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Peace returning to J&K after Art 370: Army chiefPeace returning to J&K after Art 370: Army chief

Rahul Singh

rahul.singh@hindustantimes.com

New Delhi : Army chief General Manoj Mukund Naravane on Friday asserted that peace was returning to the Kashmir Valley after the Centre’s move in August revoking special status to the region, but Pakistan-backed terrorists were making infiltration attempts every day.

General Naravane is expected to visit the Siachen glacier next week on his first outstation tour after becoming the army chief on December 31.

“Terror activity and stone-pelting have reduced drastically. The law-and-order situation is improving and we expect it to improve further…There are 200-250 terrorists waiting to cross over into J&K. Infiltration attempts are being made ever day, but we are thwarting them,” Naravane told reporters.

The army chief said that the September 2016 surgical strikes against terror pads in Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir, followed by the February 2018 bombing of a terror facility in Pakistan’s Balakot, sent out a strong message to the neighbour that India can take down terror infrastructure and launch pads and “you cannot operate with impunity.”

Asked to comment on what India’s surgical strikes achieved given that the Balakot terror facility has been reactivated, the army chief said even when a target is destroyed during war, it is later reconstructed. “We destroyed it. They have reactivated it. A lot of destruction happened there…They will show restraint before taking escalatory action,” Naravane said.

He said 20 to 25 terror camps were active across the LoC but their numbers and location kept fluctuating. “We are keeping a constant watch,” he said.

Asked how far India had pushed the nuclear threshold after Balakot, Naravane said, “Nuclear weapons have been a good deterrence. That’s where their role ends. On two or three occasions, we have carried out operations without letting the nuclear portion come into play.”


India and Pakistan Are Edging Closer to War in 2020

BY MICHAEL KUGELMAN
Turmoil is never far away in South Asia, between disputed borders, acute resource shortages, and threats ranging from extremist violence to earthquakes. But in 2019, two crises stood out: an intensifying war in Afghanistan and deep tensions between India and Pakistan. And as serious as both were in 2019, expect them to get even worse in the coming year.
Afghanistan has already seen several grim milestones in the last 12 months that attested to the ferocity of the Taliban insurgency. Casualty figures for Afghan security forces and civilians set new records. It was also the deadliest year for U.S. forces since 2014.
Ironically, violence soared even as there was unprecedented momentum toward launching a peace process. U.S. President Donald Trump, eager to exit Afghanistan, stepped up efforts to secure a deal with the Taliban that would give him the political cover for a troop withdrawal. U.S. negotiators and senior Taliban representatives held multiple rounds of talks, and by September the two sides were finalizing a deal that centered on a withdrawal of U.S. troops coupled with a commitment by the Taliban to renounce ties to international terror groups.However, in September, Trump abruptly called off talks, giving a recent Taliban attack on a U.S. soldier as the reason. The likelier explanation, as I wrote for Foreign Policy back then, was the administration’s recognition that the emerging accord with the Taliban—which didn’t call for any type of cease-fire—was a lousy deal for Washington and Kabul.
The suspension of talks didn’t last long. Trump announced plans to scale up offensives against the Taliban, but this was more of a bargaining tactic than a battlefield redirection. Washington wanted to increase military pressure on the Taliban so that the insurgents would make more concessions at the negotiating table—such as the cease-fire they had refused to agree to earlier. Indeed, several days after Trump made a surprise Thanksgiving visit to Afghanistan, talks resumed—and this time with U.S. negotiators aiming to get a Taliban commitment to reduce violence against U.S. troops.During the last few days of December, media reports revealed that the Taliban had agreed to a temporary ceasefire to clear the way for a deal with the United States. The Taliban, however, rejected these reports.
Meanwhile, 2019 was a dangerously tense year for India and Pakistan—two rivals that are both neighbors and nuclear states. In February, a young Kashmiri man in the town of Pulwama staged a suicide bombing that killed more than three dozen Indian security forces—the deadliest such attack in Kashmir in three decades. Jaish-e-Mohammad—a Pakistan-based terror group with close ties to Pakistan’s security establishment—claimed responsibility. India retaliated by sending jets across Pakistan-administered Kashmir and launching limited strikes, for the first time since a war in 1971. Soon thereafter, Pakistan claimed it had carried out six air strikes in Kashmir to showcase its might, and it also shot down an Indian fighter jet and captured the pilot. The confrontation, which de-escalated when Islamabad announced the pilot’s release several days later, represented the most serious exchange of hostilities in years.
Then, in August, India revoked the autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir, the India-administered part of Kashmir, and declared it a new territory of India. New Delhi also imposed a security lockdown in Kashmir that included the detention of hundreds of people and a communication blackout. For Islamabad, which claims Jammu and Kashmir as its own, the move amounted to a serious provocation, if not a hostile act. Pakistan retaliated by expelling India’s envoy from Islamabad and suspending trade with New Delhi. Undaunted, in the weeks that followed, senior Indian officials—including the defense and foreign ministers—turned their attention to Pakistan-administered Kashmir, which New Delhi has long claimed, and suggested they eventually planned to reclaim it.
Bilateral relations remained fraught over the last few months of the year. Islamabad issued constant broadsides against New Delhi for its continued security lockdown in Kashmir. By year’s end, an internet blackout was still in effect. Then, in December, India’s parliament passed a controversial new citizenship law that affords fast-track paths to Indian citizenship for religious minorities—but not Muslims—fleeing persecution in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. The new law angered Islamabad not just for excluding Muslims, but because of the implication—accurate but not something Islamabad likes to admit—that Pakistan persecutes its Hindu and Christian communities.
These prolonged tensions often overshadowed what was arguably the biggest story in both countries in 2019: economic struggle. India suffered its biggest economic slowdown in six years, and Pakistan confronted a serious debt crisis. The two weren’t unconnected: Given the inability of New Delhi and Islamabad to fix their economies, both governments arguably sought political advantages from the distractions of saber rattling.
Against this tense backdrop, the opening in November of a new border corridor that enables Indian Sikhs to enter Pakistan visa-free to worship at a holy shrine, which in better times could have been a bridge to an improved relationship, amounted to little more than a one-off humanitarian gesture.
Bad as these crises are, they are poised to get worse next year.
The good news for Americans is that a U.S.-Taliban deal likely isn’t far off; both sides are fully invested in a troop withdrawal. For Trump, the importance of troop departures will grow as the U.S. presidential election draws closer, and especially because the Washington Post’s release in December of the “Afghanistan Papers”—documents that feature senior U.S. officials admitting failure in the war—will likely solidify U.S. public opinion in favor of winding down America’s role in the 18-year war.
However, any U.S.-Taliban deal will do little to reduce violence, other than halting attacks on U.S. troops. In other words, the war will continue.
A U.S.-Taliban accord would clear the path for an intra-Afghan dialogue between the Afghan government, other political stakeholders, and the Taliban that aims to produce a cease-fire and an eventual political settlement that ends the war.
The path to intra-Afghan dialogue, however, is fraught with obstacles. Afghanistan held a presidential election in September. The preliminary results—released in December—showed President Ashraf Ghani in the lead, but with barely the 50 percent of votes needed to avoid a second round of voting with the second-place finisher, his bitter rival Abdullah Abdullah (who rejected the results). The close margin suggests that when final results are announced, the loser won’t accept them.
This means Afghanistan is unlikely to have a new government in place for at least another few months, and even longer if the final results are different from the initial ones and require a second vote. Due to winter weather in Afghanistan, a runoff likely wouldn’t occur until the spring. Without a new government in place, it beggars belief that Afghanistan could launch a process to establish an intra-Afghan dialogue, much less negotiate an end to the war. And even if and when an intra-Afghan dialogue is launched, the hardest of sells will be required to convince the Taliban to lay down arms and agree to share power within a political system that it has long rejected and vowed to overthrow by force.
Consequently, Afghanistan in 2020 is likely to see a withdrawal of U.S. forces before a peace agreement is in place—a demoralizing outcome for already struggling Afghan forces that would deliver another boost to the Taliban and further increase violence.
Meanwhile, the underlying tensions between India and Pakistan remain sharp. Pakistan arrested dozens of Islamist militants this past year, but New Delhi wasn’t convinced Islamabad was taking strong and “irreversible” steps against India-focused terrorists and their networks. And New Delhi’s actions in Kashmir in 2019 represented worst-case scenarios for Islamabad.
The two nuclear-armed nations will enter 2020 just one big trigger event away from war. The trigger could be another mass-casualty attack on Indian security forces in Kashmir traced back to a Pakistan-based group, or—acting on the threats issued repeatedly by New Delhi in 2019—an Indian preemptive operation to seize territory in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.
The two nuclear-armed nations will enter 2020 just one big trigger event away from war. The trigger could be another mass-casualty attack on Indian security forces in Kashmir traced back to a Pakistan-based group, or—acting on the threats issued repeatedly by New Delhi in 2019—an Indian preemptive operation to seize territory in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.
In either scenario, escalation would be swift. Bilateral relations are much worse than they were during last February’s confrontation. Ever since its resounding reelection victory last spring, India’s ruling party has pursued its Hindu nationalist agenda in increasingly aggressive fashion—which gives it no incentive to go easy on Islamabad. Pakistan, not wanting to show weakness, will not give in easily.
The doomsday clock for the next India-Pakistan war is at a minute to midnight. Diplomatic intervention from Washington and other third parties, and cooler heads on both sides, may keep it from ticking further forward. But it’s hard to see a path to unraveling such tightly knotted tensions—or to solving Afghanistan’s unending conflict.

Source: Strategic Study India


What Soleimani’s death means for Iran, West Asia and the world

With his killing, the US has entered an area of unknowns. Iran cannot be underestimated
Soleimani was the Shiite power’s chief conductor in the Syrian civil war, designing a policy of fighting ISIS while expanding Iran’s reach in the vacuum left behind. He also was the architect of Iran’s overwhelming influence in Iraq’s politics AP

Kabir Taneja

On Friday, Iran’s notable military figure, Major General Qasem Soleimani of the state’s powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which operates under the direct auspices of the Ayatollah, was killed along with another senior commander in a United States air strike at Iraq’s Baghdad airport. This marks one of the most significant moments in the region’s fragile geopolitical environment in recent years. Soleimani led the Quds Force, IRGC’s foreign operations wing, and was the architect of Iran’s expansions into the Syrian civil war and beyond. As the Donald Trump administration hailed the strike, Iran vowed revenge, setting off alarms of another impending war in the region.

This dramatic escalation occurred days after supporters of Iran-backed militias breached the US embassy in Baghdad, with reports suggesting that Iraqi troops tasked with protecting the diplomatic mission did not do so beyond a point. A week earlier, on December 27, Iran-backed militias had targeted a US base in Kirkuk in northern Iraq, wounding US troops and killing an American contractor.

The death of Soleimani comes at a time of heightened tensions between the US and Iran, with Trump, who has now entered an election year, having worked to isolate Iran both economically and politically by making major decisions such as exiting from the Iran nuclear deal. Moreover, Trump, as exhibited by comments around the killing of ISIS chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in October in Syria at the hands of the US Army, has shown that he prefers to go after high-profile names, rather than middle-rung or deputies of leaders of terror groups or militias, for a more marketable national security posture, distinguishing himself from his predecessors at the White House.

However, with the killing of Soleimani, the US has entered an area of unknowns in its dealings with Tehran. Soleimani was not just a leader of the IRGC, but over the past few years had become a revered and extremely powerful figure in Iranian polity and society. In 2013, a profile of him in The New Yorker, titled “The Shadow Commander”, highlighted Soleimani’s role as a powerful behind-the-scenes figure. He was the Shiite power’s chief conductor in the Syrian civil war, designing a policy of fighting ISIS while simultaneously expanding the reach of Iran in the political and geographical vacuums left behind. This architecture saw Iran prop up the embattled government of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, and develop an all-encompassing reach around Iraq’s politics (Soleimani even reportedly held meetings in Baghdad with Iraqi officials in place of the country’s prime minister), bringing Tehran’s influence to the doorstep of its enemies such as Saudi Arabia and Israel. Since then, Soleimani had operated with much gusto. His travels to the frontlines in Syria were documented in photos and videos, and circulated widely on social media as he developed a strong support base back home. While gaining popularity and support in Iran, specifically among the conservatives, his actions also caused the loss of innumerable lives in the region.

Amid all this, the killing of Soleimani pushes the likeliness of a direct armed escalation in the region between America, its interests and Tehran more than ever before. The assassination may end up uniting divisions within Iranian politics, with both the moderates and conservatives converging in condemning the US strike. The agenda led by Soleimani of spreading Iranian power through the region may, in fact, get strengthened further. He may become the martyr of the Iranian cause, backed up by the existential threat faced by the seat of Shiite Islam from the poles of power in both Riyadh and Jerusalem. The fact that Saudi Arabia and Israel, despite being adversaries, find the push against Iran to be a point of convergence emboldens Tehran’s publicly aired resolve to retaliate against the general’s death. For Iran, this could become a direct American declaration of war, whether Washington meant it or not.

For the US, the Trump administration, facing heat on an impeachment orchestrated by the Democrats and other domestic political upheavals, national security successes such as Baghdadi, and now Soleimani, may grant the presidency greater leverage in the impending elections later this year. Comparisons, such as an attack on the Baghdad embassy being unlike the one in Benghazi in Libya under the Obama administration in 2012 where the US ambassador died, may well be the posturing Trump was looking for, and now has successfully designed. Nonetheless, the optics are different. Iran, despite perceptions to the contrary, is a State with built-up resilience, proven survival instincts despite isolation, and a competent military. A war will by no means, be a walkover.

Any major escalation as a fallout of Soleimani’s killing will have global repercussions, with crude oil prices and major oil and trade routes in the Persian Gulf at stake, coupled with regional and global security and economic concerns.

The collision in West AsiaIran and the US have crossed redlines. The future is uncertain

The United States and Iran once again totter on the precipice as the world holds its breath. But even by the hard-nosed standards of West Asia, the US’s assassination of the Iranian Al Quds Force commander, Qasem Soleimani, was unusually public. The Donald Trump administration has given Tehran no space for manoeuvre or chance for de-escalation by killing a man who was central to the Iranian regime. Iran has a policy of retribution for lesser slights and will strike back. And that is exactly why the rest of the world is watching to see what happens next. Iran may avoid a direct military confrontation, but it has a smorgasbord of options, including using Shia proxies to hit US assets in West Asia or using cyber weapons to cripple networks in mainland America.

Unlike previous confrontations over the past four decades of the US-Iranian rivalry, however, regional circumstances are different today. Oil is no longer the weapon it once was. Iran cannot afford to shut down the Straits of Hormuz even if it had the ability to do so. Its primary customer is its ally, China, while an oil-exporting US would financially benefit from such a move. Washington is all-powerful but its interest in the Persian Gulf in dipping. Mr Trump remains a reluctant warrior. If Tehran had not surrounded the US embassy in Iraq, a red line for a president whose generation was scarred by the 1979 hostage crisis, it is likely the present tit-for-tat round would have simply petered out. Iran, on its part, may have assembled an informal empire of influence extending to the Mediterranean but its economy is shrinking and it struggles with rising social unrest. A warrior without will versus another without a way complicates the matrix.

Iran will use Soleimani’s death to shore up support for the regime. Retaliation will probably happen in due course, but with care to avoid pushing Mr Trump’s buttons and focus on signalling Iranian resolve to the region. Tehran can afford to be restrained. The US continues to slowly lose influence in West Asia. Saudi attempts to push back Iran in Yemen and elsewhere have failed. Both the US and Iran have elections coming up and a full-scale conflict is not a winning gambit in either of the campaigns. What the immediate future holds is hard to predict. But the long-term will remain a tale of regional disequilibrium, with mid-level powers like Iran and Russia struggling to replace the vacuum left by a US whose interests are shifting eastward.


NCC training camp starts at Air Force Station

NCC training camp starts at Air Force Station

Cadets of the Chandigarh NCC Air Squadron, along with officers and staff, who are attending the combined annual training camp at Air Force Station, in Chandigarh on Thursday. Tribune photo

Chandigarh, January 2

A 10-day combined annual training camp of the Chandigarh NCC Air Squadron began at the Air Force Station here today, with 107 cadets, including 39 girls from five city institutions, participating in it.

Inaugurating the camp, Brig Ranjit Singh, NCC Group Commander, Chandigarh, said the NCC imparted discipline and fitness among the youth. He exhorted the cadets to excel in all fields, enjoy the training and develop camaraderie and friendship among themselves.

The camp commandant, Group Captain MR Pandeya, said the camp aimed at imparting quality training to the cadets in flying, drill, weapons, shooting and aero-modelling, besides conducting sessions on national integration, road safety, fire safety, health and hygiene and personality development.

Various competitions such as quiz, sports and cultural activities are also being conducted during the camps to identify potential cadets who will be fielded for various national-level camps. As part of training and motivation, cadets will also be shown various aircraft of the Indian Air Force. — TNS


Army organises sports events for youth to showcase talent

Army organises sports events for youth to showcase talent

Tribune News Service
Doda, January 2

At a time when the government and local sports bodies have failed to organise sports events across Doda and Kishtwar, the Army is extending help to the youth waiting to showcase their talent during winter vacations.

Cricket, kabaddi, race and other such events have either been organised or are in the pipeline to tap the talent of J&K.

In November, the Army organised a kabaddi tournament for the people of Doda and a cricket tournament for the age group below 20 is in progress at the sports stadium Doda, which the 10 RR of Indian Army has organised.

“We want the youth to take benefit of winter vacations and showcase their talent in whatever way they can. The 4-sector of the Army is organising different events in Doda and the cricket tournament is one of the events,” said a Major-rank officer.

“On January 26, a 5-km race from Pul-Doda to Doda will be organised to mark the Republic Day celebrations and the winner will be awarded with a cash prize,” he added.

In the past, winter months used to be a blessing for the youth of Doda and Kishtwar as different sports events were being organised to provide an opportunity to the youth to remain engaged. But for the past few years, everything has come to a grinding halt. Neither the government nor the local sports bodies are coming forward to organise such events.

“It is a fact that we have enough talent in this part of the country but we are not being provided the opportunities to showcase it. Like the Army, others should also come forward to help the youth of the area,” said Irshad Hussain, a youth who is participating in the cricket tournament organised by the Army.


Lieutenant among 4 injured in mine blast along LoC in J-K’s Rajouri

Lieutenant among 4 injured in mine blast along LoC in J-K’s Rajouri

Jammu, January 3

Four soldiers, including a Lieutenant, were injured in a mine blast along the LoC in Jammu and Kashmir’s Rajouri district on Friday, officials said.

The blast took place during patrolling in forward area along the Line of Control in Kalal in Naushera sector, they said.

The injured persons were rushed to a hospital, the officials added. PTI

 


Fathers of three chiefs served in IAF

Fathers of three chiefs served in IAF

New Delhi: The fathers of the three chiefs — Air Chief Marshal RKS Bhadauria, Admiral Karambir Singh Nijjer and General Naravane — served in the IAF. The fathers of Admiral Nijjer and General Naravane retired as Wing Commanders. The father of Air Chief Marshal Bhadauria retired as Honorary Flying Officer. Notably, Admiral Nijjer, Air Chief Marshal Bhadauria and General Naravane are from the same course (56th) at the National Defence Academy. They had passed out in 1980. This information came on the Twitter handle of the Indian Air Force carrying a small message “Join Air Force”. TNS

 


CDS Gen Rawat sets deadline for creation of Air Defence Command

General Rawat also directed various branch heads of Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff to come up with recommendations for inter-service synergy and jointness in a time-bound manner.

Bipin Rawat, General Bipin Rawat, Chief of Defence Staff, CDS, Bipin Rawat CDS, Chief of Defence Staff Bipin Rawat, India news, Indian Express

After assuming charge as the country’s first Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Bipin Rawat on Wednesday held a meeting with the three service chiefs — General M M Naravane, Admiral Karambir Singh and Air Chief Marshal R K S Bhadauria. He directed that a proposal to create Air Defence Command be prepared by June 30.

He also set out priorities in the meeting for execution of synergy by June 30 and December 31. Some of the areas identified for jointness and synergy include creation of common logistics support pools in stations where two or more services have their presence.

Explained: What are role, powers of CDS?

In the meeting, General Rawat also directed various branch heads of Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff to come up with recommendations for inter-service synergy and jointness in a time-bound manner.

Emphasising a collegiate system of functioning, General Rawat directed that all three services and Coast Guard must be consulted and their views obtained in a time-bound manner.


CDS and DMA, a clever masterstroke

he Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, is a four-star General sans operational control of Services but is the military adviser to the President, not Secretary of Defence. Here, the need for the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) being a ‘single-point military adviser’ to the Union Cabinet or the Cabinet Committee on Security has been killed. With no operational powers, who will listen to the CDS?

CDS and DMA, a clever masterstroke

Ineffective CDS? The bureaucracy has won, as always.

Lt Gen PC Katoch (Retd)
Distinguished fellow, United Service Institution of India

The government has approved the appointment of the CDS in four-star rank with twin hats: Secretary to a new Department of Military Affairs (DMA) in the MoD and Permanent Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (PC CoSC). The DMA, having a mix of military and civilians, will deal with the three Services and HQ-Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), Territorial Army, works relating to Services and procurements, except capital acquisitions. The DMA will promote inter-service jointness in planning, integrated requirements, restructuring of military commands and indigenous equipment.

The CDS will be the Principal Military Adviser to the defence minister but the Service Chiefs will continue to advise the minister on Services. The CDS will not exercise any military command. The PC CoSC will administer tri-Service agencies with cyber and space commands under him; be a member of the Defence Acquisition Council and the Defence Planning Committee; function as military adviser to the Nuclear Command Authority; usher inter-service jointness in operation, logistics, transport, training, support services, communications, repairs and maintenance within three years of the first CDS assuming office; ensure optimisation of infrastructure; implement the five-year defence capital acquisition plan and two-year roll-on annual acquisition plans, and assign inter-Services prioritisation to capital acquisition proposals based on an anticipated budget.

Almost two decades after the Kargil Review Committee and follow-up Group of Ministers headed by the then Deputy PM recommended the early establishment of the CDS, PM Narendra Modi had announced on August 15, 2019, that India would soon have a CDS, the format of which has just been issued. The composition of the DMA has not been announced and will take time to fructify. However, what is being trumpeted as a masterstroke appears to be a clever one, retaining the clout of a little diluted bureaucracy, if at all.

The HQ IDS was established in 2004, aimed at being ‘part’ of the MoD. The DG DIA in HQ IDS deals directly with the defence minister. Logically, the HQ IDS should have been merged into the MoD with officers of the HQ IDS placed on deputation. Some could have even been absorbed on a permanent deputation. Creating the DMA and retaining the HQ IDS separately is hardly in sync with the government’s aim of ‘minimum government, maximum governance’.

The Service Chiefs continuing to advise the defence minister on respective Services blows the cover of the CDS being the Principal Military Adviser to the minister. The Chairman, US JCS, is a four-star general sans operational control of Services but is the military adviser to the President, not Secretary of Defence. Here, the need for the CDS being a ‘single-point military adviser’ to the Union Cabinet/Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) has been killed. The roots for this were sown by the bureaucracy in the CCS note approving the establishment of the HQ IDS, which read, “As and when a CDS is appointed, he will have equal voting rights as the Service Chiefs and in case of two Service Chiefs disagreeing, MoD (read bureaucracy) will arbitrate”. With no operational powers, who will listen to the CDS, with Service Chiefs rallying round their turfs and the bureaucracy adept in ‘divide and rule’?

The PIB release does not say that the DMA will replace the Department of Defence. Therefore, the DMA will function parallel to the Department of Defence (DoD) headed by the Defence Secretary, Department of Defence Production (DoPD), Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare (DESW) and Department of Defence R&D. Here too, the CDS will be one secretary among equals, with the DoD, DoPD and DESW headed by bureaucrats. This further downgrades the four-star rank in protocol, though the CDS will draw higher pay. Till now, Service Chiefs were ranked alongside the Cabinet Secretary, which was higher than the secretaries in the MoD, including Defence Secretary.

Cases sent directly to the defence minister will invariably be marked by him to the Defence Secretary for examination and comments before taking any decision. So, the statement of a Union minister regarding powers of the CDS as secretary is irrelevant, especially with the minister having nothing to do with defence. The role of planning, coordination and advice and making projections for centralised procurement is already being done by the HQ IDS, with the CISC functioning as secretary to the CoSC. Without operational powers and command over only tri-service organisations like cyber and space, the first CDS is to bring jointness in operations, logistics, transport, training, support services, communications, repairs and maintenance within three years of assuming office, which the MoD manned by bureaucrats has done little about in the past 72 years.

The HQ IDS, from its inception, had a slot for a joint secretary from the IFS and IAS, but the latter remained vacant due to bureaucratic ego. What civilians will be part of the DMA, including the constantly upgraded AFHQ cadre is yet to be seen. The DGQA and DG AFMS were to be under the HQ IDS but were never permitted for ‘well-known reasons’ and will likely continue under the DoD under Defence Secretary. The DoPD will similarly continue to oversee the governmental defence-industrial complex with patchy successes and unable to meet military requirements, provisioning bulk substandard products at inflated prices — their corporatisation at a snail’s pace, if at all. The DESW will continue dragging widows and disabled soldiers to court for disability pension.

The CDS is to work on ‘anticipated’ budget. He cannot make projections based on operational requirements to the Cabinet/Parliament/CCS. The FM will continue to arbitrarily cap the defence budget. Defence Finance will continue working with the Defence Secretary, as will national intelligence agencies and Defence Estates that was indicted by CAG as the most corrupt part of the MoD, recommending its disbandment.

The forces will have an additional four-star rank. The media blitz hails the move a masterstroke. Establishing the CDS is an excellent step, but the manner in which it is being implemented is a clever masterstroke by the bureaucracy-centric deep state. The CDS will remain ineffective. The bureaucracy has won as always and this will not change without political understanding of the intricacies and the will to change, one of the ironies being the belief there is going to be no war, so ‘chalta hai’ is good enough.


Theatre command model must focus on future battles: Experts

Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat inspects the Guard of Honour, at South Block lawns, in New Delhi on January 1. Arvind Yadav/HT PHOTO
Jointmanship Will have to devise a theaterisation model specific to India’s needs

Rahul Singh

rahul.singh@hindustantimes.com

NEW DELHI : India will have to evolve its model of theaterisation to fight future battles and it could involve the creation of three to four theatre commands for effective command and control of the three services and pursuing national objectives, said two leading experts on jointmanship or co-ordination and integration in terms of strategy, capabilities and execution across the three services.

As the country’s first chief of defence staff (CDS), the mandate given to General Bipin Rawat includes facilitating the restructuring of military commands for optimal utilisation of resources by bringing jointness in operations, including through establishment of theatre commands. The government expects the CDS to achieve key jointmanship targets in three years.

Setting up theatre commands is critical as the military has too many service commands handling a single adversary, said Lieutenant General Satish Dua (retd), who was the senior-most military officer handling all tri-service affairs until October 2018.

“Take the case of Pakistan. We have a total of seven commands taking care of the western neighbour. In my view, India needs to create three theatres — northern, western and southern — with tri-services assets to protect its interests,” he said. The northern and western theatres would take care of China and Pakistan, respectively, he said.

Theaterisation refers to placing specific units of the army, the navy and the air force under a Theatre Commander. Such commands will come under the operational control of an officer from any of the three services, depending on the function assigned to that command.

Creating theatres would involve merging the existing commands and the department of military affairs under the CDS will have to adopt a cautious approach to avoid turbulence that could accompany the restructuring, Dua said.

“Some existing commands can be merged now and some in phases to avoid turbulence,” Dua said.

Dua was intricately involved in promoting jointness in the military before retiring as Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee on October 31, 2018.

The military would require four theatres to execute its missions, with two commands assigned the role of handling China, said Lieutenant General Vinod Bhatia (retd), who heads the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, a think tank set up by the defence ministry 12 years ago.

Bhatia was part of the Lieutenant General DB Shekatkar (retd) committee whose recommendations on military reforms are being implemented by the government to make the armed forces more effective. The committee is among the several panels that have recommended the appointment of CDS.

“We can have two theatres for China (north-western and north-eastern), one for Pakistan (western) and a fourth one for peninsular India (southern). The country’s geography requires two theatres for China, even though the northern adversary has only one theatre for India. That’s because the geography on their side is different and allows excellent connectivity all along the border,” he said.

Both Dua and Bhatia said the theatre commands could be headed by the best officers from any of the three services.

The two experts said the model of theaterisation formulated by other leading militaries such as the United States and China would not work for India and the country would have to come up with its own mission-specific theatres.

On Wednesday, Rawat said he would work towards creating theatre commands to prepare the military for future battles, adding that India’s armed forces need not necessarily imitate the models devised by western militaries for this.

The US department of defense has 11 combatant commands, each with a geographic or functional mission. The ones tasked with defending American interests across geographies are the Africa Command, Central Command, European Command, Indo-Pacific Command, Northern Command and Southern Command.

Similarly, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army has five theater commands — eastern, southern, western, northern and central, with its western theater handling the entire border with India.

“The Indian model will have to be different because we are not an expeditionary military. The US model, for instance, doesn’t look at their own wars; it looks at others’ wars.

Our model will be based on our security needs and I am confident that its implementation can kick off within three years,” said Dua.

Bhatia concurred that the country would have to devise its own theaterisation model as other global models would not work in the Indian context because “the threats and challenges we face are vastly different.”

Commenting on theaterisation on Wednesday, Rawat said, “We can have our own system. We will work out a mechanism. We have to study and work with the three services to come out with a mechanism that suits the Indian system.”