This article does not pre-suppose in any way that India was insecure through 2016. Security is always a work in progress and there is nothing absolutist about it; it is always long-term in outlook. Yet, there are nuances which can be taken stock of, issues which have perhaps long been clamouring for attention but complexities of management have rarely afforded an opportunity to visit them.

There are some lessons learnt from handling various details which get lost in the plethora of considerations. Various ministries of the central government who have dealings with national security write annual reports and reviews. However, an unclassified document which spells out concerns for all to dwell upon and for review by strategic think tanks remains elusive. Perhaps the time for that has arrived and it could well be the precursor to a larger national security strategy/doctrine document which again has remained in ministerial files and never been available for Parliamentary debate or review by the strategic community.

The temptation is high to delve deep and come up with a comprehensive wish list. However, let me limit this to a few issues which need not be implemented through and through in 2017 but they need to be flagged, examined, and work on them at least commenced and monitoring established. The list is not prioritised and each issue has been taken randomly. However, they straddle the domains of threats, doctrine, organisation, equipment, specific conflict and personnel management.

National security strategy document

For too long has the nation done without transparency in the domain of national security. No one doubts the sincerity of the government in this all-important area, but in a nation where the understanding of national security itself has not matured, there is a need to enhance awareness. If a National Security Strategy (NSS) document is available and regularly reviewed, there will be far greater awareness and understanding. Currently, national security is considered the domain of the military and is associated with everything robust, although the military itself is hardly given the leeway to advise on this. In an emerging era when “hybrid” is the label for all kinds of conflicts which threaten the nation, this awareness has to increase. Perhaps 2017 can see the government making a bid to set up a body which will draft such a document.

The National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) is not in full-function mode. Perhaps the year could see it being restored and entrusted the task of finally delivering on an NSS document which need not be perfect and can be in two parts—classified and unclassified, just like most doctrines. Much work has gone into this in the past so it will not be a recommencement of primary research.

As a subset of this point, perhaps a push on the creation of the National Defence University (NDU) may be in order. This was a recommendation of the Kargil Review Committee. It took 12 years for the foundation stone to be laid. The need for giving it some impetus is because there is increasing interest in the country in matters strategic and we need an institution to satiate the thirst for knowledge in this crucial field.

Integration Of The MoD And Creation Of A Coordination Mechanism Between The MoD and the MHA

This is again a recommendation of the Kargil Review Committee which was attempted to be implemented in a patchwork way by creating the HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS). The Services HQs were supposed to be integrated with the Ministry of Defence (MoD), but except for the cosmetic alteration of designation, nothing else changed. At the very minimum, the MoD needs professionals with ground experience to handle policy making appointments. There are models from all over the world where uniformed officers perform bureaucratic jobs as part of joint military-bureaucracy teams. The Raksha Mantri has been examining this seriously but perhaps needs to commence an experiment with a few appointments. No one expects this to happen overnight with wholesale change but an initiation in 2017 would set the pace.

Coupled with the appointment of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or a Permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, this would be a transformational change which will send positive vibes within the uniformed community which isn’t too happy about the state of civil-military relations.

The coordination mechanism between the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and the MoD needs a look, especially since border management is the domain of the MHA but contentious borders are with the MoD. A well-thought-out structure needs to be put in place and made to work for the national good.

Revamping Information Operations And Handling Capability

I never tire of stating that Pakistan realised the importance of public information and information warfare as early as 1949. It set up the Inter Service Public Relations (ISPR) and progressively refined its entire approach to information as a domain. This has come into its own since 1989 when Pakistan launched its asymmetric war efforts in Jammu & Kashmir. Ever since the emergence of social media it has further refined its strategy. Sadly, there is no organisation in India, including within the Army, which is chartered to execute information operations. The domain of public relations, public information and information remains rooted within the archaic system of the PRO MoD which for no fault of its own is incapable or simply never considered as a General Staff arm.

The long and short of this is the fact that the nation is deficient of one arm of the security domain which in the modern world is one of the most crucial components of hybrid warfare. Even the commencement of realisation of the deficit may be sufficient, triggering the establishment of a study group to evolve and debate India’s information strategy for the future and recommend structures necessary for training and efficient execution.

Creation Of A Communication Strategy Board

India faces fault line problems arising out of its heterogeneous composition. The need for integration or mainstreaming can never be overemphasised. While there is a Minorities Commission in place, it can only address problems of the minorities and not of regional or people-based grievances which sometimes manifest as internal threats. No doubt the intelligence services monitor this but the social environment needs a perception-based handling, not a counter-intelligence handling, to convey the right information and change minds based on the correct narratives. J&K, North East and the Red Corridor have all witnessed large scale problems. These can be handled militarily through hard power but equally there is a need for a soft power approach too. For that, a permanent body which could be termed as the National Communication Strategy Board needs to be set up with representation from different walks of life to include military, police, intelligence, academia, media, psychologists and medical doctors, sociologists and even politicians who have a penchant for strategic affairs.

The tasks of this body could be worked out in detail but broadly it would be an ideating platform which would generate narratives and could even task agencies after due approval of the PMO or Cabinet Secretariat.

Civil-Military Relations

These have not been in a healthy state for long and there is a history of standoff which is denying the nation the benefit of the best services of both the civil and the military authority towards management of security affairs of the country. Issues of protocol, control, turf, budgeting and many other areas of discord are preventing the optimisation of the armed forces, something only our adversaries would be happy to note. There is no magic wand solution to this but a conscious beginning must be made to arrest and reverse the trend. Perhaps directions are necessary from the highest level to set up a permanent composite body to monitor and report the state of civil-military relations. Work towards this could commence in 2017.

J&K Affairs

One of the prime areas of concern for many years and almost through 2016 has been J&K. We have suffered the largest number of casualties in 2016. While reams can be written and advised on the management of J&K affairs, the focus area which must be kept in mind is that there is a flawed perception in the thinking of the security set up in Pakistan that it is winning the asymmetric war in J&K. This is the most dangerous thing because Pakistan considers its role in J&K as an existential issue for it. My advice would therefore be based on four issues all of which are equally important.

First, the benefits of good governance need to reach the people. The perception persists that much investment has been made in J&K but it needs more accountability to ensure the impact. Without impinging on the freedom of the state government, the central government possibly needs a department to handle J&K in a focused way and cater to governance needs in a fast track mode.

Secondly, all other aspects of security being equal, the significance of security of the rear areas needs attention, especially in the Jammu region where vulnerability appears higher, and this includes government installations, garrisons and soft spots such as schools. This attention could also expand into areas of North Punjab which may increasingly be in the crosswires of the planners across the border. Greater coordination between the Army and the police needs to be institutionalised.

Thirdly, the agitation in the streets through the second half of 2016 paralysed work in the Valley and also had Jammu seething. An ominous calm seems to have emerged, driven more by fatigue and exhaustion. It needs just a little tonic to get back to the negativism of 2016. In the window of 2017, a special strategy to reach the people needs to be made. This is no appeasement; an exhausted populace needs balm. How this can be done and done quickly should form the government’s focus. There are past best practices available which could be revisited with more consultation.

China, Russia And The US: The Big Power Game

There can be no security consideration without the China factor. The threat from China is likely to loom large, but equally, China is likely to be more focused on the US under Trump. India being an emerging strategic partner of the US could inadvertently get sucked into the vortex of the US-China rivalry. This would not be to its interest and therefore tightrope walking may have to be the cornerstone of its strategy. 2017 is likely to be a year of greater uncertainty as a new US administration wrestles with its security concerns. Russia is gaining greater confidence after its involvement in Syria and has been testing waters in Pakistan. Equations in big power politics are not zero sum games. India’s relationship with Russia is very important and this needs to be developed with messaging that given all other relationships, the India-Russia equation is extremely dear to us.

However, India cannot be restrained by the uncertainty of big power relationships. Mr Modi’s hard work through three years of foreign policy development will fructify now if India retains balance without compromising in areas where it has already scored, e.g. the rapport with Japan and ASEAN needs to continue in the quest for the development of the Indo-Pacific idea.

Afghanistan

India cannot take its eyes away from Afghanistan. 2017 may well be a decisive year in the future of Afghanistan as a strong military-oriented administration comes to power in the US. No doubt Pakistan will play an important role in whatever the US does, by sheer dint of its geostrategic location. However, India, having built its relationship with President Ashraf Ghani, cannot allow its position to be diluted. If necessary, military support to the Afghan National Army in terms of some lethal capability may also be considered in consultation with other stakeholders.

The complexities of Afghanistan are well understood in India’s diplomatic community and this understanding needs to harnessed optimally.

Bangladesh, Myanmar And Act East

No security consideration in the current context can be complete without turning attention towards the East, and that includes the handling of India’s North East region. With Myanmar more stable, opened up and integrated with ASEAN, the situation begs for incorporating it as the virtual bridge to ASEAN along the continental continuity. With Bangladesh in the best state of relations with India, this is the time to exploit the Bangladesh-North East India-Myanmar continuum in turns of connectivity and economic corridors for the mutual benefit of the entire region.

Just as in the case of Nagaland, a more focused outreach in Manipur may convince the disparate groups of the opportunity for all.

China too is increasingly looking at the Maritime Silk Route and inner connectivity, which India is yet to be convinced about. Perhaps that may yet be early, but economics needs to be the driver for Bangladesh, Myanmar and North East India and through that to the rest of ASEAN.

Military Capability

The last of the issues needing continued focus is the requirement for development of military capability. It is not as if India is weak, but in recent times there has been a trend to find fault with every single facet of the nation’s military capability. No doubt our equipment profile is getting dated and the promised fast track induction of equipment has not fully fructified.

All three services have their problems. The creation of a Chief of the Defence Staff or equivalent will contribute to the degree of clarity in priorities. Recent reforms in procurement and indigenisation have been pragmatic but the execution may need more energy through some policy changes in personnel management for those who handle this domain. We need the initiation of processes which will ensure continuity. Much has been done but equally, much still needs focus.

There is also the field of ammunition which needs attention. In 2013, the nation received a bit of a scare when it was revealed that our capability existed only to fight a 20-day war due to the restricted quantum of ammunition. In 2017, this needs to be holistically reviewed and if imports have to be resorted to, the same should be done. This is one domain where we need transparency for reassurance of the public and messaging our adversaries who may take our overall war waging potential lightly.

There can be a host of other issues on which one needs to deliberate but there can be no doubt that the government is well seized of these. The only challenge in the complex job of running a government is how to remain focused and prioritised without allowing events to dictate the course. National security from a geostrategic angle will obviously remain a key concern.

The writer is a former GOC of India’s Srinagar based 15 Corps, now associated with Vivekanand International Foundation and the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.

http://swarajyamag.com/magazine/2017-wishlist-10-things-we-wish-the-modi-govt-does-this-year-to-enhance-national-security

Much of Pakistan’s future India policy through 2017 will be based upon what transpired in 2016. Short term assessments are usually dangerous and trends become unpredictable, but risk based assessment is still essential.

The year 2016 saw Pakistan take its confidence up some notches. Some events drastically changed things for it, both in a positive and a negative manner.

First, on the positive side, Pakistan appeared to have turned the tide against terror after almost nine years. In 2015, post the massacre of children in Peshawar’s Army school, a renewed resolve emerged in Pakistan to go after the “bad terrorists”. This year, the number of terror related incidents reduced drastically and the security agencies achieved a semblance of control over Karachi. Rogue terror groups were targeted and their leaderships eliminated.

Second, Pakistan’s hold over the Afghan Taliban loosened considerably; it could not prevent the spring offensive for the second consecutive year although news of Taliban operations did not emerge in international media.

Third, the relationship with President Ashraf Ghani deteriorated, leading to the kind of remarks the latter made at the Heart of Asia Conference at Amritsar earlier this month.

Fourth, the relationship with China continued to blossom with the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) becoming the most important hinge around which the strategic relationship will revolve. Pakistan’s national confidence seemed to receive a boost.

Fifth, the US control over Pakistan reached a nadir and Russia’s overtures to Islamabad took observers by surprise.

Sixth and the most important development was Pakistan’s decision to change priorities after July and concentrate on Jammu & Kashmir. Pakistan may or may not have a hand in propping up Burhan Wani but it surely had an involvement in the uprisings post his encounter.

Pakistan’ military leadership probably felt that such a moment could not be allowed to pass. With J&K receiving full attention, a diplomatic offensive was launched in the UN and various major and minor capitals around the world. Using the old line of home grown terrorists attacking defence installations in Kashmir, Pakistan denied its own hand in the Uri terror attack and continued the game of denial even as surgical strikes were launched by India to target terror camps across the LOC.

The ceasefire of 2003 almost ceased to exist even as street turbulence and vigilantism continued through four months with an enhanced element of fervour being displayed by the mosques in the Valley.

In November end, Pakistan Army Chief Gen Raheel Sharif retired and was replaced by Gen Qamar Bajwa. The line of control (LoC) went quiet even as Bajwa visited his erstwhile command, Pakistan’s 10 Corps which looks after Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). The streets of Kashmir had already been witnessing the return of order and stability progressively through November once the seat of government shifted to Jammu.

Strangely, the Hurriyat also reportedly changed its strategy, inviting tourists to Kashmir and pilgrims to all religious sites in J&K and placing greater control over its own calendar. The silence in the Valley is only an ominous one because it’s yet uncertain whether it is due to loss of appetite or arrival at the conclusion that violence in the streets would not budge Indian authorities from their stand.

So what could 2017 be like in terms of India-Pakistan relations with special reference to J&K? Clearly among factors which dictate relations between estranged nations are the strategic environment, the immediate past, personalities at the helm, perceived strengths and weaknesses and payoffs from likely actions.

The strategic environment of 2017 is yet highly unpredictable with the onset of the new Administration, Trump’s personal lack of experience and his probable dependence on a clutch of high level ex military men as advisers. The start point is Afghanistan where Trump may be advised to continue US engagement for some more time to prevent the Taliban making greater progress. That automatically involves greater cooperative commitments from Pakistan, the key state which shares a boundary with Afghanistan, and has some influence (although just marginal) over the Taliban.

Recent reports suggest a Russia-China-Pakistan axis to work on accommodating Taliban as a tool against expansion of ISIS post the Aleppo-Raqqa-Mosul situation. Ignoring India and the US may well spur the US to pursue its interests and maintain or even enhance its presence in Afghanistan. If big power rivalry over the future of Afghanistan becomes a stronger reality through 2017, it could see Pakistan more intensely involved there.

When that happens, the intensity of focus towards J&K dilutes. In the priority, Afghanistan and the Taliban definitely score over J&K and the Hurriyat, which can wait for appropriate times. Sadly Pakistan too is aware that the Indian authorities will not get their act together in terms of placating and stabilising Kashmir. If this be the scenario, Kashmir may see some stability and less Pakistani energy dedicated towards it.

Pakistan is also acutely aware that 2016 was a year which involved greater risk in its ‘war by thousand cuts’ with India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s utterances on Baluchistan, Gilgit-Baltistan, PoK and the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) would also have sent signals of increasing threats to India’s level of tolerance, which is now under stress. The surgical strikes, bigger fire assaults and the increasing criticism against the Indian Army’s rear area security, all raised the costs for Pakistan.

Pakistan would have the choice to spread itself thin through simultaneous focus on J&K and Afghanistan or pursue a more proactive policy towards Afghanistan in conjunction with China and Russia to keep Indian and US influence under control. Any new campaign in J&K could be delayed with the presumption that not much may change and a policy of minimum action to keep the pot boiling may be employed.

The question is how much influence do Pakistan and the Hurriyat actually exercise? That remains the moot point because the new diffused leadership could just decide to resume where it left off last month. In that case, Pakistan would have little option but to grudgingly support and accept the risk. The latter could be calibrated by lowering the intensity of its actions and the utterances from time to time.

General Bajwa’s first 30 days of being quiet gives no indication of the approach he would like to follow. He can choose to bide his time till better opportunities arise, look for one or two mid profile actions which may not risk escalation or he could just reverse policy and do what Musharraf did in November 2003, that is start lowering the temperature and create conditions for a long drawn engagement in a peace process.

From the indicators available, the latter is the least likely because in Pakistan’s strategic circles, there appears a perception that the investment of 27 years in J&K may just be entering its pay off stage. A misreading of this kind is likely to be the cause of missing the opportunity and creating conditions for giving any kind of confidence to India that dialogue could be an option again.

For India, the public pressure to no longer absorb but rather respond in kind or even proactively take military action, has increased manifold. Fortunately, the political leadership remains extremely mindful of its larger responsibility and will not act brashly unless absolutely driven against the wall.

The year 2017, therefore, can at best be assessed to be a lower profile year than 2016 with little chance of resumption of any dialogue with Pakistan. Temperatures at the LoC will remain low unless provoked by another terror act from Pakistan’s soil. The Valley is still in fatigue and doesn’t seem ready for another full throttle agitation, but terror acts will continue especially against army convoys. One or two acts of terror in the Jammu region will necessarily take place to keep a balance north and south of the Pir Panjal.

The alliance of People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is likely to receive a reprieve in terms of time. It must act quickly to curb corruption, enhance accountability and provide governance which will make some positive difference to the lives of the people. If this period is counted as a window, it must be exploited to the hilt in political outreach.

Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti has the ability to be uncomfortable while attempting to make others comfortable. This is what she must aim to do to get back that trust which people had in her. It’s been difficult stewardship of the chief minister’s office, but there is enough time to recover and get the act together.