Operation Sindoor, launched by India in response to the deadly Pahalgam terror attack that killed 26 civilians on April 22, 2025, has now been revealed to be far more expansive and strategically significant than initially acknowledged by Indian authorities. This new understanding comes from a confidential Pakistani dossier on its own military response, Operation ‘Bunyan un Marsoos’, which has come to light through multiple media reports and official briefings.

While Indian defence officials had publicly confirmed strikes on nine high-value terror hubs across Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK)—including the Jaish-e-Mohammed headquarters in Bahawalpur, the Lashkar-e-Taiba camp in Muridke, and sites such as Muzaffarabad, Kotli, Rawalakot, Chakswari, Bhimber, Neelum Valley, Jhelum, and Chakwal—the Pakistani dossier documents at least eight additional Indian airstrikes. These newly revealed targets include major urban and strategic locations: Peshawar, Jhang, Hyderabad in Sindh, Gujrat in Punjab, Gujranwala, Bahawalnagar, Attock, and Chor.

The Pakistani dossier, supported by maps and satellite imagery, lists the following additional locations as having been struck by Indian forces:

Bhagwant Mann’s sindoor remark sparks outrage from BJP leaders

Ruchika Khanna Tribune News Service

Punjab Chief Minister Bhagwant Mann on Tuesday mocked the BJP for distributing ‘sindoor’ (vermilion) in Ludhiana to mark the success of Operation Sindoor against Pakistan, asking if the saffron party had now started “one nation, one husband” scheme.

Mann was replying to a question about the BJP’s campaign for the Ludhiana West Assembly bypoll, which is scheduled for June 19. “If they distribute ‘sindoor’, which man will ask his wife to start using the ‘sindoor’ sent by Modi? I want to ask whether the BJP has started ‘one nation, one husband’ scheme?” he said.

Later, AAP spokesperson, Neel Garg, taking off from where Bhagwant Mann had left, said “The right to give sindoor to a woman is only with the husband, not with any political party. Has the BJP now got right over the sindoor of the women?” he asked.

His comments drew sharp criticism from various leaders, with BJP’s Pritpal Singh Balliawal called it “shameful”.“He is mocking Operation Sindoor. The BJP isn’t sending ‘sindoor’ to every household. Operation Sindoor was named so because terrorists killed Hindu tourists after checking their religion — they identified victims through the ‘sindoor’ on their wife’s forehead. The operation was about terrorism, martyrdom and the protection of Indian lives. A man who mocks the Army, insults veer naris and turns every sacred symbol into a joke will never understand the value of ‘sindoor’. It signifies sacrifice, love and devotion,” he said.

The concept of theatre commands does not meet the challenge of future multidomain warfare

Air Marshal Ramesh Rai (retd)

The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has conceptualised creation of integrated theatre command structures, as part of military reforms, in the belief that these will augur jointness augmenting our war fighting capability. Clearly his contention is that in the present arrangement we operate in silos and lack the ability to fight as an integrated force.

But in reality, the present structure has always worked in the face of the many challenges of various wars. Pakistan’s first attempt to occupy Kashmir in 1947-48 was blunted by close and effective cooperation between army and the air force. In 1965 Indo-Pak War, Indian Army plans were initially not known to the IAF, but later as the army asked for help, the coordination was complete. During the 1971 conflict, the planning process was joint from the word go and India conducted one of the most successful campaigns in history with the liberation of Bangladesh and surrender of 93,000 Pakistan soldiers, a feat unprecedented after WWII. Likewise, during the Kargil conflict, the Indian Army and Air Force combined remarkably well once the initial hiccups were resolved at the Chiefs of Staff Committee and threw back the intruders by integrated combat power application. Videos of Mirage aircraft firing laser bombs on Pakistani troops on Tiger Hill still roll in our minds bearing testimony to the army-air force combine. The army-air coordination in the ongoing imbroglio in Ladakh, bereft of any theatre structure is another example.

It seems rather strange that theatres are being conceived to force a combine on military personnel, merely on the belief that a compulsory merge would integrate forces and enhance war fighting potential. In his treatise, titled ‘Has it Worked-The Goldwater Nichols Act’, the author James R. Locher III, cites that problems of jointness exist even in integrated/ theatre command structures. Problems between Gen. Wesley K. Clarke, Commander Allied Force and Lt. Gen. Michael C. Short, Joint Air Force Component Commander affected campaign planning in the Kosovo operations even while under an Integrated Command Structure. Refusal of orders from Gen. Clarke by Gen. Michael David Jackson, Commander Rapid Reaction Force, had to be resolved after the Kosovo conflict. In Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan (March 2002), senior army commanders were widely criticised by their naval and air counterparts for not coordinating with them effectively even while under one command. The Indian armed forces have had a similar experience when during the IPKF operations in 1987, the army commander of the IPKF Unified Command elected to make a helicopter drop at Jaffna University, overruling the air force element’s advice of it being far too risky. Consequently, all helicopters were damaged, and a number of lives lost. These examples pointedly confirm that jointness is not implicit in an integrated command structure.

Integration implies merging of activities for warfighting by understanding concepts of joint warfighting, resolving doctrinal issues, clarity on roles and planning jointly for synergistic application of military power, as was demonstrated during the 1971 war. Joint planning requires knowledge and understanding of the core competencies of the other service and is a fundamental requirement irrespective of the structure we carve/ adopt/ retain. This is where the CDS ought to focus for evolving reforms. In his article titled ‘Theaterisation: Are We Ready’, Lt Gen. P.R. Shankar surmises that before we create theatre commands, we must increase ‘jointness’ between the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force. He opines that until aspects of joint training and staffing are sorted out, we will not get theatre commanders of value. He further adds that certain fundamental issues pertaining to the chain of command, communications, operational guidance and training if not clarified, are better off being where we are.

Restructuring the armed forces is a far-reaching reform with vast implications for national security. It requires due deliberation and foresight. According to Locher’s book mentioned above, the US department of defence debated the Goldwater-Nichols Act, 1986 (GNA) for re-organising the US armed forces and creating theatre commands, for four years and 241 days, a period longer than their involvement in World War II. They are already discussing whether GNA would adequately meet their 21^st century vision to shape, employ and combine future military forces with other instruments of national power or whether it warrants a reform. Likewise, we must discuss, debate and war game at length various re-structuring options to arrive at the most optimal structure that would meet the requirements to fight wars of the future and combine with other elements of national power. Commodore Uday Bhaskar, in his article titled ‘Don’t rush into unviable theatre commands with skewed structures’ has said that creation of theatre commands needs to be reviewed holistically and discussed objectively both in the Parliament and with professionals who can testify before select committees before embarking upon this restructuring.

Theatre commands work best with permanently allocated assets. While the army and the navy may have enough forces to be divided into various theatres, and yet remain an effective war fighting entity, the air force does not. The IAF’s strength is just about sufficient for a single front contingency. For a two-front war, the same assets will have to be multiplexed on both sides. Any, division by way of permanent allocation to theatres would render each theatre operationally weak in air power terms. This we cannot afford. An analysis of armed conflicts between the end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st century, unequivocally indicate the strategic significance of air power in achieving military aims. To win the air war, in a two-front contingency, we must retain the air force together in any new structure we evolve.

When Dr K. Subramanian, chairman of the Kargil Review Committee, was asked his opinion on creation of theatre commands, he responded by saying, 60 squadrons would be required for a theatre command structure. Considering that we are at a 30-squadron force level and may at best get to 45 in the next 20 years, any division would create an asymmetry in favour of the enemy, much to our peril.

Future wars would be multi-domain, multi-dimensional and hybrid in nature, with information dominance. In a two-front war, the hybridity could vary from a conventional war to a mix of regular forces intermeshed with irregular forces, with support of terrorists and insurgents, cyber intrusions, and possibly some dimension of social and economic warfare. Such hybridity would call for the war to be conceived, understood and orchestrated at the apex level though a framework that coordinates warfare in every domain. Hence, prior to evolving structures, we would require a complete re-cast of our military strategies, doctrines and operational concepts with cross domain synergy as the underlying fundament for an integrated response. Accordingly, the strategic thought for re-structuring should sprout from the idea of combining domains and not Services, a concept of the bygone era. More so, we must allow for the fact that Cyber, Space and Air domains would be dominant players in the future, and these have vast geographical disseminations which ought not to be limited to the small confines of a theatre.

Cross-domain synergy implies application of combat power between domains. The fundamental frame for such a concept is based on connectivity that provides netcentric warfare capability with operational data links (ODL) serving as the prime means for information, data, pictures, messages exchange and dissemination of orders on a near-real-time basis. The crux of integration will lie in designing ODL gateways to translate information and intelligence in content and context in line with our joint war fighting concept. This will be the core that integrates operations. The essence being that sensors, shooters and decision-makers from all domains are on the same communication grid. Commanders make joint decisions with the full operational picture and pass orders instantaneously to combine subordinate elements setting the pace and tempo of operations. A fifth-generation war structured on networked warfare concepts, networked thinking and application of networked combat power is where we should be headed. This will inherently set a mechanism to integrate and synergise application of combat power.

The Army organised a programme to support disabled soldiers in which they were presented with scooters. The Tiger Division at Jammu organised the event during which six modified scooters were donated by NGO War Wounded Foundation (WWF). An official spokesperson…

The Army organised a programme to support disabled soldiers in which they were presented with scooters. The Tiger Division at Jammu organised the event during which six modified scooters were donated by NGO War Wounded Foundation (WWF).

An official spokesperson said, “The programme was conducted on the initiative of Director North Zone, WWF. The war-disabled soldiers were identified with the help of the Indian Army. GOC Tiger Division presented the keys of the scooters to these soldiers.”

GOC of Tiger Division appreciated the services and dedication of the soldiers, who were injured in the line of duty. He mentioned that even after retirement, the soldiers are always ready to provide their services for the nation, as was evident during Operation Sindoor as well.

While serving in the Army, many soldiers are wounded in war/ during war-like situations. The injury reduces mobility of the soldier. To help such soldiers, WWF provides mobility equipment and other help to these soldiers. Till date, WWF has helped soldiers from J&K and Punjab with around 60 modified scooters, five auto-rickshaws, two electric wheelchairs, modification to bathrooms and help for marriage of their daughters. With this help, injured soldiers can move independently, carry out routine functions and develop self-confidence.

Brig Harcharan Singh (retd) thanked the Indian Army for conducting this event to help ex-servicemen. He informed the gathering about welfare schemes being run by WWF that are benefitting war-disabled soldiers residing in any part of the country.

Impractical Idea

India is not yet ready for joint theatre commands

Pravin Sawhney

The clamour for creation of two joint theatre commands – western theatre command for Pakistan and eastern theatre command for China – for better war-fighting has grown loud with senior serving military officers and, importantly, defence analysts (Business Standard, 14 July 2018) having jumped into the fray.

The Indian Air Force (IAF) is seen as the villain of the piece with the army and the navy in favour of the new structural reform for optimal war results. The IAF believes that given its limited assets, enormous flexibility inherent in aircraft, and that the military is for defence of the nation and not for out-of-area operations, expensive assets should remain centralised and not distributed to theatre commands. Cognisant of this internal bickering, defence minister Nirmala Sitharaman has taken a clever position by saying that while she liked the idea of joint theatre commands, she prefers a ‘bottom-up’ rather than a ‘top-down’ approach.

The basic argument of the army and navy is that the Indian military (three services) today have a total of 19 different commands which are neither co-located nor co-purposed. Since speed (in decision-making, allocation of resources and flexible operations) would be the essence in modern war, it is important that there should be only two commanders, one for each joint command theatre, instead of the present 19 which, given their prejudices, domain knowledge and so on, would end up as collective drag on speedy operations. Example is given of the Chinese military which has created theatre commands. Thus, against Chinese single Western theatre commander for India, the Indian military has three army (Northern, Western and Eastern), two air force (Western and Eastern Air Command) and one navy (Eastern Naval Command) commander-in-chiefs facing it.

To put this debate into perspective, the following three imperatives should be considered. One, modern warfare, which is driven by technology, has transformed in two ways. Instead of linear battlefields (either air-land, or air-sea), there are now six battle-fields whose optimisation would determine the war outcome. These are land, air, sea, space, cyber and electronic. Given these disparate battle-fields, the Chinese focus has shifted to non-contact war with limited or no loss of lives to own troops. China would use its stand-off, precision weapons including cruise missile, laser-bombs, armed unmanned aerial vehicles and so on for destruction, rather than fight soldier-to-soldier with the Indian Army. Given this situation, in India, the air force and not the army would lead the land war. This is not acceptable to the army chief, General Bipin Rawat, who recently said that the army should lead the land war. Thus, either the modern war is not understood by the army or there is a dogged attempt to resist drastic down-sizing of its bloated numbers.

Moreover, the desired outcome of military power by major powers (with nuclear weapons) is no longer deterrence or actual war-fighting, if deterrence fails. It is successful military coercion (compellence without fighting). However, if the compelling force is not credible, there are heavy costs to reputation of the coercing state. An example of unsuccessful military coercion is the 2001-2002 Operation Parakram initiated by India against Pakistan, where India withdrew its mobilised army without any gains after 10-months long face-off. On the other hand, the 2017 Doklam crisis between India and China which eventually led to Prime Minister Narendra Modi seeking peace with President Xi Jinping through the Wuhan understanding is an example of successful military coercion. India took the beating because its army mistook the land battlefield for war (total of different battlefields).

Major spy network dismantled; Ropar man was closely associated with Shakir alias Jutt Randhawa, a key figure in terror-backed espionage ring

In a major breakthrough, the State Special Operations Cell (SSOC) in Mohali has unearthed a significant espionage and terror-backed network involving Jasbir Singh, a YouTuber from Mahlan village in Rupnagar district.

Punjab DGP Gaurav Yadav, in a post on X, stated that Jasbir, who runs a popular YouTube channel named “Jaan Mahal,” has been found to have deep ties with individuals linked to anti-national activities.

Investigations revealed that Jasbir was closely associated with PIO Shakir alias Jutt Randhawa, a key figure in the terror-backed espionage ring.

Moreover, he maintained regular communication with Haryana-based YouTuber Jyoti Malhotra, recently arrested on charges of spying, and Ehsan-ur-Rahim alias Danish, a Pakistani national who was expelled from the Pakistan High Commission, the DGP said.

He said Jasbir attended the Pakistan National Day event held in Delhi on Danish’s invitation, where he reportedly met Pakistani Army officials and various vloggers connected to intelligence activities.

It was further discovered that Singh had travelled to Pakistan three times — in 2020, 2021, and most recently in 2024. His electronic devices, seized during the probe, contained numerous Pakistan-based contacts, all now undergoing detailed forensic scrutiny, the DGP said.

Following Malhotra’s arrest, Jasbir reportedly attempted to erase his communication records with the network members to avoid detection. An FIR has been registered against him at State Special Operations Cell, Mohali.

Investigations are ongoing to dismantle the broader espionage-terror network and identify all collaborators involved in these anti-national activities, Yadav added.

The advisory comes amid ongoing operations such as Operation Sindoor, where senior officers have gained public attention for their leadership roles

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) on Tuesday issued an advisory urging media personnel to refrain from intruding into the private lives of armed forces personnel and their families, and to avoid approaching them for news stories.

The advisory comes amid ongoing operations such as Operation Sindoor, where senior officers have gained public attention for their leadership roles. The ministry noted that this focus has, in some cases, extended beyond professional coverage to the personal lives of officers and their families.

“Media personnel have approached residences, contacted family members and pursued personal coverage unrelated to official duties. Such actions are deeply inappropriate and potentially compromise the dignity, privacy and safety of officers and their families,” the MoD said.

The ministry emphasised that while officers may serve in prominent public roles, their families remain private citizens and should be treated with respect and sensitivity.

Media outlets have been advised to avoid visiting or contacting the private residences or families of serving or retired armed forces personnel, unless expressly invited or cleared through official channels. Additionally, the publication or broadcast of personal details — such as addresses, family photographs, or other non-operational information — should be avoided.

The MoD encouraged the media to focus on the professional and operational aspects of the armed forces’ activities and leadership, and to avoid speculative or intrusive reporting.

The ministry acknowledged the important role the media plays in informing the public and fostering awareness about national security, and expressed appreciation for continued coverage of the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force.

The contributions include a dedicated ambulance, among other things

Tribune Web Desk

Quazigund Expressway Pvt Ltd and Athaang Jammu Udhampur Highway Pvt Ltd have jointly extended substantial infrastructure support to Sainik School Nagrota under the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) framework.

The contributions include a dedicated ambulance, among other things. The ceremonial handing-over event took place yesterday on the school campus. The assets were formally presented by Vamshidhar M, vice president, Athaang, and his team of officials to school principal Captain (IN) Shibu Devasia. The event was witnessed by cadets, staff and senior officials from both organisations.

In a press release, Capt (IN) Shibu Devasia said, “This generous support reflects the true spirit of nation-building. These assets will directly contribute to nurturing disciplined, responsible and future-ready leaders of the armed forces.”

Retired soldiers will be roped in for training the pupils, he said

Basic military training will be imparted to students from Class 1 in Maharashtra in a move to instill a sense of patriotism, discipline and promote the habit of regular physical exercise, state School Education Minister Dada Bhuse has said.

Retired soldiers will be roped in for training the pupils, he said.

“A decision has been taken to give basic level military training to students from Class 1. This will help inculcate love for the country, encourage habits like doing physical exercise regularly and discipline that will benefit the students,” Bhuse said.

Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis has responded positively to the proposal, he noted.

To implement the proposal, help of 2.5 lakh ex-servicemen will be taken along with sports teachers, National Cadet Corps (NCC), Scouts and Guides, the Shiv Sena minister added.

Special age relaxation of up to 3 years will also be provided to Agniveers applying for the posts

he Uttar Pradesh government on Tuesday decided to provide 20 per cent reservation for Agniveers in direct recruitment to several positions in the state police force.

The decision was taken at a cabinet meeting chaired by Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath.

Talking to reporters after the meeting, Finance Minister Suresh Kumar Khanna said the move aims to provide meaningful post-service opportunities to Agniveers, who have completed their four-year term under the Agnipath scheme.

“This is a significant decision. The reservation will be applicable across categories — general, SC, ST, and OBC. If an Agniveer belongs to the SC category, the reservation will apply within SC; if OBC, then within OBC,” he explained.

He added that special age relaxation of up to three years will also be provided to Agniveers applying for these posts.

There are four categories–constable police, constable PAC, mounted police and fireman –in which recruitment will be made.

The first batch of recruits under this system will come out in 2026, he said.

“Several states and central forces have already taken initiative to provide reservation to Agniveers. States like Haryana and Odisha have offered 10 per cent reservation to former Agniveers. The Uttar Pradesh Cabinet has now approved 20 per cent horizontal reservation, which is a bold and generous initiative,” Khanna said.

“This not only recognises their service but ensures they can continue contributing to the nation’s security infrastructure after their military stint,” he said.

The Centre introduced the Agnipath scheme in 2022 for short-term induction of personnel in the Army, Navy and Air Force with an aim to bring down the age profile of the three services.