In hindsight, could we have fought the war differently?Three major factors influenced fighting the Kargil War. First, Pakistan had surprised us. Initially even the adversary – whether militants or Pakistan Army Regulars – was not clear. Second, for both political and strategic reasons, security of the Srinagar-Kargil-Leh Highway was critical. Third, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) directed us to vacate the intrusions without crossing the LoC or the international border. Even in the third week of June 1999, the CCS ruled out crossing the LoC. Under these circumstances, I do not think the Indian military could have fought the war differently.During the war you had famously remarked ‘If a war is thrust upon us we will fight with whatever we have’. How deficient in war fighting capabilities were we then? Could we have defeated Pakistan had a full-fledged war with Pakistan erupted?During Kargil, our critical deficiencies were worth Rs 14,800 crore. Except for a small number of tanks, infantry combat vehicles, artillery and air defence guns, all other weapons and equipment were of 1960s-70s vintage. We had raised 30 Rashtriya Rifles battalions but without getting sanction for their weapons and equipment which had to be equipped from Army reserves, some even from regular battalions. The situation in other Services was similar. However, the plus point was that the Pakistani armed forces were in a no better state. Our frontline soldiers were led better and displayed unparalleled dedication. If the war had escalated, we would have got the better of them. Would you have recommended opening another front had you been unable to vacate the intrusions? Definitely. I had stated this publically. The CCS was made aware of it. If circumstances demanded, we were prepared for escalation and open another front after the third week of June 1999. Was there a nuclear threat from Pakistan as Bruce Reidel (President Bill Clinton’s advisor) subsequently claimed?There was a lot of nuclear rhetoric by politicians on both sides. However, on the ground, there were no indications of a Pakistani nuclear threat. What are the lessons from the war? Have we learnt them?Many lessons required a holistic national security review as well as re-thinking on the nature of conflict in the new strategic environment. Some were: 

• There may be remote chances of a full-scale conventional war between two nuclear weapon states. But as long as there are territory-related disputes (we have with China and Pakistan), an adversary can indulge in a proxy war, limited border war, or both.
• Political reluctance in India to adopt a pro-active strategy invariably leads us to reactive military situations. This is compounded when no loss of territory is acceptable to the public and political authority. This cannot be achieved unless we have credible deterrence, intelligence assessments and very effective border surveillance.
• Successful outcome of a border war depends upon our ability to react rapidly.
• A war in current strategic environment requires close political oversight and politico-civil-military interaction. It is essential to keep the military leadership within the security and strategic decision-making loop.
• Credible deterrence and escalation dominance require our armed forces to be regularly modernised.
• Kargil highlighted weakness of India’s higher defence control organisation, inadequacies in intelligence acquisition, assessment and surveillance capabilities, and in border surveillance. Post war half-hearted tinkering done in the higher defence organisation has made no impact. In fact, civil-military relations have further deteriorated.

At the tactical and operational levels, some lessons were:

• All units and formations require a certain minimum period of re-orientation when there is a change in their role and operational environment.
• Assaulting troops must have up-to-date information of the terrain.
• When troops are required to scale heights, and still be fit enough for a ‘hand to hand’ fight, physical fitness gains paramount importance. So, a young profile of officers and men in combat units is vital.
• There is much greater need for artillery as the movement in high altitude mountains is very slow.
• Logistics bases have to be located as far forward as possible with multiple means of transportation.

We have since Siachenised the LoC. Can we afford to? Is it good military tactics?Pakistan had not only destroyed the Lahore Agreement signed only two months earlier, but also all trust and confidence-building measures since the Simla Agreement. Under these circumstances, and when no deterrent and pro-active defence policy is followed by India, the military has no option but to increase density of troops along the LoC. It was later revealed that there was a lack of synergy between the three Services. Why was that? How did it impact our war fighting ability?A joint military strategy is extremely important. In terms of attitude and defence organisations, we have not paid adequate attention to this aspect even now. There were initial hiccups during the Kargil War but after 24 May 1999, there was no synergy problem.Did we capture and return any Pakistani soldiers during or after the war?We captured eight Pakistani regular soldiers – four from 5 Northern Light Infantry, two from 33 Frontier Force, and one each from 19 Frontier Force and 24 Sind battalions. After the war, they were returned to Pakistan. Interestingly, our defence attaché in London was approached for the body of a young Pakistani officer, Captain Taimur Malik of the Special Service Group, attached to the 3 Northern Light Infantry, who had been killed at Point 5770. Taimur’s grandfather, who was living in London wanted his request to be conveyed to me. On receipt of this message, we got young Taimur’s and other bodies exhumed. The bodies were then returned. When the war ended, we handed over 10 bodies of Pakistani soldiers to them in the Dras sector. But the Pakistani army refused to accept bodies of around 200 soldiers recovered in the areas re-captured by us as it would have exposed Pakistan’s perfidy.