Sanjha Morcha

When INA dealt a big blow to the Raj

When INA dealt a big blow to the Raj

Brig Jagbir Singh Grewal (Retd)

THE immediate compulsion for the British to quit India arose with the erosion of loyalty to the Crown among the Indian armed forces’ personnel as a result of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose’s military activities. The Indian National Army (INA) was founded with the collaboration of Indian soldiers, prisoners of war, expatriates and Japanese allies in Southeast Asia; it also had a women’s regiment, the Jhansi Ki Rani Regiment, led by Lakshmi Sahgal.

Things came to a head when the British committed a grave error — they set about putting on public trial members of the top brass of the INA at the Red Fort in Delhi during 1945-46 on the charge of waging a war against the King-Emperor.

Col Prem Sahgal, Major Gen Shah Nawaz Khan and Col Gurbaksh Singh Dhillon had served as officers in the British Indian Army. They had been taken prisoners of war at Malaya, Singapore and Burma. Later, they joined the INA along with a large number of Indian Army troops and fought for the liberation of India. Their trial spread disenchantment against the British within the armed forces. The public, too, rose in unison.

On February 18, 1946, Indian sailors of the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) mutinied; the mutiny spread to over 70 ships. Bringing down the British flag on their ships, the mutineers hoisted flags of the Congress, the Muslim League and the Communist Party. Vociferously raising the demand for Independence, thousands of sailors went around Bombay holding portraits of Netaji. The mutineers were joined by the people of Bombay, who wholeheartedly extended support. Within 48 hours, the British had lost control over the navy, even as the mutineers rechristened RIN as the Indian National Navy.

It is estimated that around 220 people died in police firing and about 1,000 were injured during the unrest. The RIN mutiny was followed by a rebellion in the Royal Indian Air Force and in some Army units, mainly at Jabalpur.

The British painfully realised that a mortal blow had been inflicted on the Raj, and that they no longer controlled the Indian armed forces. They feared more such mass movements. The mutinies, coupled with the uproar in the Indian armed forces and the sacrifices of freedom fighters, convinced the British to expedite the process of quitting India. Clement Attlee, then British Prime Minister and the Leader of the Labour Party from 1935 to 1955, was left with no option but to approve the decision to grant Independence to India.

As World War II ended, Britain had already exhausted Indian resources, finances and manpower for its war effort. Britain’s economy was left severely depleted. The state of affairs had a tremendous impact on British foreign policy, even as the tumultuous events of 1945-46 played a key role in hastening the colonial power’s exit from India.


THE RAIN HAVOC IN NORTH: HEADLINES: CLICK TO READ DETAILS

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Monsoon fury: Battered by rain, Himachal crumbles; 48 lives lost in day, 13 in Shimla alone


Conspiracy in Murder VETERANS Daugter of Ms Neha Shoree, Zonal Drug Licensing Authority-cum-Head of Punjab State

Pradhan Mantri Bhartiya Janaushadhi Pariyojana (@pmbjppmbi) / X

The Chairperson,

National Commission of Women,

Plot No. 21, Jasola Institutional Area,

New Delhi – 110025 14th July 2023

Respected Madam,

Subject – Conspiracy in Murder of Ms Neha Shoree, Zonal Drug Licensing Authority-cum-Head of Punjab State Flying Squad for Conducting Raids Against Misuse of Drugs, Shot Dead at 11:33 AM on 29.03.2019 in her Office Seat at Kharar, Dist. SAS Nagar; in Govt. owned Food &Drug Administration and Chemical Laboratory Offices Complex: Balwinder Singh, who was Planted for Murdering Her, was also Killed within two minutes at 11:35 AM.

1. Please refer to your letter No 8/18532/2019/NCW/RS/NMG dated 30.06.2023

2. In the above connection we forward herewith the copies of our two letters dated 28/31.03.2023 and dated 24/26.04.2023. The contents of these letters are self-explanatory. Neha Shoree murder is Political and a deep-rooted Conspiracy. The connivance of DC, SSP and IG Range of Ropar is proved beyond doubt.

3. We wrote about hundred letters at different stages of our own investigation, to all the related authorities and the Constitutionally mandated agencies of both the State (of Punjab) and of the Union Governments. The copies of our above mentioned two letters had also been mailed to the Constitutional Authorities of the Nation, i.e., Honourable two Presidents, Prime Minister, Home Minister, both CJs of India, both CJs of P&H High Court, Governor and all Punjab’s Chief Ministers. Had the various SITs’ reports on Drugs Proliferation not been kept in sealed cover by Judiciary, Neha and Punjab could have been saved from Drugs Menace!

4. We emphatically reiterate that the then Govt. of Punjab had got Ms Neha Shoree murdered in cold blood in her office seat in broad day light at 11:33 AM on 29.03.2019 during 2019 Elections. Within two minutes, this Govt. had also got its planted killer Balwinder Singh murdered; and made it an ‘Open &Shut Case’.

5. This Double Murder Episode of 29th March 2019 for eliminating Ms Neha Shoree is a SLUR on the Indian Constitution and its Democracy. Judiciary too, is heavily tilted in favour of the Criminals in Politics.

6. The above is submitted for your kind information and necessary action. We humbly request for Justice.

Wonder how we can help this father who is seeking justice for his daughter.

Capt Kailesh Kumar Shori


India has big plans for Sri Lanka’s Trincomalee port

Trincomalee Harbour is recognised as an unspoken part of New Delhi’s Indo-Pacific strategy.
India has big plans for Sri Lanka’s Trincomalee port

Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta (retd)

Military Commentator

THE new Framework Agreement on Trincomalee oil tank farms, to be based on the agreement of January 2022, was among a slew of pacts signed during Sri Lankan President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s recent visit to India. It is a grand plan for turning the Trincomalee Harbour and region into an energy hub.

This harbour is the geo-strategic crown jewel of Sri Lanka’s vital assets. It is the world’s fourth largest natural deep sea harbour and New Delhi has eyed it for decades. Along with the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord (ISLA), letters were exchanged between then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and then President JR Jayewardene, stating that Trincomalee or any other port in Sri Lanka would not be made available for military use by any country prejudicial to India’s security. It also mentioned that India would consider armed intervention if diplomacy failed.

Besides creating provincial councils, the ISLA amalgamated Northern and Eastern provinces into the North-East provincial council, not just because the Eastern province was Tamil-dominated, but also as the Trincomalee Harbour was located there. The Sri Lankan Security Forces had one red line that was to be held at all costs — the line north of Trincomalee Harbour to Vavuniya and beyond. For the Lankan forces, this harbour was never to be lost to the enemy. Further, in 2003, the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, after hearing a bunch of petitions, separated the Eastern province from the North-East provincial council as the ISLA had made a two-year provision for a referendum over jointness which was never held. A cordon sanitaire consisting of Sri Lankan Navy’s Eastern Command and an army division surrounded the harbour. During the ceasefire agreement in the 1990s, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had literally surrounded the harbour from Sampur in the south to opposite Trincomalee Fort in the north.

This harbour is 40-m deep and can shelter warships, aircraft carriers and large merchant vessels. It has one of the world’s most elaborate underground ammunition depots, pillboxes and artillery emplacements. Singapore has constructed a flourishing wheat flour mill that is Sri Lanka’s bread basket. But the key assets are 99 oil tank farms (OTFs) of World War II era, some of which have been restored. During the Indian Peace-Keeping Force’s (IPKF) 30 months in Sri Lanka, its 36 Infantry Division was deployed around them, with the harbour being used for logistics by sea. Later, 57 Mountain Division, which I commanded, took charge of Trincomalee when the IPKF was being withdrawn as it was one of the two de-induction hubs in 1989-90. The IPKF had concerns about potential security threats, including the possibility of attacks by the LTTE or other disgruntled Tamil groups.

In 2003, Lanka Indian Oil Corporation (LIOC) was created to repair, maintain and operate 14 of 99 OTFs. They were leased for 35 years, with India paying an unknown annual subsidy to Sri Lanka. A new agreement was signed in January 2022 on the eve of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s Colombo visit. The division of OTF assets was in three parts: the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC) was allotted 24 OTFs, LIOC would continue operating 14 OTFs, and a new joint venture of the CPC, the newly created Trinco Petroleum Terminal (TPT) and LIOC, would activate the remaining 61 OTFs. Wickremesinghe has appointed former CDS Admiral Ravindra Wijegunaratne as Managing Director, CPC, and Chairman, TPT. Today, Lanka IOC operates 206 fuel stations across Sri Lanka and is a one-third partner in CPC storage terminals. The July 22 Framework Agreement is to expand infrastructure projects and also evaluate building a petroleum pipeline from the Indian mainland to Trincomalee.

The Trincomalee Harbour area was one of Britain’s biggest sea bases for its naval campaigns in the Far East. It is a model naval base, grand and awesome, that kept French and Dutch forays into Trincomalee Harbour at bay. Britain was reluctant to transfer the control of Trincomalee Harbour to Sri Lanka at the time of its independence in 1948. Britain did not quite attempt a Diego Garcia, but handed back the naval base and OTFs to Colombo only in 1957. Sri Lanka tried reviving OTFs by first inviting the US and later Singapore, but both turned down the offer to operate the OTFs. India seized the opportunity in 1987 with the ISLA.

Writing in the Colombo Telegraph last year, Rusiripala Tennakoon noted the problems of land lease and funding inadequacy of the CPC in the new agreement. More importantly, he observed that Sri Lanka’s objective over the years has been to ‘regain control’ of the OTFs and Trincomalee Harbour by developing the assets independently and not as a joint venture with India. In 2022, then Energy Minister Udaya Gammanpila blamed previous governments for losing Trincomalee, but Tennakoon contends that such claims are fallacious in the light of letters exchanged between leaders after signing the ISLA.

The docking of a Chinese conventional submarine at Colombo Port in 2014 drew a strong protest from India. The Hambantota Port project was first offered to India in 2007. Unable to repay Chinese debt, Wickremesinghe as PM was forced to give the port on lease for 99 years to China. Wickremesinghe could also not prevent Chinese ‘spy’ ship Wuan Yang 5 from docking at Hambantota last year.

Speaking at a seminar last month on Sri Lanka’s strategic geography in the Indian Ocean, Vice Admiral Anup Singh (retd) said the Indian Navy could make former Chinese President Hu Jintao’s Malacca dilemma come true as 80 per cent of Chinese oil tankers passed below Hambantota. Trincomalee Harbour is recognised as an unspoken part of New Delhi’s Indo-Pacific strategy. The ISLA and Trincomalee Framework Agreement have revived and reinforced India’s vital interests in it. Equally, Colombo’s efforts to get New Delhi out of it will continue, but India’s footprint is likely to stay there.

On March 24, 1990, INS troop ship Magar lifted anchor from Trincomalee Harbour, carrying the last group of the IPKF. Sri Lanka’s then Defence Minister Ranjan Wijeratne, who bade them farewell, quickly called then President Premadasa to report that the last foreign soldier had left Sri Lankan soil. The harbour was back in Colombo’s control.


Non-lapsable Defence Modernisation Fund no silver bullet

Implementing the DMF would be tantamount to duplicating prevalent budgeting procedure, but expecting a different outcome.

Non-lapsable Defence Modernisation Fund no silver bullet

Amit Cowshish and Rahul Bedi

Amit Cowshish Ex-Financial Adviser, acquisition, MoD & Rahul Bedi Senior Journalist

THE issue of instituting a rollover

or non-lapsable Defence Modernisation Fund (DMF) to upgrade India’s three Services, mooted in 2004, remains a work in progress 19 years later. Replying to a question in the Lok Sabha last month, Minister of State (Defence) Ajay Bhatt stated that a ‘special mechanism’ was underway to operationalise the DMF, but did not elaborate when this long-promised undertaking would be put in place.

The decision to introduce a Rs 25,000-crore non-lapsable DMF was first announced by then Finance Minister Jaswant Singh in the NDA government in his interim 2004-05 Budget, to ensure ‘committed availability’ of monies for materiel procurements. At the time, Jaswant Singh had argued that a DMF would ‘commit availability of adequate funds’ as the process of defence procurement often extended to over three years. The fund was to be operationalised from the ensuing financial year.

But the NDA lost the General Election soon after, and the DMF provision was summarily dropped in the Budget presented by Jaswant Singh’s successor from the Congress-led UPA that assumed office in mid-2004.

This should have sounded the death knell for the DMF, but it captured the imagination of successive Parliamentary Standing Committees on Defence (SCoDs), which continued to doggedly pursue it and demand its imminent establishment. The SCoDs insisted on a DMF with ‘committed allocations’ for a five-year period since ‘lapsing of funds year-after-year (had) greatly hampered (the) procurement of defence equipment and modernisation of the defence forces’.

The proposal for creating a non-lapsable DMF had emerged following the Services’ inability to annually expend their capital budget allocated for modernisation which, between 1999 and 2004, had cumulatively amounted to Rs 20,217 crore, or nearly 22 per cent of the overall outlay committed to this end. This lapse, however, was due primarily to the military’s ineptness in fast-tracking acquisitions, of which their vast ‘overreach’ in equipment specifications was one of the several culpable shortcomings.

But badgered over years by an influential number of serving and veteran military personnel, the SCoDs erroneously and somewhat naively assumed that this ‘surrender’ of unspent balances at the end of each fiscal could be circumvented by transferring these amounts to a non-lapsable DMF. This prospect also excited the armed forces, who too mistakenly believed that such a fund could be dipped into at will, much like an ATM, to effect acquisitions over and above the allocated annual defence outlay.

This belief, however, remains flawed for multiple systemic reasons.

Constitutionally, all revenue from taxes, loans, disinvestment and analogous sources, aggregated by the Government of India, accrues to the Consolidated Fund of India (CFI), and no monies can be appropriated from it, even for beefing up non-lapsable funds, without parliamentary approval. This is how other non-lapsable funds, like the one for the northeastern states, work and the reality is that Parliament cannot be bypassed to replenish, access or establish such funds at will.

These contrary arguments were presented by the Defence and Finance Secretaries to the SCoD between 2004 and 2006, but to no avail, and the latter continued to insist on founding the DMF. In fact, in 2017, the SCoD reiterated that it was ‘imperative’ to institute such a fund ‘for enhancement and heightened operational preparedness’ of India’s military.

Thereafter, PM Narendra Modi’s BJP-led government responded by referring the matter to the Fifteenth Finance Commission (FC), which too recommended the DMF’s formation in its 2020 report, but its implementation obviously stands deferred. This is so probably because the DMF’s overall rationale and utility were still being internally debated, even though there was no legal impediment in its founding.

The FC had also recommended that though the bulk of the DMF’s corpus would be sourced from the CFI, it would marginally be supplemented by disinvestment in Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) and via monetisation of surplus defence land, with an annual cap of Rs 51,000 crore on all such transfers. But analysts pointed out that since DPSU disinvestment and land monetisation could not be a regular revenue source, the burden of underwriting the proposed DMF would then inevitably fall to the CFI which, ironically, was the original source for annual budgetary allocations anyway, bringing matters back to square one.

In the meantime, the original rationale for launching the DMF had become infructuous, as the Ministry of Defence (MoD) had largely been expending its annual capital outlay, as evident from the available data for three successive years between 2019 and 2022. This, in turn, obviated the requirement for introducing a rollover account.

Alongside, elementary monetary logic too dictated that if the CFI, in the first instance, was capable of financing the non-lapsable fund, surely it could afford to make budgetary allocations of comparable amounts each year without routing it through a DMF, considerably complicating matters by adding yet another layer of bureaucracy to an already hidebound structure.

While deposing before the SCoD in 2006, then Finance Secretary Adarsh Kishore had summed up the DMF conundrum by stating that though no major conceptual problem existed in setting it up, the armed forces would not be ‘particularly happy’ if it was initiated, as all existing procedures that related to the yearly budget would, perforce, apply to operate it since Parliament could not be bypassed in this regard. Therefore, implementing a DMF would be tantamount to duplicating the prevalent budgeting procedure, but miraculously expecting a different outcome in its add-on DMF avatar.

Hence, it’s little wonder that the DMF proposal remains stillborn, as few in the government have any inkling regarding its final contours. But it’s immutable that DMF in any form would have limited, if any, use as the bulk of its finances would inevitably come from the CFI and their utilisation would always be subject not to MoD’s discretion, but to parliamentary sanction.

In short, the DMF is not the panacea for the problems concerning India’s military modernisation, but something more fundamental is — addressing the enduring financial resource crunch.


Agnipath hurdle

Agnipath hurdle

FACING a two-front challenge, the Indian Army has stood up valiantly to the simultaneous threats posed by China and Pakistan on the borders. However, the bureaucracy has left a lot to be desired while completing the formalities for recruits under the Agnipath scheme. Out of the first batch of 18,849 Agniveers, 6,277 have not been inducted into the Army because their police verification has been delayed. Apparently, the police of several states have not expedited the verification process in tune with the condensed training period of 6-8 months for Agniveers.

As The Tribune reported, one-third of the Agniveers are waiting to participate in the attestation ceremony because the police have not submitted their verification certificates so far. Apparently, the cops are verifying the antecedents of Agniveers at the leisurely pace of the pre-Agnipath-era training that lasted 9-18 months.

The Agnipath scheme aims to reduce the uncomfortably high tooth-to-tail ratio and provide fitter, younger and technically savvy troops who will be well prepared to tackle the security challenges facing the nation. Reducing the pension burden is also among its objectives. Three-fourths of the Agniveers will be released from service after four years. While the government has given an assurance regarding the re-employment of released soldiers, there is uncertainty about the future of these militarily trained personnel. Some of them may find it tough to acclimatise to a civilian life. Doubts about the efficacy of the recruitment scheme make it incumbent upon the authorities to remove every stumbling block. Fast-tracking the police verification process is a must to ensure that the scheme does not get bogged down in bureaucratic impediments.


Niger another flashpoint for Russia, West

Niger another flashpoint for Russia, West

New Delhi, August 13

A group of countries in West Africa with abundant mineral wealth have become the latest flashpoint in the tussle between the West and Russia.

Leaders from Niger, which has had the latest coup in West Africa, met with coup leaders of Mali and Burkina Faso to discuss the possibility of a rapid deployment of Wagner forces to the country in case the West-influenced 15-member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) tried to dislodge them by military force.

Mali, where the coup took place in 2021, has expelled the French army fighting an insurgency and has recruited fighters from Russia’s private military company, the Wagner Group, to replace them. Rallies by the ruling military junta’s civilian supporters tend to have a sea of Russian flags.

Burkina Faso, which witnessed a coup in November last year, has also expelled Western military advisors and has recruited the Wagner group. At stake are mines and reserves of critical minerals ranging from cobalt to uranium. Mali and Burkina Faso have warned that any military intervention in Niger would be considered as a declaration of war against them and would lead to their withdrawal from ECOWAS. — TNShttps://ebfcfac21fa40119f38d578060fd11fb.safeframe.googlesyndication.com/safeframe/1-0-40/html/container.html

African nations warn against military action

Mali and Burkina Faso have warned that any military intervention in Niger, which has had the latest coup in West Africa, would be considered as a declaration of war against them and would lead to their withdrawal from West-influenced ECOWAS.


Eye on China, economic pact for Indo-Pacific gathers steam

Eye on China, economic pact for Indo-Pacific gathers steam

Tribune News Service

Sandeep Dikshit

New Delhi, August 13

India will participate in a week-long meeting in Bangkok to negotiate the Indo Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) which does not have China and its three close allies from the ASEAN — Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia.

Launched by US President Joe Biden in the presence of PM Narendra Modi as well as the PMs of Australia and Japan, the IPEF is billed as the US’ repivot to the east to counter China’s narrative as the prime economic and trading power in the region.

For India, it means more business and manufacturing as members of the 14-country IPEF alliance — most of them dynamic economic powers — shift their supply chains away from China as well as exclude Beijing from the new supply chains based on emerging technologies.

India, however, has kept away from trade, one of the four pillars of the IPEF, Sources said talks would be held with the US’ Trade Pillar Chief Negotiator Sarah Ellerman in this respect.