Soldiers engaged in hostilities on three border points would be ominous in almost any context except where India and China are concerned. Along the Line of Actual Control, it could mean an escalating confrontation that could spread into diplomatic and economic spheres. Or it could mean that another border incident has got a bit out of control. The reasons for escalation could be the ever-changing border infrastructure or a rush of blood by an individual soldier. If the latter, one can expect the status quo to be restored, but after much muscle-flexing.

The problem in Sino-Indian relations is that whether such incidents are motivated by the geological or the geopolitical is often unclear to either side. Much of the discussion at officer-level flag meetings or between diplomats in the twin capitals is about trying to determine at which level the wheels are turning. That, in turn, goes to a much deeper issue of distrust between India and China and opacity on the part of both governments, but with Beijing being the blacker box. The two countries now have four border management agreements, with a fifth in the works. But with new roads being built, better vehicles being deployed, and the strategic landscape forever changing along the border, each agreement starts becoming outdated as soon as the ink dries.

India and Chinese troops are face-to-face in Galwan Valley, Finger 4 and Naku La. China’s “all weather friend”, Pakistan, has turned up the temperature along the Kashmir border. But, at the same time, the People’s Bank of China’s licence to invest in India has just been renewed. Beijing has ensured emergency medical supplies are being sent, albeit with some quality control issues. In contrast to the rhetorical aggression that Beijing has shown to the West or Southeast Asia, the noises from China regarding India have been benign. This is all part of a long-standing dichotomy in the Sino-Indian relations, much competitiveness with many elements of cooperation. However, with the international strategic environment changing, this rough-and-ready way of handling bilateral relations needs to be replaced. The goal should be a framework where lines of communication, strategic red lines and dotted lines along maps are all better delineated. This is a task of a generation, but one that is essential if India and China are to ensure border flare-ups do not become something much larger and more dangerous.

ribune News Service

Mohali, May 23

The problems of former Director General of Police (DGP) Sumedh Singh Saini are likely to increase as former police officer Gurmeet Singh Pinki today recorded his statement before a special investigation team (SIT) in the abduction and disappearance case of Balwant Singh Multani in 1991.

According to information, Pinki arrived at the Mataur police station at 10 am and left after being questioned by the SIT for three hours. The SIT asked him as to how he met Saini, his proximity to the then SSP, Chandigarh, and his revelation that Balwant Singh Multani, a junior engineer with the Chandigarh Industrial and Tourism Corporation (CITCO), had allegedly died due to torture in custody.

However, the police had claimed that Multani had escaped from the custody of the Qadian police in 1991. Since then, his whereabouts were not known.

Pinki had made disclosures in a magazine in 2015 and on that basis, Palwinder Singh Multani, brother of victim Balwant Singh Multani, had filed a complaint against Saini in Mohali on May 6.

A case was registered under Sections 364 (kidnapping or abduction in order to murder), 201 (causing disappearance of evidence), 344 (wrongful confinement), 330 (voluntarily causing hurt to exhort confession) and 120B (criminal conspiracy) of the IPC.

SIT head Harmandeep Singh Hans refused to divulge details about the investigation.

Ajay Banerjee

Tribune News Service

New Delhi, May 23

Armed forces of India and China have literally “dug in” their boots at separate locations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh. The Chinese have a huge build up that includes upcoming military-style bunkers, new upcoming permanent structures, military trucks, road-building equipment and even a warehouse.

Some of the structures, military camps, road-building equipment and trucks are within the territory of India and in areas that are not disputed, like those at the confluence of the Galwan and Shyok rivers in what is defined as the sub-sector north (SSN).

“Matters could escalate. This is by far the most tense situation since 1962,” said an official. An Australia-based security analyst tweeted what he claimed were satellite images of Chinese “incursion” in Galwan.

At Galwan, India and China never disputed the alignment of the LAC. India’s new road, the 255-km Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Baig Oldie (DSDBO) road has seemingly caused this flare up. The road is within the Indian territory and provides all weather access to the DBO, Depsang plains and the Karakoram pass. Opposite of the road or eastwards of it is the Aksai Chin plateau, illegally occupied by China.

In the valley along the Galwan river, the China infrastructure is poor. The other flashpoint is the north bank of Pangong Tso, a 135-km glacial melt lake at an altitude of more than 14,000 feet. China is objecting to a road made by India between one of the eight mountain spurs that end at the lake. Each of the spur is identified as “finger” in the military parlance and each ridgeline is separated by 2-5 km. On the night intervening May 5 and 6, troops of either side had clashed, resulting in injuries to many.

India assumes the LAC to be at Finger 4. China is trying to push Indian troops back to Finger 2, a distance of more than 10 km.

Structures in Indian territory

• The Chinese have a huge build up that includes upcoming military-style bunkers, new upcoming permanent structures, military trucks, road-building equipment and even a warehouse
• Some of these structures are within the territory of India and in areas that are not disputed

 

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Ghazala Wahab has rightly reminded the veterans of India that their relationship with the Army must not end with entitlements of personal nature – like the Canteen Stores Department (CSD) and One Rank One Pension (OROP) – but should extend to them becoming conscience keepers of the Army they so profess to love.

The veterans simply do not articulate their views on national security, particularly on contentious issues. Though it cannot be proved through data, this is mostly the result of surviving long careers by not speaking up and not objecting to anything.

Career consciousness is a reality in all jobs but in the Army, the pyramid structure ensures that every red mark matters.

However, veterans do know exactly what is going wrong. Here is what is going wrong.

‘Tour Of Duty’ project

The project envisages youngsters being given a year’s training and then being commissioned for three years of service, which is non-pensionable. As a pilot project, it is a good idea.

However, it is feared that the results will not be seen objectively. They will be managed to suit political masters.

One thing is already proven – the Army can no longer justify training anyone for more than one year. If those recruited through the Tour of Duty (ToD) are expected to deliver after one year’s training, why shouldn’t others?

At present, entry into the National Defence Academy means four years of training – and then, you take up the same responsibilities as the ToD youngsters will after one year. All of them will undoubtedly be used in combat arms.

Also read: The Proposed Three Year ‘Tour of Duty’ Will Benefit Everyone but the Army

On the other hand, several ex-NDA entries will, after four-year training, join non-combat services, where the daily workload is not one that calls for experience in riding a horses or boxing. It’ll be ridiculous to have youngsters with one-year service leading platoons, while those with four years arrange sacks of logistics!

How an officer turns out after the first three years depends on how he is handled in these first three years. The length of pre-commission training has absolutely nothing to do with delivering in battle or command, after the formative initial three years.

Had that been the case, the Army would have provided some career benefits to ex-NDAs over others who take up the same job with much less training and expenditure. That is not the case and rightly so.

The Army need simply not train anyone for more than a year. As for jobs in the services like ASC and AOC, six months will do.

With this system, the brightest youngsters India has, will be in the Army through the ToD route and use the certificate to move into the civil sector, which will gladly pay for what the Army refuses to. Only those who know that the civil sector may not hire them even after the ToD certificate will opt for permanent commission. With that, our Army will be of those who know they were not good enough in the competitive world of the civil sector. This is already happening, but the problem will be further accentuated.

I am sad that the Army has decided to go in for the cheapest labour available rather than improve career prospects so that these so-called ‘patriotic’ youngsters serve for life. But since the Army is hellbent on following the political diktat, there is really no point labouring this issue.

Excessive casualties in J&K

There is no doubt that the Army suffers excessive casualties in J&K, particularly at the level of commanding officers. The martyrdom of Col. Ashutosh Sharma is what caused Ghazala to write that piece.

Unfortunately, several veterans have gone public with defending whatever happened in this case.

They approach the topic from the safe stand-point of ‘Isn’t it the job of an army leader to lead from the front? Shouldn’t we be proud of it?’ That’s a good example of the Strawman technique wherein a weak argument is falsely created on purpose, demolished with ease and then success claimed.

Of course, leaders should lead. But should they lead four-man teams? I note with concern that COs are dying in engagements where our side has the initiative i.e. the terrorist is cowering and we can choose the time and place of the attack. I know of just one case where the CO got involved in a fire fight because he had no option. This is when Col. N.J.C. Nair, CO 16 Maratha, Kirti Chakra, laid down his life in 1993 in repulsing an ambush and earned the Ashok Chakra.

It is not for nothing that the authorised personal arm of a CO is a pistol and not an AK 47. I know of a CO who went into a full attack with just his swagger stick. Yes, he has the responsibility to influence battle, but the teaching is that he does so by employment of reserves.

The point here is – should COs be leading small teams, completely out of communication with the unit, in order to ferret out terrorists? The answer is a resounding no.

Why are COs doing so? Is that the SOP? If not, what is being done to ensure compliance of SOPs? If the events are any different than what is repeatedly coming out in the press, then the Army has a duty to rebut it – with facts and some evidence, which it never does.

If one or two terrorists (essentially civilians with a few days of training) are able to inflict such casualties on thorough professionals with 15-25 years of specialist training – something is surely wrong. The earlier we do something about it, the more lives we save.

Our training and equipment is pretty bad. We’re investing too little in it. Also, we are too liberal with our casualties. These will definitely reduce if more questions were asked by the parents of the martyrs, or better still, those of the fauzis still alive.

The veterans asking them will not change anything. We have lost the leverage.

ROI of Indian Armed Forces

At the apex of all issues lies this poser – why such poor return on investment (ROI) from armed forces that take up such a large part of the national budget?

The best ROI of any armed forces is not to win wars; wars cost too much money. The best ROI is to prevent wars, so that the national resources can be used for prosperity. The second-best ROI is to win wars decisively, such that the scale of victory and annihilation of the aggressor works as a deterrent for others.

It is clear to all that Indian Armed Forces have failed in being a deterrent of any type. Not only nations, even small-time insurgency groups are not scared of taking on the might of the Indian Army. What we call terrorist attacks in J&K are not what terrorist attacks are supposed to mean i.e. terrorising unarmed civilians. These are daring attacks on the best that the Army has to offer – some well inside fortifications. Even small teams are taking on the Army. We have never been able to inflict a heavy price on aggressors.

Earlier, the enemy was always attacked back with all the might the armed forces had – even if not very successfully. But now even that is not happening. After our strike at Balakot, Pakistan Air Force attacked the Indian mainland openly in daytime on February 27, 2019. They attacked, lost some and took some and went back. There was no response by India thereafter, much less massive retaliation for extracting severe penalties for the daring.

This is a new development – in the Modi era. Who will take Indian Armed Forces seriously?

Yes, our young officers have delivered well, but at a very high cost. And they have had to do since many others refused to do their bit.

All that Indian Armed Forces have achieved in 72 years is that India has not lost to Pakistan – a country one-fourth its size, and with numerous problems. Is that good enough for such a heavy investment of money and lives?

There is, however, no doubt that the veterans must get their act together and speak up. However, while we are ‘guilty, as charged’, there are some mitigating circumstances that may help reduce the sentence.

Also read: As They Mourn Those Killed in Action, Veterans Must Also Ask the Govt Some Basic Questions

Most veterans are quiet because they can see that the damage is already too heavy and deep. The creation of the department of Military Affairs, meanwhile, has been a masterstroke.

Now, there is no need to get the defence ministry involved. All that is required is a nudge to the Chief of Defence Staff. The Chiefs are wrongly projecting that orders of CDS cannot be refused. The CDS is merely the secretary of the Department of Military Affairs. The commander of all Chiefs is still the defence minister.

The CDS has authority only in matters of jointsmanship, not in deciding how armed forces must choose to respond. However, when it comes to the COVID-19 issue, the chiefs have taken the easy way out and have abdicated their command.

Col Alok Asthana is a veteran, presently a consultant on leadership and innovation. He is author of two books – Leadership for Colonels and Business Managers and Reclaim your Democracy. He can be contacted at alok.asthana@gmail.com

Beijing: China, the second-largest military spender after the US, has hiked its defence budget from last year’s 177.6 billion to USD 179 billion, nearly three times that of India, the lowest increment in recent years apparently due to the heavy disruption caused to its economy by the COVID-19, according to the official media.

China, which has the world’s largest military of two million troops, will continue to lower its defence budget growth rate to 6.6 per cent in 2020, according to a draft budget report presented on Friday to National People’s Congress (NPC), the country’s top legislature.

The 2020 defence budget continues to see single-digit growth for a fifth consecutive year. It is the lowest growth rate in recent years, the state-run Xinhua news agency reported.

China’s this year’s defence budget will be around 1.27 trillion yuan (about USD 179 billion) against last year’s 177.61 billion, according to the draft submitted to the NPC.

China’s total defence spending in 2019 only amounted to a quarter that of the United States, the world’s largest defence spender, while the per capita expenditure was just about one-seventeenth, the report said.

On Thursday Zhang Yesui, spokesperson for the NPC in a media briefing played down criticism about lack of transparency in China’s defence expenditure which defence analysts say considering the rapid expansion of Beijing’s military and modern weapons is far higher than what is announced.

Zhang said China had no “hidden military spending”.

China has been submitting reports on its military expenditures to the United Nations every year since 2007, he said.

“From where the money comes from to how the money is used, everything is accounted for,” Zhang said.

According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the military expenditure figures of China’s defence spending in 2019 amounted to USD 232 billion.

While China compares its defence expenditure with the US, whose defence budget according to SIPRI was USD 732 billion, Beijing’s massive defence modernisation drive is pushing India and a number of other countries to hike their own defence budgets to ensure reasonable balance of power.

India’s budget for 2020 amounted to USD 66.9 billion (Rs. 4,71,378 crore) according to a write-up in Indian Institute for Defence and Analysis, (IDSA). China’s latest budget of USD 179 billion is amounted to about 2.7 times more that of India.

China’s defence spending has been staying at around 1.3 per cent of its gross domestic product for many years, well below the world’s average of 2.6 per cent, Zhang said.

China’s defence budget in recent years acquired limelight as it embarked on a massive modernisation which included a number of aircraft carriers, stealth aircraft, rapid development of modern naval frigates.

Since Chinese President Xi Jinping came to power, China has revamped its defence forces, cutting the army by three lakh troops and enhanced its naval and air power as Beijing expanded its influence abroad.

China currently has one aircraft carrier, the second one is undergoing trials while the third is being built. According to official media reports, China plans to have five to six aircraft carriers in near future to challenge the US all around the world including in Beijing’s backyard the South China Sea (SCS).

China claims all most all of the SCS as its territory. Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia Brunei and Taiwan have counterclaims on it.

China is engaged in hotly contested territorial disputes in both the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Beijing has built up and militarised many of the islands and reefs it controls in the region. Both areas are stated to be rich in minerals, oil and other natural resources and are also vital to global trade.

Also read: The 5 flashpoints to watch as US-China relations go into a free fall

Armed forces are identifying weapons & platforms that will be placed on an import ban list as Modi govt has announced a slew of measures to boost ‘Make in India’.

Addressing an online seminar organised by the Society for Indian Defence Manufacturers (SIDM), in partnership with the Department of Defence Production, Army Vice-Chief Lt Gen S.K. Saini said the negative list will help the indigenous industry and provide micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME) the opportunity to fulfill the defence needs of the force.

He, however, assured that the import ban list will not restrict the forces from procuring niche technologies abroad.

As ThePrint reported on 16 May, the armed forces are identifying weapons and platforms that will be placed on an import ban list as the Narendra Modi government has announced a slew of measures to boost the ‘Make in India’ programme in the defence sector.

Also read: Army not naming terrorists killed in encounters is a step back on its transparent culture

Perceptible shift from OFBs to private entities

Lt Gen Saini said there is a perceptible shift of dependence in the Army, from the state-run Ordnance Factory Boards (OFBs) to private entities in terms of non-core activities and even in certain types of critical ammunition.

“It is hoped that other ammunition varieties including those that were being imported currently, based on the response of the defence industry, will also be added in the list of items to be manufactured indigenously,” he said.

The Ministry of Defence had in December 2017 approved manufacturing of eight select ammunition under the Make in India initiative.

This included the 30mm ammunition used by infantry carrying vehicles, 125mm armour piercing types and 40 mm grenades that can be machine launched.

Army sources said while eight have been identified for local manufacturing, more ammunition like the 40mm used by Air Defence and those for Anti Material Rifles continue to be imported.

Also read: India and China hold military talks amid rising tensions at LAC in eastern Ladakh

‘Finance minister’s announcement will have positive impact’

Lt Gen Saini echoed the call for ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and said the defence production and policy announcements, made by Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman on 17 May, will have a huge positive impact on India’s defence acquisition and sustenance.

He said 80 per cent of the Army’s capability development and more than 92 per cent of its sustenance budget was based on indigenous products and services.

Lt Gen Saini urged startups and MSMEs to come up with sophisticated technical solutions to military challenges and advised that the use of these technologies concurrently in the civil domain will help bring down their costs, making them financially viable in the medium and long term.

He also asked larger enterprises to act as major hubs of R&D, manufacturing and integration, which in turn will provide impetus to the smaller MSMEs to provide them with ancillary support, creating a self-sustaining ecosystem in the long run.

Also read: Army caught in old hiring conflict — 3-yr Tour of Duty or 5-yr Short Service Commission?