Sanjha Morcha

The Sino-Indian disengagement deal in Eastern Ladakh is a bad deal

India’s ability to negotiate is severely constricted owing to its diminished Net National Power over the past 80 months of the NDA/BJP rule. (Photo:AP)

India’s ability to negotiate is severely constricted owing to its diminished Net National Power over the past 80 months of the NDA/BJP rule. (Photo:AP)

The Sino-Indian disengagement deal in Eastern Ladakh is a bad deal. Make no mistake it is an agreement on terms of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Unfortunately, it was perhaps the only one on the table and thus a fait accompli. India’s ability to negotiate is severely constricted owing to its diminished Net National Power over the past 80 months of the NDA/BJP rule. A ravaged economy, coupled with cut to the bone defence spending, has left us very vulnerable.

Manish Tewari is a lawyer and a former Union minister. The views expressed are personal. Twitter handle @manishtewari

The decision to disengage on the Southern bank of Pangong Tso, thereby giving up our tactical advantage on the Kailash range in return for China moving back to their base in Srijap east of Finger eight and India moving to its position on Finger three — the Dhan Singh Thapa Post, can hardly be termed as a negotiating triumph.

 The judgment not to have a broader disengagement all along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) encompassing Depsan, Gogra, Hot Springs, Naku-la and the Upper Subansiri district of Arunachal Pradesh, given that the Chinese have transgressed across our perception line of the LAC at all these places, has, in fact, de-facto legitimised the Chinese 1959 claim line.

Anyone in government with even a nodding acquaintance with the November 1960 “Report of Officials of the Government of India and the People’s Republic of China on the Boundary Question” knows that the Chinese perception line of the LAC, even according to them, lies further to the east of Finger eight. The PLA, therefore, has withdrawn only to their perceived claim line without making any substantive concession.

 It would be noteworthy to recall that on the intervening night of August 29 and 30, 2020, Indian troops had occupied commanding positions on the heights overlooking the south bank of Pangong Tso. These heights included Rezang La, Reqin La, Black Top, Hanan, Helmet, Gurung Hill, Gorkha Hill and Magar Hill.

The operative part of defence minister Rajnath Singh statement to both Houses of Parliament underscores this concession unambiguously. He said, “The agreement that we have been able to reach with the Chinese side for disengagement in the Pangong lake area envisages that both sides will cease their forward deployments in a phased, coordinated and verified manner.

 The Chinese side will keep its troop presence in the North Bank area to east of Finger 8. Reciprocally, the Indian troops will be based at their permanent base at Dhan Singh Thapa Post near Finger 3.

A similar action would be taken in the South Bank area by both sides. These are mutual and reciprocal steps and any structures that had been built by both sides since April 2020 in both North and South Bank area will be removed and the landforms will be restored. It has also been agreed to have a temporary moratorium on military activities by both sides in the North Bank, including patrolling to the traditional areas. Patrolling will be resumed only when both sides reach an agreement in diplomatic and military talks that would be held subsequently. The implementation of this agreement has started yesterday in the North and South Bank of the Pangong Lake. It will substantially restore the situation to that existing prior to commencement of the standoff last year… The House should also know that there are still some outstanding issues with regard to deployment and patrolling at some other points along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh. These will be the focus of further discussions with the Chinese side.”

 What this statement clearly means is that India has exchanged its tactical advantage on the South Bank of Pangong Tso for concessions on the North Bank. India will leave the tactically important heights it had occupied in late August.

Why did the Chinese agree to go back and now? To answer that question one needs decode a further riddle. Why did the Chinese come in the first place? This is a question no one in the Indian strategic community has ever asked with any degree of seriousness and the government, of course, runs a mile refusing both to discuss and even answer questions on the Chinese transgression both inside and outside Parliament.

 Let us rewind to the February-March of 2020. Details started emerging that the China in conjunction with the World Health Organisation (WHO) had covered up the severity of a mystery illness that broke out in Wuhan on November 19 and soon became the worst global pandemic since 1918. Given a generic “nom de guerre” Covid-19 it should have rightly been called the China Virus. This rapidly proliferating virus caused horror around the world calling into serious question Chinese pretensions of global leadership.

The Communist Party of China (CPC), thereafter, was confronted with a twin challenge of gargantuan proportions. Staving off an international scientific investigation into the origins of the coronavirus pandemic because it would have triggered of enormous demands for reparations and concurrently repair the global damage to its standing.

 It, therefore, decided to act with extreme bellicosity. It created three flashpoints. First and foremost it stoked tensions in the South China Sea by unilaterally announcing on April 18, 2020, the establishment of two new administrative structures, prompting the US Navy to launch repeated freedom of navigation operations through out 2020. Second, in April itself, it encroached deep into Indian territory at multiple points along the LAC in contravention of multiple agreements. It did not even hesitate to engage in the most medieval orgy of violence on June 15 and 16 in the Galwan valley that left 20 Indian soldiers dead. A stand-off that is continuing even today.
 On June 30, it moved on the sovereignty of Hong Kong by enacting a new security law that fundamentally transformed the “one nation two systems” paradigm, thereby sparking of another international outrage.

The intent was to send a message to the world. China would react with ruthlessness and irresponsibility if the world demanded accountability for its malfeasance qua Covid-19.

Then, very mysteriously, on February 9, 2021, a WHO investigative team, after a purported four-week investigation, gave China a virtual clean chit by publicly declaring that the coronavirus came from an animal and had not leaked from the laboratory in Wuhan. China had got its vindication. Its threat to disrupt global peace had paid off.

 

On February 11, Rajnath Singh announced the disengagement deal. Are these two developments coincidental? Absolutely not. China is a bad actor. The world will pay a price for succumbing to its blackmail in the years ahead.

Tags: india china disengagementindia china border issuesino-indian disengagementindian armypeoples liberation army

More to Chinese retreat than meets the eye

If the Dragon has blinked, it is also due to various reasons which are not directly related to India. The LAC situation would be a minor headache for China compared to the problems it faces to its east and south-east. From Senkaku islands to the South China Sea, it has an inimical neighbourhood. Taiwan continues to be a festering sore, while the Biden administration has yet to spell out any tangible policy changes vis-a-vis China.

More to Chinese retreat than meets the eye

Tactical: The sudden decision by China to pull back troops must have taken place at the explicit orders of the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. PTI

Lt Gen Pradeep Bali (retd)

Ex-commander, Sikkim-based 33 corps

After the protracted standoff between the Indian Army and the Chinese PLA that lasted over nine months in eastern Ladakh, the process of disengagement and pullback to previous positions has started. The military tension between the two neighbours had grabbed international attention even as the world was grappling with the Covid-19 pandemic.

The last six months saw a number of engagements between the two countries, both military and diplomatic, including long-drawn-out confabulations between commanders at the corps level, the highest field formation of the Army. The last such meeting on January 24 apparently led to this disengagement of frontline troops.

What has led to this pullback of forces? Chinese proclivity for inordinately dragging out territorial disputes and its intransigence are well-known. It is habituated to making extravagant claims, tenacious in maintaining these and cloaking them with plausibility by sheer persistence. This ‘grab what you can get and then try and grab some more’ policy, accompanied by bluff and bluster, are greatly favoured by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Consistent with this policy, China had deployed its troops in extreme winter opposite the Indian formations in Ladakh, indicating that the PLA was there for the long haul. The Indian Army formations stood steadfast, holding their ground.

With troops on either side having faced the harshness of extreme cold conditions, the PLA has now decided to pull back, especially in the north of Pangong Tso, to areas which the Indian Army had been insisting upon during various rounds of talks. The Raksha Mantri’s statement mentions “the Chinese side will keep its troop presence in the North Bank area to east of Finger 8… any structures built since April 2020 will be removed and landforms will be restored.”

Many Sinophiles would surely have been surprised by this sudden acquiescence by the PLA. While the operational orders to the PLA troops would have been issued by its western theatre command at Chengdu, it would only be at the explicit directions of the top leadership of the CCP in Beijing.

A quid pro quo is expected from the Indian troops, especially from the tactically advantageous positions to the south of Pangong Tso.

There are many reasons for this change in Chinese obduracy. First, the terrain-hardened Indian Army has matched it in every which way on the frozen soils of Ladakh — operationally and logistically. Though China may have mobilised adequate logistic resources, there have been inputs about unease among the PLA soldiers during the severe winter conditions. Plentiful supplies are worth little when the morale is low.

The Chinese decision-makers cannot but be aware of the Indian Army’s capabilities and long experience both in combat and sustaining viable fighting formations in extreme conditions. They seem to have realised that the Indian Army could not be stared down.

Even more importantly, the Indian government’s political line has been very clear and widely supported during this confrontation with the northern adversary. Optimum synergy between the Indian Army and the Foreign Ministry was apparent at all times, be it during various meetings at the LAC or in diplomatic statements. The Chinese had been effectively halted at Doklam in west Bhutan in June 2017 and the PLA got a much larger dose of the same medicine from the same Army in east Ladakh for the better part of 2020.

Apparently, China has realised that being the bigger power, continuation of this standoff would not be to its advantage. This was one battle it may not be able to win by contact warfare.

However, if the Dragon has blinked, it is also due to various reasons which are not directly related to India. The LAC situation would be a minor headache for China compared to the problems it faces to its east and south-east. From Senkaku islands to the South China Sea, it has an inimical neighbourhood. Taiwan continues as a festering sore below its underbelly.

The Biden administration has yet to spell out any tangible policy changes from the last regime vis-à-vis China, but whatever has emerged so far appears a continuation of dealing with it from a position of strength.

The deployment of the Nimitz carrier strike group to join the Theodore Roosevelt strike group, on the heels of a French nuclear submarine sailing in the South China Sea, which China has convinced itself it owns, would surely be disquieting to its leadership and a bigger military challenge than Ladakh.

The protests in Hong Kong have been a constant irritant for the CCP leaders and make for poor optics. Its heavy-handed repression of the restive Uyghurs in Xinjiang shows China’s leadership very unfavourably. The much-flaunted Belt and Road Initiative is increasingly mired in controversy in many countries, seen it is as a debt trap. With all this on its plate, the Chinese leadership would do well to put the Ladakh issue on the back burner.

However, this is definitely not the last of it. To draw a parallel with Doklam, though the PLA was stopped from its direct progress further south, in the last three years, it has managed to circumvent that area by building a road to the east, through western Bhutan, by which it can outflank the Jampheri ridge line. It has also been busy settling population in newly created border villages, near sensitive and disputed areas on the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh.

While weather and terrain may make such settlements unfeasible in eastern Ladakh, China will surely look for indirect ways and means to achieve its objectives of regional dominance by pursuing territorial claims, however unfounded they may be. These would go beyond the military and could encompass economic, diplomatic and non-contact (non-kinetic) means of warfare.

As the pullback on the LAC progresses, there will be a bevy of experts who may question the tactical and operational wisdom of vacating areas occupied earlier, especially south of Pangong Tso. Rest assured that the formation and theatre commanders of the Indian Army are battle hardened professionals, who know what they are doing.

For India, being ever wary of its northern neighbour is a given. The Army needs to be equipped and prepared for the long haul all along the 3,500-km Line of Actual Control. More importantly, coordination between Indian defence and diplomacy has to remain on an upward trajectory.


Terror plot foiled on Pulwama anniversary, student among 4 held

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Jammu, February 14

A terrorist plan to set off an explosion at a crowded place here on the second anniversary of the Pulwama attack was scuttled with the recovery of a powerful IED from a nursing student, who was arrested with three others, the police said today.

Proud of our forces

We pay homage to all martyrs. We are proud of our security forces. Their bravery will continue to inspire generations. — Narendra Modi, Prime Minister

Mukesh Singh, IGP, Jammu, said six pistols and 15 IEDs were seized in Samba district in another operation. Flanked by DGP Dilbag Singh, he said a youth carrying a bag was found roaming in the vicinity of the local bus stand. When searched, he was found carrying nearly 7 kg of IED.

He identified him as Suhail Bashir Shah, a resident of Newa village in Pulwama, who was pursuing nursing course in a college in Chandigarh and was assigned the task of planting the IED in Jammu by his Pakistan-based handler affiliated with Al-Badr.

Homage by farmers in Tikri

“He was given four targets, Raghunath temple, bus stand, railway station and Lakhdata bazar. He was to take a flight to Srinagar on completing his job,” the officer said. Athar Shakeel Khan, an overground worker, who was to receive him in Srinagar, was arrested.

“Suhail’s fellow student from Kashmir, Qazi Wasim, was picked up from Chandigarh while their another associate, Abid Nabi, was arrested in Srinagar,” the officer added. — PTI


BRIGADIER KULDEEP SINGH CHANDPURI, MAHAVIR CHAKRA, VASHISHT SEVA MEDAL…BY Brig Indrajeet Singh Gakhal

BRIGADIER KULDEEP SINGH CHANDPURI, MAHAVIR CHAKRA, VASHISHT SEVA MEDAL…..


…….a tribute to an outstanding Soldier by Brig Injo Gakhal

The genes of valour were tempered in the First World War, reinforced during the Second World War and decorated in the third generation at Longewala. S. Karam Singh, the grandfather, served with XXXVI Sikhs(4 SIKH-Saragarhi Battalion) in Mesopotamia in WW-1, followed by S Wattan Singh , the father who served in the St John’s Ambulance Brigade during the Second WW. Hardships and hard work are companions that build character, S Karam Singh decided to move the family from their rain dependent farming to canal irrigated fertile lands that he had invested in. In early 1938 the family left Village Chandpur Rorki (7 Kms from Garh Shankar on Noorpur Bedi road) for Chack 161/9L, Tehsil Hadappa in the Montgomery (now in Pakistan) district. S Karam singh had invested in 6 Morabas of fertile land. Life began afresh for this hard working family of Karam singh and his four brothers, Sant singh, Karam singh, Indar singh & Udham singh . Wattan singh lived in Motgomery town while the rest were at Chack 161. It was here that Kuldeep Singh was born on 22 Nov 1940, his two sisters followed. Things were beginning to look up, however, providence had other plans and Partition happened. A young seven year old saw murder, loot and rape from close quarters, till his mother, sisters and him were evacuated by the Army to Amritsar, where Col Assa Singh a family friend provided shelter. The male members of the family had to trudge back in different groups avoiding murdering marauders. The family reunited at Chandpur Rorki and set about stitching their lives together. The loss of fertile agricultural base was partly compensated when some land of repatriated Muslims was allotted to the family at Village Saroya, Tehsil Balachaur, not far from Chandpur Rorki. As elders set about building life anew, young Kuldeep set about educating himself. Studies were enjoyable but football even more, but as lives were being built over again one had to help with chores in farming. It was a hard grind, school, followed by churning the fodder machine wheel and feeding the cattle. The young shoulders were strengthening under the weight of responsibilities. This is where young Kuldeep Singh grew up, studying, helping out on the farm and when time permitted playing Football that had caught his fancy. After passing District Board High school, from Saroya, football took Kuldeep Singh to SGS Khalsa college, Mahilpur, which was considered a nursery of the game. The next leap based on football was to government college Hoshiarpur. While still undergoing graduation Kuldeep Singh became an under officer in NCC, participating in the Republic Day Parade of 1962 as part of the NCC contingent. Later the same year the Chinese invasion happened. Kuldeep singh’s leaning towards an Army career found opposition from his mother. About this time Chief Minister of Punjab S Partap Singh Kairon, visited the college in Hoshiarpur, seeking volunteers to fight the Nations enemy’s. Nothing could now stop young Kuldeep singh who joined the Officers Training Academy, Madras, passing out from there on 30 June 1963. 2 Lieutenant Kuldeep Singh Chandpuri joined 3Rd Battalion the Punjab Regiment. A promising military career had been launched.
The Indian Army was weighed down by the humiliation of the Chinese aggression, newer equipment was inducted and the entire focus was on training. For a young officer it was an ideal learning opportunity. Soon, the Indo-Pakistan September 1965 war happened and 3 Punjab was defending the Beas Bridge as the enemy armored thrust threatened to cut off a major chunk of Punjab. Being a reserve battalion 3 Punjab saw frequent changes in tasks and locations, all adding to the experience of Lt Chandpuri. In Oct 1965, the Battalion moved to Poona (now Pune) for its UN Mission assignment UNIEF in Gaza for a year. An international assignment early in ones military career always helps widen ones perspective, so it did for Capt Chandpuri. On completion of the UN assignment 3 Punjab landed in Sunderbani (J&K), from where Capt Chandpuri proceeded on Platoon weapons course, returning with an instructor grading and Best student award. On 10 Dec 1967 Capt Kuldeep singh Chandpuri married Ms Surinder Kaur whose father S Baldev Singh was a Dy Superintendent of Police in the Vigilance Department of Punjab Police. A stint as General staff officer Grade 3(GSO3) in Sikkim followed in 1968. A GSO3 being an operational appointment Capt Chandpuri learnt operational details from his association with Maj Gen Inder Gill, the General officer Commanding who had an exceptional war record. In May 1971, Capt Chandpuri was posted to 23 Punjab, then located at Bikaner with an operational role in Jaisalmer sector of the Thar desert. 23 Punjab was then commanded by Lt Col Md Khurshid Hussain also of 3 Punjab, but not particularly fond of Chandpuri. Maj Chandpuri after his promotion was assigned the command of Alfa (Sikh) company, (Punjab Battalions have a mix of two Sikh & two Dogra Companies). Soon Major Chandpuri , was detailed for a month long familiarization with the operational area, which was to pay great dividends in the war that was to follow. Maj Chandpuri diligently studied the terrain in detail going over from one sand dune to the other. After a sweat soaked month under the unbearable sun, Maj Chandpuri was sure of his bearings, little realizing that time and events were beckoning him to claim his glory. The Indo-Pak war of Dec 1971 was about to unfold.


Anticipating the war, 23 Punjab had occupied its battle positions, Major Chandpuri’s Alfa Company was defending the Logewala sweet water position, while the remaining Battalion was occupying a Battalion defended area at Sadewala. The remaining brigade was to Tanot. The Longewala position was reasonably well fortified with anti-Tank mines laid by the Pioneer section largely towards the South West . The only wire fence that circumvented the position was basically laid to keep out the wild camels that came sniffing for water. This wire was to later prove the undoing of the attackers. A section each of 81 MM Mortars, 7.62 MMG and 106 mm RCLs were in location. Having patrolled the areas around and fortified the trenches the Sikhs were confident of themselves. Intelligence inputs pointed to a Pakistani attack, sure enough on 03 Dec 1971 air strikes on all Indian airfields announced the start of the war on the western front. Lt Dharamvir, the Company Officer with Maj Chandpuri, who was keeping tabs of the enemy reported large columns of tanks and Infantry moving towards Longewala. Maj Chandpuri collected his men spoke to them about their rich martial traditions and the Gurus blessings, urging them to hold fast at all costs. “Loon day mull chakon da wayla agaya” (time to repay the Nation is upon us) he said. A series of Jaikars “Jo bole so nihal, Sat Sari Akal” reverberated amongst the vast expanse of the dunes. Maj Chandpuri realized that his motivational tirade had hit home. The battle that unfolded is well documented and gave Sunny Deol’s flagging career a great thrust. (Today when people use Sunny Deol’s name to recall Maj Chandpuri, it hurts us soldiers). The crux was holding fast despite the overwhelming enemy tank’s, artillery bombardment and infantry attacks. It needed grit and faith, both amply displayed by Maj Chandpuri. The morning after saw the Indian Air Force decimate the Pakistani tanks. It was the grit of Maj Chandpuri, his motivational skills his faith in God and his men that the battle ended the way it did. The strand of wire that had kept the camels away also kept the Pakistani’s at bay! The Maha Vir Chakra awarded to Maj KS Chandpuri was an apt recognition of his valour & professionalism.


As Col Chandpuri progressed in life, successfully commanding his Battalion, as Brigadier commanded 100 Brigade and the Punjab Regimental Centre, besides other staff appointments. In his entire military career his earthy and simple ways came to the fore. A son of the soil he remained a teetotaler and vegetarian all his life, simple of habit and strong of character was Brig Kuldeep Singh Chandpuri , MVC. His dedicated services were recognized by the Nation by way of the award of Vashisht Seva Medal. By now he had established his credentials in the Track and Field and was a listed IOA judge, frequently called upon to lend his services at international meets. His ability for hard work and constantly learn were not diminished by age. Post retirement Brig Chandpuri , MVC,VSM worked with Godrej & Boyce as their Security advisor for many years. He was on the board of directors of the PESCO and a nominated member in the UT council. In all the appointments his sincerity, simplicity and earthiness endeared him to all whose lives he touched.
On 17 Nov 2018, just five days short of his 78Th Birthday Brig Kuldeep Singh Chandpuri,MVC,VSM breathed his last. His passing is a loss to the entire soldier’s brotherhood and those whose lives he touched however fleetingly. Soldiers may fade away, but their valour lives forever. Brig Kuldeep Singh Chandpuri,MVC,VSM Amar Rahain and may the noble soul rest in the heaven above till eternity !!
Brig Indrajeet Singh Gakhal


30-member parliamentary panel on defence to visit Galwan Valley, Pangong Tso

Indian and Chinese armoured columns pulling back from Rechin La on the southern side of Pangong Tso Wednesday | Credit: Army

ndian and Chinese armoured columns pulling back from Rechin La on the southern side of Pangong Tso Wednesday | Credit: Army

New Delhi: The parliamentary standing committee on defence intends to visit the Galwan Valley and the Pangong lake in the eastern Ladakh region which has been witness to a violent stand-off between the troops of India and China, sources said.

However, it may seek the permission of the government before visiting the strategically-located areas, they said.

The 30-member committee, chaired by senior BJP leader and former Union Minister Jual Oram and of which Congress leader Rahul Gandhi is a member, intends to visit the eastern Ladakh region in the last week of May or June, the sources said on Friday.

The decision to visit these areas was taken in the panel’s latest meeting, they said. Gandhi did not attend it.

The panel’s visit to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) depends on the approval from the government, the sources added.

After a nine-month standoff, militaries of Indian and China reached an agreement on disengagement in the north and south banks of Pangong lake that mandates both sides to cease forward deployment of troops in a “phased, coordinated and verifiable” manner.

On Thursday, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh made a detailed statement in Parliament on the disengagement pact.

According to the agreement, China has to pull back its troops to east of Finger 8 areas in the northern bank while the Indian personnel will be based at their permanent base at Dhan Singh Thapa Post near Finger 3 in the region.

Similar action will take place on the south bank of the lake as well, Singh said.

India has not “conceded” any territory to China by firming up an agreement on the disengagement process in Pangong Tso in eastern Ladakh, and other outstanding “problems” including in Depsang, Hot Springs ad Gogra will be taken up at the upcoming talks between military commanders of the two countries, the defence ministry said on Friday.

The statement by the ministry came hours after Congress leader Rahul Gandhi alleged that the government has “ceded” Indian territory to China and raised questions over the agreement on the disengagement process.

The ministry also dubbed as “categorically false” the assertion that Indian territory is up to Finger 4 in the Pangong Tso area, adding the permanent posts of both sides in the area are “longstanding and well-established”.

“India has not conceded any territory as a result of this agreement. On the contrary, it has enforced observance and respect for LAC and prevented any unilateral change in the status quo,” the ministry said in the strongly-worded statement.

The MEA also said the two countries have agreed to convene the 10th round of senior commanders meeting within 48 hours after complete disengagement in the Pangong Lake area to address the remaining issues, and added that no date has been set for Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on India-China border affairs.

The agreement on disengagement in the north and south banks of Pangong lake mandates both Chinese and Indian sides to “cease” forward deployment of troops in a “phased, coordinated and verifiable” manner.


Also read: India hasn’t ceded territory, Depsang issue will be taken up in next round — defence ministry

 


In boost to Atmanirbhar Bharat, security forces to get India-made Israeli assault rifles

Special forces and others using these assault rifles used to import them from the Israel Weapons Industry, a former Israeli government firm that was privatised in 2005.

The Tavor family of rifles in India| PLR Systems

New Delhi: In a boost to the ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ initiative, India-made Israeli Tavor X 95 rifles are now being supplied to central forces and various state police teams, ThePrint has learnt.

Until now, special forces and others using these assault rifles used to import them from the Israel Weapons Industry (IWI), a former Israeli government firm that was privatised in 2005.

The Indian Army has also issued a fresh Request for Information (RFI) to fast-track procurement (FTP) of 93,895 carbines, after the last process, under which UAE firm Caracal was shortlisted, was scrapped.

The Army has issued RFI to all major foreign small arms manufacturers, including Caracal, Colt, SiG Sauer, Beretta and Kalashnikov. But the significant change in FTP this time is that the RFI has also been sent to multiple Indian firms like the Ordinance Factory Board, Reliance Defence, SSS Defence, Bharat Forge of the Kalyani Group and the Adani-PLR Systems, besides others.

“Under the FTP process, it is usually ‘Buy Global’ category, as the forces buy a global product off the shelf which is then supplied to, in a specific short period. But this time, Indian firms will be participating in the FTP process for carbines,” said a source in the defence and security establishment.

The front runner is likely to be the Adani-PLR Systems, which is fielding the Israeli Galil Ace 21 carbine that is now manufactured in India.

The Ace 21 was chosen by the Army in an earlier attempt (2013-14) to buy carbines, but the deal could not go through because of single vendor situation, a development which is not allowed under the Indian defence procurement rules.

The IWI, however, did not take part in the FTP (2017) because it was eyeing a deal for assault rifles (won by an American firm) and the Light Machine Guns (LMGs) — that it had won and is in the process of delivering to the Army.

Sources said that a large tender for over 3 lakh carbines is also in the process and could be issued later this year. This would be a ‘Make in India’ initiative.

ThePrint, in September last year, had reported that the Caracal deal was being scrapped. By December, it was reported that the UAE firm had offered to manufacture them in India.


Made in Indian Tavors

The Adani-PLR Systems also manufactures the 56×45 mm chambered Tavor X 95 which are used by the special forces and others. These rifles come with ‘Made in India’ markings and were showcased during the recently-held Aero India 2021.

Sources said that the CISF has procured these ‘Made in India’ rifles, along with other state police forces. They also said that Adani-PLR Systems is in the process of setting up India’s first private barrel manufacturing plant in Gwalior. With this, the indigenous manufacture of rifles will go up to about 75 per cent.

The Gwalior facility would be functional by the end of this year and it is expected that other Indian private small arms players will be using it, rather than importing barrels from outside the country.


Also read: Want more cooperation with India in aerospace industry, top Ukrainian official says

 


Free market push may hit small farmers

Unlike the American farmers, the protesting Indian farmers are not using the word ‘parity’. What they are demanding is an income assurance by way of an assured price. Knowing that farmers everywhere have suffered the brutality of markets, farmers want MSP to be made a legal right. This will impact trade policy, but that is a small price compared to the loss of livelihood millions of farmers suffer year after year.

Free market push may hit small farmers

Protest on wheels: The use of the tractor as a symbol of farm discontent is a throwback to the 1979 Tractorcade in the US. PTI

Devinder Sharma

Food & Agriculture Specialist

On a cold winter morning, hundreds of tractors had rolled down the streets of Washington DC. This was on February 5, 1979, when more than 900 tractors (some estimates say more than 1,500) had descended on the American capital to protest against policies which depressed farm prices, resulting in declining income, and

to demand a guaranteed farm income to enable them to stay on the farm.

Forty-two years later, the iconic farm movement — unprecedented in recent Indian history — echoes the same sentiments, with almost similar demands.

The American Agricultural Movement (AAM) — as it was called — arose after the 1977 US Farm Bill failed to protect farm prices at a time of surplus food production. While commodity prices continued to decline, farmers found it difficult to cover even the cost of production. This resulted in small farmers increasingly quitting agriculture, and in the process leading to soaring auction of farm lands. Farmers argued that the government was more concerned about keeping food prices low for consumers than caring for farmers. Sounds familiar, isn’t it?

Wheat price for instance, when adjusted for inflation, was lower than what the American farmers had received after the Second World War. Another study showed that adjusted for inflation, the US farm income in 1976 was less than the annual farm income during the Great Depression years in the 1930s.

It was then that a group of farmers met at Campo, in Colorado, and decided to launch a series of strikes across state capitals to show how the rural family structures were crumbling, increasingly leading to agricultural population declining to obscurity. Using the tractor as a symbol of farm discontent, thousands of tractors were used in the next two years to demonstrate in the state capitals. These tractor demonstrations — which began to be known as Tractorcade — helped take the message of agrarian distress to the urban population, which knew little about the economic disparities plaguing rural America.

According to the US Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, what the farmers wanted was ‘100 per cent parity on domestic and exported agriculture products, all agriculture products contracted at 100 per cent parity, food imports prohibited until domestic supplies were used to fulfil domestic demand, agriculture policy announcements made in advance to give farmers time to adjust production, and a way to give farmers an influence in policy matters’. In other words, American farmers were seeking a price assurance, and even wanted protection at times of trade distortions.

When I look at the demands of the protesting Indian farmers, and compare with what the American farmers were asking for, I see a similarity. While the Indian farmers are not using the word ‘parity’, what they are demanding is an income assurance by way of an assured price. Knowing that farmers everywhere have suffered the brutality of markets, farmers want Minimum Support Price (MSP) to be made a legal right. This will definitely impact trade policy, but that is a small price compared to the loss of livelihood that millions of farmers suffer year after year. When they ask for repealing the three Central laws, which were pushed in without any meaningful consultation with stakeholders, they are in reality seeing a role in formulating future farm policies.

The historic 1979 Tractorcade that stormed Washington DC had attracted farmers from across the country. In an interview, Beverly Anderson, probably the only woman who drove a tractor from 1,300 miles away, recalls: “Sometimes, the tractorcaders were fed by people of the communities where they stayed, and people took notice of them as they drove down the highways. In that respect, their mission was a success — the contacts allowed farmers to tell their stories — that wheat was selling for about the same price as it had at the end of World War II, while production prices increased, that it cost more to put in a crop than they would realise at sale, and that failure of the family farm system would make the country dependent upon imported food.”

Initially, the residents were unhappy, wanted the farmers to be moved out. But then, it so happened that the city was hit with a blizzard and life came to a halt. Public transport was all shut down. It was at that time farmers used the tractors to clear the streets, pull out the cars from under the snow, and take doctors and nurses to hospitals and so on. This helped develop bonhomie with the urban population that began to see farmers as fellow citizens. For several weeks, farmers would drive their tractors daily through various parts of the city appraising people of their plight. Some farmers even stayed back for months.

The then American President, Jimmy Carter, himself a farmer, was sympathetic. “I don’t know of any other group that has suffered more from inflation than farmers,” he had reportedly said. The bureaucracy of course was not convinced. They had more faith in the markets.

As Anderson reminisced: “We were successful in telling the story of the plight of the American farmer. As far as any legislation that helped, not really.”

If only the policy makers had listened to the farmers’ woes, and provided them with at least a guaranteed price, American farming wouldn’t have been left devastated, with farm lands gobbled up, forcing small farmers to move out. Intensive agriculture has destroyed the soil, polluted the groundwater, and chemical pesticides have contaminated the food chain. With the real cost of cheap feed externalised, American agriculture is crying for regeneration. Decades later, the headline of a Time cover story (November 27, 2019) says it all: “They’re trying to wipe us off the map’. Small American farmers are nearing extinction.”

There are lessons here. Free market orthodoxy hasn’t helped increase farm incomes in America, and for that matter, anywhere in the world. It has only pushed small farmers out of agriculture. To make farming an economically viable and sustainable enterprise for small farmers, India needs to carefully listen to the protesting farmers. There may not be another opportunity again.


A tribute to Major Hoshiar Singh, Param Vir from 3 Grenadiers The Tribune begins a series on gallantry award winners of 1971 India-Pak War

A tribute to Major Hoshiar Singh, Param Vir from 3 Grenadiers

A photograph of Maj Hoshiar Singh, who retired as Colonel

Lt Col Dilbag Singh Dabas (Retd)

Col Hoshiar Singh, PVC, undoubtedly, is a shining jewel in 3rd Grenadiers’ crown but old-timers from 2nd Jat Battalion too claim him as theirs, and rightly so; they fondly refer to him as “Mhara Hoshiare”.

Maj Hoshiar Singh being awardedthe Param Vir Chakra by President VV Giri.

Son of Ch Hira Singh Dahiya, Hoshiar Singh was born on May 5, 1936, at Sisana village in Rohtak district of undivided Punjab. Sisana is now in Sonepat. After matriculation from Jat Heroes Memorial High School, Rohtak, and first year at Jat College, also in Rohtak, he was enrolled as a Sepoy in 2nd Jat Battalion (Mooltan). An outstanding volleyball player, Hoshiar Singh was referred to as Hoshiare by his teammates. For possessing leadership and officer-like attributes, Hoshiare was selected for the Army Cadet College and commissioned into 3rd Battalion of the Grenadiers in June 1963.

3 Grenadiers, one of the oldest infantry battalions, was raised on August 4, 1768, at Bombay as 1st Sepoy Battalion. Since then, it has fought gloriously in all the wars, inland and overseas. The impressive tally of the gallantry awards won by its tall and sturdy Grinders (Grenadiers are commonly referred to as Grinders) is testimony to the stuff they are made of. Hoshiar Singh carried forward the rich legacy and took it to the highest level by earning the Param Vir Chakra during the Battle of Basantar (Jarpal) in the 1971 third round with Pakistan in the western theatre.

The Battle of Basantar encompasses the entire gamut of battles and skirmishes that took place in the Shakargarh sector, that includes ‘Jarpal Complex’ and the surrounding areas. It was an area of strategic importance. If the enemy continued to hold Jarpal and the area around, it would threaten the Pathankot-Jammu road, the lifeline of Jammu and Kashmir. 3 Grenadiers was tasked with capturing Jarpal across Basantar nullah before the enemy reinforced the defences around it.

It was for his exploits during this iconic battle to capture and hold Jarpal that Hoshiar Singh, now a Major commanding Charlie company of 3 Grenadiers, was awarded the PVC, the highest gallantry decoration in the face of the enemy.

The battle account reads:

“On December 15, 1971, 3 Grenadiers Battalion was given the task of establishing a bridgehead across Basantar river in Shakargarh sector. For accomplishment of the mission, the enemy locality named Jarpal had to be captured first. Major Hoshiar Singh, who was commanding the left forward company, was ordered to attack and capture Jarpal, which was well fortified and held in strength by the enemy. During the assault, his company came under intense artillery shelling and effective crossfire from the enemy medium machine guns. Undeterred, Major Hoshiar Singh led the charge and captured the objective after a fierce hand-to-hand fight.

The enemy reacted sharply and put in three successive counter-attacks supported by armour on December 16. Major Hoshiar Singh, unmindful of heavy shelling and tank fire, went from trench to trench motivating his men and encouraging them to remain steadfast and fight. Inspired by his dauntless leadership, his company repulsed all counter-attacks, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. Again, on December 17, the enemy launched another massive counter-attack with a battalion supported by medium artillery fire. Though seriously wounded, Major Hoshiar Singh, with total disregard to personal safety, continued to inspire his men by going from platoon to platoon even under intense artillery shelling.

When an enemy artillery shell landed near the machine gun post seriously injuring the crew and rendering the machine gun inoperative, Major Hoshiar Singh, realising the importance of machine gun fire, immediately rushed to the machine gun pit and though seriously wounded, manned the gun inflicting heavy casualties onto the enemy. The counter-attack was repulsed yet again and the enemy retreated, leaving behind 85 dead, including Lieutenant Colonel Akram Raja, their commanding officer, and three other officers. Major Hoshiar Singh, though seriously wounded, remained with his Charlie company and refused to be evacuated till the ceasefire.

Throughout the operation, Major Hoshiar Singh displayed most conspicuous gallantry, indomitable fighting spirit and unparalleled leadership.”

From the Battle of Basantar emerged not just one but two Param Virs; on one flank of Jarpal, while Major Hoshiar Singh was beating back infantry counter-attacks one after another, on the other, a young subaltern, Second Lieutenant Arun Khetrapal of Poona Horse, took on the enemy armour within 200 yards and knocked down the enemy tanks one after another till his own tank was hit and the fearless boy from Poona Horse went down with his tank named ‘Famagusta’, posthumously earning the topmost honour for his regiment.

After the war, the Indian Army did well to post Major Hoshiar Singh, PVC, to the Indian Military Academy as company commander, Sinhgarh Company, where he proved to be a tremendous inspiration for the cadets and turned the company into the champion company for much of his tenure there. Later, as Colonel, he commanded 3 Grenadiers, his own battalion, with distinction.

After 35 glorious years in olive greens, the Param Vir from 3 Grenadiers retired in 1988. He made Jaipur his second home but frequently spent time in his village Sisana and motivated the young generation to continue to follow the good old Haryanvi tradition of being part of the defence services.

After a brief illness, Col Hoshiar Singh, PVC, breathed his last on December 6, 1998. The ace volleyballer Hoshiare of 2nd Jat and the fearless Hoshiar Singh of 3rd Grenadiers had been an epitome of regimental spirit. All his three sons consciously attempted to follow in his footsteps. Two made the grade and were commissioned into Grenadiers. One even availed the parental claim and served in 3 Grenadiers, his father’s battalion, the PVC Battalion.

Col Hoshiar Singh, PVC, undoubtedly, is a shining jewel in 3rd Grenadiers’ crown but old-timers from 2nd Jat Battalion too claim him as theirs, and rightly so; they fondly refer to him as “Mhara Hoshiare”.


Param Vir Chakra

Established: A draft royal warrant was prepared in October 1948 for the institution of Param Vir Chakra in the name of the British sovereign as, during the dominion period, such a step would have been necessary to give the award status within the Commonwealth. On further consideration, this course was abandoned and the medal was created and was instituted by the President of India on January 26, 1950, with the award effective from August 15, 1947.

Eligiblility: Officers, men and women of all ranks of the Indian military, paramilitary and members of the nursing services of the Armed Forces.

Awarded for: The most conspicuous act of bravery, or some daring or pre-eminent act of valour or self-sacrifice in the face of the enemy on land, at sea or in the air. The decoration may also be awarded posthumously.

The award of the decoration carries with it the right to use PVC as a post-nominal abbreviation. Provision has also been made for the award of a Bar for second (or subsequent) award of the PVC.

First recipient: Major Som Nath Sharma of 4th Battalion of the Kumaon Infantry Regiment.

Youngest awardee: Grenadier

(now Honorary Lieutenant) Yogender Singh Yadav, the living legend. He was just 19 years and two months old when he displayed the stuff he was made of during the Kargil war in 1999.

21 recipients: 20 from the Army

and one from the Air Force. However, no PVC awardee has so far won the award the second time.


Toll plazas in Punjab shut, uncertainty looms over mandatory use of FASTag

Toll plazas in Punjab shut, uncertainty looms over mandatory use of FASTag

Toll collection in 25 toll plazas, including both public-funded and BOT (built, operate and transfer) and on national highways (NHs) in Punjab have been directly or indirectly affected due to farmers’ protests since October last year.

Vijay C Roy

Tribune News Service

Chandigarh, February 15

Although the Union Ministry of Road Transportation and Highways has said the Radio Frequency Identification tag (FASTag) will become mandatory from Monday midnight and vehicles without it will have to pay twice the toll, its implementation is uncertain in Punjab as currently all plazas in the state are closed due to farmers’ protest.

“Since the toll collection in all the plazas is suspended, uncertainty prevails over the implementation of this decision. Once toll collection resumes only then we will be able to implement it,” said a senior NHAI official.

Toll collection in 25 toll plazas, including both public-funded and BOT (built, operate and transfer) and on national highways (NHs) in Punjab have been directly or indirectly affected due to farmers’ protests since October last year. It is worth mentioning that members of different farm unions forced all 51 toll plazas across Haryana and Punjab to close, giving a free pass to motorists.

However, the official said except Punjab and Haryana, FASTag would be made compulsory from Monday midnight across the country where the operations had not been disrupted.

The government said the complete migration to FASTag would help promote fee payment through the digital mode, reduce waiting time and fuel consumption, and provide a seamless passage through the plazas.

Vehicle owners can buy FASTag for their vehicles at certain toll plazas across the state by producing identification and vehicle registration documents. They can also buy it online on e-commerce portals and on the websites of certain banks such as HDFC Bank, SBI, ICICI Bank, Axis Bank, Kotak Bank, etc.

Customers can recharge their FASTag digital wallet using Internet banking, credit and debit cards or UPI.

Multiple options for recharge

Customers can recharge their FASTag digital wallet using Internet banking, credit and debit cards or UPI. Vehicle owners can buy FASTag for their vehicles at certain toll plazas across the state by producing identification and vehicle registration documents.