Sanjha Morcha

Six insurgents killed in encounter in Arunachal Pradesh

Six insurgents killed in encounter in Arunachal Pradesh

Six NSCN (IM) insurgents were killed in an encounter with security forces in Khonsa area of Arunachal Pradesh on Saturday. PTI photo

Six insurgents killed in encounter in Arunachal Pradesh

One soldier of Assam Rifles was injured in the operation, condition stable

New Delhi, July 11

Six NSCN (IM) insurgents were killed in an encounter with security forces in Khonsa area of Arunachal Pradesh early on Saturday morning, military sources said.

One soldier of Assam Rifles was injured in the operation and his condition was stated to be stable, they said.

Khonsa is in Tirap district of Arunachal Pradesh, and at a distance of 50 km from Tinsukia, a leading industrial town in Assam.

The encounter took place at around 4:30 am, the sources said, adding six weapons along with “war-like stores” were recovered from the area

The operation was launched by the Assam Rifles based on specific intelligence inputs that armed insurgents were present in the general area of Khonsa in Tirap district of Arunachal Pradesh.

“At approximately 4:30 hours, an operational contact was established with the NSCN (IM) insurgents in the area. In the ensuing firefight, six insurgents were neutralised,” said a source.

Arms and ammunition recovered after six NSCN (IM) insurgents were killed in an encounter with security forces in Khonsa area of Arunachal Pradesh on Saturday. PTI photo

The National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah) or NSCN (IM) is a militant outfit fighting for a separate homeland for Naga people for last several decades.

It has been holding talks with the Centre for resolution of the vexed six-decade-long Naga issue. PTI


China may win, without fighting | Opinion

The present path aids China’s strategy of attrition, friction, containment to harass, encircle and weigh India down

The present path aids China’s strategy of attrition, friction, containment to harass, encircle and weigh India down(REUTERS)

China’s territorial revisionism has been unrelenting. Under Mao Zedong, China more than doubled its size by annexing Tibet and Xinjiang, making it the world’s fourth- largest country in area. Under Xi Jinping, China’s expansionism increasingly threatens its neighbours, big and small. Xi’s regime has just opened a new territorial front against one of the world’s smallest countries, Bhutan, by disputing its eastern borders.

In this light, the outcome of China’s aggression against India will have an important bearing on Asian security. If the current India-China military disengagement ends up like the 2017 Doklam disengagement in making China the clear winner, an emboldened Xi regime will likely become a greater threat to neighbours.

China’s strategy after its disastrous 1979 invasion of Vietnam has been to win without fighting. Deception, concealment and surprise have driven China’s repeated use of force — from seizing the Johnson Reef in 1988 and the Mischief Reef in 1995 to occupying the Scarborough Shoal in 2012 and now vantage locations in Ladakh. It has changed the South China Sea’s geopolitical map without firing a shot or incurring any international costs.

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China has displayed its art of deception even in its disengagement process with India. The first accord of June 6 to disengage collapsed after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) erected structures on Indian territory and then ambushed and killed Indian Army men on verification patrol. The disengagement process restarted after Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi seemed to let China off the hook with his June 19 speech at the all-party meeting. But the fresh process became a ruse for PLA to encroach on two new Indian areas — the Depsang Y-Junction; and the Galwan Valley site of the ambush killings.

India and China are now in their third disengagement series. But while the previous two abortive rounds followed military-level talks, the latest cycle is being driven politically. We now know that Modi’s July 3 Ladakh visit, and his tough words there, were essentially designed to create domestic political space for his government to seek de-escalation with China. Barely 48 hours after his visit, India and China hammered out a disengagement deal.

Will the latest deal stick? Having encroached on key areas that overlook India’s defences, PLA is sitting pretty. A full return to status quo ante as sought by India seems remote, thanks to India’s own mixed signals. Moreover, by encroaching on additional areas behind the previous disengagement facade, China has armed itself with greater leverage to impose a revised status quo, including by applying the precept that “possession is nine-tenths of the law”.

Disengagement (pullback of rival forces from close proximity), if not de-escalation (ending hostilities through demobilisation of forces), meshes well with China’s interest in presenting India a fait accompli. Removing the threat of an Indian counteroffensive or Indian tit-for-tat land grab will help China win without fighting.

This explains why China has accepted disengagement — but on its terms. This is illustrated in the Galwan Valley, where India has pulled back from its own territory and created a “buffer zone” on its side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). These steps, though temporary, create a new, China-advantageous status quo that PLA could seek to enforce because it keeps India out of China’s newly-claimed zone — the Galwan Valley.

The risk that, like at Doklam, the current disengagement may not end well for India is high. Instead of demonstrating strength and resolve, India has displayed zeal to end the stand-off, despite its armed forces being mobilised for possible war.

At a time when the international environment is beginning to turn against China, India could have prolonged the stand-off until winter to compel restoration of status quo ante. But, instead, it has kicked status quo ante down the road and settled merely for disengagement. This allows China to hold on its core territorial gains and trade the marginal occupied territories for Indian concessions, as part of its well-known “advance 10 miles and retreat six miles” strategy.

Far from imposing military costs, India has shied away even from trade actions against the aggressor, as if to preserve the option of another Modi-Xi summit. India’s steps so far (banning Chinese mobile apps and announcing an intent to restrict Chinese investment in some areas) have been designed to assuage public anger at home, but without imposing substantive costs on Beijing or damaging bilateral relations.

In 1967, a weak India, while recovering from the 1962 and 1965 wars, gave China a bloody nose. But in 2017 and again now, after its soldiers displayed extraordinary bravery in tackling China’s aggression, a nuclear-armed India hastily sought disengagement. Its decision-makers remain loath to fundamentally change the China policy even when faced with aggression.

Bite by bite, China has been nibbling away at India’s borderlands, even as successive Indian PMs have sought to appease it. When political calculations trump military factors and a nation lives by empty rhetoric, it can win neither war nor peace.

The present path risks locking India in a “no war, no peace” situation with China and imposing mounting security costs. This path aids China’s time-tested strategy of attrition, friction and containment to harass, encumber, encircle, deceive and weigh India down.

If India wants Himalayan peace, it must make China pay for its aggression to help create a deterrent effect. The present aggression — the most serious since the 1960s — resulted from India letting China off the hook too easily in 2017, allowing it to capture Doklam. And if China emerges the winner from the current crisis, its next aggression could be worse. Only a chastened China saddled with high costs and loss of face will rein in its aggressive expansionism.

 Brahma Chellaney is a geostrategist.
The views expressed are personal

How PM Modi called China’s bluff in Ladakh, writes Shishir Gupta

Prime Minister Narendra Modi interacts with the Indian troops during his visit to the forward post at Nimu in Ladakh

Prime Minister Narendra Modi interacts with the Indian troops during his visit to the forward post at Nimu in Ladakh(PTI)

After the successful outcome of the July 6 meeting between National Security Adviser and Special Representative for boundary talks, Ajit Doval, and his counterpart and Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, there has been a palpable lowering of tensions between the Indian and Chinese armies along the 3,488 km Line of Actual Control (LAC). The aggressive Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has thinned its presence at Finger Four in Pangong Tso, has withdrawn from forward positions to base camps in the Galwan sector, and is on the way back to its April positions in the Gogra and Hot Springs area. Disengagement has begun with de-escalation to follow in next three weeks — three divisions (30,000 troops) each of the Indian and Chinese armies are still facing each other from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh.

There is a certain amount of satisfaction among national security planners that the Indian military stood up to PLA, but the massive bilateral erosion of trust after the June 15 flare-up has convinced the Narendra Modi government that Beijing will be back on LAC, perhaps at Depsang Plains in Ladakh, next summer. For a country which believes that it is a global superpower, 2017 Doklam and 2020 Galwan are mere tactical mistakes in power projection and ambition.

That Prime Minister (PM) Modi will think a hundred times before he does a Wuhan or Chennai connect again with paramount leader Xi Jinping is akin to a traffic ticket for the Middle Kingdom. For a rampaging China, it is only the big picture that matters.

The Chinese expansionist posture in Ladakh is intertwined with the country’s plans in the South China Sea — something that is evident by looking at the world map. Beijing wants the Shyok river alignment to be the border with India in Ladakh so that the multi-billion dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is further away from the Indian military positions, and also to ensure it gets a better all-weather route linking the Tibet Highway in Aksai Chin to the Karakoram highway south of the Khunjerab pass.

With Pakistan now reduced to a client State of China, it is through the port of Balochistan that the PLA Navy will dominate the oil trade in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. The Chinese base in Djibouti and Beijing’s huge influence on Africa’s eastern seaboard will allow it to dominate the sea route from Suez Canal. The strategic location of both the Gwadar and Djibouti bases makes this amply evident to any military planner.

The Chinese military’s ambition in the South China Sea is not only limited to dominating more than half of world trade passing through the Malacca, Lombard and Sunda Straits, but to also capture Taiwan as part of One China Policy to, then, break out from its backyard and contest the dominance of the Pacific Ocean with the United States (US) Japan and Australia. The military key to this posture is the presence of ballistic missile firing Chinese nuclear submarines at Yulin Naval Base at Hainan Islands, just north of Vietnam.

As a military plan, all this looked good and achievable, till such time India, under PM Modi, called the Ladakh bluff and the mighty US Navy simultaneously pincered Beijing by challenging the PLA Navy in the South China Sea. Currently, supercarriers USS Ronald Reagan and USS Nimitz are not only orchestrating a full spectrum war game in the South China Sea but also daring Beijing’s mouthpieces who threaten to use DF-21 D and DF-26 “ship killer” nuclear missiles on carriers. The US task forces now dominate all the exit routes from the East and South China sea in Miyako, Bashi Channel and Luzon Strait through which the global internet cables pass undersea.

Asean countries are also unhappy with China, and Japan is finally standing up to Beijing in the Senkaku Island dispute. Australia and Canada have called out China, and Europe has finally woken up to the reality of a Communist State. If one were to look at the big picture, then the global pushback against China was inspired by the Galwan fightback and followed by US President Donald Trump translating America’s often stated but never implemented Asian Pivot objectives on the sea. The plight of the Buddhist people of Tibet and Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang under the traditionally xenophobic Han Chinese is back on the global agenda, and suddenly things don’t look so good for the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party.

Rather than distracting countries from the global fight against the marauding coronavirus, which originated from Wuhan, by indulging in a war dance in Ladakh and the South China Sea, China should be at the forefront of the battle against the pandemic. It needs to de-escalate from both the areas and not wait for another opportunistic strike when the world is focused on US Presidential elections in November 2020 as it did against India in 1962 taking advantage of Cuban Missile Crisis.

Taking a leaf out of past paramount rulers, China needs to settle the borders on basis of the 2005 agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles of the India-China Boundary Question. President Xi surely understands the popularity of Modi, whom much of India followed faithfully through the painful demonetisation and total lockdown. But the global bully that China has become, it understands only the language of power, and the economic, military might and technological superiority of the US. Had the India-US nuclear deal been nixed by opponents in India, the 2005 border agreement would have never come through. Beijing will not forget 2020, the year of the metal rat in the Chinese calendar, in a hurry. The world, particularly India and the happy tiny kingdom of Bhutan, will hear the echoes of this in the future.


MAJOR HARBANS SINGH VSM , SNOW TIGER TROPHY UNVIELD BY KULDEEP SINGH VAID MLA, GILL CONSTITUENCY

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 SNOW TIGER TROPY INSTITUTED/UNVIELD AT VILLAGE
KHERA BY S. KULDEEP SINGH , MLA ,GILL CONSTITUENCY ON 06 JUL 2020.
 
It was a proud moment for Khera Village to remember Late Major Harbans Singh VSM , a farmer’s son, who was known as true Bengal Sapper and called as SNOW TIGER , instituted a Trophy in his memory and named it as
MAJOR HARBANS SINGH SNOW TIGER TROPHY”
WAS unveiled by Gill Constituency MLA S. Kuldeep Singh Vaid on 06 Jul 2020 at the Snow Tiger Complex of village Khera.
   It was a recognition of his dedicated services, with outstanding determination, Exemplanary courage ,acumenship,technical knowledge cum mechanical knowledge of snow clearing Russian machinery  along with his personnel example to his troops kept Leh-Zozilla road ( Supply line) open and kept it cleared from heavy snow during China 1962 war.

 Major Harbans Singh VSM  S/O S Hardit Singh,Lambardar born on  12 Jan 1919.Completed Matriculation from  Malwa Khalsa High School,Ldh. Joined army on 19Nov 1932 as Sepoy in BEG &Centre Roorkee.  Got commissioned as officer on 15 Dec1945.  He participated in WW-II (Burma), was awarded Burma Star & WW-II medals. In 1961 posted to Ladakh as Major with 653 Engr Plant Coy.

 During China War1962, he kept Leh-Zozilla road clear of heavy snow. Working 16 Hrs daily standing in snow that Army personnel’s starting calling him “SNOW TIGER” in Army Circles . He was  awarded VSM on 11 Oct 1963 for distinguished, dedicated service during china war. He was the 3rd Bengal Sapper officer who was decorated with VSM.

He was well known mechanical Engineer, written books on maintenance of dozers/caterpillars/cranes, was also known as Master of plant machinery. He dismantled a dozer ,loaded in helicopter, assembled at top of mountain and constructed helipad shows his expertise and mechanical knowledge that even Roorkee University Professors, Army Workshop officer consulted him on Dozer repairs. He repaired Dozers that even Russian delegation came in 1964 to see his repair work on their machinery.

Posted to GREF Centre Roorkee in 1963 and raised Border road pioneer companies. He recruited almost 500 youth of Distt Ldh in army & Border Roads from Vill khera,,Lehra,Poheer,Gagrana,Laltala,Gujarwal,Falewal,Kalar,Siaar,Selon,Batari etc. Still many are alive and remember him.

He was the first Bengal Sapper to carryout Para Jump & completed 21 para Jumps. A good hockey player. An officer with less words and more work. On leave he helped his father in agriculture. A kind hearted personality with vast knowledge of machinery. He left for heavenly abode on 19 Jan 1974.

His sustained hard work of working 16 hours in snow earned the Title “ SNOW TIGER” , from his troops and higher commanders. He was bestowed with VSM on 11 Oct 1963 by President of India His Majesty Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan.
It was a great day,brought cheers to the villagers FOR those who had seen and met him in their younger days but tears in the eyes of those who  served/seen him during his service days or were recruited into Army or GREF by him.
It was the first time that there were total of 6 sarpanches from the nearby village were present . All were  honoured who worked for the betterment and contributed for village upliftment and those who worked against covid to save the village by sanitizing it. A total of 35 Trophies were distributed by MLA Kuldeep Vaid.
 It was a proud moment for the sons/ grandsons of Major Harbans Singh.
Two sons Col Charanjit Singh Khera  and Col Sharanjit SIngh Khera ( Bengal Sappers) retired as Colonels, One son Bhag SIngh as EEM from Border Roads. One grand son Col Sukhvinder SIngh Khera ( Bombay Sappers) retired as Colonel and second grandson  Col Navshinder SIngh ( Bengal Sappers)   still  serving . A family of Sappers and Mechanical/Electrical Engineers. Third generation still serving.
GOG Distt Head Ludhiana’s Col HS Khalon Vrc and Major Harbanslal , Tehsil head Gill along with GOG sector area incharge H/Capt Syam Singh were present on the occasion 
Col charanjit singh Khera S/O Maj Harbans Singh and Col Sukhvinder Singh Khera grandson of Maj Harbans Singh were
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AN UNSUNG HERO OF NEFA

Major Bob Khathing: Unsung Hero Who Brought Tawang Under India ...

Sometimes history has unsung heroes whose valour and sacrifice go unnoticed because there was none to record it or publicise it.  Sometimes, rarely, such valour and sacrifice are well known and documented, but it is embarrassing to sing praise, acknowledge or put the spot light of publicity on them. The story of Maj Bob Ranenglao Khathing MC, OBE, of the Indian army, is one such aberration. He was the man who surreptitiously went and annexed Arunachal Pradesh to India back in 1951   Like the Henderson Report, the real story of 62 war with China, the story of Maj Khathing remains buried in the Def Sec’s cupboard in spite of parliamentary intervention and RTI.  It remains hidden from public view even after 50 yrs, though Indian Official Secrets act has a lifespan of only 30 yrs. It is politically expedient for the Govt Of India to erase Maj Khathing from all records that show that such a man ever existed. The right person who can corroborate this story is probably the venerable ‘Dalai Lama’, but even he has too much at stake to say anything that embarrasses GOI.
I did not invent this story and I do not know its veracity personally because I was only 2 yrs old when it happened. I have simply, and rather shamelessly, reinvented and plagiarised it from a story filed by Yambem Laba , a news paper man from the northeast, because I believe it is true.  It has some relevance to another story that I am writing for you, about a fictional futuristic Sino Indian war, rather long story compared to my other stories on this blog. My ever increasing brood of fans are demanding stories faster than I can write them. Hence this story is being putout to buy myself time to finish my other fictional war story, about the same kind of ‘Dogs Of War’ 

To tell the story of Maj Khathing, and highlight his relevance in Indian history in the immediate aftermath of independence, it is necessary for me to first highlight the circumstances that led to the military defeat of Indian army in the Sino Indian war of 1962. Let me start this story from the British colonial India at the turn of the 20th C.  Here we go.

In 1903, alarmed by the Chinese and Russian influence in Tibet, Col Francis Younghusband of the British army led a military expedition to subdue Thubten Gyatso, the 13th Dalai Lama (predecessor of the current one Tenzin Gyatso ). Thubten ran off to China and took asylum there. It took quite a while, and a lot of manoeuvring, for the British to tame Thubten. In 1914 Henry McMahon, the then British foreign secretary, finally managed to get Thubten’s envoy into Shimla to sign a free trade agreement between Tibet and British India. As part of the agreement, they also signed a treaty demarcating the southern boundary of Tibet. Since the Himalayas were unchartered, unmapped and rather unhappy territory, McMahon did the only thing that was practical and pragmatic. He took a pencil and drew simple line on a map, connecting all the highest peaks, the water shed, the northern slopes of which were to be in Tibet and the southern ones in British India. Even at that time, this line, the watershed, was neither acceptable to man, Yaks, Yeti, 13thDalai Lama, nor Col Younghusband as a practical, defensible, geopolitical border. However, at that time, this was not considered strategically or militarily important, or an issue, considering the greater cause and benefits to one sided, parochial, British interest in trade and commerce.

The border between British India and Tibet at that time (Shimla agreement in 1914) had three buffer Kingdoms, all of them simple monarchies propped up by treaties with British India. Nepal was ruled by the Ranas, Sikkim by the Chogyals and Bhutan by the Wangchuks. Eastwards from Bhutan lay the large 61,000 sq km stretch of sparsely populated and utterly inhospitable never never land, the barren mountains and jungles beyond any man’s ambition and aspiration. In those days it did not even have a name, at best it was referred to by the British as the ‘Dirang Dzong of Twang’ (it became North East Frontier Agency or NEFA, only in 1954 and Arunachal Pradesh recently in 1986).

I am told that ‘Dzong’ in Tibetan means a fort. I am also told that in those days such forts had a small military or police contingent of sorts to up keep law and order as also collect taxes in kind, and favours from local women.  The master of such a Dzong was a ‘Dzongpen’, or a magistrate, with selected Lamas who helped administer the territory under the Dzong, called ‘Dirang Dzong’. The Dzongpen of Tawang  owed allegiance to the quasi political and religious leader, the Dalai Lama at Lhasa. Prior to 1951, Aksai Chin, Leh, NEFA (Arunachal) were all Dirang Dzong that were administered by their respective Dzongpen as Tibetan territory with absolutely no allegiance or recognition of Delhi, either British or Indian.  So the relevance of the McMahon line was mostly to do with the border along the northern Aksai Chin and Leh area, and the north eastern NEFA, all of which, tactically speaking, was a non contentious no man’s land during the colonial past. It was the land of the Lamas, Yaks and Yetis, all of them of little interest to the men of the early 20th C.

It became contentious half a century later, around 1950-51, when China occupied Tibet and the 14th (Current) Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso ran off from Lhasa and took political asylum in a newly independent India. A pro Chinese interim govt was installed in Lhasa.  It became necessary for the politically naive, rather new Govt Of India to have a militarily defensible border with the Chinese occupied Tibet, especially keeping in mind India’s then foreign policy of abetment of Tibetan aspirations. The border became a bone of contention around 1958 – 60 period as a result of several clashes between Chinese and Indian army patrols to jockey and occupy mountain passes in the Himlayas that controlled thriving trade route between Tibet and India at several places. To give the Chinese due credit, the then Chinese Premier, Chow En Lai, wrote many letters to Nehru to try and resolve the problems amicably. However, Nehru, though wise and sagacious in so many ways, was besotted by his own rising unpopularity in parliament as well as the political  brinkmanship strategies of the inflexible and highly autocratic Def Min, VK  Krishna Menon,  who was probably perceived by Nehru as his mentor and saviour. India refused to give any importance to the Chow En Lai letters. Chow En Lai then came to India in 1962 with an unusually large 135 member trade and military delegation, armed with trade concessions, historical  maps  as well as records to prove rightful borders of Tibet (specially Aksai Chin and NEFA). The trade concessions were olive branches sticking out of the barrel of a gun. The GOI  did not notice this. The delegation returned to China empty handed. Krishna Menon ordered the Indian army to do forward posturing. The 1962 war was triggered by Indian army incursion at Namka Chu, an east-west stream which separates the Thag La and the Hathung La ridge, and at Se La pass, north of Tawang. But I am jumping the gun, this is a success story, not one of defeat and humiliation. It is the story of Maj Khathing who captured Tawang in 1951, around the time that the Chinese were occupying Tibet.

Ranenglao Khathing was born on 28 Feb 1912 in Manipur’s Ukhrul district. He was a Tangkhul Naga. The Christian missionaries had a profound influence on his psyche and one of them adopted him as their son. He studied at Sir Johnstone High School in Imphal, did his matriculation (10th)  from Shillong and joined Cotton College in Guwahati. When he failed to clear his BA examinations in 1936, he was determined not to return home until he had obtained a degree. So he went to Harasingha in Assam’s Darrang district and founded a school where he also taught.  A year later, after he had managed to graduate, a family friend SJ Duncan, who was then the British sub divisional magistrate of Ukhrul, convinced him to leave the Harasingha school and return to Ukhrul High School as it’s Head Master. In 1939 when WW-II precipitated worldwide mobilisation, 27 yr old Khathing immediately enrolled in the British army and was sent to the Officer’s Training School in Dehra Dun.

Commissioned into the 9/11 Hyderabad Regiment (now Kumaon Rgt), he had Thimaya (later General) as his company commander and TN Raina (later COAS) as fellow subaltern. In 1942 Khathing was transferred to the Assam Regiment in Shillong and became a captain. He was soon attached to the USAAF contingent at Jorhat for the ‘Hump Lift’ as a logistic liaison officer. ‘I am Capt Ranenglao Khathing’, he would introduce himself. It was too much for the Americans to mouth. ‘Yes Bob’, they would respond. Soon Capt Ranenglao Khathing morphed into ‘Capt Simply Bob’.

After the Japanese blocked the Burma road, the British army formed a  guerrilla outfit called Victor Force (an earlier version and subsequent role model for Col Wingate’s Chindits) using the missionary educated tribals of Nagaland.  Their task was to use topography and the jungles as their cover, live off the land and operate 100 to 150 miles deep inside the enemy territory to interdict the Japanese supply and communication lines, to inflict heavy causalities on the enemy and to act as a screen for then retreating British army from Burma. Capt ‘Simply Bob’ was sent to command this V-Force group in the Ukhrul area. He shed his army tunic, shaved his head like a typical Tangkhul tribesman with a thick mane running down the middle of his scalp, Mohawk style. On his back he carried a basket with dried salted meat and concealed his gun in his Tangkhul shawl. It is believed that while in command of Victor Force in 1942-44 period, he personally killed some 120 Japanese soldiers and played shindig with the Japanese, hit and run kind of war, living off the land and never surfacing anywhere, totally cut off from friend and foe. After the war was over, for his exemplary sacrifice and valour, he was awarded the Military Cross and made a Member of the British Empire.

After the World War, around 1945-46, Maj Bob was demobilised along with a large number of short-service emergency commissioned officers.  Immediately afterwards, on request of then Maharaja ‘Kumar Priyabrata Singh’, he went to Manipur and joined the then interim government as minister in charge of the hill areas. In 1949, when Manipur merged with India, the interim government was dissolved and Bob found himself at loose ends. Soon Sir Akbar Hydari, then Assam governor, asked him to rejoin the Assam Rifles as a stopgap measure. He then served with the 2nd Assam Rifles Battalion for two years in Sadiya. In 1951 he was inducted into the IF AS (Indian Frontier Administrative Service) as an assistant political officer.

One day he was summoned by the new Assam Governor, Jairamdas Daulatram.

‘Bob, do you know where is Tawang ?, Jairamdas asked him.

‘No Sir’, Bob answered truthfully.

The Governor took him to a ‘Globe’ on his desk and pointed out Tawang. ‘This is the kingdom of the Dzongpen of Tawang’, he traced his finger over the incredible 61,000 sq km waste land that lay north of Tezpur stretching eastwards from Bhutan, all the way to Mon tribal area of Nagaland that Bob was familiar with. ‘He who controls Tawang shall control the far east’, Jairamdas predicted. ‘Do you think the Chinese should control it ?’.

‘No Sir’, Bob repeated.

‘What would take you to mount an expedition to Tawang and bring the Dzongpen under Indian political control, and to annex the region to the Union of India ?, the governor came straight to the point.

‘Sir, I am no longer in the army, I am now simply an assistant political officer, an Iff Ass’, he said with visible sadness. ‘I do not have the authority to do this’.

‘I am all the authority that you need, though neither the centre nor I have the ability to get the C-in-C Roy Boucher to agree to a military expedition for this task. At least not quickly enough to do it before the Chinese react’, Jairamdas mulled, running his hands over his bald head. ‘We need someone to do it quietly. Keeping in mind your war record, I cannot think of a better man to do it than you’.

‘I will do it’, Bob answered simply. ‘But I need an expeditionary force, about 200 hundred fully armed troops, mountaineering equipment as well as mules and porters to carry the equipment, a doctor and medical stores.

‘Sure’, answered Jairamdas. ‘Go, think it over. Send me the list of what you need and when you can start, the sooner the better’.

Bob did not think or procrastinate. He simply walked out of the Governer’s office, went to his PA’s office next door and dictated two simple letters to be typed on the letter head of the Govt Of India with the prominent Sarnath Lions in the top left corner. The letters were addressed ‘To Whomsoever It May Concern’.  The first letter, with a heading ‘SECRET’, said that the Governor of Assam, on behalf of the newly formed ‘Republic Of India’,  has ordered Maj Ranenglao Khathing (Rtd) to rejoin the Indian army, raise an armed expeditionary force, make war if necessary, and annex the Kingdom of the Dzongpen of Tawang with the Union Of India, as soon as possible. In the second letter, with the heading ‘UN CLASSIFIED’, the Governor authorised  Maj Ranenglao Khathing, a serving officer of 2nd Assam Rifles, to collect Rs 25,000 from the treasury and requisition any stores or personnel he felt necessary for a mountaineering expedition in eastern India. He concluded the second letter making himself accountable, that he was subject to expenditure accounting at the end of the expedition. He took both the letters to the Governor for his signature and the then ubiquitous red wax seal of authority.

He asked the Governor for two months to conclude the operation. The Governor gave him 45 days to do it. Once again Bob walked into the PA’s office and dictated several telegrams, using Jairamdas’s name.

The  first telegram was to his old unit, the 2nd Battalion of the Assam Rifles Regiment, still at Sadiya, near Barrackpore, near Calcutta. The message simply said, ‘Mobilise forthwith two companies with light weapons, ammo and stores to Tezpur. Requisition train resource and complete move with urgency. Capt Hem Bahadur Limbu from 5 AR to be in-charge of the move. Capt Modiero (doctor) and five physically fit medical orderlies to accompany troops with adequate medical and surgical stores. The troops to report to, and be under command of, Maj Khathing, reinstated forthwith to AR as Major’.

The second telegram was to Bata Company in Calcutta, requesting a special order for 1000 pair of fleece lined leather mountaineering shoes, to be shipped to Tezpur by chartered aircraft  urgently, payment to be made in advance from treasury against an invoice’.

The third telegram was to the cartographers at the ‘Geographical Society Of India’ also at Calcutta, to urgently forward to the Governor’s office, ten sets of large scale relief maps of area north of Tezpur, whatever was available.

The fourth telegram was to Benny & Sons, Canned Food Suppliers, once again at Calcutta to immediately accept an urgent delivery order for canned Luncheon Meat, Sausages and Mackerel, each ten thousand tins, to be handed over to Captain Hem Bahadur Limbu at Sadiya.  Payment to be made in advance from treasury against an invoice’.  Bob chuckled when the PA looked up from the type writer with a perplexed look. ‘Look my good man’, he said amicably. ‘If we have to march up the mountains  all day, we may as well sleep on a full stomach. Moreover, I have had more than enough of living off the land in Victor Force’.

His last telegram was to the Army Supply Park at Dhimapur. ‘Requisition thousand sets of Parkha or Irwing jackets, socks and other articles of warm clothing. Await instructions from Maj Khathing of 2 AR, scheduled to arrive your location in two days’.

When he finally arrived there at Dhimapur, all he could find was brown US Army issue Angola shirts, which he accepted though they were all of awkward sizes.  On a spur of the moment brainwave, he travelled to Chabua and Dinjan where the USAAF had left behind large metal containers of stores when they withdrew their operations of the ‘Hump Lift’ from Chabua and Ledo six years earlier. There were hundreds of containers kept in safe custody of the Army and Air Force. When he broke open these containers, he found camping gear, tents, Irwing Jackets, woollen gloves and socks, inners, just about everything that he wanted for equipping his expeditionary force into the cold wasteland of the Himalayas. He got them repacked into four of the same containers and had them transported to Tinsukhia railway station, from where he sent them to Tezpur via Guwahati since that was the only road and rail crossing across the wide Brahmaputra river. Afterwards he caught a routine ferry from Dibrugarh to  Majauli island and crossed over to the north bank of the river on elephant back. Once across the river, he requisitioned an old war surplus jeep from a British tea planter and drove down tea plantation tracks and back roads to Tezpur, arriving several days before the men and material arrived there from all quarters. At Tezpur he made arrangements for around two hundred mules and donkeys, 400 odd porters from the plains, and another two hundred from the hills. He also requisitioned ten odd tailors and cobblers to go with them on the expedition with their tools of the trade. A mountain of food supplies, mostly rice, flour and condiments, kerosene jerry cans, he procured locally.  As the men and material arrived, he moved his base camp to a large clearing at Lokra, about twenty km north of Tezpur town.

For three weeks he drilled his men and took them on long endurance runs, carried out rifle shooting practice and formed them into a tough bunch with high morale and camaraderie. He formed small teams of porters, each hundred men, in change of a Naik of the AR, and sent them with the men and animal ported packed stores in relays to establish forward camps. He also sent scouts towards Tawang to not only reconnoitre easy mountain trails to Tawang, but also gather intelligence.

Due to the sudden nature of Bob’s activities and flashing of the unusual authorisation letter, the expedition came to the notice of Major TC Allen, the last British political and intelligence officer of the east, based in Dibrugarh. He followed Bob to Tezpur to enquire into whatever that was happening and met up with him at Lokra. Though Bob received him cordially, he gave Allen a Hobsons’s choice. Either come with him to Tawang or be quarantined at close arrest under guard at Lokra till the expedition was over. Allen, a keen mountaineer, chose the former and applied himself with zest as Bob’s second in command, thereby making it a strange indirect ‘Anglo Indian’ expedition 

The expedition started out from Lokra on 17 Jan 1951, with 200 soldiers under full pack with arms and ammunition. There were no regular roads or bridges over the rivers and streams, one had to just walk cross country. Because of physical toughening of troops and staging of camps twenty to twenty five km apart over inhospitable terrain with just goat tracks,  Bob was able to move his expeditionary force at great speed. However, he allowed the men from the plains to acclimatise to altitude by stopping a day every three days of march. Within nine days they were able to reach the Dzong at Bomdila, the first frontier post of Tibet then commanded by Katuk Lama, an assistant political agent. Bob camped right at the closed gates of the Dzong. The next day, on 26th Jan he hoisted the Indian flag in front of the Dzong and invited all the inhabitants to a feast. The Governor sent a Dakota from Guwahati to reconnoitre Bob’s progress. The aeroplane flew low over the monastery and while the soldiers waved, it did several rounds of the monastery. The show of force was enough to convince Katuk Lama that an invasion was in progress. He urgently despatched runners to warn all Dzongs towards Tawang.

After three days rest and recuperation, as also time for the hill porters of his retinue to catch up, Bob moved out once again on 1st Feb 51 to Chakpurpu and Senge Dzong at the base of the Sela Pass. The five mile climb to Sela Pass sapped their energy and wits. Undaunted, they moved further up the mountain to Nauranang. On 4 February, they camped at Jang village. Two locals and some troopers were sent out by Bob to collect information and to gauge the feelings of the local people towards their expedition and to invite them for another feast. The next day, the headmen and elders of Rho Changda and the surrounding villages of Jang visited Bob. Through an interpreter Bob explained the purpose of his visit and advised them not to pay obeisance to the Tsona Dzongpens, that they were now free citizens of the Union Of India.  To the exceptionally primitive tribals in such isolated and far flung land, the concept of freedom and democracy were as alien as the back side of the moon.   However they understood that a new conqueror ‘Bob’ had come to rule them.  Bob then detached Capt Limbu, Sub Bir Bahadur and Jam Udaibir Gurung, tasking them to scout around the Sela Tract to find a militarily defensible site  and to construct a permanent check post and barracks to establish an Indian frontier post. He left behind some of his troops as well as porters and advised Limbu to take the help of the local  tribals to carry out his task.

Bob moved his task force further forward. On 6 February they camped at Gyankar and Tibetan representatives of the Dzongpen of Lhau came down hill to meet them. They brought presents and offered Bob incentives in gold and women if he would go back. Bob simply smiled and welcomed them as fellow citizens of a new country to enjoy a new found freedom. Next day was the Tibetan New Year or Lhosar, the first day of the Year of the Iron Horse. In the evening it snowed heavily and the weather turned extremely cold. However, the entire expeditionary force including the porters were snug and warm in American war surplus clothing due to Bob’s foresight and good sense .

Bob and the expeditionary force reached Tawang on 7 Feb 51. They spent two days scouting the area for a permanent site where both civil and military lines could be laid out with sufficient area for a playground. A place was chosen north-east of Tawang Monastery and he camped his force at this location. He put his soldiers and porters to work building a semi permanent military camp with wooden logs and stones. He then sent emissaries to the Dzongpen for cordial meetings and to arrange an instrument of accession to the Union Of India.  For two days there was no reciprocity or goodwill. The small population remained indoors.

After three days, Bob got impatient. That night he ordered his men to fire 20 rounds of two inch mortar at the hill sides and fire off 1000 rounds of 303 ammo in the air. In the closed confines of the mountain, on a dark and silent night, the fireworks sounded like frightening thunder claps, echoing and reverberating, one placating message after another. The voice of God. In the morning he lined up his troops, fixed bayonets and marched his troops up and down Twang for four hours. He also planted the Indian Flag in front of the Monastery. This had the desired effect and the next morning the Dzongpen sent emissaries. Bob put Maj Allen of the British army on the job to negotiate armistice and to draw up a parchment for the formal accession.

There were endless long winded negotiations.  The emissaries were told that the Tsona Dzongpens or any representatives of the Tibetan government could no longer exercise any power over the people living south of the Bumla range. Obviously the emissaries had many objections to such a preposterous proposition.

On 11 Feb Bob made a courtesy call on the Abbot of the Tawang monastery. He gifted the Abbot with a hand wound gramophone and two Beethoven 33 rpm records. The Abbot had never seen such an invention and after the initial fear he instantly took a shine to ‘Music of Budha’. Bob then presented other monks with knickknacks from his camp, American warm clothing, several Tiffin carriers, back pack, tinned food, a bugle. He requested them for their assistance to advise and to influence the local people to acknowledge and accept the accession to the Union Of India. No taxes were to be imposed, women were to be treated with respect.  He told them of the withdrawal of the British from India. He sold them the concept of freedom and the new found aspirations of the people of India.  The rural rustic monks found Bob a more pleasant and sagacious King to have than the autocratic Dzongpens.

After two days, on 13th Feb, because Allen was making no headway, he sent out patrols to round up the Chhgergans (officials) of the 11 Tsos or Tibetan Administrative Units and to bring them into the camp. If they did not come voluntarily, he ordered that they were to be brought by force. For several days afterwards they were wined and dined with great hospitality and respect, Bob issued a general order that they were henceforth not to accept the suzerainty of the Dzongpens or Drekhong, or pay tax or tribute to them.

Finally around the 19th or 20th of Feb, Bob ran out of patience. He was also running out of the time that the Governor had given to him. Along with Allen, the Chhgergans and a hundred troops,  he marched directly to the palace of Nyertsang, the Dzongpen of Tawang. He did not meet with any resistance and there was no violence of any kind. All proceedings were done with traditional cordiality and respect.

Nyertsang laboured and stalled for time, to seek advice and guidance from Tibetan government in Lhasa.

‘What Govt ?’, Bob interjected. ‘The Chinese army has invaded Tibet’.

‘You ever heard of Col Younghusband ?’, Allen asked Nyertsang. ‘There is a treaty with the Govt of Tibet, and as per that treaty the area south of the watershed, south of the McMahon line,  it is in India, not Tibet. Tawang is part of India. You really have no business here’, he said.

Because of his awkwardness in sitting on the cushions placed on the ground, and because his pistol butt was poking his hip, Allen suddenly took out his Smith & Wesson pistol and placed it on the ground in front of him.

Nyertsang’s visage fell, he deflated like an air pillow.

Allen took out the parchment from his map case and the treaty of accession to the Union Of India was signed by Nyertsang without much ado. Under the powers vested on him by the Governor of Assam, Maj Bob Ranenglao Khathing  MC, OBE, signed the treaty on behalf of the Republic Of India. As a token of appreciation, a ‘Nazrana’, of 1000 Rupees was paid to Nyertsang.  Allen named the Kingdom of the Dzongpen of Tawang, as the ‘North East Frontier Agency’ (NEFA). Bob appointed Allen as a Lieutenant Governor, accountable to the Governor of Assam,  to administer the kingdom till GOI could send their representatives. A quarter-guard was established at the Dzongpen’s treasury using AR troops and Allen set out to document all cash and treasure, besides other administrative tasks of governance. Allen was the first ‘Nawab of Nefa’, albeit white.

After the accession ceremony, Bob had a final task to do, to go back to the Governor and inform him that he had carried out his duty, to every one’s satisfaction, without firing a shot (except for the fire works for entertainment). So he set out downhill to Tezpur with a small retinue leaving the expeditionary force in charge of Allen. The Governor sent a Dakota to pick him up from Tezpur and they flew to Delhi and went to see the Prime Minister, Nehru.

Nehru was livid, ‘Who asked you to do this?’, he vented his anger at the Governor. ‘I wish you had the good sense to consult me before you commissioned this colossal stupidity. Do you have any idea how much trouble I am having with Chow En Lai over Tibet?’, he mourned. ‘I want a complete black out on this incident’, he ordered the PMO. ‘I want the PTI to put the lid over this, and not blabber about it’.

‘And you’, he pointed an accusing finger at Bob. ‘Please get lost, don’t ever talk about it’.

Bob and Jairamdas walked out of the PMO dejected.

It took Nehru another four years of tough negotiations with Chow En Lai to come to terms and sign an eight year agreement over Tibet and form the first ‘Sino Indian Pact’. Only in Apr 1954, after the pact, did GOI publically announced it’s suzerainty over NEFA and appoint an Indian overseer team in NEFA to replace Allen and his merry men from 2 AR. The new Indian team was from the Special Intelligence Bureau, none from the prestigious newly formed IAS ever wanted to go and live in this god forsaken land . NEFA finally became an Indian state, renamed ‘Arunachal’, the land of the rising sun,  only in 1986. It was to have a brand new capital, to be built out of the blue at Itanagar, a pasture in the foot hills. Tawang was too much of a bother for both the new found politicals, as well as IAS in NEFA.

Afterwards Bob simply disappeared amongst the vast multitude of India, faceless and without an identity. He was to go back to Tawang only in 1986, for the statehood celebrations. His visit was private and unrecognised. A 74 yr old man’s personal trip down memory lane. None recognised or remembered Bob. Like all old and bold soldiers, he did not die, he simply passed away, having done his duty well.

In 1966, when I joined NDA, my Divisional Officer in Foxtrot Sqn was a nephew of Bob, the same kind of man, with the same genes, simply an incredible, resilient, unstoppable, hard core soldier. The first ten years of my own soldiering was in that area, the god forsaken country in the far-east. One soldier to another, three cheers,  ‘Long live Maj Bob Ranenglao Khathing MC, OBE, hip hip ………….


PLA troops ‘completely move out’ of Galwan as India-China head towards total disengagement

File image of Indian soldiers in Ladakh | By special arrangement

File image of Indian soldiers in Ladakh | By special arrangement
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New Delhi: The Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) “completely moved out” of the Indian side of the Galwan Valley area Monday as India and China began disengagement in Ladakh after a 61-day intense stand-off, ThePrint has learnt. However, sources said the Indian Army remained cautious about sounding too optimistic.

While the Chinese have initiated disengagement steps at Gogra and in the Hot Spring Area, they continue to hold fort at Finger 4 at Pangong Lake. However, sources said the “movement of a few men and vehicles backwards was noticed” at Pangong Lake, where Chinese soldiers had come up to 8 km inside Indian territory. Government sources described the movement as “non-tangible”.

The disengagement exercise launched Monday came a day after the special representatives of India and China, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, respectively, held a detailed phone conversation where they agreed on the “earliest complete disengagement of the troops along the LAC and de-escalation from India-China border areas for full restoration of peace and tranquility”.

This is the second attempt at disengagement — the first followed a meeting between corps commander-level officers on 6 June but culminated in the 15 June Galwan Valley clash, which killed 20 Indian soldiers, after the Chinese refused to fulfil their part of the agreement.

The whole process, sources said, will be long-drawn-out.

Sources underlined that it will be “premature” to say the stand-off is over as “any unfavourable” incident like that of 15 June can take place until “tempers on both sides cool down completely”. The leadership on both sides, the sources said, will continue to remain in contact 24×7.

Both India and China will begin a 72-hour verification process to make sure each side has fulfilled the commitment before the next round of disengagement is initiated.


Also Read: It’s time for China, Pakistan, even India to rethink the fantasy Modi called expansionism

 ‘Buffer zone’

Ladakh constitutes the western sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Several spots along the border — Galwan Valley, Depsang Plains and Hot Spring — have been sites of stand-offs since April-May in light of Chinese incursions.

As part of the fresh disengagement, China has moved back by about 1.5-2 km in various locations, while the pullback by India is a “little less” since Indians were anyway in their own territory, sources said.

Both sides have agreed to what is being described as a “buffer zone”, which would be an area where neither side carries out any construction or patrolling activity and would differ from location to location, the sources said.

This means the Chinese troops will be closer to the LAC than Indian soldiers, and it will be some time before India can resume its normal patrols up to Patrol Point 14 in Galwan Valley, and patrol points 15, 17 and 17A in the Hot Spring area.

No specific time has been agreed upon regarding how long the buffer zone will exist, the sources added, saying it is a confidence-building measure for restoration of status quo as of early April.

The disengagement comes at a time when the flow in the Galwan river has increased due to snowmelt, according to inputs, making it difficult for both India and China to sustain troop build-up in the area.

At the Galwan Valley, government sources told ThePrint, the PLA has moved out completely from the Indian side of the LAC into their own territory.

The pullback region included the area called Y-Junction, which is located 1.5 km from the LAC. The Chinese had intruded into this area and built observation posts and numerous tents, the sources said.

The eventual gameplan of Chinese incursions in the Galwan Valley seemed to be to prevent India from carrying out any new construction beyond the confluence of the Shyok-Galwan river.

The Chinese also sought to restrict Indian patrols to the same point, located 4.5 km from the LAC, rather than until Patrol Point 14, which is 500 metres from the border (according to the 1960 claim line of China) and marks the status quo before the PLA incursions began in May.

In Hot Spring area and at Gogra post, the sources added, the Chinese had started dismantling tents and moving back men and vehicles from inside the Indian side of the LAC.

“The process will most likely be completed by tomorrow. Here, as per the schedule, they are supposed to move back about two km. Once they do this, they will be on their side of the LAC,” a source said.

Giving details about the Pangong Lake area, where the Chinese have occupied areas up to Finger 4, about 8 km inside Indian territory that starts from Finger 8, sources said there has “not been any tangible movement”.

“There has been some movement in terms of few vehicles and men going back from Finger 4. However, they continue to hold the position,” another source said.


Also Read: From Nathu La to Galwan, India has been trapped in reaction-mode to China’s aggression


Doval and Wang hold cordial talks’ 

Diplomatic- and military-level talks aimed at resolving border tensions had been underway between India and China since May. On Sunday, a telephone conversation was held between Doval and Wang, the special representatives appointed by India and China to discuss boundary-related matters.

Over an hour-long “cordial” phone call, the two are said to have held “a frank and in-depth exchange of views” on the border standoff.

According to sources, both the representatives discussed the Galwan Valley clash separately and assessed the reasons that led to it.

Their talks were “based on the commitment” reached by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the two informal summits of Wuhan (2018) and Mamallapuram (2019) when they vowed that differences should not be allowed to become disputes.

“They agreed that it was necessary to ensure at the earliest complete disengagement of the troops along the LAC and de-escalation from India-China border areas for full restoration of peace and tranquillity,” the Ministry of External Affairs said in a statement Monday. “In this regard they further agreed that both sides should complete the ongoing disengagement process along the LAC expeditiously.”

The two also agreed to the fact that it is critical to maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas and that it is “essential for the further development of our bilateral relations”.

According to the MEA statement, both Wang and Doval agreed to stay in touch to ensure “full and enduring” restoration of peace and tranquility. Bilateral agreements dating back to 1993 that lay down specific protocols on the LAC issue were discussed as well.

These pacts are: The Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, 1993; the 1996 Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC; the 2005 Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of the Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC; the 2012 Agreement on the Establishment of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs; and 2013 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement.

The two representatives also decided that “both sides should strictly respect and observe the Line of Actual Control and should not take any unilateral action to alter the status quo and work together to avoid any incident in the future that could disturb peace and tranquillity in border areas”.

The special representative talks had been under consideration ever since External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Wang held a phone call on 17 June, sources told ThePrint.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry said in a statement on the Doval-Wang dialogue that both sides “should pay great attention to the current complex situation facing China-India bilateral relations, and work together to overcome and turn it around as soon as possible”.

“Not long ago, what happened in the western part of the border between China and India in the Galwan Valley is very clear. China will continue to effectively defend its territorial sovereignty and the border area and peace,” the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Monday.

“Both sides should adhere to the strategic assessment that instead of posing threats, the two countries provide each other with development opportunities,” it added.

This is an updated version of the report


India considering ITBP patrols in LAC ‘grey zones’ to keep the peace on China border

This could mean that Army will be away from grey zone areas of LAC, where forces from both India and China patrol and come face to face. At present, Army & ITBP jointly patrol grey zones.

An army convoy moving towards the Zojilla pass in Drass (representational image) | ANI

An army convoy moving towards the Zojilla pass in Drass (representational image) | ANI
New Delhi: Amid the India-China stand-off, the defence and security establishment here is considering a more prominent role for the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) in LAC management with the Army then being in charge of border defence.

According to sources, this idea is being discussed at various levels in the establishment. If cleared it would mean that the Army will be away from the grey zone areas of the LAC, especially since both sides are creating buffer zones in Ladakh near the LAC.

The grey zones refer to areas where the forces from both India and China patrol and come face to face. Currently, the Army and ITBP jointly patrol the grey zones.

Under discussion also is the possibility that on the Chinese side, it would be the Border Defence Regiment (BDR) manning these grey areas, and not the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). This, if approved, will be taken to the Chinese for further discussion to ensure peace and tranquility along the LAC.

“China is indulging in salami-slicing. It takes four steps forward and two behind to give an illusion of being accommodating. There is a need to clearly demarcate the LAC and the grey zones,” said a source familiar with the matter.

“The grey zone should ideally be handled by the border forces of the two countries. The agreements on patrol protocols should be followed there,” said the source.

If the idea finds acceptance, the Army would be deeper in areas that the country clearly controls, said the sources.

“The protocols won’t be applicable in this area. If anyone tries to come in there, they would be treated as per the Standard Operating Procedures of border defence,” the source quoted above said.

The idea has gathered some steam, especially after the 15-16 June Galwan clash where the Army lost 20 soldiers.

“The Army can be given a straight order to capture the grey zones and they will fight for it with their life. But then if it’s decided that such zones will exist till both sides work out border issues, then the ITBP should be given the role of border management,” said a second source.


lso read: Ajit Doval talks to Chinese foreign minister, both agree on ‘earliest complete disengagement’

 Tense situation

Following the initiation of disengagement process in Ladakh, China has moved back by about 1.5-2 km in various locations, while the pullback by India will be a “little less” since Indians were anyway in their own territory.

However, both sides have agreed to what is being described as a “buffer zone”, which would be an area where neither side carries out any construction or patrolling activity and would differ from location to location.

It will take time before India resumes its normal patrols up to patrol point (PP) 14 in Galwan Valley, and PP 15, 17 and 17A in the Hot Spring area.

All these posts fall in what has been described as a “grey area”, which both sides claim but have no permanent posts or structures in. Such grey zones are almost all along the LAC.

No specific time has been agreed upon regarding how long the buffer zone will exist, the sources added, saying it is a confidence-building measure for restoration of status quo as of early April.

‘Army men are taught to defend and attack’

A third source said the two sides will eventually “have to settle the border or have at least some kind of understanding about the LAC”.

“Army men are taught to defend and attack. A soldier who gets posted to LAC suddenly finds himself doing the opposite of what he has been taught — no use of firearms, banner drills among others,” the source said.

In September last year, Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat, who was then the Army chief, had said that officers forget that things being done at the Line of Control was for a different purpose and the deployment at LAC has a different purpose.

Rawat had then argued for creating reserves and using technology to monitor the LAC.
He had also stressed the need to increase capability against China saying that unlike Pakistan, a possible future war with China will be long-drawn, instead of a sustained, intense operation.


Also read: Army postpones mandatory annual, periodic medical tests of soldiers as Covid cases rise


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India and China to formally verify disengagement in Ladakh by end of the week

India and China to begin next phase of disengagement only after formal verification of initial phase is complete. Verification being done through visual detection and drones.

New Delhi: India and China are set to carry out a formal verification of the first round of disengagement in Galwan Valley and Hot Spring Area, initiated Monday, by the end of this week before the next round is undertaken, ThePrint has learnt.

While Chinese soldiers have moved out from the Indian territory in Galwan Valley, the process is still on at Patrol Point 15, 17 and 17A in the Hot Spring Area.

“The whole process at PP (patrol point) 15 should be completed by tomorrow. PP 17A might be completed by Thursday. Verification is already on but there will be a formal verification once the first round of disengagement process is completed,” a source told ThePrint.

Once this is done, only then will the next round of disengagement begin, sources said, adding that the verification is being done through visible detection and use of drones.

“The two sides are constantly in touch with each other,” another source said.

This is the second attempt at disengagement between the two countries after border incursions began early May. The first followed a meeting between corps commander-level officers on 6 June, which eventually failed when soldiers violently clashed on 15 June, in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed. The skirmish was a result of the Chinese not holding up their end of the agreement.

 The fresh disengagement process saw China move back by about 1.5-2 km in various locations, while the pullback by India was a “little less” since the Army was already in its own territory, sources said.

Also read: Military talks with the Chinese must not wear India down. Plan B should be ready


India won’t resume patrolling upto PP14 immediately

Sources in the defence and security establishment said there was no buffer zone that has been created between the two sides in Galwan Valley, but admitted that normal patrolling activity will not take for some time, as reported by ThePrint Monday.

“One cannot call it a buffer zone. It is more of maintenance of safe distance between the two forces,” a source said.

While both sides moved back to a mutually agreed distance, the Chinese will be closer to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) than India.

The Print had reported that it will be some time before India can resume its normal patrols up to PP 14 in Galwan Valley, and PP 15, 17 and 17A in the Hot Spring area.

There will be no patrolling done by both sides in the area being maintained as a “safe distance” between the two armies.

“Restarting patrolling is a long process. The focus first is to ensure that there is total disengagement that takes place. Restoration of status quo ante will be the final aim,” a source explained.


Also read: Modi’s chest-thumping ministers, and not Congress, are an irritant in dealing with China


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Raise costs for China India must convince it that using LAC as pressure tool will yield diminishing returns

Raise costs for China

he gap: What has encouraged the Chinese is the growing difference between the capabilities of the PLA and the Indian military.

Manoj Joshi

Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

PM Modi has been to Ladakh, where he visited injured troops and addressed jawans. His style was somewhat theatrical, but he has raised the morale of the forces and the country. The tough talk was, no doubt, aimed at the domestic constituency; the Chinese go by deeds rather than words and so we are still left with the problem of a restoration of status quo ante as of May 4.

Reports now suggest that both sides have begun pulling back 1.5 km each in Galwan and Hot Springs/Gogra area; Pangong Tso remains a problem area. This is for the good, but can only be seen as a first step to fix the problem permanently, as was the stated intention of the 1993, 1996 and 2005 agreements.

The responsibility to set the situation right rests with Beijing because it is the party that has violated the long-standing agreements to maintain peace along the LAC. But equally, it is in our own interest to terminate this crisis which is exacting a huge price in terms of resources and effort, at a time when we are fighting the Covid-19 pandemic.

The choices before us are stark. It was the Galwan incursion that was the serious one because of its proximity to a key highway of ours. But there seems to be no agreement yet on two other important areas, in Depsang and Pangong Tso. And beyond disengagement there as well is the task of persuading China to permanently settle the differences over the LAC. In other words, delimit a line acceptable to both sides in detailed maps. Since this task has yet to be accomplished, we should continue to pursue a mix of policies using military, diplomatic or economic tools to push the Chinese to act on the issue.

Though we have built up a force of nearly four divisions in the area, well balanced with armour, artillery and air assets, we cannot contemplate a military riposte casually. Any action must factor in the possibility of a larger India-China conflict if we act to vacate the encroachments in the Ladakh region.

Making emergency acquisition of military material, as we have done, is not a good sign. For four successive years, the Services have received substantially lesser money than they asked for their modernisation. Some shortages have been set right through emergency acquisitions in 2017 and 2018, but there are others built into the system.

What has encouraged the Chinese is the growing gap between the capabilities of the PLA and the Indian military arising from the resource crunch we are suffering from. This is not something that has happened overnight, but has emerged over two decades.

Now, an additional burden will be imposed by the logistics of dealing with three additional divisions in Ladakh. Stocking for one division there is a trying task, but doing it for four will be very arduous and expensive. But a credible military posture will have its own payoff, provided we are clear-headed about the goal, which is not to fight a war, but by our deterrence capacity, force China to back off.

In this endeavour, economic policy is a force multiplier. The government has sent a tough signal by banning 59 Chinese apps, but they generate small profits for their parent companies. What will matter, is trade and investment. Total trade tops $90 billion, most of it in Chinese goods destined for the Indian market. Official figures put Chinese investment at $2 billion, the actual sum is likely to be several times that. We may be small-time players when it comes to trade with China, but the threat of tariffs on Chinese goods and restrictions on investment has a certain value, given the pushback China is facing on this account in the US and Europe. The steps we take must be carefully calculated and not impose greater costs on us, than on China. But even so, they should signal our serious intent to do whatever we can to influence Chinese behaviour.

The importance of a permanent fix to the LAC problem should not be underrated. We need to convince China that its policy of using the undelimited LAC as a means of pressuring India will now yield diminishing returns. For years, Modi has been trying to convince the Chinese of this point, because an unclear LAC has led to crises in 2013, 2014, 2019 and now in 2020, where it has led to a serious clash in which lives have been lost.

Disengagement by itself will not be enough, we need to ensure that the incursions are put to an end permanently, and this can happen if we clarify where the LAC runs, something both countries had signed on to do but have not done because of Chinese mendacity.

Ensuring peace and stability at the LAC has never been as important as it is today. The war against the pandemic has hit us hard, indeed, we do not even now know just how things will pan out since the infection is yet to peak in the country. Recovery will take years, and India will need more trade, more investments, lesser restrictions and a peaceful and stable periphery. In dealing with the crisis in Ladakh, we should not miss the wood for the trees.


Naga peace talks stall as stakeholders dither

A positive closure of the Naga peace process would have ended the mother of all insurgencies in India and the world’s longest-running demand for secession, facilitating the end of residual insurgencies in Manipur and other armed movements scattered across the North-East and, most importantly, giving a fillip to India’s Act East policy.

Naga peace talks stall as stakeholders dither

Accord elusive: Mainstreaming Naga armed groups has been a challenge for New Delhi since Independence.

Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta (retd)

Military commentator

In a letter to Nagaland CM Neiphiu Rio on June 16, the government interlocutor with Naga entities and Governor RN Ravi virtually accused both the state government and the predominant Naga armed group NSCN-IM (National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah) of undermining law and order and state legitimacy without naming any Naga group. He charged the armed gangs with running a parallel government and extorting taxes.

On June 27, the Isak-Muivah (IM) faction replied that the legitimate taxes it levies were not extortion as these sustain the Naga political movement and were not objected to by the earlier interlocutors. Rio said the law and order was much better than the pre-ceasefire period. Ravi has directed that all postings of law and order officials will require the approval of the Governor. This is the first time that such a step has been taken in the state. Mainstreaming Naga armed groups has been a challenge for New Delhi since Independence.

Last year, Ravi failed to secure a PM Modi-set deadline of October 31 for consummating a full and final settlement with the IM within the framework of the Constitution following the government’s success in J&K, nullifying Article 370. Modi was to have signed the follow-up to the 2015 Naga Framework Accord in Kohima on December 11 with Muivah.

Ravi told a newspaper on October 18 that the Naga peace process would be concluded by October 31 without a separate flag and the Constitution sought by the IM. The others were told that the Naga accord would be signed with or without the IM, hinting towards the more amenable group of seven Naga parties he began engaging in 2017. This Ravi-nursed NNPG did sign the accord, postponing the issue of flag and Constitution for later. But the Nagaland Framework Accord was between the IM and the Government of India and not with the NNPG.

A positive closure of the Naga peace process would have ended the mother of all insurgencies in India and the world’s longest-running demand for secession, facilitating the ending of residual insurgencies in Manipur and other armed movements scattered across the North-East and, most importantly, giving a fillip to India’s Act East Policy.

The most striking event of the Naga peace process occurred when Ravi inaugurated this January 17, the fifth session of the 13th Nagaland Legislative Assembly. According to the Nagaland Today, Ravi stated in the Assembly that negotiations between the Government of India and Naga political groups were successfully concluded. He referred to a meeting with the Joint Legislative Forum on Naga political issues held on November 13 which he said would facilitate a final solution to the prolonged Naga issue which is honourable, acceptable and recognises the uniqueness of the history of the Naga people. He asked the neighbouring states to help as the Naga peace process had reached a critical juncture.

In the discussion on the Governor’s address, the East Mojo Times of February 8 reported that Opposition lawmakers, Imkong Limshen and Vikheho Swu, questioned the veracity of the remarks of the Governor, his claiming that talks were successfully concluded but also saying that we are at a critical juncture while also asking the Nagas to unite or ‘miss golden opportunity’.

Swu said the Centre should not use the excuse of getting a favourable response from the neighbouring states in resolving the issues. The Governor in his reference to ‘successfully concluded negotiations’ with Naga political groups was correct, as he had signed an agreement with the NNPG on November 17, 2017. He excluded any mention of the IM with whom he reportedly signed an agreement on October 31 to sign a final peace deal later, keeping the dialogue process alive.

In the House, the Governor reassured the Nagas, who fear a J&K being done to them, that Nagaland enjoys Article 371A which protects identity and the customary law of the Nagas and the inner line provision of the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulations of 1873 as both disallow Citizenship (Amendment) Act Bill or CAB 2019 in the state. Despite this, the Opposition in the Nagaland Assembly insisted that an anti-CAA resolution be passed in the House, like in West Bengal and Kerala. The Naga Opposition is worried about an influx of illegal immigrants because Assam, the gateway to the North-East, had not been entirely exempted from the purview of the law, making Nagaland susceptible to illegal immigration.

On February 28 this year, according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, Ravi said in an interview that “delay in concluding talks is entirely on the part of IM which seems not prepared for a settlement and is using delaying tactics by giving new mischievous interpretations on the already agreed provisions of contentious issues.” The pan-Naga entity was mutually agreed to be a cultural body with no political role or executive authority. After the October 31 deadline, they want a pan-Naga body to have political and executive influence over the Nagaland government, precisely the reference he made in his June 16 letter.

Ravi will have to think out of the box to get the 86-year-old Thuingaleng Muivah to accept a solution within the framework of the Constitution of India. In his recent TV interviews to East Mojo and News Live, Muivah says the Nagas will not budge from their own flag and Constitution. Using the NIA or other coercive measures against an old warhorse and his group will not work.

While the IM has 7,000 armed fighters with a long legacy of insurgency pre-dating Independence, Kashmir has just 240 militants. Muivah’s Tangkhul Nagas are warning: Do not create another Kashmir, it will hurt your Act East Policy. Given the situation along the LoC and LAC, opening a third front against the world’s oldest insurgency will be harakiri.