Admn notifies 90 more time-bound delivery of services

Dushyant Singh Pundir

To strengthen citizen-centric governance, the UT Administration has notified time-bound delivery of 90 more services across various departments under the Punjab Right to Service Act as extended to the Union Territory. The services include 35 of the Estate Office, 24 of the Registering & Licensing Authority (RLA), eight of the Directorate of School Education, seven of the Directorate of Higher Education; six each of the Directorate of Ayurveda, Yoga & Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha & Homeopathy and Chandigarh Child & Women Development Corporation Limited; and two each of the Tourism Department and Chandigarh Transport Undertaking. The notification lays out the

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timelines, designated officers, first and second appellate authorities to ensure a quicker and more accountable public service delivery. The stipulated time limit fixed for delivery of services will start from the date of submission of application, along with the entire requisite documents complete in all respects. Each department head or the designated officer will serve as the nodal authority responsible for ensuring compliance with the Act.

According to the notification, the Estate Office will now give an NOC for sale/gift/ transfer of lease rights (uncontested) within 50 days; change of ownership/lease-hold rights on the basis of sale deed/gift deed/ transfer of lease rights (uncontested) in 30 days; transfer on any basis e.g. intestate death/registered/unregistered Will/court decree/family settlement, etc where issuance of public notice is required (uncontested) within 40 days. Change of ownership on any basis, e.g. intestate death registered/un-registered Will/court decree/family settlement etc on application after public notice (uncontested) will be carried out within 20 days.

Similarly, the Estate Office will issue No Dues Certificate (NDC) after depositing the dues, if any, within 15 days, conversion of property from leasehold to freehold within 35 days, change of partners in partnership firm after public notice within 20 days and conversion of property from shop-cum-flat (SCF) to shop-cum-office (SCO) within 30 days.

The Tourism Department has fixed seven-day deadline for giving permission for movie shooting and booking of the guest house.

Learner licence within one-day

The Registering & Licensing Authority (RLA) will now issue learner licence within one-day. The RLA has a timeline of 10 days for issuance of new driving licence, addition of another class of vehicle, renewal, issuance of a duplicate licence, change of address on the driving licence etc.

Similarly, the Chandigarh Transport Undertaking (CTU) has fixed a deadline of three days for bus passes issued at the ISBT-17 for sub-urban routes and five days for bus passes issued at Sampark Centres for other routes.

According to the notification, the Directorate of Higher Education will issue bona fide and character certificate within seven days. Similarly, Directorate of School Education will issue school leaving certificate within 10 days and duplicate certificate in 20 days.

Earlier, the administration had notified time-bound delivery of 182 services in December last year and 32 services in September. According to officials, more than 700 services of various departments have been brought under the Right to Service Act so far in the city.

The US military can seize the island, but it cannot compel others to share in whatever outcome follows

Carla Norrlof

The key question about Iran’s energy-export terminal on Kharg Island is not whether the United States can seize or disable it. Of course it can. The real issue is what happens afterwards, when the conditional logic that the US has applied to its alliances begins to shape allied behaviour in turn. When allies’ behaviour can no longer be assumed, American power becomes more constrained. The key variable is no longer what the US can do, but what costs others will be willing to bear. American primacy rested on a simple bargain — pay more, decide more, and allies follow. That bargain is broken.

Such is the problem now confronting US President Donald Trump’s administration. Kharg Island looks like the kind of target the world’s strongest military should be able to turn into leverage with relative ease. But difficult trade-offs would soon follow. Seizing and holding it would impose a sustained burden that allies would be expected to help carry, whereas destroying it would deliver a sharper, escalatory blow whose costs would be immediate, unevenly distributed, and concentrated among the partners most vulnerable to energy shocks. Both options rely on allied participation in different forms, and neither can be taken for granted.

Obviously, any serious disruption would cascade through global energy markets, tightening supply, driving up prices, and increasing shipping and insurance risks. But much of that sensitivity reflects the vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint for a significant share of global oil flows, where even limited disruption can affect supply expectations far beyond any single facility.

Kharg Island, by contrast, handles roughly 90% of Iran’s own oil exports (more than one million barrels per day), concentrating a significant share of supply at a single, exposed point. That concentration makes the island immediately visible to markets, which have already responded to the risk of escalation despite the continued flow of exports. War-risk premiums are increasing for tankers moving through the Gulf, raising the cost of transit even without sustained physical damage. Insurers are restricting or withdrawing coverage, and some shipments are being delayed or diverted, tightening effective supply at the margin and adding upward pressure on prices even before any sustained supply loss.

In the event of a disruption at Kharg Island, these effects would not be confined to Iran. They would be felt acutely in economies that depend on imported energy, most of which are already struggling to manage inflation and weak growth, with limited political room to absorb further shocks. Recent tanker data show how quickly these pressures fragment, with rates splitting sharply across allied routes by early March, revealing a fundamental asymmetry in how the shock is transmitted. For governments in Europe and across Asia, higher energy costs translate directly into domestic pressure, because they affect industrial competitiveness, household budgets, and political stability.

In earlier periods, those costs might have been willingly absorbed within the US alliance network. Though they would not have been evenly distributed, they would have been accepted as part of a shared strategic effort. Not anymore. What has changed is not simply the distribution of costs, but expectations about who will bear them, and uncertainty about whether they will be shared at all.

For years now, the US has treated alliances less as durable commitments than as arrangements to be publicly questioned and renegotiated. There have been repeated disputes over burden sharing within NATO, with US officials openly questioning Article 5 (mutual defence) commitments and publicly disparaging allied governments. As a result, security guarantees have become contingent commitments.

This change has prompted allies to hedge their bets by not automatically aligning themselves with the US during crises. The cumulative effect has been a shift in how allies think about what they can rely on in crises. Arrangements that were once organised around standing commitments are increasingly taking the form of situational coalitions. While selective autonomy on the part of US allies can work in some cases, if it becomes the default, coordination will splinter, producing uneven responses from one crisis to the next.

That is what we are now seeing. The shift to greater conditionality is shaping how all governments respond to geopolitical developments, with some US allies already limiting their involvement as the risks of escalation grow. In reducing their exposure, they weaken the expectation of coordinated allied action.

By concentrating both the potential benefits and the costs of action, Kharg Island brings this dynamic into sharper focus. Seizing it would increase pressure on Iran, but it would also redistribute strain across the coalition needed to sustain that pressure. The same move that generates leverage introduces risk, and that risk is distributed across the partners expected to bear it.

More broadly, moving from a system of assumed alignment to one that must be negotiated raises the political cost of collective action and weakens its strategic effect. Conditional alliances will not end all cooperation, but they make it more difficult to translate alignment into power on a predictable basis.

That is why Kharg Island — the “forbidden island” — matters. It is important not because it lies beyond American reach, but because it is tempting the US to pursue a course of action with consequences others may not be willing to shoulder. The US military can seize the island, but it cannot compel others to share in whatever outcome follows. The old message was clear: contribute more or the security guarantee weakens. The new one is just as stark: without agreement on the mission, allied support weakens.

The writer is Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2026.

www.project-syndicate.org

As US President threatens to bomb Iran into the Stone Age, Pezeshkian writes a letter

Gaddam Dharmendra

TWO contrasting messages were sent on April 1 by the principal protagonists of the ongoing war in West Asia. One was a much-anticipated speech by US President Donald Trump, while the other was a “Letter to American People” by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.

In a made-for-television address, Trump eventually had nothing new to say as he rehashed his social media posts and media comments. There was no mention of unblocking the Strait of Hormuz, under the chokehold of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGC-N), nor of inserting US ground troops, massed in their thousands across the region, into Iran.

The strait, through which one-third of global energy flows, remains under the IRGC’s control. Financial and commodity indices, monitored closely by Trump, are steadily trending upwards, while countries from Australia to Egypt are facing fuel shortages and shutdowns. The entire global economy is on edge, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicting a recession. Till date, Trump has been cleverly manipulating markets, aligning his comments to shape them. No longer, it seems. Stock markets are now moving more in line with battlefield developments rather than Trump’s comments.

Pezeshkian’s letter — penned in English, not Farsi — was circulated widely on social media. Given the country’s official stance of hostility towards the US, this is an unusual, perhaps even brave, message. Both sides have previously exchanged letters at the highest levels, but such a public outreach by a sitting Iranian President has no historical precedent. After all, the two countries broke off diplomatic ties in 1979 following the kidnapping of US diplomats stationed in Tehran. Pezeshkian is now seeking to set the record straight on Iran-US relations, that these were “not originally hostile”, and goes on to lay the blame for the current conflict entirely on the US and Israel.

Pezeshkian’s plea is mature and subtly goes beyond a US audience. He addresses the world by saying that attacking Iran’s vital infrastructure constitutes a war crime, that these “generate instability, increase human and economic costs, and perpetuate cycles of tension, planting seeds of resentment that will endure for years”. Chronologically, it needs to be noted, Iran’s strikes on infrastructure in the region, as opposed to military targets, were usually reactive and not proactive.

In his address, Trump doubled down on a globally unpopular war. He appeared reasonable while simultaneously renewing his trademark threats, declaring, “We are going to hit them (Iran) extremely hard over the next two to three weeks. We are going to bring them back to the stone ages where they belong. In the meantime, discussions are ongoing… We have all the cards; they have none.”

An unfazed Iran, confident that it currently holds the upper hand, taunted US troops to “come closer”. One Iranian analyst succinctly noted that an aerial assault from 36,000 feet is vastly different from “manly” combat at six feet.

Trump’s address is also replete with contradictions. He claims completion of “core strategic objectives”, but elsewhere in the same address, he says that “we will continue until our core objectives are fully achieved”. This contradiction is deliberate, not random.

It is directed at a target audience of critical importance to him, electorally and financially. The former is an increasingly nervous MAGA base, which he has assuaged by saying “we are winning, bigly”. The latter is a band-aid, a placebo, to the six Persian Gulf countries witnessing, in real time, the devastation of the entire foundations on which their economies were built.

The US President’s coarse and insulting language towards Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the Kuwaitis simplifies complex issues to a populist base unconcerned with niceties.

Trump is essentially signalling a further escalation, which could last several more weeks. In recent days, the US and Israel have sharply expanded their bombing campaign, going beyond military targets to strike at the very heart of Iran’s society and industrial base. They have bombed two of Iran’s steel plants, a pharmaceutical factory, civilian installations, gymnasiums and residential areas. The Mobarakeh steel plant in Isfahan is, in fact, the largest in West Asia. As one analyst describes it, “Steel sits at the core of infrastructure, construction and industrial circulation. Damage it, and the effects cascade far beyond one sector”.

The US President is not merely wreaking havoc but is seeking to shape a post-war Iran, ensuring that its economic recovery and reconstruction will be long and painful. As such, his rhetoric needs to be taken with deadly seriousness. Clearly, “regime change” is no longer on the US-Israel agenda, but wishing to send Iran back to the “Stone Age” is playing itself out before the entire world. This is an assault on a people who just two months ago were, quite ironically, assured by Trump that “help is on its way”.

Trump is also casually papering over a military quagmire into which he has drawn the entire US CENTCOM (Central Command), and, for us in India, the US PACOM (Pacific Command), a theatre of vital importance. US military assets are being relocated from East Asia to replenish the losses in West Asia. Till date, the Iranians have destroyed half a dozen THAAD radar systems, decapitated the US’s most complex radar array at the Al-Udaid base in Qatar and with pinpoint precision destroyed E3 Sentry surveillance aircraft, KC 135 air refuelling tankers and other surveillance aircraft. This is just a small inventory of what the Iranians have managed to destroy, apart from the devastating damage inflicted on US bases.

Meanwhile, ongoing mediation talks, being brokered by Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, don’t appear to be making much headway. So also is the Pakistan-China “5-point initiative”. The latter is heavy on optics and light on substance, a classic diplomatic feint, which will please none and achieve nothing.

The reality is that the US and Iran are locked in maximalist positions. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi made this abundantly clear, saying that Iran has neither been consulted nor is it in any way engaged in the mediation. Araghchi also says these are not negotiations but merely an exchange of messages.

He rejected any claims of a ceasefire, saying that Iran seeks a complete and perpetual cessation of all hostilities and compensation for damages. The danger, as always with the Iranians, is their tendency to overplay their hand and not know when to fold their cards.

Brig Prahlad Singh Chairman Sanjha Morcha motivating student to join armed forces : Sujanpur

SARDARNI MEHAR KAUR W/O COL SHAMSHER SINGH DHANOA: ANTIM ARDAS

Obituary Col Gurdial Singh :Antim Ardas on 04 Apr 2026: Gurdwara Sahib Sector 34A:Chd

Modern warfare exposes India’s defence shortcomings

The future battlefield is defined by hypersonic missiles, swarm drones, electronic warfare and artificial intelligence.Lt Gen (retd) Harwant Singh

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55 ENGR REGIMENT : ATTENDED ANTIM ARDAS

STANDING BEHIND SOL SS DHANOA : HAVING LANGER :SEATED IN FRONT

L TO R—Brig Amarjit Singh, Col Charanjit Singh Khera, Maj Gen Manmohan Singh, Col Tajinder Singh Sandhiu, Col Paraminder Nirwal , Col Om Prakash, Col Harbinder Singh .

Col Parminder Nirwal drove down from Jullundur (140Km) to attend the antim ardas : Regiment and Bengal sappers spirit

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Colonel Gurdial Singh (The Bengal Sappers), 1971 war veteran, mentor to the golfing community and Secretary SEPTA, Chandimandir for more than 20 years.cremated on 28th March 2026.

Condolences on text/whatsapp may be conveyed to

Mrs Nargis G Singh, 9316441063

Major Navdeep Singh, Senior Advocate, High Court 9316132817

Navjosh Singh, 9814210900

What an irreplaceable loss of a sterling human being and an ace golfer & creator of golf courses. He never bothered which course he was working for he simply loved to create unique golf courses. He was instrumental in creating / assisted to create golf courses in Chandimandir, Roorkee, Assam where created a new course from scratch for the Governor.
As a human he was a humble, big hearted person who was always ever ready to help others in whatever form the help was required. Col. Gurdial will be sorely missed & so will be his legacy & magnanimity. He was self motivated, tireless, dedicated soul. He was also instrumental in creating our Faujeshwar Enclave in Roorkee.
May his soul rest eternally in peace. JAI HIND
Brig Sewak S. Sidhu- one of admirers of Col. Gurdial Sing

The future battlefield is defined by hypersonic missiles, swarm drones, electronic warfare and artificial intelligence.

Lt Gen (retd) Harwant Singh

INDIA’S security environment has never been more demanding. To the west, Pakistan, now armed with fifth-generation Chinese aircraft, cyber support and satellite intelligence, continues its policy of a thousand cuts. During Operation Sindoor, China provided Pakistan with real-time ground intelligence. Pakistan has also concluded a defence pact with Saudi Arabia and maintains strong ties with both the US

To the north, Indian and Chinese troops remain deployed along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). China occupies parts of Indian territory in Ladakh and covets the Karakoram Pass for a direct link with the Shaksgam valley above the Siachen Glacier. Opposite Arunachal Pradesh — which China continues to claim and is also giving Chinese names to Indian villages and towns — Beijing has constructed a large number of villages along the LAC.

Meanwhile, Nepal is increasingly coming under Chinese influence. China is building a railway line to Kathmandu as part of the Belt and Road Initiative and has pressured Nepal to claim Kalapani and parts of Uttarakhand in order to control the Lipulekh Pass — which overlooks the Chinese road in Tibet — despite the long-recognised border running along the Kali Ganga.

The neighbourhood picture is equally troubling. The Agnipath scheme has led to Nepalese Gorkhas no longer joining the Indian Army; they may soon be absorbed into the Chinese military. Bhutan is leaning towards China. So too are Bangladesh and Myanmar, both of which have long received Chinese military equipment. In Sri Lanka and the Maldives, China has established a firm foothold.

China has built a significant presence in the Indian Ocean through what is widely described as a ‘String of Pearls’ — a network of commercial and military ports designed to secure energy routes and expand Beijing’s geopolitical influence. These include Kyaukphyu in Myanmar, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Gwadar in Pakistan and Djibouti at the Horn of Africa. China now commands the largest navy in the world.

A country’s strategic environment has a direct bearing on its security requirements; India is today surrounded by hostile or compromised neighbours.

India’s defence allocation for FY2025-26 stands at approximately Rs 7.85 lakh crore. While capital expenditure has grown and 75% of acquisition funds are now reserved for domestic procurement, the structural weight of pensions — at nearly 22% of the total — continues to constrain modernisation. It is worth noting that age and physical fitness eligibility thresholds for serving personnel have also risen; a corresponding increase in the retirement age for soldiers to 42/45, and for junior commissioned officers and officers by two years, would reduce the pension burden while retaining experienced manpower.

The Agnipath scheme, conceived as a solution to the rising pension burden, has instead damaged unit cohesion and regimental spirit. As many as 50% of the Agniveers who feel they cannot make it to the 25% to be retained lose all interest, while in the remaining 50%, there is cut-throat competition to be retained.

India’s efforts at indigenisation under the ‘Make-in-India’ initiative have made limited progress. The country still imports close to 75% of its defence equipment. The engine for its 4.5-generation fighter aircraft is imported. Even small arms continue to be sourced from Russia. This is particularly alarming given that China is already developing sixth-generation fighter aircraft.

Make-in-India cannot succeed unless significantly better talent is inducted into research and development and substantially greater funds are allocated to it. Several private companies have taken up government defence contracts without any genuine R&D capability — some are merely importing equipment from abroad and assembling it in India. This is not indigenisation; it is relabelling.

The lessons of recent conflicts demand urgent attention. Operation Sindoor, the Russia-Ukraine war and the evolving Israel-Iran confrontation share a common lesson: warfare has been transformed. The future battlefield is defined by hypersonic missiles, swarm drones, electronic warfare and artificial intelligence.

Instead of preparing for this kind of future, India risks equipping itself for the last war — seeking amphibious light tanks rather than elite precision-guided drones and hypersonic missiles.

Fighter aircraft and main battle tanks face existential threats from missiles and drones; their primacy on the modern battlefield is being fundamentally challenged.

India’s defence budget, while growing in absolute terms, remains structurally inadequate. The country’s strategic environment has never been more complex, nor the cost of complacency more consequential.

A credible, enduring military strategy demands three simultaneous commitments: first, a sustained increase in defence allocation to at least 3% of the GDP; second, a genuine investment in indigenous R&D — not assembly lines but design capability, with the DRDO funding doubled and deep linkages built between research institutions, private innovators and the armed forces; and third, a strategic diplomacy that arrests the drift of Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan and the Maldives into China’s orbit before it hardens into permanent encirclement.

Incremental allocations, short-tenure soldiers and imported weapons assembled under an Indian label are not a defence policy — they are a deferred catastrophe.

The authorities stated that the change had been made keeping in view the changing weather conditions and daylight hours

The timing of the iconic retreat ceremony at the Attari-Wagah joint check post at the Indo-Pakistan border in Amritsar has been revised.

The daily ceremony, which draws thousands of spectators from across the country and abroad, will now be held from 5:30 pm to 6:00 pm.

Earlier, the ceremony used to begin at 5:00 pm and conclude by 5:30 pm. The authorities stated that the change had been made keeping in view the changing weather conditions and daylight hours.

The new timing has come into effect from April 1.

The retreat ceremony, jointly conducted by Indian Border Security Force and Pakistan Rangers, remains a major attraction for both tourists and locals, showcasing discipline, coordination and patriotic fervour.

The treatment of SSC officers post-release raises uncomfortable questions of policy, equity and national foresight.

Lt Col Gurprakash Singh Virk retd

INDIA’S armed forces are one of the most respected institutions in the nation, built on discipline, sacrifice and honour. Yet, within this proud structure exists a silent contradiction — one that affects thousands who once wore the uniform under the Short Service Commission (SSC). Their contribution is unquestionable, but their treatment post-release raises uncomfortable questions of policy, equity and national foresight.

If the country is to optimise both its military strength and socio-economic potential, Short Service must be reimagined — not as a temporary arrangement, but as a strategic national asset. The issue is neither new nor unknown. Since the promulgation of Army Instruction AI 11/S/64, which ambiguously stated that “pension under consideration orders will be issued separately”, a policy vacuum has persisted. For over six decades, this assurance has remained largely unfulfilled, leaving SSC personnel in a state of uncertainty.

This gap has not gone unnoticed. Courts, including the Supreme Court and various high courts, have increasingly been called upon to intervene. Recent judicial pronouncements — particularly those granting relief by notionally treating certain categories as deemed to have completed 20 years of service — have exposed the deeper malaise. These judgments reflect prolonged executive inaction.

The core issue is not limited to gender or specific cases. It is a systemic neglect of the SSC cadre itself.

Short Service entrants volunteer in the prime of their youth. They undergo the same rigorous training, carry the same responsibilities and face the same operational risks as their permanent commission counterparts. For five, 10, or 14 years, they serve with unwavering commitment.

Yet, upon release, they step into an uncertain civilian landscape — often without pension, without full healthcare benefits and without a structured resettlement pathway. The absence of these basic assurances creates financial insecurity as well as a sense of institutional indifference.

One of the starkest manifestations of this disparity is in the access to the Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS). While regular retirees enjoy comprehensive healthcare coverage, SSC veterans often face restrictions or exclusion. This has led to ongoing litigation, including writ petitions in high courts.

Healthcare cannot be selectively granted. It is an extension of the nation’s obligation to those who have served. Any deviation from this principle undermines both constitutional values and institutional credibility.

A common argument against extending pensionary benefits to SSC personnel is fiscal burden. However, a closer examination reveals the opposite. Regular commission personnel typically serve 20 years or more and draw pension for life. In contrast, SSC personnel serve for shorter durations and then transition into civilian careers, where they continue to contribute economically through taxes, enterprise and professional engagement.

Granting pro-rata one rank one pension (OROP) to SSC personnel would involve a lower per capita pension outgo while generating long-term economic gains. It creates a dual-benefit model — reduced pension liability and increased national productivity. In essence, the SSC becomes not a cost centre, but a force multiplier.

Perhaps the greatest strength of the SSC model lies in its potential to produce disciplined, skilled and motivated individuals at a relatively young age. Released in their 30s or early 40s, they are ideally positioned to contribute meaningfully in civilian sectors. From corporate leadership to public administration, from entrepreneurship to internal security, their training and experience are invaluable. Yet, in the absence of structured support, much of this potential remains underutilised.

A well-designed resettlement framework can transform this transition into a national advantage.

India lacks a comprehensive legal structure to address the resettlement and welfare of Short Service personnel. Existing schemes are fragmented and lack enforceability. An armed forces resettlement and welfare Act is needed — one that provides statutory backing to key provisions, such as:

•  Pro-rata OROP for all SSC personnel
•  Universal and non-discriminatory access to ECHS
• Structured resettlement programmes aligned with national employment policies
• Lateral entry into government and public sector roles
• Recognition of military rank and experience in civilian hierarchies

Such a framework would ensure fairness and enhance institutional efficiency.

Beyond policy and economics lies a more fundamental issue — the moral contract between the nation and those who serve it. When a young individual joins the armed forces, there is an implicit assurance of dignity, fairness and respect — not just during service, but also beyond it. Any perception of neglect erodes this trust and, by extension, affects morale and motivation.

The growing discontent among SSC veterans calls for introspection and corrective action. The transformation of Short Service into a national asset requires a shift in perspective. It demands that policymakers move beyond incremental adjustments and adopt a holistic approach.

Key steps in this direction include:

• Addressing the long-pending ambiguities of AI 11/S/64
•  Extending pro-rata pensionary benefits
• Ensuring parity in healthcare and welfare schemes
• Institutionalising resettlement through legislation
•  Recognising SSC personnel as equal stakeholders in national defence

These measures are not radical — they are rational. The need for a youthful, agile military force is matched by the need for skilled human capital in the civilian domain. The SSC model, if properly structured, can serve both objectives. It can provide the armed forces with flexibility and vitality while simultaneously enriching the civilian workforce.

Military rank and honour earned during Short Service should be a lifelong asset, not a post-service liability. Those who have worn the uniform, even for a limited tenure, carry with them values that the nation cannot afford to overlook. It is time to move from ad hoc measures to institutional reform and from ambiguity to assurance.

Making Short Service a national asset is not just in the interest of those who serve; it is in the interest of India itself.