pakistan’s operation that they thought would continue for 48 hours folded up in about eight hours and they wanted to talk, he added.
When the request for talks and de-escalation came from Pakistan, we did accept it, Gen Chauhan said.
On India’s overall approach, he said, “We have raised the bar; we have connected terror to water, we have drawn a new line of military operation against terror.”
Pak planned 48-hour operation but it folded up in 8 hours: CDS
In the first detailed account of India’s clashes with Pakistan, Gen Chauhan said India’s response to the Pahalgam terror attack was to draw “limits of tolerance” to cross-border terrorism and not tolerating Islamabad’s nuclear blackmaiPTI
Pakistan launched multiple attacks on early May 10 aiming to bring India to its knees in 48 hours, but it had to fold up the offensives in eight hours and reach out to New Delhi for talks seeking an end to the hostilities, Chief of Defence Staff Gen Anil Chauhan said on Tuesday.
In the first detailed account of India’s clashes with Pakistan, Gen Chauhan said India’s response to the Pahalgam terror attack was to draw “limits of tolerance” to cross-border terrorism and not tolerating Islamabad’s nuclear blackmail.
In an address at the Savitribai Phule Pune University, the top military commander appeared to reject criticism against him for acknowledging three days ago that India lost an unspecified number of combat jets during the initial phase of Operation Sindoor.
Professional militaries are not affected by temporary losses as overall outcomes are much more important than such setbacks, he said and used cricketing metaphor to draw a clear distinction between initial setbacks and the overall outcome.
Suppose you go into a cricket test match and you win by an innings, then there is no question of wickets and balls etc, he said.
Gen Chauhan, who played a key role in planning India’s response to the Pahalgam terror attack as well as subsequent Pakistani offensives, threw light on various aspects of the conflict.
“On May 10, about 1 am, their (Pakistan) aim was to get India to its knees in 48 hours. Multiple attacks were launched and in some manner, they have escalated this conflict. We had actually hit only terrorist targets,” he said.
The Chief of Defence Staff said the rationale behind Pakistan’s decision could be based on two aspects.
“One — they must have assumed that if they continue, they are likely to lose much more. And second — since they had stuck us at multiple fronts, they still did not have the benefit of understanding what they had struck,” he said.
When the request for talks and de-escalation came from Pakistan, we did accept it, he said.
US President Trump’s ceasefire claim is alive and well
THE controversy over US President Donald Trump’s claim that he mediated a ceasefire between India and Pakistan refuses to die down. Though India has refuted his claim, Trump is insistent that he played the peacemaker. On May 30, he said, “I think the deal I’m most proud of is the fact that we’re dealing with India, we’re dealing with Pakistan and we were able to stop potentially a nuclear war through trade as opposed through bullets”.
This comment encapsulates his three assertions on the ceasefire that was announced on May 10. One, he was responsible for it; two, the hostilities could have potentially led to a nuclear conflict; and three, he threatened to snap trade ties with both countries, thus prompting them to agree to a ceasefire.
India has stated that the cessation of hostilities happened after Pakistan’s Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) called up his Indian counterpart on May 10. During this conversation, the two DGMOs agreed that all military action would cease from 5 pm that day. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has clarified that Operation Sindoor has only been paused. India has also emphasised that the conflict remained in the conventional domain and there was no nuclear signalling by Pakistan.
Significantly, Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said on May 13, “From the time Operation Sindoor commenced on May 7, till the understanding on cessation of firing and military action on May 10, there were conversations between Indian and US leaders on the evolving military situation. The issue of trade did not come up in any of these discussions”.
After his attention was drawn on May 29 to US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick’s declaration in a US court that Trump cited trade to bring about a ceasefire, the spokesperson said, “I hope you have seen the court order as well”. Thereafter, Jaiswal went on to repeat his May 13 comment. It was premature for him to mention the court order, for a superior court stayed it on May 29 itself. The spokesperson should not have relied on a lower court’s decision to try to validate his country’s position.
Pakistan has stated that the ceasefire was the result of intervention of several countries. During the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore last week, Pakistan’s Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Gen Sahir Shamshad Mirza, named six in this context: the US, UK, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and China. This would hardly please Trump, who is claiming entire credit for the best ‘deal’ he has made.
Islamabad has not said that this conflict was in danger of going beyond the conventional stage, but it has now reaffirmed its general concern that Indian kinetic action could lead to a nuclear exchange if foreign powers don’t get enough time to intervene. Pakistan has also not made any comment on Trump’s claim of threatening to stop trade ties if the hostilities did not cease. Pakistan-US trade talks are set to begin.
Why has the Trump administration shown such disregard for Indian sensitivities on the trade issue that it has included it in an affidavit submitted by Lutnick in a US court on May 23? The case pertains to a legal challenge to Trump’s tariff policies, which he is justifying under his country’s International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).
Technically, Lutnick has given a declaration, but as he states that he has done so “under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct”, it is nothing but an affidavit. My diplomatic experience suggests that it is unprecedented for a country to convert a political statement of the kind Trump made on invoking trade to bring about a ceasefire into a legal document. Its implication is that the US cannot resile from the President’s claim on the issue. Trump talks loosely and often contradicts his own statements. But a legal document is not to be trifled with. This puts the US at odds with the Indian stand on this matter at a time when both countries are negotiating a trade deal.
Considering the India-US differences on Trump’s trade threat, it is worthwhile to give details of Lutnick’s averment in his affidavit. Asserting that any curtailment of the President’s powers under the IEEPA would adversely impact US security interests and foreign policy, Lutnick said: “A ruling that narrows IEEPA would have ripple effects across every domain in which economic instruments are used for strategic effect. For example, India and Pakistan — two nuclear-armed powers which engaged in combat operations just 13 days ago — reached a tenuous ceasefire on May 10.”
He added: “The ceasefire was only achieved after President Trump interceded and offered both nations trading access with the US to avert a full-scale war. An adverse ruling that constrains presidential power in this case could lead India and Pakistan to question the validity of President Trump’s offer threatening the security of an entire region and the lives of millions”.
In response to another question on May 29 on Lutnick’s declaration, the MEA spokesperson bristled and said, “I have stated my position, and when I state my position, I do it as spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India with flags on both sides. That has an implication, it means a lot”.
Of course, it means a lot if the Modi government is formally asserting that the US Commerce Secretary made a false declaration in a US court “under penalty of perjury”. It will mean much more if the matter gains traction in America.
As for India, it cannot help feeling let down by Trump’s actions and statements since Operation Sindoor. Perhaps the popular song from the 1964 classic Sangam best sums up Delhi’s current mood, “Dost dost na raha…” And the days of ‘Howdy Modi’ and ‘Namaste Trump’ are now a distant memory.
Vivek Katju is former Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Now, owners liable to pay relief for dog bites in Chandigarh
Owners will be liable to pay compensation in case of dog bite or any damage to property caused by their pets. For better pet management and public safety, the Municipal Corporation (MC) House today approved the final draft of the “Pet and Community Dogs Bylaws 2025”.
Laying down stringent responsibilities for the dog owners, the bylaws also restrict access of dogs to several high-traffic and public spaces in the city, including Sukhna Lake, Rock Garden, Leisure Valley, Rose Garden, Fragrance Garden, Shantikunj, Terrace Garden, Mini Rose Garden, Shivalik Garden and any green belt of 20 acres or more.
Pet walking will be allowed in regular parks, with a strict requirement for owners to carry poop bags. Registration of pet dogs will also be mandatory and the number of dogs a house can have has also been restricted. A family in a five-marla house can keep only one pet dog. However, people living on first or second floors can also have one dog each. Similarly, houses measuring from six marla to 12 marla can keep two pets. A family living in a kanal house can have two dogs and one stray dog. The owners of two-kanal houses can have two pets and an equal number of stray dogs.
Under the new rules, all dogs must be leashed in public spaces, with ferocious breeds also required to wear muzzles. When walking aggressive dogs, the owners must carry a stick as an additional precaution. Failure to control a dog’s behaviour, including acts of aggression or damage, can lead to authorities seizing the pet and imposing penalties on the owner.
The bylaws prohibit the disposal of deceased pets in public bins or municipal areas, mandating cremation at authorised facilities or respectful private burials instead. The regulations maintain the existing ban on seven aggressive dog breeds, as per the 2023 Animal Birth Control Rules, and ban commercial dog breeding or trading within the city.
Additionally, the draft emphasises strict control over pet defecation in public, residential and common areas. Owners must clean up the space or ensure their pets relieve themselves in isolated locations.
The final draft was formulated through consultations involving the Joint Commissioner-I of MC, the Medical Officer of Health (who also serves as Secretary of the SPCA), and other key stakeholders. The comprehensive policy is aimed at striking a balance between animal welfare and public safety, ensuring responsible pet ownership in Chandigarh.
The bylaws now await approval from the Chandigarh Administration before they are formally implemented.
Revisit Theatre Commands After Success of Operation Sindoor
The lessons from Operation Sindoor need to be assimilated by the military establishment and the national leadership and applied to bolster national security. One significant issue being pursued by the nation is enhancing jointness among the services through a transition to theatre commands. The Indian Air Force (IAF) has long argued that India is one theatre as far as the Air Force is concerned. Op Sindoor, the author of the article below, a retired Air Marshal and someone who has been Commander-in-Chief of an IAF Command argues against such a requirement. There will be many different views on his argument which we welcome. Read on.
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Operation Sindoor was successfully executed by the Indian armed forces. It is an example of synergy and jointness in planning and executing operations across the entire length of the western borders, from Kutch in the south to Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) in the north. The operation is ongoing; however, the current pause provides an opportunity to review what we did well, replenish the war machine, undertake an honest evaluation and tighten the loose ends.
Operation Sindoor was planned, executed, and reviewed at the highest level, as it involved a subtle transition from a sub-conventional response to conventional military operations involving the Indian Army (IA) and Indian Air Force (IAF), with robust support from the Indian Navy (IN). It was predominantly a classic air campaign in which air power provided the winning punch.
Genesis of Theatre Commands
The genesis of theatre commands traces its roots back to the analysis of the Kargil War in 1999. In August 2023, the Indian Parliament passed a landmark bill advocating the establishment of theatre commands for the Indian Armed Forces. Traditionally, the Indian military has fought wars individually based on unifying their operational plans rather than jointly formulating operational plans. The result is a lack of efficiency and duplicity of efforts. The importance of synergy and jointness in any future network-centric and joint all-domain conflict cannot be overstated. While the bill’s passage signifies a crucial initial step, a lot of effort would be needed to iron out issues to operationalise theaterisation.
Presently, the Indian Armed Forces have 17 Individual service commands. Of these, the IA has seven commands, the IAF has seven and three belong to the IN. IA has six, IAF has five, and IN has two operational commands.
Creation of theatre commands commenced with the appointment of the first CDS, Gen Bipin Rawat, in January 2020. While many deliberations have taken place and progress has been made, the theatre commands have yet to materialise. It highlights the complexity of the process and the numerous variables and imponderables that need to be resolved before it bears fruit.
The duties and functions of CDS, as enunciated in the GoI document dated 3 February 2020, include “To bring about jointness in operation, logistics, transport, training, support services, communications, repairs and maintenance, etc. of the three Services.” And “Facilitation of restructuring of Military Commands for optimal utilisation of resources by bringing about jointness in operations, including through the establishment of joint/theatre commands.
The higher directions advocate jointness as the ultimate goal, and theatre commands as a means of achieving it. They do not necessarily direct the formation of theatre commands, should a better solution be found. The information available in the open domain indicates provision for three theatre commands, one each for the Western Front, Northern Front, and Peninsular Front, extending into the Indian Ocean region.
Broadly, the structure envisions theatre commanders leading operations within their Area of Responsibility (AoR). The Service Chiefs are envisioned to play only the role of Raise, Train, and Sustain, with no operational role in warfighting, a role they have been performing since independence.
Threats and Likely Future Operations
India faces multiple threats across the entire spectrum in all domains, ranging from sub-conventional, hybrid, and asymmetric threats to grey zone operations, minor incursions, and limited wars, as well as full-scale conflict. Both neighbours have repeatedly created situations necessitating the mobilisation of resources, ending in either a stand-off or limited kinetic action—the latest being Operation Sindoor. Current indications do not inspire confidence, and demand continued vigilance to address evolving situations.
Operation Sindoor, which is ongoing, has once again confirmed collusion between Pakistan and China and, to an extent, overt support from Türkiye. 81% of Pakistani military equipment is now from China, up 7% from 2019. Indications are that China extended both material support and provided services to Pakistan for the conduct of operations. Pakistan is now collaborating with both China and Türkiye on the development of fifth-generation fighter aircraft, modern drones, and weapons. China is likely to also assist in the Cyber and Space domains. The elevation of Gen Asim Munir to the rank of Field Marshal is a clear indication of continued Pakistani support of terrorism and their desire to avenge the punishment meted out by India.
Both China and Pakistan will closely study the outcomes of Operation Sindoor in formulating their future strategies. Operation Sindoor revealed close coordination and cooperation between Pakistan and China, indicating that both nations should be treated as a single entity. The regional dynamics suggest that any future conflict with either will likely involve the other, either directly or indirectly. Therefore, strategies, capabilities, and plans should cater to a two-front conflict, which more or less makes India a single theatre.
Any future conflict would involve Joint All Domain Operations, which are a step above multi-domain operations (JADO). JADO necessitates that all services operate in a synchronised manner, involving networks and employing resources from across the nation. This concept enables the effective utilisation of the strengths of every service rather than assigning service-specific responsibilities. A simple example is conventional IRBMs, which, when decided for induction, may reside deep inside the AoR of another theatre for centralised employment. Similarly, future fifth-generation fighters will have adequate range and weapons to address targets in a different theatre, strategic force multipliers like air refuelers and AEW&C also fall into the same category. JADO identifies the best solution from among the available solutions, thus enhancing efficiency and effectiveness. Splitting resources under such conditions may not be the most efficient way to deal with the evolving character of war. Executing JADO requires Joint All Domain Command and Control. Service Chiefs could provide it through their respective chains of command.
The rapid transition of conflict from sub-conventional to full-scale war would involve close interaction, coordination, and decision-making at the apex level. Operation Sindoor highlighted a whole-of-nation approach. It means that the war would be directed from Delhi rather than from Theatre Command HQs. Future conflicts would be fast, intense, and rapidly evolving, necessitating innovation and extensive iterations regarding scaling the operational tempo up or down, as well as decisions from the political leadership. It can be best executed from Delhi with all agencies and COSC in the loop.
Operation Sindoor once again underscored the existence of space for controlled conventional escalation under a nuclear hang. It allows for future conventional conflicts in a limited sense, which will be controlled by the political leadership for specific objectives so far as Pakistan continues to promote terrorism and against Chinese nibbling at territory along the LAC.
Takeaways from Operation Sindoor
Operation Sindoor was launched on 07 May 2025 to avenge the dastardly terror attack against innocent tourists involving a particular religion. This operation provided insight into the shape of future operations as it evolved from a counter-terror air and land operation into a controlled military operation involving all domains. It’s also the biggest tri-services operation after the 1971 war without formal mobilisation of all services, representing the changing character of conflict and the nation’s response to emerging threats and challenges.
The Prime Minister chaired numerous meetings in the run-up to and during the active phase of Operation Sindoor involving senior functionaries, including CDS and the three service chiefs. It indicates the close control being exercised and reviews taken during the planning and execution phase of the operation. It also demonstrates the government’s hands-on approach to calibrating military action and response across all domains. It can, therefore, be surmised that political leadership will remain intricately involved in military operations, which would necessitate the orchestration of operations from the national capital.
Operation Sindoor is a classic example of centralised planning and organising a campaign with decentralised execution in a synergised manner by the three services. The jointness was therefore achieved through coordinated planning at the service headquarters level and executed through joint operations by integrating networks and systems. Centralised command and control was the key. Additionally, the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) under the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) reviewed the progress of operations and made necessary adjustments. The operation also highlighted the strength of condensed chains of command exercised by all three services and the importance of the service chiefs leading operations. All available assets were efficiently employed to achieve the desired effect due to pan-India visibility and understanding of the progress of operations. Centralised planning and organisation also reduced the cyber and electronic footprint on communication channels between executors and national leadership, thus fostering secrecy.
The jointness during the operation was achieved through centralised planning, and the much-discussed Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) resulted from integrated networks that synergised the capabilities of the three services. It was certainly not because of the three services sitting and executing operations from a single ops room.
It clearly highlighted the importance of joint operations by synergising the core competencies of each service, fostering a common understanding of the nature of conflict, setting clear military objectives, and harnessing the strengths of each service. It has also proved that once the historical baggage is shed, then working together towards a common cause is easier to accomplish.
All this was achieved without the implementation of theatre commands. The primary difference between Operation Sindoor and all previous conflicts/ wars and operations was that they were planned in service-specific stove pipes with an attempt to marry them at the tactical level, whereas this time, the planning and coordination were done at the apex level, which allowed decentralised execution at the operational and tactical levels. A simple example is the targeting of the terror infrastructure using the most suitable platforms and weapons by the IAF and IA, something that was not conceivable a few years ago.
Requirements for Future Wars
India faces collusive threats from both its adversaries. While Pakistan can be handled with force and India holds an asymmetric advantage, China poses a principal threat due to its technological and military growth. As China competes with the USA, it builds capabilities which outpace India at current levels. China is learning fast and is filling the operational voids. It will continue to support Pakistan both overtly and covertly (military hardware overtly and Cyber, Space, EW and intelligence support covertly). It necessitates readiness on both fronts with the available resources. The most intense conflict in the Indian context would likely take place in the air and on the ground, with some offensive and deterrent roles in the maritime domain. India must, therefore, be considered as a single theatre to respond to future collusive threats.
To tackle this threat, India needs to have its full complement of authorised/ sanctioned equipment, expand space and counter space capabilities, and network all available systems and weapons into a redundant network with artificial intelligence solutions in targeting (Surface-to-surface and Air-to-surface weapons and platforms) and defending (IADS), develop a common operating picture for all domain awareness and air space management. It calls for integrating networks of the three services from strategic to tactical levels. Bringing in theatre commands would only add another layer to this effort, which may not be advantageous in a fast-evolving battle.
Pakistan also adopted an A2/AD philosophy using Chinese AD and Drone/surface-to-surface missile warfare. In any future conflict, China will likely do so multiple times. Strong Integrated AD, including a strong CUAS grid, needs to be developed, including reviewing the number of SAMs and ammunition required to counter an intense drone and missile strike against diverse targets. Directed Energy Weapons could be a choice of system to counter the drone threat.
There is a need to expand surface-to-surface missile capability with longer-range weapons to strengthen our long-range non-contact strike capability along with air-launched air-to-surface long-range precision weapons.
Cyber and Space will need to be scaled up many times for a collusive threat. It could be achieved by elevating the DSA and D Cy A to the status of independent tri-services commands.
Way Forward
The threats in the Indian context are unique since the Indian military is constantly responding to threats across the entire spectrum of conflict. Grey zone and hybrid operations are ongoing on a routine basis on both borders. The theatre command template adopted by various nations may not be suitable for India. India is, like, one of the theatres for the USA, especially given the collusion between China and Pakistan, which effectively renders India a single theatre since an integrated response should be ready while addressing threats emerging from one border. The collusion observed during Operation Sindoor lends support to this argument.
Is there a need for more jointness? Yes. Do present structures address those requirements? Perhaps not. Does Op Sindoor provide an insight into the kind of operations India could undertake in the future? Yes. Does the present proposal of theatre commands serve Indian warfighting needs for a future conflict? Perhaps not.
It is, hence, opined that there is a need to revisit the theatre command concept presently envisaged after the success of Op Sindoor. Op Sindoor has highlighted the importance of the service chiefs’ role in operations, the need for joint planning and organisation at the HQ level, and centralised planning with decentralised execution through joint structures at service HQs and other agencies. Command HQs of all three services are supported by redundant networks spanning from strategic to tactical levels. The repeated meetings held between the Prime Minister (PM) and the National Security Advisor (NSA), individually or together with the service Chiefs or the Chief of the Staff Committee (COSC), provide the decision-making template in the Indian context.
It is recommended that discussions on jointness focus more on aligning the areas of responsibility of all operational commands across the three services for both fronts. Build on the successes of the integrated AD system and joint planning for offensive and defensive operations to address future drone and missile warfare. Create a joint planning HQ with three-star reps and their staff under the COSC. Operationalise networks in a timebound manner for planning, execution and real-time flow of information for prompt decision-making at the strategic and operational levels. Speed up the formation of Cyber and Space commands. Review the manpower and resources required to address a collusive threat from a technological and future threat perspective.
Conclusion
Operation Sindoor has been a paradigm shift in the conduct of military operations by India. It highlighted the unique command and control complexities in a counter-terror operation escalating into military operations. It provides an insight into the shape of things to come in the future as India deals with a collusive threat spanning the full spectrum of conflict. Thus, India effectively becomes a single theatre. It also provides a deep insight into how operations would be conducted through regular meetings between the political and military leadership, which necessitates the presence of military leadership in the national capital and highlights the importance of service chiefs leading operations.
The unique disposition faced by India and the collusion between the two neighbours necessitates centralised command and control of resources, along with decentralised execution through the shortest chains of command and an efficient span of control. A study is hence essential in the backdrop of Operation Sindoor to review the proposed theatre command construct in the context of the likely contours of future conflicts and decision-making in the Indian context.
Air Marshal Ravi Kapoor (The author retired as Commander-in-Chief, Central Air Command in 2024)
More targets struck in Op Sindoor than revealed, claims Pakistan dossier
The intensity of India’s attack on Pakistan during Operation Sindoor has been unravelled in greater detail with Islamabad claiming that seven additional military bases were hit by India on May 9 and May 10.
It has issued tenders worth millions of dollars for the repair of its damaged military bases and replacement of some equipment.
A dossier issued by the Pakistan armed forces was shared with its strategic partners on May 18. It has been seen by Indian security agencies. The dossier on Pakistan’s Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos says India struck at least seven more targets that what was revealed earlier. Maps in the Pakistan dossier detail the strikes on Peshawar in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province; Jhang, Gujarat, Bhawalnagar and Attock in Punjab; and Hyderabad and Chhor in Sindh province.
These locations were not acknowledged as targets by Indian officials at any of its briefings held during or after the hostilities. The revelation by Pakistan means India struck at 18 places during Operation Sindoor from May 7 to 10. The attack on additional places like Peshawar or Hyderabad Sindh indicates the depth of the Indian strikes.
The Director General (Air Operations) of the IAF, in press briefings on May 11 and 12, had listed 11 airbases as targets. These were Nur Khan, Sargodha, Rafiqui, Murid, Sukkur, Sialkot, Pasrur, Chunian, Skardu, Bholari and Jacobabad.
On May 10, Pakistan had called up the US and then called up India seeking a cessation to the hostilities. The ceasefire was announced around 5.30 pm on May 10. Meanwhile, the Pakistan air force (PAF) has invited bids to carry out repairs at airbases and replace damaged equipment, including at Nur Khan, Jacobabad, Bholari, Sukkur, Sargodha, Masroor and Rafiqui. The collective expense runs into millions of dollars.
Tenders have been floated for the repair of aircraft such as JF-17 fighter jets and transport plane C-130, besides communication systems.
The PAF has issued tenders for civil works, equipment supply and vehicle and machinery repairs. This includes both maintenance and construction-related services.
Another tender is for various repair and procurement works, including the repair of items for DA-20 aircraft and AW-139 helicopters.
It also covers advanced vulnerability assessments, telecom works, procurement of digital radio systems and vehicle-mounted generators.
Included in the PAF tenders is the procurement of various sensors and repair of engines and hydraulically operated systems — used for missile launches or air defence.
3 Army personnel dead, 6 people including Lt Col Pritpal Singh Sandhu, his wife Squadron Leader Arti Sandhu (retd) and daughter Amayra Sandhu among 6 missing in Sikkim landslide.6 missing as landslide hits military camp at Chhaten in Sikkim
Rain-triggered landslide occurred near Lachen town in Mangan district
A very sad news is pouring in from North Sikkim. In a very major landslide,HQ 112 Bde has suffered many casualties. The details of dead bodies recovered so far includes that of L Nk Munish of 3 DOGRA My heartfelt Condolences to the families. May Jwala Mata accept the departed Souls in her Lotus feet. 🙏🙏🙏🙏 👇👇👇👇
update
landslide at Bde office area and CSD last ni between 2000-2100h
Hy rains the whole ni hence limited rescue Op could be done.
Sqn Ldr Aarti Sandhu (Retd), w/o Lt Col Pritpal Sandhu
Miss Amayra Sandhu, d/o Lt Col Pritpal Sandhu
Porter
Porter Abhishek Lakhada
Army personnel died and six soldiers went missing after a landslide hit a military camp at Chhaten in Sikkim, a defence official said on Monday.
The landslide, which occurred at 7 pm on Sunday near Lachen town in Mangan district, was triggered by heavy rainfall in the area, he said.“… A catastrophic landslide occurred following intense and continuous rainfall in the region causing death of three combatants, identified as Havaldar Lakhwinder Singh, Lance Naik Munish Thakur, and Porter Abhishek Lakhada,” the official said in a statement.
Bodies of the personnel have been recovered, while four other soldiers were rescued with minor injuries, the official said in a statement.“Rescue teams are working round the clock under challenging conditions to locate the six missing personnel,” he said.
Hear the pain of Air Force Chief , as to how Defence Forces are being Neglected by the Govt . Good to hear our Chiefs are living up to the High Moral Values of their ‘Responsibilities towards the Force they are Commanding .’
