Sanjha Morcha

Indigenously built Aircraft Carrier INS Vikrant likely to be patrol the Eastern Seaboard

India’s first indigenous aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, currently being built at the Cochin Shipyard Limited, is likely to be based at Visakhapatnam, the headquarters of the Eastern Naval Command to add to its effectiveness when it is commissioned, a top military commander said on Wednesday.

“In tandem with the growth of the Indian economy, I see the Eastern Fleet will be more capable. We should be having more capable assets. Hopefully, the Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC) will be based in Visakhapatnam and it should be operating as part of the Eastern Fleet in 2023, if all goes well,” its Flag Officer Commanding (FOCEF), Rear Admiral Dinesh K Tripathi told reporters here.

The interaction aboard the indigenously-built INS Sumeda partol vessel took place as part of the ongoing Navy Week celebrations.

“We should take pride that India is one five countries (the others being the US, the UK, France and Russia) with the capability to design and build an aircraft carrier. Its construction is on course. We should start sea trials by 2020,” Tripathi said.

He said Indian Navy’s aim is to secure national interests, provide maritime, coastal and offshore security and also ensure safe and secured seas by assisting friendly countries in any contingency.

According to Tripathi, the Eastern Fleet has grown in strength and capability over the years and now operates some of the most modern warships, which include the Shivalik class stealth frigates and the Kamorta class anti-submarine corvettes.

Asked about the presence of the PLA Navy in the Indian Ocean Region and China’s military rise, he said: “Every country has got a right to do what is required for its national security. We respect all that what has been done by any countries to secure their national interest. We are monitoring the presence of all that what is happening in our area.”

INS Sumeda and the corvette INS Kirch are presently docked here as part of the ongoing Navy Day celebrations.


I gave my life to Army, in return I got taint, says MI officer acquitted of graft charges

mi-officer

Before joining the Military Intelligence wing (MI), which interprets satellite images, in January 2009, Colonel M.K. Chakraborty had a fantastic military career. As an officer of the Intelligence Corps, he had received commendation twice from the Army chief for his exemplary work. However, within months of joining joining the MI, he became a victim of alleged corporate rivalry. Complaints were raised against him for alleged corruption in procuring of Rs 200 crore worth of equipment to enhance Indian Army’s capability to use satellite images of enemy troop movements and assets. A court of inquiry found him guilty and put him under military arrest for 18 months.

On November 10, the general court martial acquitted him from all charges by calling the court of inquiry (CoI) proceedings a gross violation of Army rules.

“I am acquitted and released from the Army arrest. But who will return eight years of trauma and agony that I and my family had faced. I had given my life to Army, but in return, the Army has given me the taint,” Colonel Chakraborty, who retired last year, told THE WEEK.

It all began in 2009 when Colonel Chakraborty was heading 54 Imagery Interpretation Teams (IITs) in the Indian Army in the Military Intelligence Directorate, which is the nodal agency for processing satellite images and forwarding the same to various Army formations after analysis. MI also gets images from other agencies like the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) and the Defence Image Processing and Analysis Centre (DIPAC) to gather technical intelligence.

In order to upgrade the obsolete systems, the Military Intelligence floated the process of acquiring new photogrammetry and geographical information systems. These equipment were essential for getting better clarity from satellite images to track the movements across the border, including military exercises, training and military build-up by China and Pakistan.

During the course of procurement, three of Colonel Chakraborty’s colleagues complained against him on alleged misappropriation of funds in 2011.

As the matter was related to highly sensitive military intelligence unit, the Army headquarters promptly ordered an an internal inquiry into the matter. All complaints were investigated and the matter was closed in August 2011 at Vice Chief of Army Staff level, with remarks that complaints “lack substance” and were “devoid of merit”.

The matter did not end there, and several anonymous complaints were sent to various authorities, including the office of the then chief of Army General V.K. Singh and even the to Central Vigilance Commission. Subsequently, on May 2012, the then defence minister A.K. Antony ordered an enquiry by an Independent Expert Technical Committee (IETC) comprised of officials from ministry of science and technology and scientists from DRDO to look into the allegations. The IETC, after investigations, found the allegations as “lacking substance”.

But, months after change of guards in the Army headquarters—General Bikram Singh took over from V.K. Singh—a lady officer raked up the issue again by sending complaints to the Army chief’s office. The Director General of Military Intelligence wrote to Army chief’s office, informing him about the outcome of the earlier investigation into the matter. Despite suggestions from the DGMI, General Bikram Singh ordered a CoI against Colonel Chakraborty. General Bikram Singh also closed the secret intelligence unit, Technical Support Division, set by his predecessor V.K. Singh.

The then head of Military Intelligence Lt. Gen D.S. Thakur questioned the motive behind the CoI. Coming down heavily on the court of inquiry, he said, ” This court of inquiry is also likely to make a big dent into the morale and operational efficiency of the Military Intelligence Directorate. It has done what the Pakistan’s ISI would have loved to do to our Military Intelligence Directorate.”

Hinting at the internal rivalry in the Amy headquarters Thakur stated, “There is already a buzz in the corridors of the Army HQ and a section of the environment in the Army at large that, this CoI is possibly part of the games being played by the Army hierarchy at higher level at the cost of the junior officers.”

Finally, after four years of inquiry and subsequent court martial proceedings, the General Court Martial headed by Brigadier Anil Singh Chandel, in its order on November 10, acquitted Colonel Chakraborty of all the charges and ordered to release him from Army custody. It also questioned the convening order of the CoI and termed the order as violation. The court martial order also raised issue of documents being tampered, casting aspersions on the fairness of pre-trial procedure.

“The prosecution has failed to adequately counter the contentions of the defence. The court, after having examined the contentions of the defence, reply of the prosecution, legal position in the instant case and after deliberate examination of court of inquiry, hearing of charges and summery of evidence, is of the opinion that accused is entitled to the relief,” Brigadier Anil Singh Chandel said in his order.

Mohammand Mujib, advocate for Colonel Chakraborty claimed that he became scapegoat in the corporate rivalry as well the ego-tussle of top generals of the Army.

“In September 2015, the court of inquiry found eight officers blameworthy but recommended disciplinary proceedings against only Colonel Chakraborty. It clearly shows that entire CoI proceedings were motivated. It is a classic case of misuse of power by higher authorities,” said Mujib.

But, Chakraborty’s ordeal did not end there. Although the court martial ordered release of Chakraborty from the Army custody on November 10, he was released only on November 20, when he had moved the Armed Force Tribunal. Now, the Armed Forces Tribunal has issued a notice to the Army headquarters on the issue.


The mystery of Reliance subsidiaries receiving defence-manufacturing licences

Reliance Group’s exploration of business opportunities in the defence sector escalated exponentially after Modi’s announcement of the Rafale deal. 

SHAILENDRA BHOJAK/PTI

On 10 April 2015, during his first prime ministerial visit to France, Narendra Modi announced a government-to-government deal to purchase 36 Rafale jets that were to be manufactured by the French company Dassault Aviation, in “fly-away” condition. As per procedure, any foreign defence-manufacturer selling to India is required to reinvest part of the total cost of the deal into India—known as “offsets.” In September 2016, Manohar Parrikar, the defence minister at the time, and his French counterpart signed the Rafale deal. It was reported to be worth €7.87 billion—roughly Rs 59,000 crore—and Dassault was required to reinvest half that value in India.

In The Caravan’s September cover story, I reported how the Rafale deal ensured that Reliance Group, headed by the industrialist Anil Ambani, went from having almost no history in the defence sector to suddenly having aerospace businesses worth thousands of crores. Thirteen days before the deal was announced, the Reliance Group registered a new subsidiary named Reliance Defence Limited. Ten days after the agreement was signed, Reliance Aerostructure Limited—a subsidiary of Reliance Defence—and Dassault Aviation announced the creation of Dassault Reliance Aerospace Limited, a joint venture that is majority-owned by Reliance.

Reliance Group’s exploration of business opportunities in the defence sector escalated exponentially after Modi’s announcement of the Rafale deal. According to the 2016–17 annual return filed by Reliance Defence Limited, the company has 13 subsidiaries. All of these companies are involved in the manufacture of defence products. Nine of them were incorporated within three weeks of Modi’s announcement. Within a year of their incorporation, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry issued licences to seven of these nine companies, for the manufacture of defence products. But as of March this year, none of these companies had commenced any business.

According to Reliance Infrastructure’s annual report, 12 of the 13 subsidiaries of Reliance Defence Limited had not commenced business as of March 2018. Despite this, right-to-information documents reveal that on 22 February 2016, the department of industrial policy and promotion (DIPP), under the Ministry of Commerce and Infrastructure, issued defence-manufacturing licences to eight of these subsidiaries—seven of these were formed soon after Modi’s announcement.

On 10 April 2015, during his first prime ministerial visit to France, Narendra Modi announced a government-to-government deal to purchase 36 Rafale jets that were to be manufactured by the French company Dassault Aviation, in “fly-away” condition. As per procedure, any foreign defence-manufacturer selling to India is required to reinvest part of the total cost of the deal into India—known as “offsets.” In September 2016, Manohar Parrikar, the defence minister at the time, and his French counterpart signed the Rafale deal. It was reported to be worth €7.87 billion—roughly Rs 59,000 crore—and Dassault was required to reinvest half that value in India.

In The Caravan’s September cover story, I reported how the Rafale deal ensured that Reliance Group, headed by the industrialist Anil Ambani, went from having almost no history in the defence sector to suddenly having aerospace businesses worth thousands of crores. Thirteen days before the deal was announced, the Reliance Group registered a new subsidiary named Reliance Defence Limited. Ten days after the agreement was signed, Reliance Aerostructure Limited—a subsidiary of Reliance Defence—and Dassault Aviation announced the creation of Dassault Reliance Aerospace Limited, a joint venture that is majority-owned by Reliance.

Reliance Group’s exploration of business opportunities in the defence sector escalated exponentially after Modi’s announcement of the Rafale deal. According to the 2016–17 annual return filed by Reliance Defence Limited, the company has 13 subsidiaries. All of these companies are involved in the manufacture of defence products. Nine of them were incorporated within three weeks of Modi’s announcement. Within a year of their incorporation, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry issued licences to seven of these nine companies, for the manufacture of defence products. But as of March this year, none of these companies had commenced any business.

According to Reliance Infrastructure’s annual report, 12 of the 13 subsidiaries of Reliance Defence Limited had not commenced business as of March 2018. Despite this, right-to-information documents reveal that on 22 February 2016, the department of industrial policy and promotion (DIPP), under the Ministry of Commerce and Infrastructure, issued defence-manufacturing licences to eight of these subsidiaries—seven of these were formed soon after Modi’s announcement.

In response to an RTI application that I filed in March this year, the DIPP responded with details of 12 licences granted to nine defence companies of the Reliance Group. These included licences for the design, development and production of missiles and simulators for air and naval platforms, and for the manufacturing of helicopters, aircraft and all-terrain combat vehicles as well as weapon launchers for combat aircraft. It is mysterious that these companies were granted defence licences before they were even operational. Pertinently, Dassault’s reinvestment into India is governed by the Defence Procurement Policy of 2013, and the procurement of a defence licence is one of the criteria to qualify as an Indian offset partner.

On 26 November, I spoke to R Mythili, an under-secretary in the DIPP, about the routine procedure followed by the department before issuing defence licences and when companies become eligible to receive them. Mythili explained the comprehensive process undertaken before the DIPP issues any license, which included taking into consideration the comments from the defence ministry, the environment ministry and the home ministry. Their comments are then placed before an internal licensing committee, which makes its recommendation to the minister of commerce, who then decides whether to approve or reject the application for a licence. She added that a company applying for a licence must be registered under the Arms Act, employ a minimum number of people and have commenced its operations. Under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, she said, “a minimum staff strength is required, which means that the company has to be in operation.” While the number of employees of these companies is not publicly available, Reliance Infrastructure’s annual report expressly states that these subsidiaries have not commenced business.

The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act of 1951 and the Arms Act of 1959 prescribe a detailed procedure for granting licences. These laws regulate licensing for setting up an arms and ammunition unit as well as for the manufacture, sale, import, export and transportation of defence products. While these laws do not provide a fixed timeline for the issuance of a licence, each of them stipulate a rigorous process of vetting a company’s financial credibility, its experience and expertise, and internal affairs, among other things, before an application is approved.

The IDR Act exercises jurisdiction over any undertaking pertaining to one of the scheduled articles, which includes aircraft as well as arms and ammunition. In June 2014, the DIPP released a press note listing several defence items that require compliance with IDR Act—all the equipments for which the Reliance Group companies received licenses are mentioned in the list. The act enables the central government to appoint an officer to make a “full and complete investigation” of all applications for a licence under the act. The scope of this investigation is wide, including scrutinising details such as a fall in the production of the volume of a particular article being sought to be manufactured and a rise in the price or national importance of any such article. The act further states that a licensing authority may issue a license if it is “satisfied that the person by whom the licence is required has a good reason for obtaining the same.”

The Arms Act also mandates a police officer to conduct an inquiry into the application seeking a licence and submit her report stating whether the licence should be granted. In addition, the Arms Rules of 2016 prescribe an extensive application process that mandates any company applying for a manufacturing license to submit, among other things, “a declaration with proof thereof to the effect that it has acquired the land for setting up the manufacturing plant.” The company must also demonstrate proof that it has installed an electricity and water connection. Moreover, the rules mandate that the company “shall preferably be self-sufficient in areas of product design and development.”

In August 2015, the Maharashtra government allotted a land measuring 289 acres to Reliance Aerostructure. Two years later, Ambani and Eric Trappier, the CEO of Dassault Aviation, laid the foundation stone at the facility. However, it is unknown whether the Reliance Defence Limited subsidiaries complied with these procedural requirements. I emailed questions to Ramesh Abhishek, the secretary of the department of industrial policy and promotion, and Daljeet Singh, the president of Reliance Group’s corporate communications department, enquiring about the grant of these licenses. Neither Abhishek nor Singh had responded at the time this story was published.

On 24 July 2015, Indrajit Singh, then the minister of state for defence, informed the Lok Sabha that the government had relaxed several norms regarding the issuing of industrial licences. Singh further stated that several defence items were exempted from the requirement of licencing “to reduce the entry barriers for the industry, particularly small and medium segment.” Six days later, Parikkar, who was the defence minister at the time, stated before parliament that the central government had withdrawn the tender to buy 126 Rafale jets.

In February this year, Subhash Bhamre, the minister of state in the defence ministry, informed the Lok Sabha that as of November 2017, the central government had issued a total of 100 defence licences to 74 private companies in the previous three years. Bhamre further stated that as of December 2017, 69 companies having 112 licenses had commenced production. The Reliance Defence Limited subsidiaries, on the other hand, received defence manufacturing licenses despite not commencing any business.


2nd batch of Afghan women officers undergo training at OTA

2nd batch of Afghan women officers undergo training at OTA

An Afghan woman army cadet shoots a target during a practice session in Chennai on December 19. AFP

Chennai, December 19

Head scarf-clad Zuhra Nabizada showed no traces of emotion as she handled the machine gun with the ease of a professional during a training session at the shooting range of the Officers Training Academy here.

She is part of a group of 19 women from the Afghanistan Armed forces honing their skills at the Academy.

Wiping the sweat off her sunburnt face, Afghan Air Force’s Second Lieutenant Nabizada said this is her second visit to India.

“The first visit was in 2014 to Dehradun to take part in a Taekwondo match,” she said.

India’s only academy to impart training to women cadets and officers, OTA is hosting women officers from the Afghanistan Armed Forces for the second time, the first being last year with 20 women.

Afghanistan Army’s Liaison Officer Captain Sirajulhaq Safi told PTI that this time officers from the country’s Air Force have also joined the programme.

“Compared to last year, the team this year comprises many young officers,” Safi said, adding that his country sees the exercise as a knowledge-sharing experience.

The month-long training that began on November 26, includes weapons training and drill besides others.

Indian Army’s Major Ritu Jaswal said the officers were focused and showed keen interest in what was being taught.

“Each country has a different weapon system… Most of the time they use MI-16 assault rifles, here they get the opportunity to learn to use the Indian Small Arms System — light machine guns,” she said.

“However, weather is the major hurdle they face here, as the present temperature in their country is below 5 degree Celsius.”

December is the time when Chennai experiences cooler climes, Jaswal, who acted as an interpreter for a majority of the women officers who knew only Pashto and Dari, added.

Nabizada, a trainee pilot, said it was not just about weapons, but the session also fostered her leadership skills and boosted her self-confidence.

She is the only one of her nine other siblings to have chosen a career in the armed forces.

The squad has mostly women below 30 years, while a 50-year-old officer is the senior-most.

About changes made to the training curriculum since last year, an officer said the duration has been extended to four weeks from three weeks last year.

“This has given us more time to teach the officers about everything that is happening in OTA. They also consider it as a lifetime experience,” the officer said.

According to OTA officials, the officers also visited various places in the city during the training period which will end on December 26.

Media personnel were allowed to witness a training session in which the women officers showcased their skills in handling light machine guns at the OTA shooting range, abutting Chennai Airport. — PTI


Nation celebrates Vijay Diwas to commemorate India’s victory over Pakistan in 1971 war

The nation today celebrated Vijay Diwas to commemorate India’s victory over Pakistan in 1971 war. Rich tributes are being paid to the Martyrs who laid down their lives during the war.

President Ram Nath Kovind, Vice President M. Venkaiah Naidu and Prime Minister Narendra Modi also paid tributes to the soldiers who sacrificed their lives for the nation during the war. In a tweet, Mr Kovind said, the nation remembers with gratitude the Armed Forces who defended the nation and upheld universal values of human liberty in 1971.

Mr Naidu also remembered the courage of the brave soldiers and their selfless sacrifices. Mr Modi said, the unwavering courage and patriotism of the soldiers ensured that the country is safe and that their service will always inspire every Indian.

On this day in 1971, the chief of the Pakistani forces, General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi, along with 93 thousand troops, had surrendered unconditionally to the allied forces consisting of Indian Army and Mukti Bahini, led by Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora in Dhaka after their defeat in the Liberation war. This historic victory led to creation of Bangladesh.

This year’s celebration marks the 47th anniversary of India’s victory over its neighbour. Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman along with Navy Chief Admiral Sunil Lanba, Air Force Chief Air Chief Marshal Birender Singh Dhanoa and Vice Chief of Army Lieutenant General Devraj Anbu paid tributes to the Martyrs at Amar Jawan Jyoti on Sunday morning.


Ex-servicemen vow to oppose BJP nominees

Tribune News Service

Rohtak, December 8

Former defence officials associated with the Haryana Ex-Services League (HESL), a body of ex-servicemen, have decided to work for the defeat of the BJP nominees in the mayoral and municipal elections across the state.

This was stated by Col RS Malik (retd), a former president of the league, who was accompanied by Col KS Sansanwal (retd), Col RS Budhwar (retd), Col Jai Singh Kadian (retd), Capt Shamsher Singh Malik (retd) and Sub RK Ahlawat (retd), while addressing a news conference here today.

The former defence officers supported the candidature of Dr Jagmati Sangwan, the CPM’s mayoral nominee for Rohtak.

Col Malik alleged that the state government had hijacked the League and some functionaries government were interfering in its affairs.

The former HESL president maintained that the BJP regime at the Centre had made the surgical strikes a political tool, whereas it was a routine military exercise and no government had ever tried to seek credit or political mileage for it.

He alleged multifarious irregularities in the functioning of the League under the government-appointed administrator and an advisory committee constituted by him.

Jat samiti to campaign against BJP in Hisar

The All India Jat Arakshan Sangharsh Samiti will oppose the BJP candidates in the municipal corporation polls in five towns of Haryana. The samiti spokesperson Rambhagat Malik said at a meeting in Hansi town of the district that they would start campaign among electorate to vote against the BJP candidates in the MC polls. He said the state government had backstabbed the Jat community on the issue of reservation.


1962 – A case of Chinese whispers

Time for India to get scholars to write unbiased books on the India-China War as conflicting versions abound

Line of Conflict: Blame game over India’s debacle in the 1962 War continues in the books that chronicle and analyse it

Ajay Banerjee

In the absence of an authentic public account, events leading to the month-long India-China war in 1962 have diametrically opposite and rather ‘conflicting versions’. Some blame India for being the aggressor, others blame China for having prepared for a war since 1959 and for being the aggressor.

Adding to the cauldron of conflicting versions are books written by key players of those times. B.N Mullick, the director Intelligence Bureau, wrote Chinese Betrayal: My Years with Nehru;  Lt Gen B.M Kaul, the then commander of the Tezpur-based IV Corps, wrote The Untold Story;  Brig DK Palit, the then Director Military Operations, penned the War in High Himalaya: The Indian Army in Crisis, 1962;  Brig J.P Dalvi, the then Commander of the Army’s 7th Brigade, has his version of events  Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain-Raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962.

All have looked at their own specific roles and are autobiographical accounts. In 2016, Shiv Kunal Verma, son of an Army Captain who fought the Sino-India war, wrote  1962: The War That Wasn’t. He pieced together yet another account that discusses the battle-scape and also the political scene.

Conflicting versions

A 1971 book India’s China War  by Australia-based  author Neville Maxwell kicked off the blame game by maintaining that Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had unleashed a ‘forward policy’ that ‘provoked’ China into a war (Oct 20, 1962 to Nov 23, 1962). Maxwell’s theory propagated in his book reinforces the thought that China was only defending its territory. British author Sir Alistar Lamb, who has authored three books, also presents a case against India.

Two other books have a diametrically opposite view maintaining that it was China, and not India that ‘provoked’ the war. Swedish Journalist Bertil Lintner’s China’s India War-Collision Course on the Roof of the World, and History of the Conflict with China — 1962, released for ‘restricted’ circulation by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in March 1993, puncture the Maxwell-Lamb theory that has cast a shadow on the post-Independence thinking on the Sino-Indian conflict.

At the launch of his book in New Delhi in December last year Lintner had said, “Maxwell may have misjudged and most people do make that mistake”. His book goes on to detail that the decision to go to war with India had been taken in 1959 — the year Dalai Lama had arrived in India.

The MoD book, rebuts the Maxwell claim an a aggressive ‘forward policy’ — a decision taken by India in November 1961 — saying it was to restrict the Chinese to their claim-line of 1956 and stop claims over the new territory in 1960. Beijing had expanded its claim on another 5,100 sq km of territory in eastern Ladakh. It was to “prevent further infiltration into unoccupied areas of Ladakh”, says the book possessed by a miniscule number of Indians, but the same is again not in public domain being classified as ‘restricted’.

India and China have an un-demarcated boundary. Five attempts by the British between 1847 and 1914 did not yield results. At present the India-China special representatives are charged to tackle the boundary question.

Need to correct misperception of disgrace 

The MoD book also debunks the ‘popular belief’ that India was totally ‘disgraced’ in the 1962 India-China War. It accepts the shortcomings, but tells how Indian troops held on in Ladakh, most notably at Rezang La in eastern Ladakh, just 5 km south-east of the hamlet of Chusul. “The Indian soldier was defeated but not disgraced in Ladakh,” it says, dispelling the notion.

Notably, the Chinese officially admit to 2,419 casualties (722 dead and 1,697 wounded). The figure is quite stunning given the situation in which each Indian position was asked to fight.

Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report apportions blames on Generals  

A report on the war by Lt Gen Henderson Brooks and Brig (later Lt Gen) Prem Bhagat is classified even as Neville Maxwell put out portions of it on a website. New Delhi did not rebut him for this nor had it done in 1971 by a scholarly rebuttal of his earlier book hence allowing Maxwell’s one-sided interpretation to flourish.

The portions put out in public reveal that the government wanted a ‘forward policy’, but left the implementation to the generals. Gen B.M Kaul, overruled valid cautions presented by Lt Gen Daulet Singh, the Western Army Commander who had insisted that a forward move must have adequate troop numbers, combat support and logistics.

The belief that pushing forward would not encounter Chinese resistance came from the Intelligence Bureau. The Army’s earlier stated view that “the Chinese would resist by force any attempts to take back territory held by them,” was countered by B.N Mullick thus: “The Chinese would not react to our establishing new posts and that they were not likely to use force against any of our posts even if they were in a position to do so”.

The Army Headquarters had a wrong assessment of troops. It argued that China could not muster more than 5,000 troops facing eastern Ladakh even as Lt Gen Daulat Singh warned (correctly) on August 17, 1962 that Beijing had 15,000 troops.

Hindrance in accessing records

The Public Record Act 1993 does not entail automatic declassification of military records, and exemptions under the Right to Information Act 2005 are a deterrent for researchers. A war history cell at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) produced a paper in 2016 titled A Historiographic Analysis of the Military History of  Post-Independent India. Authored by Jaideep Chanda, it is candid: “An analysis of the military historical literature in India will primarily find personal accounts mostly written by retired Army officers”.


ONE STEP CLOSER TO THEIR DREAMS

As many as 28 students from Mohali cleared the written test of National Defence Academy (NDA).

HT PHOTO■ Twenty-eight cadets, who have cleared the written test of National Defence Academy, all smiles during a press conference at Shemrock Senior Secondary School, Sector 69, in Mohali on Wednesday.

The students, who are enrolled at Shemrock Senior Secondary School, Sector 69, Mohali, were trained at Maharaja Ranjit Singh Armed Forces Preparatory Institute, Sector 77, Mohali.

Institute director Major General Baljit Singh Grewal (retd) said, “Cadet GS Gosal and Cadet Shashank topped India. Cadet Armandeep Singh made it to the all India merit.”

School principal Prineet Sohal said, “Out of the total 339 seats, 28 students were selected from Maharaja Ranjit Singh Armed Forces Preparatory Institute and Shemrock Senior Secondary School.” The written exam was conducted on September 9, 2018. Candidates, who qualified the exam, will now appear for interview.


Navy Day celebrated

Navy Day celebrated

The Navy Day celebrations underway at DPS, Nagbani. Tribune Photo

Jammu, December 4

A special programme to mark the Navy Day celebrations was organised at Delhi Public School, Nagbani, on Tuesday.

The day started with a speech by senior students, who also sung patriotic songs to celebrate the greatness, glory and role of the Navy to the country.

Navy Day in India is observed on December 4 every year to celebrate the magnificence, achievements and role of the naval force to the country.

School coordinator Aarti Gupta acknowledged the efforts of the students by saying that the Indian Navy plays a crucial role of exercising joint operations with neighbouring countries, providing support to people living on edges and helping them to set up their lives in such difficult regions. — TNS

 


An Imran yorker that Punjab must dig out by Vivek Katju

The corridor, if not handled properly, can cause friction instead of promoting goodwill. At the same time, does it indicate Pakistan’s fresh thinking towards India, brought forth by its realisation that its economic woes and stability cannot be addressed without normalisation of ties with India?

An Imran yorker that Punjab must dig out

Navjot JUST A CONDUIT: Countries decide not on the basis of personal friendships, but a careful evaluation of their interests.

Vivek Katju
Ex-secretary, Ministry of External Affairs

IF Pakistan’s object was to take the corridor to Kartarpur Sahib to the destination of peace and engage a reluctant India in full dialogue, the comments and actions of Prime Minister Imran Khan and army chief Qamar Bajwa on November 28, the day it organised the ground-breaking ceremony, and later, the injudicious remarks of Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi were counterproductive.

Khan’s initial intention may have been to use the occasion to point to his desire for the normalisation of India-Pakistan relations. But if that was the case, he should have realised that a reference to the Kashmir issue would vitiate the atmosphere. General Bajwa’s presence was useful, for it indicated the army’s support for the corridor. But his exchange of greetings with a known Khalistan supporter raised legitimate questions of that all-powerful institution’s motivations. And, Qureshi’s exultation that Khan had bowled a ‘googly’ which had compelled India to send ministers to the ground-breaking ceremony was plain stupidity, raising doubts about Pakistan’s objectives.

India too travelled away from the Kartarpur Sahib corridor’s possibility of positively impacting the bilateral relationship. On Gurpurab, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, seeking the blessings of Guru Nanak Dev, implicitly held out the vision of a changed India-Pakistan relationship. However, in External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj declining the invitation to attend the ceremony and instead sending two Sikh ministers, India signalled that it was honouring Sikh sentiment more than anything else. That indication was confirmed when, on the ground-breaking day itself and when its ministers were to be in Pakistan, Swaraj reiterated India’s position that full bilateral engagement could only be undertaken once Pakistan had abandoned terror.

Swaraj cannot be faulted for drawing attention to the inappropriateness of Qureshi’s ‘googly’ boast. It is noteworthy that while the Pakistan Foreign Ministry was underlining that the Kartarpur initiative was “solely in deference to the long-standing wishes of our Sikh brethren”, the minister himself was using the cricketing metaphor — and in that context ‘yorker’ would have been better — to show how Khan, the fast bowler, had slipped one past India. In doing so, he only succeeded in eroding the effort of his diplomats. Khan’s endeavour at damage control by asserting that “it was not a googly or a double game but a straightforward decision” will hardly help.

The choice of the word “brethren” in the statement reveals Pakistan’s long-held desire to build enduring bridges with Sikhs all over the world, and especially in India. For decades, Pakistani official propaganda targets India’s minorities, including Sikhs, and seeks to create schisms between the majority community and the minorities. It projects the minorities to be under majority yoke. The fact that it will never succeed in its vain attempt at diluting the patriotism of India’s Sikhs does not and will not deter Pakistan from making attempts to do so.

The role of Navjot Singh Sidhu is merely a distraction to the larger issues surrounding the Kartarpur Sahib corridor. Countries take decisions on issues such as the corridor, which had remained stuck — but not always in focus — for decades, not on the basis of personal friendships but a careful evaluation of their interests. Individuals can become conduits for messages or hasten or retard processes, but by themselves, they can never solely deliver. Mutual praise between Khan and Sidhu may have made for catchy TV shows but is meaningless in achieving results in difficult bilateral ties as between India and Pakistan. Sidhu’s comments and actions added passing grist to the domestic political mill but even here they are hardly of enduring relevance.

Apart from the physical construction of the corridor, which Pakistan wants to complete in time for the 550th Gurpurab, the two countries will have to work out the procedures for its use by the pilgrims. The Pakistan Foreign Ministry’s statement noted, “We also look forward to working out necessary details and modalities with the Indian side concerning passage through the corridor.”

In addition, India will have to seek guarantees that Pakistan does not inflict Khalistani propaganda on the pilgrims. This is especially important as Pakistan routinely does so on Indian Sikh jathas during their visits on important festivals. India may have to insist that its officials are allowed daily access to the Pakistani side of the corridor to look after the welfare of the pilgrims. If the corridor is not handled properly, it may become a source of constant bilateral friction instead of promoting goodwill.

Pakistan plans accommodation and facilities around the Kartarpur gurdwara to fully utilise the potential of religious tourism. These will obviously not be within the corridor but in close vicinity of the gurdwara. It obviously hopes that these will attract Sikh pilgrims from the world over. Some visas to Indian Sikhs may be forthcoming for this purpose too. Does such a project and indeed the corridor itself indicate fresh thinking towards India brought forth by its current economic difficulties as well as a realisation that without the normalisation of ties with India, Pakistan will not be able to become really stable let alone prosperous? Unfortunately, there is no evidence to indicate so, especially in the army.

The fact is that Pakistan will have to radically change course so that a full dialogue with India can take place. For that, Pakistan will have to redefine its approach to the use of terrorist groups against India. Pakistan is hardly going down that path, for it is keeping Khalistani elements within its territory and also supporting them outside. The assessment that Indian security agencies cannot be complacent on the Khalistani front is valid. The Kartarpur Sahib corridor, while a good and welcome development for Sikh pilgrims, may add to the concerns of Indian security managers.