Monthly Archives: August 2018

Bathinda, May 4

Col Sarabjit Singh Sangha (retd), District Defence Services Welfare Board, Bathinda, today stated that the office of the District Defence Services Welfare Board, Bathinda, was starting free six weeks coaching for preparation of exams for NDA and CDS recruitment as Army officers.Besides imparting coaching in all the related subjects, the candidates will also be taught personality development. He added that since the number of candidates was limited, the aspirants should get enrolled for the courses as soon as possible. He also appealed the mathematics, English and general knowledge experts to approach the board to impart coaching. He added that the work on linking living proof certificate with the Aadhar card was going on.He appealed to the ex-servicemen and widows/dependents to get their two documents linked so that they do not face problem in receiving their pension. For further information, one can also contact at 0164-2212612. — TNS

GUWAHATI: An Army jawan, sent on a 10-km “route march” even after he had complained of chest pain, collapsed and died, possibly of a cardiac arrest.

After his death, four to five fellow jawans got “emotional and agitated” and picked up an altercation with their unit adjutant, a Major, leading to a fight with him. Army sources confirmed there were some injuries but they were not serious.

The incident was reported from eastern Arunachal Pradesh on Sunday. The exact location was not disclosed by Army authorities. The unit involved was 8 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles, which comes under 3 Corps, which is based in Nagaland’s Dimapur.

The 3 Corps and Assam’s Tezpur based 4 Corps look after security in Arunachal, which shares its border with China, Bhutan and Myanmar. Army sources said the jawan went ahead with the route march after the unit’s Medical Officer had found him “fit” during an examination.

The examination was carried out after the jawan had complained of chest pain.

“It was an endurance training involving 30 to 40 jawans. When the jawan collapsed, he was immediately brought to the Field Ambulance where he succumbed,” an Army officer told Express on the condition of anonymity.

The social media is abuzz with reports of a “mutiny-like” situation in the area. The reports suggested that the route march was a punishment drill, ordered following a recent clash between a jawan and a Captain, in which some other jawans and officers got involved. The Captain was stated to be critical.

Army sources rubbished the reports as “rumours”. The officer also categorically said that it was not an act of mutiny. “Any act of violence, done by an individual, is an act of indiscipline. When two or more individuals are involved, it’s an act of mutiny. However, this case is not exactly mutiny, rather, it’s a case of the troops running amok,” he claimed.

Sources within the Army said that an investigation has been ordered into the alleged scuffle between the jawans and Army officer.

Chandigarh, May 1

A Naib Subedar has complained that someone withdrew around Rs 5.85 lakh from his account after exchanging his ATM card at an ATM booth in Sector 22.According to the police, complainant Umesh Chander Pandey, a resident of N-Area, Airport Road, Chandigarh, reported that someone exchanged his ATM Card at PNB ATM, booth 1-2, Sector 22-D. The complainant claimed that Rs 5.85 lakh was withdrawn from his account between March 3 to 13. . A case of cheating has been registered. — TNS

In hindsight, could we have fought the war differently?Three major factors influenced fighting the Kargil War. First, Pakistan had surprised us. Initially even the adversary – whether militants or Pakistan Army Regulars – was not clear. Second, for both political and strategic reasons, security of the Srinagar-Kargil-Leh Highway was critical. Third, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) directed us to vacate the intrusions without crossing the LoC or the international border. Even in the third week of June 1999, the CCS ruled out crossing the LoC. Under these circumstances, I do not think the Indian military could have fought the war differently.During the war you had famously remarked ‘If a war is thrust upon us we will fight with whatever we have’. How deficient in war fighting capabilities were we then? Could we have defeated Pakistan had a full-fledged war with Pakistan erupted?During Kargil, our critical deficiencies were worth Rs 14,800 crore. Except for a small number of tanks, infantry combat vehicles, artillery and air defence guns, all other weapons and equipment were of 1960s-70s vintage. We had raised 30 Rashtriya Rifles battalions but without getting sanction for their weapons and equipment which had to be equipped from Army reserves, some even from regular battalions. The situation in other Services was similar. However, the plus point was that the Pakistani armed forces were in a no better state. Our frontline soldiers were led better and displayed unparalleled dedication. If the war had escalated, we would have got the better of them. Would you have recommended opening another front had you been unable to vacate the intrusions? Definitely. I had stated this publically. The CCS was made aware of it. If circumstances demanded, we were prepared for escalation and open another front after the third week of June 1999. Was there a nuclear threat from Pakistan as Bruce Reidel (President Bill Clinton’s advisor) subsequently claimed?There was a lot of nuclear rhetoric by politicians on both sides. However, on the ground, there were no indications of a Pakistani nuclear threat. What are the lessons from the war? Have we learnt them?Many lessons required a holistic national security review as well as re-thinking on the nature of conflict in the new strategic environment. Some were: 

• There may be remote chances of a full-scale conventional war between two nuclear weapon states. But as long as there are territory-related disputes (we have with China and Pakistan), an adversary can indulge in a proxy war, limited border war, or both.
• Political reluctance in India to adopt a pro-active strategy invariably leads us to reactive military situations. This is compounded when no loss of territory is acceptable to the public and political authority. This cannot be achieved unless we have credible deterrence, intelligence assessments and very effective border surveillance.
• Successful outcome of a border war depends upon our ability to react rapidly.
• A war in current strategic environment requires close political oversight and politico-civil-military interaction. It is essential to keep the military leadership within the security and strategic decision-making loop.
• Credible deterrence and escalation dominance require our armed forces to be regularly modernised.
• Kargil highlighted weakness of India’s higher defence control organisation, inadequacies in intelligence acquisition, assessment and surveillance capabilities, and in border surveillance. Post war half-hearted tinkering done in the higher defence organisation has made no impact. In fact, civil-military relations have further deteriorated.

At the tactical and operational levels, some lessons were:

• All units and formations require a certain minimum period of re-orientation when there is a change in their role and operational environment.
• Assaulting troops must have up-to-date information of the terrain.
• When troops are required to scale heights, and still be fit enough for a ‘hand to hand’ fight, physical fitness gains paramount importance. So, a young profile of officers and men in combat units is vital.
• There is much greater need for artillery as the movement in high altitude mountains is very slow.
• Logistics bases have to be located as far forward as possible with multiple means of transportation.

We have since Siachenised the LoC. Can we afford to? Is it good military tactics?Pakistan had not only destroyed the Lahore Agreement signed only two months earlier, but also all trust and confidence-building measures since the Simla Agreement. Under these circumstances, and when no deterrent and pro-active defence policy is followed by India, the military has no option but to increase density of troops along the LoC. It was later revealed that there was a lack of synergy between the three Services. Why was that? How did it impact our war fighting ability?A joint military strategy is extremely important. In terms of attitude and defence organisations, we have not paid adequate attention to this aspect even now. There were initial hiccups during the Kargil War but after 24 May 1999, there was no synergy problem.Did we capture and return any Pakistani soldiers during or after the war?We captured eight Pakistani regular soldiers – four from 5 Northern Light Infantry, two from 33 Frontier Force, and one each from 19 Frontier Force and 24 Sind battalions. After the war, they were returned to Pakistan. Interestingly, our defence attaché in London was approached for the body of a young Pakistani officer, Captain Taimur Malik of the Special Service Group, attached to the 3 Northern Light Infantry, who had been killed at Point 5770. Taimur’s grandfather, who was living in London wanted his request to be conveyed to me. On receipt of this message, we got young Taimur’s and other bodies exhumed. The bodies were then returned. When the war ended, we handed over 10 bodies of Pakistani soldiers to them in the Dras sector. But the Pakistani army refused to accept bodies of around 200 soldiers recovered in the areas re-captured by us as it would have exposed Pakistan’s perfidy.

Havildar Hangpang Dada

Tribune News Service

Srinagar, May 27

Havildar Hangpang Dada, a native of Tirap in Arunachal Pradesh, on Friday succumbed to his injuries sustained in an encounter in Nowgam sector yesterday, but not before etching his name in the Army’s annals of bravery.The 36-year-old led his team in killing three militants in a gunfight close to the Line of Control after the Army foiled an infiltration bid at Tutmar Gali in the Nowgam sector, 120 km north-west of Srinagar, before sustaining fatal injuries.Havildar Dada served in the Army for 19 years and is survived by his wife and two children. Enrolled in the Assam Regiment in 1997, he was posted with 35 Rashtriya Rifles. “He showed courage and bravery. Before succumbing to injuries, he eliminated foreign terrorists,” Maj Gen JS Nain, General Officer Commanding of the Baramulla-based 19 Infantry Division, said, adding that the 20-hour operation had been called off with the killing of another militant today.“The operation was conducted in tough conditions at an altitude of 11,000-12,000 feet. It was raining and snowing,” he said. “We recovered a large quantity of arms, ammunition, radio sets, winter clothing, food items and mountaineering equipment,” he added.The gunfight erupted on Thursday morning when Armymen observed the movement of a group of militants. The identity of the slain ultras and the group they were affiliated to was yet to be ascertained. Over 40 militants have managed to infiltrate into Kashmir this year so far, higher than the figure of 35 for last year.Army officials said Dada was seriously injured as the militants were perched higher up on the mountains.In a separate gunfight, two militants of the Hizbul Mujahideen were killed in north Kashmir’s Kunzer area in Baramulla district today. The gunfight erupted at Kanchipora in Tangmarg, 35 km from Srinagar,.“They were given an offer to surrender, which they refused. They fired at the joint search parties and an encounter ensued in which three militants died,” said a police officer.