The Sino-Indian disengagement deal in Eastern Ladakh is a bad deal. Make no mistake it is an agreement on terms of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Unfortunately, it was perhaps the only one on the table and thus a fait accompli. India’s ability to negotiate is severely constricted owing to its diminished Net National Power over the past 80 months of the NDA/BJP rule. A ravaged economy, coupled with cut to the bone defence spending, has left us very vulnerable.
The decision to disengage on the Southern bank of Pangong Tso, thereby giving up our tactical advantage on the Kailash range in return for China moving back to their base in Srijap east of Finger eight and India moving to its position on Finger three — the Dhan Singh Thapa Post, can hardly be termed as a negotiating triumph.
Anyone in government with even a nodding acquaintance with the November 1960 “Report of Officials of the Government of India and the People’s Republic of China on the Boundary Question” knows that the Chinese perception line of the LAC, even according to them, lies further to the east of Finger eight. The PLA, therefore, has withdrawn only to their perceived claim line without making any substantive concession.
The operative part of defence minister Rajnath Singh statement to both Houses of Parliament underscores this concession unambiguously. He said, “The agreement that we have been able to reach with the Chinese side for disengagement in the Pangong lake area envisages that both sides will cease their forward deployments in a phased, coordinated and verified manner.
A similar action would be taken in the South Bank area by both sides. These are mutual and reciprocal steps and any structures that had been built by both sides since April 2020 in both North and South Bank area will be removed and the landforms will be restored. It has also been agreed to have a temporary moratorium on military activities by both sides in the North Bank, including patrolling to the traditional areas. Patrolling will be resumed only when both sides reach an agreement in diplomatic and military talks that would be held subsequently. The implementation of this agreement has started yesterday in the North and South Bank of the Pangong Lake. It will substantially restore the situation to that existing prior to commencement of the standoff last year… The House should also know that there are still some outstanding issues with regard to deployment and patrolling at some other points along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh. These will be the focus of further discussions with the Chinese side.”
Why did the Chinese agree to go back and now? To answer that question one needs decode a further riddle. Why did the Chinese come in the first place? This is a question no one in the Indian strategic community has ever asked with any degree of seriousness and the government, of course, runs a mile refusing both to discuss and even answer questions on the Chinese transgression both inside and outside Parliament.
The Communist Party of China (CPC), thereafter, was confronted with a twin challenge of gargantuan proportions. Staving off an international scientific investigation into the origins of the coronavirus pandemic because it would have triggered of enormous demands for reparations and concurrently repair the global damage to its standing.
The intent was to send a message to the world. China would react with ruthlessness and irresponsibility if the world demanded accountability for its malfeasance qua Covid-19.
Then, very mysteriously, on February 9, 2021, a WHO investigative team, after a purported four-week investigation, gave China a virtual clean chit by publicly declaring that the coronavirus came from an animal and had not leaked from the laboratory in Wuhan. China had got its vindication. Its threat to disrupt global peace had paid off.
On February 11, Rajnath Singh announced the disengagement deal. Are these two developments coincidental? Absolutely not. China is a bad actor. The world will pay a price for succumbing to its blackmail in the years ahead.