India’s joint air defence show was a masterclass — calculated, cohesive and coordinated.

Lt Gen SS Mehta (Retd)

N the swirl of claims and counterclaims after Operation Sindoor, the truth was quietly sidelined. Pakistan trumpeted tales of downed Indian aircraft and heroic resistance. Its military-run media machine — an expert in psychological optics — spun a victory narrative. Then came the grand spectacle: Gen Asim Munir was promoted to Field Marshal. His reward for green-lighting the Pahalgam attack. Now he shoulders it.

But here’s the core reality:

This was a campaign of manoeuvre, not attrition, aimed squarely at the enemy’s will. Pakistan sued for peace before it truly began. Every time its terror gambit faces consequences, Pakistan retreats into spectacle — missiles dodged, jets downed, heroic last stands. These are illusions crafted for a public long held captive by a military-first state. An army with a nation.

What happened instead:

Assaults on Indian territory repulsed to a nick. The joint air defence show was a masterclass — calculated, cohesive and coordinated. A message that should be comprehensively etched by those who dream of aerial mischief.

Wars are not won by trending hashtags or by giving state funerals to terrorists draped in military honour. They are won when the enemy’s core infrastructure is struck — when 11 airfields go dark in one precise operation. That’s when backchannels flare to life. Not out of strength, but out of the fear of ‘what next?’

As the CDS observed, there was no nuclear sabre-rattling, no call, no warning.

— No civilian casualties.

— No escalation into population centres.

— Yet, airfields, logistics hubs and launch pads were struck with precision.

Then Pakistan’s DGMO reached out — not under global pressure, but because India changed the rules.

A military doctrine in motion

A military truism: No plan survives first contact with the enemy. Op Sindoor was no different. But what followed was more telling. Tactical adjustments were immediate. Operational responses required coordination across commands. Strategic recalibration demanded clarity and speed. Op Sindoor demonstrated all three.

From the frontline to airbases to the highest military echelons, each platform and level of command acted with coherence and control. It was professionalism in motion across the full chain of command. An early glitch, observed and corrected, became a turning point.

Yet, even as India recalibrated in real time, adversaries rushed to declare victory — triumphalism based on partial facts, amplified by platforms that never asked what happened next. Within hours of claiming dominance, Pakistan lost operational use of 11 airfields. Silence replaced bluster. Propaganda gave way to paralysis.

Op Sindoor demonstrated what 21st-century military doctrine must aim for: low-cost, high-impact outcomes that preempt escalation. The operation became a lesson in calibrated deterrence — timed, targeted and entirely within the thresholds of responsible force.

Conflict termination: The Indian model

Across the modern battlefield, wars begin easily — but rarely end. Vietnam lingered. Iraq fractured. Afghanistan collapsed. Russia-Ukraine drags on. Gaza remains a wound with no closure. Great powers dominate airspace — but fail at ending wars. India has done it twice.

In 1971, 30,000 entrenched Pakistani soldiers in Dhaka surrendered to 3,000 Indian troops on the move. The ratio was 10:1. In all, Pakistan capitulated in 13 days. Ninety thousand PoWs. It was victory of mind over matter — manoeuvre over attrition. Not conquest, but conclusion.

Now in 2025, Operation Sindoor — executed in 88 hours — had a conflict-terminating objective: Dominate the escalatory space. India enforced consequences, then chose restraint. In both cases, India didn’t just fight well — it ended well. That is the rarest art in strategy.

Why did India control escalation? Because Pakistan’s instability is manufactured — not accidental. The world knows it. Neighbours definitely do. Yet the myth continues — sustained by fear, denial and spectacle. Nations do not rise on martyrdom or manipulated memories. They rise when people refuse to be misled. When the public ceases to serve the lie, truth finds its place. Until then, silence fuels the cycle.

Instability as leverage: The real game around Pakistan

For years, Pakistan’s volatility has been treated not as a threat — but as a tool. China, Pakistan’s long-time patron, benefits from an India constantly drawn into reactive postures. A distracted India suits Beijing’s strategic aims — from Ladakh to the Indian Ocean. The United States, despite long acknowledging Pakistan’s duplicity, still sees its military as a useful conduit — whether for regional optics, minerals or access to Afghanistan. Even multilateral institutions and segments of the Western press hedge their bets.

Pakistan’s military curates victimhood while incubating instability — and the world, knowingly, plays along. In this global theatre, Pakistan has become a proxy — not just for terror, but for transactional diplomacy. And India, for too long, bore the cost alone.

Op Sindoor changed that. Not by shouting, but by showing.

India cannot talk to proxies. But the people of Pakistan can choose not to be used. Upright, clean governance begins not with outsiders — but with a nation’s own citizens telling their Army: “Serve, do not rule. Integrate, do not destroy.” Because a puppet on a string may entertain the world, but it only dances for the puppeteer. When the show ends, it is the people who pay the price.

The Indian doctrine: Clarity, not conquest

India’s strategic posture has evolved. We are no longer reactive. We respond — precisely, proportionally and with purpose. Operation Sindoor reflects a mature doctrine — no overkill, yet enough to alter behaviour. No spectacle, yet enough to jolt Rawalpindi. A war won before it escalated. India doesn’t need to destroy Pakistan to deter it. We only need to show we can — but choose not to.

This is strength with conscience. This clarity, this blend of capability and restraint, makes India’s calibrated deterrence credible in ways brute force never could. When adversaries cannot predict you, and allies cannot second-guess you, a new equilibrium emerges — one in which India is assertive, yet aligned with its values.

The war before the war

Op Sindoor wasn’t about platforms or payloads. It was about clarity, initiative and control. In a world where wars drag on — inflicting brutal costs on civilian men, women and children — India has offered a different model: Manoeuvre over attrition.

Where others fight to exhaust, we act to conclude. Where others escalate into chaos, we calibrate for stability. And just like Dhaka, the enemy blinked — not after the war began, but before it could.

Let the record show: India won the war before the war — while the nations of the world watched. Some nervously. Others knowingly. But all, now, undeniably aware.

Lt Gen SS Mehta (Retd) is ex-Western Army Commander and Founder Trustee, Pune International Centre.

Pakistan has been in the Grey List three times, the last being in 2018

Aditi Tandon Tribune News Service

Opposition Congress on Thursday slammed as unacceptable the naming of Pakistan as the vice-chair of the 15 member UNSC counter terrorism committee.A day after Pakistan was appointed the vice-chair of key 1988 Taiban Sanctions Committee, which enforces freeze on assets, arms embargos and travel bans on terror outfits and their leaders, Congress President Mallikarkun Kharge termed the development as ill informed.

“The naming of Pakistan as the vice-chair of the 15-member United Nations Security Council’s Counter Terrorism Committee and chair the Taliban Sanctions Committee for 2025 is most unfortunate, ill-informed and unacceptable.  The international community must see merit in India’s case that Pakistan should be included back in the FATF grey list for monitoring of its terror financing,” Kharge said.

He said Pakistan was first included in the FATF grey list after India’s diplomatic efforts under PM Dr Manmohan Singh in 2008 and then again in 2012.Pakistan has been in the Grey List three times, the last being in 2018.

“Making Pakistan accountable for its sins is a necessity not just for India, but for the interests of the international community. It is perhaps worth remembering that the most wanted terrorist – Osama Bin Laden responsible for 9/11 was found and eliminated in Pakistan. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the chief planner of 9/11 was also a Pakistani,” said the Congress chief.

He said as a responsible Opposition party, Congress urges the government to take appropriate and resolute diplomatic actions to de-hyphenate India and Pakistan on the global stage.

“The Indian National Congress exhorts the international community to understand and support India’s stand on terrorism emanating from Pakistan. Pakistan is the perpetrator of terror. India is a victim of terror. They cannot be equated. They should not be hyphenated,” Kharge said in a statement.

He said IMF, ADB, and World Bank sanctioning or deciding to sanction loans and bailout packages shall only increase Pakistan’s military expenditure, which its rogue Army uses to unleash terror on Indians.

India has opposed extension of loans to Pakistan by top global financing agencies including the IMF and ADB.

India is also preparing to submit a dossier for returning Pakistan to the FATF grey list.

The FATF meeting is due this month.

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Revisit Theatre Commands After Success of Operation Sindoor

More targets struck in Op Sindoor than revealed, claims Pakistan dossier

Operation Sindoor was in response to a cross border terrorist attack at a place close to Pahalgam in Kashmir valley where 26 Indians were mercilessly killed. The concerned terrorists from across the border had come deep inside the valley and later seem to have made good their escape. For India it was a major intelligence failure and security lapse for which accountability is yet to be fixed and appropriate action initiated against those responsible for this failure. Also Read – Fragmented Reflections On The “Time of Monsters” Earlier India had carried out retaliatory operations in the form of surgical strikes against terrorist launch pads and bombed terrorist camps at Balakot. Operation Sindoor was enlarged in response to the terrorist attack at Pahalgam. It included strikes on nine known terrorist centers, some deep inside Pakistan and some military infrastructures. During this operation, drones and missiles were extensively used. Also Read – The History And Geo-Politics Of The Rohingya Crisis India’s air defence systems performed extremely well and troops displayed appropriate skill in handling high-tech military equipment. Much of the equipment with Pakistan was from China. While India did hit designated targets, Pakistan’s success lay in shelling Indian villages in Jammu and Kashmir and inflicting large scale civilian casualties. Pakistan also claimed knocking down Indian fighter planes. The precise figures of casualties on either side are not known. Nor has the full extent of damage to military assets on either side been disclosed. Also Read – India Must Use Investigation To De-Hyphenate Pakistan We have to wait and see if this operation is enough to dissuade Pakistan from continuing with cross border terror attacks and give up its policy of ‘thousand cuts’ against India. Going by the past record and Pakistan army Chief’s recent statement, it is less likely for Pakistan to refrain from this nefarious activity, more so when China would be encouraging it to continue to engage India in cross border conflict. Also Read – India Launches F-32 ! In response to the next terror attack, as and when it takes place, India’s response, in all probability will be substantially enhanced from that of Op Sindoor. If it turns out to be so, then the possibility of the conflict getting enlarged is very much there. India needs to determine in realistic terms the Red Line, which when crossed, may tempt Pakistan to reach for the nuclear button. Pakistan must realize the outcome of a nuclear conflict and its end result. While India feels that enough damage has been done to selected targets, Pakistan too has been claiming that it adequately dealt with the Indian offensive action. In recognition of the Pakistan army’s performance, its army chief, General Asim Munir has been promoted to the rank of Field Marshal. That apart, what should be of concern to us is the world at large did not stand by India in this brief conflict. On the other hand, four to five countries openly supported Pakistan, and some even supplied military equipment. All this does reflect on the success of our foreign policy, more so when reviewed in the light of the fact that we do not have adequately friendly relations with any of our immediate neighbors. Our Foreign Minister, before the launch of Operation Sindoor warned Pakistan about our attack on terrorist centers and advised its military not to get involved in this action by India. Later he changed his statement to say that he warned Pakistan of this attack after 15 minutes (later he shifted this time to 30 minutes ) of its launch. Perhaps this is his idea of good diplomacy and not knowing that it is a serious breach of security which perhaps resulted in the escape of some terrorists from these centers and put in danger the safety of our aircrafts and lives of our pilots. Leader of Opposition, Rahul Gandhi has raised this issue in one of the national newspapers. We have now dispatched a number of teams consisting of MPs to various countries to brief them on Pakistan’s terrorist activities and the compulsions for India to launch Operation Sindoor. It is merely a case of shutting the gate after the horse has bolted. The credit for Operation Sindoor’s suspension within three days is being claimed by the American President, Donald Trump and his staff, who alleged to have worked overnight, speaking to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan to terminate hostilities. Trump also proposed to resolve the Kashmir problem between the two countries. Further he had threatened India that he would otherwise close trade with it. On the other hand the Indian leadership maintains that agreement for the ceasefire was reached between the Director General Operations ( DGMOs) of the two countries and later approved by the respective governments. India ruled out the American President’s offer to help resolve the Kashmir problem. As for India, there is no such thing as the Kashmir problem. The problem, if any, relates to Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. ( PoK) The issue that needs looking into is whether Pakistan will give up its policy of staging terrorist attacks against India. What one must realize is that Pakistan’s army’s existence in its present state is related to maintaining hostile relations with India. If relations between India and Pakistan become friendly to the extent that the possibility of any conflict between these countries does not exist, then there can be no rationale for Pakistan to have such a large army and its consequent heavy strain on the country’s economy. Added to this is the China factor. China wields great influence in Pakistan and would make sure that relations with India remain strained. Therefore, in all probability Pakistan will continue with its policy of thousand cuts against India. Some months later Pakistan may stage a major terrorist attack and then be fully ready to deal with Indian reaction. China will keep giving more and more high tech military equipment to Pakistan. China would strive to strengthen the Pakistan Air Force. In the event of conflict with India, China’s support to Pakistan will mainly be in cyber, information and supply of weapons, ammunition and equipment. The point is that in such a situation what should India do! Should it respond to every minor terrorist attack or wait for some enhanced attack to take place to stage an operation at a scale higher than that of Op Sindoor. The likely outcome of enhanced action by India has every possibility of enlarging the conflict. Or is there another option with India which may prove more effective and make Pakistan realize its folly in following the anti-India policy. This option for India is to warn Pakistan that another terrorist attack against India will result in the termination of the Indus Water Treaty and not its recasting, as being proposed by some. Earlier the impression was that the World Bank would intervene in this case, but now the Chairman World Bank has stated in unequivocal terms that it is only a facilitator and no more. In the meantime, India should examine, in detail, the ways and manner by which it can starve Pakistan of waters for irrigation etc. At present India can, to a sufficient extent, block flow of water in Chenab River, which is the main source of water for irrigation in Pakistan’s Punjab. Water stressed population of Pakistan, particularly that from Punjab is bound to impress upon its government and military to end support to terrorists and improve relations with India. It is for Pakistan’s public to realize that its army is unnecessarily creating the bogey of a threat from India. There is a pressing need for their country to reduce expenditure on it’s military and focus on economic development of the country. Its present poor state of economy and near bankruptcy, cannot bear high expenditure on defence. Pakistan desperately needs to develop good relations with India. Good relations and enhanced trade with India will work to Pakistan’s great advantage. Finally, what has been the sum total of gains from ‘Op Sindoor for India and Pakistan! For India, besides demonstrating its resolve to meet head-on cross border terrorism, there are expectations of enormous electoral gain. India suffered casualties in soldiers and civilians. On the Pakistan side, it had multiple effects. Firstly, the fissures that were surfacing in its army seems, to some extent, to be closed. Army’s standing in the country appears to have been restored. Finally, the army chief has gained the confidence of the army, political class and the country, having performed well during this operation. There is every possibility of his engineering a conflict with India. . Lt General Harwant Singh (Retired) is former Deputy Chief of Army Staff. Views expressed are the writer’s own.

https://www.thecitizen.in/opinion/fragmented-reflections-on-the-time-of-monsters-1147604

Operation Sindoor, launched by India in response to the deadly Pahalgam terror attack that killed 26 civilians on April 22, 2025, has now been revealed to be far more expansive and strategically significant than initially acknowledged by Indian authorities. This new understanding comes from a confidential Pakistani dossier on its own military response, Operation ‘Bunyan un Marsoos’, which has come to light through multiple media reports and official briefings.

While Indian defence officials had publicly confirmed strikes on nine high-value terror hubs across Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK)—including the Jaish-e-Mohammed headquarters in Bahawalpur, the Lashkar-e-Taiba camp in Muridke, and sites such as Muzaffarabad, Kotli, Rawalakot, Chakswari, Bhimber, Neelum Valley, Jhelum, and Chakwal—the Pakistani dossier documents at least eight additional Indian airstrikes. These newly revealed targets include major urban and strategic locations: Peshawar, Jhang, Hyderabad in Sindh, Gujrat in Punjab, Gujranwala, Bahawalnagar, Attock, and Chor.

The Pakistani dossier, supported by maps and satellite imagery, lists the following additional locations as having been struck by Indian forces:

Bhagwant Mann’s sindoor remark sparks outrage from BJP leaders

Ruchika Khanna Tribune News Service

Punjab Chief Minister Bhagwant Mann on Tuesday mocked the BJP for distributing ‘sindoor’ (vermilion) in Ludhiana to mark the success of Operation Sindoor against Pakistan, asking if the saffron party had now started “one nation, one husband” scheme.

Mann was replying to a question about the BJP’s campaign for the Ludhiana West Assembly bypoll, which is scheduled for June 19. “If they distribute ‘sindoor’, which man will ask his wife to start using the ‘sindoor’ sent by Modi? I want to ask whether the BJP has started ‘one nation, one husband’ scheme?” he said.

Later, AAP spokesperson, Neel Garg, taking off from where Bhagwant Mann had left, said “The right to give sindoor to a woman is only with the husband, not with any political party. Has the BJP now got right over the sindoor of the women?” he asked.

His comments drew sharp criticism from various leaders, with BJP’s Pritpal Singh Balliawal called it “shameful”.“He is mocking Operation Sindoor. The BJP isn’t sending ‘sindoor’ to every household. Operation Sindoor was named so because terrorists killed Hindu tourists after checking their religion — they identified victims through the ‘sindoor’ on their wife’s forehead. The operation was about terrorism, martyrdom and the protection of Indian lives. A man who mocks the Army, insults veer naris and turns every sacred symbol into a joke will never understand the value of ‘sindoor’. It signifies sacrifice, love and devotion,” he said.

The concept of theatre commands does not meet the challenge of future multidomain warfare

Air Marshal Ramesh Rai (retd)

The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has conceptualised creation of integrated theatre command structures, as part of military reforms, in the belief that these will augur jointness augmenting our war fighting capability. Clearly his contention is that in the present arrangement we operate in silos and lack the ability to fight as an integrated force.

But in reality, the present structure has always worked in the face of the many challenges of various wars. Pakistan’s first attempt to occupy Kashmir in 1947-48 was blunted by close and effective cooperation between army and the air force. In 1965 Indo-Pak War, Indian Army plans were initially not known to the IAF, but later as the army asked for help, the coordination was complete. During the 1971 conflict, the planning process was joint from the word go and India conducted one of the most successful campaigns in history with the liberation of Bangladesh and surrender of 93,000 Pakistan soldiers, a feat unprecedented after WWII. Likewise, during the Kargil conflict, the Indian Army and Air Force combined remarkably well once the initial hiccups were resolved at the Chiefs of Staff Committee and threw back the intruders by integrated combat power application. Videos of Mirage aircraft firing laser bombs on Pakistani troops on Tiger Hill still roll in our minds bearing testimony to the army-air force combine. The army-air coordination in the ongoing imbroglio in Ladakh, bereft of any theatre structure is another example.

It seems rather strange that theatres are being conceived to force a combine on military personnel, merely on the belief that a compulsory merge would integrate forces and enhance war fighting potential. In his treatise, titled ‘Has it Worked-The Goldwater Nichols Act’, the author James R. Locher III, cites that problems of jointness exist even in integrated/ theatre command structures. Problems between Gen. Wesley K. Clarke, Commander Allied Force and Lt. Gen. Michael C. Short, Joint Air Force Component Commander affected campaign planning in the Kosovo operations even while under an Integrated Command Structure. Refusal of orders from Gen. Clarke by Gen. Michael David Jackson, Commander Rapid Reaction Force, had to be resolved after the Kosovo conflict. In Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan (March 2002), senior army commanders were widely criticised by their naval and air counterparts for not coordinating with them effectively even while under one command. The Indian armed forces have had a similar experience when during the IPKF operations in 1987, the army commander of the IPKF Unified Command elected to make a helicopter drop at Jaffna University, overruling the air force element’s advice of it being far too risky. Consequently, all helicopters were damaged, and a number of lives lost. These examples pointedly confirm that jointness is not implicit in an integrated command structure.

Integration implies merging of activities for warfighting by understanding concepts of joint warfighting, resolving doctrinal issues, clarity on roles and planning jointly for synergistic application of military power, as was demonstrated during the 1971 war. Joint planning requires knowledge and understanding of the core competencies of the other service and is a fundamental requirement irrespective of the structure we carve/ adopt/ retain. This is where the CDS ought to focus for evolving reforms. In his article titled ‘Theaterisation: Are We Ready’, Lt Gen. P.R. Shankar surmises that before we create theatre commands, we must increase ‘jointness’ between the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force. He opines that until aspects of joint training and staffing are sorted out, we will not get theatre commanders of value. He further adds that certain fundamental issues pertaining to the chain of command, communications, operational guidance and training if not clarified, are better off being where we are.

Restructuring the armed forces is a far-reaching reform with vast implications for national security. It requires due deliberation and foresight. According to Locher’s book mentioned above, the US department of defence debated the Goldwater-Nichols Act, 1986 (GNA) for re-organising the US armed forces and creating theatre commands, for four years and 241 days, a period longer than their involvement in World War II. They are already discussing whether GNA would adequately meet their 21^st century vision to shape, employ and combine future military forces with other instruments of national power or whether it warrants a reform. Likewise, we must discuss, debate and war game at length various re-structuring options to arrive at the most optimal structure that would meet the requirements to fight wars of the future and combine with other elements of national power. Commodore Uday Bhaskar, in his article titled ‘Don’t rush into unviable theatre commands with skewed structures’ has said that creation of theatre commands needs to be reviewed holistically and discussed objectively both in the Parliament and with professionals who can testify before select committees before embarking upon this restructuring.

Theatre commands work best with permanently allocated assets. While the army and the navy may have enough forces to be divided into various theatres, and yet remain an effective war fighting entity, the air force does not. The IAF’s strength is just about sufficient for a single front contingency. For a two-front war, the same assets will have to be multiplexed on both sides. Any, division by way of permanent allocation to theatres would render each theatre operationally weak in air power terms. This we cannot afford. An analysis of armed conflicts between the end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st century, unequivocally indicate the strategic significance of air power in achieving military aims. To win the air war, in a two-front contingency, we must retain the air force together in any new structure we evolve.

When Dr K. Subramanian, chairman of the Kargil Review Committee, was asked his opinion on creation of theatre commands, he responded by saying, 60 squadrons would be required for a theatre command structure. Considering that we are at a 30-squadron force level and may at best get to 45 in the next 20 years, any division would create an asymmetry in favour of the enemy, much to our peril.

Future wars would be multi-domain, multi-dimensional and hybrid in nature, with information dominance. In a two-front war, the hybridity could vary from a conventional war to a mix of regular forces intermeshed with irregular forces, with support of terrorists and insurgents, cyber intrusions, and possibly some dimension of social and economic warfare. Such hybridity would call for the war to be conceived, understood and orchestrated at the apex level though a framework that coordinates warfare in every domain. Hence, prior to evolving structures, we would require a complete re-cast of our military strategies, doctrines and operational concepts with cross domain synergy as the underlying fundament for an integrated response. Accordingly, the strategic thought for re-structuring should sprout from the idea of combining domains and not Services, a concept of the bygone era. More so, we must allow for the fact that Cyber, Space and Air domains would be dominant players in the future, and these have vast geographical disseminations which ought not to be limited to the small confines of a theatre.

Cross-domain synergy implies application of combat power between domains. The fundamental frame for such a concept is based on connectivity that provides netcentric warfare capability with operational data links (ODL) serving as the prime means for information, data, pictures, messages exchange and dissemination of orders on a near-real-time basis. The crux of integration will lie in designing ODL gateways to translate information and intelligence in content and context in line with our joint war fighting concept. This will be the core that integrates operations. The essence being that sensors, shooters and decision-makers from all domains are on the same communication grid. Commanders make joint decisions with the full operational picture and pass orders instantaneously to combine subordinate elements setting the pace and tempo of operations. A fifth-generation war structured on networked warfare concepts, networked thinking and application of networked combat power is where we should be headed. This will inherently set a mechanism to integrate and synergise application of combat power.

The Army organised a programme to support disabled soldiers in which they were presented with scooters. The Tiger Division at Jammu organised the event during which six modified scooters were donated by NGO War Wounded Foundation (WWF). An official spokesperson…

The Army organised a programme to support disabled soldiers in which they were presented with scooters. The Tiger Division at Jammu organised the event during which six modified scooters were donated by NGO War Wounded Foundation (WWF).

An official spokesperson said, “The programme was conducted on the initiative of Director North Zone, WWF. The war-disabled soldiers were identified with the help of the Indian Army. GOC Tiger Division presented the keys of the scooters to these soldiers.”

GOC of Tiger Division appreciated the services and dedication of the soldiers, who were injured in the line of duty. He mentioned that even after retirement, the soldiers are always ready to provide their services for the nation, as was evident during Operation Sindoor as well.

While serving in the Army, many soldiers are wounded in war/ during war-like situations. The injury reduces mobility of the soldier. To help such soldiers, WWF provides mobility equipment and other help to these soldiers. Till date, WWF has helped soldiers from J&K and Punjab with around 60 modified scooters, five auto-rickshaws, two electric wheelchairs, modification to bathrooms and help for marriage of their daughters. With this help, injured soldiers can move independently, carry out routine functions and develop self-confidence.

Brig Harcharan Singh (retd) thanked the Indian Army for conducting this event to help ex-servicemen. He informed the gathering about welfare schemes being run by WWF that are benefitting war-disabled soldiers residing in any part of the country.

Impractical Idea

India is not yet ready for joint theatre commands

Pravin Sawhney

The clamour for creation of two joint theatre commands – western theatre command for Pakistan and eastern theatre command for China – for better war-fighting has grown loud with senior serving military officers and, importantly, defence analysts (Business Standard, 14 July 2018) having jumped into the fray.

The Indian Air Force (IAF) is seen as the villain of the piece with the army and the navy in favour of the new structural reform for optimal war results. The IAF believes that given its limited assets, enormous flexibility inherent in aircraft, and that the military is for defence of the nation and not for out-of-area operations, expensive assets should remain centralised and not distributed to theatre commands. Cognisant of this internal bickering, defence minister Nirmala Sitharaman has taken a clever position by saying that while she liked the idea of joint theatre commands, she prefers a ‘bottom-up’ rather than a ‘top-down’ approach.

The basic argument of the army and navy is that the Indian military (three services) today have a total of 19 different commands which are neither co-located nor co-purposed. Since speed (in decision-making, allocation of resources and flexible operations) would be the essence in modern war, it is important that there should be only two commanders, one for each joint command theatre, instead of the present 19 which, given their prejudices, domain knowledge and so on, would end up as collective drag on speedy operations. Example is given of the Chinese military which has created theatre commands. Thus, against Chinese single Western theatre commander for India, the Indian military has three army (Northern, Western and Eastern), two air force (Western and Eastern Air Command) and one navy (Eastern Naval Command) commander-in-chiefs facing it.

To put this debate into perspective, the following three imperatives should be considered. One, modern warfare, which is driven by technology, has transformed in two ways. Instead of linear battlefields (either air-land, or air-sea), there are now six battle-fields whose optimisation would determine the war outcome. These are land, air, sea, space, cyber and electronic. Given these disparate battle-fields, the Chinese focus has shifted to non-contact war with limited or no loss of lives to own troops. China would use its stand-off, precision weapons including cruise missile, laser-bombs, armed unmanned aerial vehicles and so on for destruction, rather than fight soldier-to-soldier with the Indian Army. Given this situation, in India, the air force and not the army would lead the land war. This is not acceptable to the army chief, General Bipin Rawat, who recently said that the army should lead the land war. Thus, either the modern war is not understood by the army or there is a dogged attempt to resist drastic down-sizing of its bloated numbers.

Moreover, the desired outcome of military power by major powers (with nuclear weapons) is no longer deterrence or actual war-fighting, if deterrence fails. It is successful military coercion (compellence without fighting). However, if the compelling force is not credible, there are heavy costs to reputation of the coercing state. An example of unsuccessful military coercion is the 2001-2002 Operation Parakram initiated by India against Pakistan, where India withdrew its mobilised army without any gains after 10-months long face-off. On the other hand, the 2017 Doklam crisis between India and China which eventually led to Prime Minister Narendra Modi seeking peace with President Xi Jinping through the Wuhan understanding is an example of successful military coercion. India took the beating because its army mistook the land battlefield for war (total of different battlefields).

Major spy network dismantled; Ropar man was closely associated with Shakir alias Jutt Randhawa, a key figure in terror-backed espionage ring

In a major breakthrough, the State Special Operations Cell (SSOC) in Mohali has unearthed a significant espionage and terror-backed network involving Jasbir Singh, a YouTuber from Mahlan village in Rupnagar district.

Punjab DGP Gaurav Yadav, in a post on X, stated that Jasbir, who runs a popular YouTube channel named “Jaan Mahal,” has been found to have deep ties with individuals linked to anti-national activities.

Investigations revealed that Jasbir was closely associated with PIO Shakir alias Jutt Randhawa, a key figure in the terror-backed espionage ring.

Moreover, he maintained regular communication with Haryana-based YouTuber Jyoti Malhotra, recently arrested on charges of spying, and Ehsan-ur-Rahim alias Danish, a Pakistani national who was expelled from the Pakistan High Commission, the DGP said.

He said Jasbir attended the Pakistan National Day event held in Delhi on Danish’s invitation, where he reportedly met Pakistani Army officials and various vloggers connected to intelligence activities.

It was further discovered that Singh had travelled to Pakistan three times — in 2020, 2021, and most recently in 2024. His electronic devices, seized during the probe, contained numerous Pakistan-based contacts, all now undergoing detailed forensic scrutiny, the DGP said.

Following Malhotra’s arrest, Jasbir reportedly attempted to erase his communication records with the network members to avoid detection. An FIR has been registered against him at State Special Operations Cell, Mohali.

Investigations are ongoing to dismantle the broader espionage-terror network and identify all collaborators involved in these anti-national activities, Yadav added.