India has sought recognition of the ancient medicinal tradition as its “intangible cultural heritage”.

New Delhi, November 24

India and China are at loggerheads over the legacy of one of the oldest systems of traditional medicine, known as Sowa-Rigpa, which has similarities with Ayurveda.

India has sought recognition of the ancient medicinal tradition as its “intangible cultural heritage”, a claim contested by China at a global forum, sources said.

Sowa-Rigpa is a traditional Tibetan system of medicine practised in India’s Himalayan belt. It is popular in Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, West Bengal’s Darjeeling, Himachal Pradesh and the Union Territory of Ladakh.

“India has approached UNESCO, seeking enlisting of the Sowa Rigpa as its ‘intangible cultural heritage’. China has raised objection to it,” an official said.

An Indian delegation is strongly pushing the country’s application based on detailed documents and evidence provided by the AYUSH Ministry which has been working closely with the Ministry of External Affairs on the matter, officials said.

The move comes in the backdrop of the Modi government promoting the traditional medicine system, one of the oldest surviving medicine systems in the world. The Union Cabinet on November 20 approved the setting up of National Institute for Sowa-Rigpa (NISR) in Leh as an autonomous organisation.

This is, perhaps, one of the first decisions taken by the Union Cabinet on Ladakh’s development after it became Union Territory on October 31 following the bifurcation of Jammu and Kashmir. The theory and practices of Sowa Rigpa are similar to that of Ayurveda and include a few principles of the traditional Chinese system of medicine.

The fundamental textbook ‘Rgyud-Bzi’ of Sowa Rigpa is believed to have been taught by Buddha himself and is closely linked with Buddhist philosophy. The establishment of the NISR as an autonomous body under the Ministry of AYUSH has been approved at an estimated cost of Rs 47.25 crore.

According to an official, setting up of NISR would provide an impetus to the revival of Sowa-Rigpa in the Indian subcontinent and provide opportunities to students of the traditional medicinal system, not only in India but also from other countries. — PTI

Sowa Rigpa has similarities with Ayurveda

• Sowa-Rigpa is a traditional Tibetan system of medicine practised in India’s Himalayan belt. It has similarities with Ayurveda
• It is popular in Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, West Bengal’s Darjeeling, Himachal Pradesh and Union Territory of Ladakh
• The theory and practices of Sowa Rigpa are similar to that of Ayurveda and include a few principles of the traditional Chinese system of medicine

Security has two important facets: proximate and peripheral. The SPG or now the CRPF caters only to proximate security, while the peripheral one is the responsibility of the local police. Peripheral insecurity adds to the problem of proximate security. To avoid that, the SPG does advance security liaison by visiting the places the way the VVIP cell of the IB used to do.

Reality check: Like the SPG, will the CRPF perform advance security liaison or merely accompany the Gandhi family like bodyguards?

Vappala Balachandran
Ex-Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat

The withdrawal of protection by the Special Protection Group (SPG) to Congress president Sonia Gandhi and family has been described as ‘vendetta politics’ It is compared to a similar step against Rajiv Gandhi by the VP Singh government in December 1989. Although Cabinet Secretary TN Seshan had ordered the extension of the SPG cover by three months after a high-level review on December 4 1989, Vinod Pande who succeeded him on December 23, 1989 reversed it as it was not allowed under the SPG Act, 1988. This was permitted only in September 1991 by the Chandra Shekhar government by amending the law after the assassination on May 21, 1991.

The Justice JS Verma Commission, which probed the security failure leading to Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination, had referred to the December 4, 1989 meeting in its 1992 report, adding that a legal solution could have been found to extend the SPG cover. Besides accusing the Tamil Nadu police of blatant neglect with regard to security precautions, the Commission also blamed the VP Singh government for ‘arbitrarily’ withdrawing the SPG cover within a month of its taking over without any fresh security assessment.

Parliamentary debates on May 14, 1993 mentioned P Chidambaram’s repeated pleas and meetings with the then Secretary (Security) for reinstating SPG protection to the Prime Minister. Not mentioned openly but whirling in intelligence circles was a rumour at that time about that officer’s personal animus against the PM.     

The NDA government which also decided to withdraw SPG cover to the Gandhi family from November 8 this year took care to avoid being charged with ‘arbitrariness’ like in 1989 as it has claimed that the decision was taken after a ‘detailed security assessment’.

At the same time, we need to realise that security in this interconnected world has many nuances and not necessarily connected to legal subtleties or a person’s official government status. A person may be out of power, yet be the most threatened individual than even the highest political dignitaries in a country. Thus, one needs to traverse beyond the realm of politics and legal quotients in making an assessment on security issues affecting high personages like the Gandhis who are perhaps the only family in the world to suffer two assassinations within a decade like the Kennedys. Their international status would be evident by the courtesy calls most foreign dignitaries make on them during their official visits to New Delhi.

That is the reason why the London Metropolitan Police (MET) guards high personages, including unidentified persons. They guard former Prime Ministers John Major (1990-97) and Tony Blair (1997-2007) even during international travels unconnected with any British government work. A report in The Telegraph (September 8, 2010) said the MET spent 128 million pounds in 2010 for protecting such dignitaries, including former Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf staying in London. In 2012, US President Obama amended the Former Presidents’ Protection Act to give life time protection to former Presidents and spouses, altering the 10-year restriction after retirement.

The Verma Commission report and the 1993 parliamentary debates give further reasons why a security downgrade would affect the quality of security. The Congress had to repeatedly move the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi to get security assistance each time Rajiv Gandhi moved out. As a result, the former prime minister who was elected with the largest majority of 414 seats in the Lok Sabha in 1984 had to travel to Manipur with one Delhi Police guard.

The report castigates the then government and its agencies for merely exchanging notes without taking any step to protect the former PM. It mentions that the Intelligence Bureau (IB) started warning about the danger to his life as the 1991 elections approached. In April 1991, it warned of LTTE threats through explosive devices. A few days before the Sriperumbudur address, they conveyed that an attempt would be made ‘during an election meeting’. On May 20, the IB requested the state police to control access to Rajiv Gandhi and also urged the Home Ministry to give him NSG cover. There was also a state intelligence warning on ‘garlands and bouquets’. All these fell on deaf ears.

The 1993 parliamentary debates also saw opposition members indulging in political polemics in defending the VP Singh and Chandra Shekhar governments who were accused of security neglect. Jaipal Reddy, who was then a minister in the Chandra Shekhar government and also in the UPA-II, laid blame mostly on the Tamil Nadu Congress for breaching security instructions. The omissions included lack of coordination between the police and the organisers, ineffective access control, no sterile area, erection of single barricades, inadequate lighting and uncontrolled movement of people behind the rostrum.

These points are relevant even now as our politics has become more divisive and polemics sharper. The Verma Commission blamed the short-lived VP Singh and Chandra Shekhar governments for the withdrawal of SPG cover ‘without provision for a suitable alternative for proximate security’. What could be the ‘suitable alternative’?

Security has two important facets: proximate and peripheral. The SPG or now the CRPF caters only to proximate security, while peripheral security is the local police responsibility. Peripheral insecurity adds to proximate security problems. To avoid that, the SPG does advance security liaison (ALV) by visiting the places like how the IB’s very efficient VVIP security cell used to do. An ALV can cure loopholes by briefing the local police. The local police are attentive to the SPG with its elevated status in the national security realm.

At Sriperumbudur, both proximate and peripheral security broke down. The question is whether the CRPF would do the ALV or merely accompany the Gandhi family like bodyguards, leaving the onus on the local police, who may not be very cooperative, especially in non-Congress ruled states? Would the local police be as attentive to the Central Reserve Police Force as they used to abide by the SPG suggestions?

The last question is whether the CRPF team would be given access to last-minute threat intelligence? At Sriperumbudur, the IB had the last mile intelligence which got clogged in the inattentive bureaucratic pipeline for which a popular Prime Minister had to pay a heavy price.

A CDS with operational control and effective participation in HR issues is required. Control of operations, currently highly centralised at the HQ, needs to be delegated to theatre commands, as is prevalent in most advanced armed forces. We need integration, albeit a full-spectrum one, extending all the way to the Defence Ministry through cross-manning and joint staffing. The model has to be supported by an approved national security strategy.

Needed: An empowered Chief of Defence Staff.

Lt Gen KJ Singh (retd)
Former GoC-In-C, Western Command

The PM, in his trademark style of springing surprises, announced the institution of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in his Independence Day speech. This was followed by a flurry of articulations, centred on the CDS, limited to: who and when? As the deadline of November-end for the committee to finalise the contours of the proposed system approaches, speculation is further fuelled by the impending superannuation of the Army Chief. It is time to attempt to get the focus on the most relevant issues — what, if any, will be the transformative ecosystem accompanying the CDS? Alternatively, as is our wont, will it once again be incremental tinkering with the existing system?

Speculation emanating from informed circles, based on the purported report of a well-connected think tank, has thrown up ominous signals. As per this report, the CDS is likely to be a souped-up version of the current Chief of Integrated Staff (CISC), who heads the coordinating mechanism instituted consequent to some honest introspection after the rude jolt in Kargil. There is no mention of joint theatre commands, which are globally accepted as the essential framework for integration. Locked in our turf- and pelf-centric outcomes, debate is primarily focused on a four- or five-star status for the CDS, influenced by the bureaucratic fetish of ‘coup proofing’.

The general expectation is that the CDS will be four and quarter star, in the mould of ‘primes inter pares’, first among equals, yet keeping alive the possibility of politico-bureaucratic lobbies playing favourites. It really implies that the remit of the proposed incumbent will be limited to the coordination of capability building and perspective planning with no real control on two major functions — operations and personnel management. Ask any professional to name the most powerful branches, invariably the answer is: military operations and military secretary (dealing with officer management). The new dispensation, like the current CISC, will remain ineffective without control over these two vital functions. 

The reform process is resisted till we are jolted out of our inertia by shocks and setbacks. We were surprised in 1947, 1962, 1965 and Kargil. Mercifully, except the Chinese debacle, the forces have saved the situation. Kargil was followed by a critical analysis and a series of committees — Kargil Review Committee, followed by sub-groups and, later, the Group of Ministers deliberations headed by the Deputy PM. The consensus was for a CDS and joint commands. In keeping with our bureaucratic DNA, notwithstanding the initial euphoria and consensus, back-pedalling took over. The first manifestation was cobbling up an Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) HQ instead of a full-fledged CDS. Nearly a decade later, the Naresh Chandra Task Force came up with an incongruous Permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee and just skipped the issue of joint theatre commands.

The government created two joint commands, initiating a pilot project as the forerunner to the proposed integrated structure. The first one, on a functional basis, established the Strategic Forces Command (SFC). The second one, on a regional basis, led to Fortress Andamans (Fortran) being converted to the integrated Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC). Essentially, it was a ploy to buy time to overcome the inherent resistance and paranoia of the IAF, of being subsumed and obstinate insistence on fighting standalone centralised air war. Reservations persist and the main argument advanced now is the dwindling inventory of fighters. This obviously disregards that surveillance, air defence, communications are organised on joint and integrated theatre grids. The IAF assets, like radars, unarmed aerial vehicles and helicopters, both attack and logistics, have a pivotal role, even if aircraft are centrally applied.

The most pertinent requirement at this juncture is to take stock of the pilot projects. The IDS HQ, despite getting no role in operations and a raw deal in staffing, has managed to reinforce the need for jointness. The SFC has been a hugely successful experiment and has paved the way for the setting up of integrated agencies on emerging disciplines of cyber, space and special operations. Presently, these agencies are headed by Major General-level officers and it is hoped that they will be incrementally upgraded to the desired level of joint commands.

It is rather unfortunate that the directive on regional joint command was implemented in the most lackadaisical manner. The Services, treating it as unwanted baby, provided neither cutting-edge assets nor quality manpower. The current thinking in the ministry is that the ANC should be headed by the Navy. Missed out in this ill-advised formulation is the cascading debiting effect in our spoils-driven system. This move would deny the Navy a rotational share in the top slots in the CISC and SFC. It is ironical that while we are committed to the triad in strategic weapons, leadership in the SFC will be in the diad mode.

The tortuous process of integration is based on forging consensus, resulting in sub-optimal lowest common multiple (LCM) solutions. It is hoped that the government will emulate the top-down approach displayed in Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 in the US and promulgate an eco-system that will promote operational synergy. The way forward is to reduce the complexity of 14 regional commands by creating the optimum number of integrated theatre commands. Instead of aping the Chinese or American models, we should customise our own theatres, based on our unique challenges.

We do need a CDS, but an empowered one, with operational control and effective participation in HR issues. Control of operations, currently highly centralised at the HQ, needs to be delegated to theatre commands, as is prevalent in most advanced armed forces. We need integration, albeit a full-spectrum one, extending all the way to the Defence Ministry through cross-manning and joint staffing. The proposed model has to be supported by an approved national security strategy, enhanced budgeting, functional procurement system, National Defence University and clarity on interfaces with other security management structures.

Neutralsing The Lone Wolves! By Col NN Bhatia (Retd)

The ‘lone wolves’ are reckless deranged individual militants highly motivated to carry out acts of terrorism alone without remorse and material support from any individual or group following the radical ideology and sympathetic to a particular cause like establishment of Islamic state world over governed by the Shariat laws. They get indoctrinated by the terrorist organisations like the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Elam (LTTE), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Al Qaida, Jaish-e- Muhammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and so on who are highly radicalized. Though they are loner but sometimes work in a pack called as the ‘pack of wolves’.

On 15 March 2019, the suspected 28 year Australian gunman named Brenton Tarrant attacked two  mosques in Christ Church, New Zealand wearing  a head mounted camera on  Friday during mid day prayers killing 50 Muslims. The Muslims comprise less than 1% of the New Zealand population rated as the world’s second most peaceful nation that is mourning the worst terrorist attack in its modern history. The country is also fiercely debating the prevalent gun laws and sudden overtones of religious intolerance.

In India every terrorist attacks in the Kashmir valley supported, trained and equipped by the Pakistani Army and the dreaded Inter Service Intelligence or the ISI are common by such lone or packs of wolves. Recently, on 14February 2019, a convoy of vehicles carrying Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel were attacked on Pathankot- Jammu- Srinagar National Highway by the local vehicle-borne lone suicide wolf bomber Adil Ahmad Dar, member of the Pakistani based JeM terror outfit trained and operationalised by the Pakistani army and the ISI near Lethipora in the Pulwama district killing, 40 CRPF personnel. The JeM took the responsibility for this dastardly attack. On 26 February, the Indian  Air Force (IAF) retaliated targeting  Balakot  a training camp of the JeM  group in Balakot  across the Line of Control (LoC), killing large number of JeM terrorists. Both the countries were almost on the brink of war, amidst India getting ready for the general elections shortly.

The dastardly mass killing at Pulse Night Gay Club in Orlando is not a case in isolation killing 50 people and seriously injuring other 53 but a repetition of the shootings in San Bernardino some years back. In another harrowing incident suspected gunman Gokmen Tanis killed 3 and wounded another 9in an unprovoked attack on a streetcar in the Dutch city of Utrecht on 18 Mar 2019.

Lone wolf is a complex dual personality individual- on one side, he is outwardly a respectable family man or woman, mostly married with a family, transformed from a friendly teenager to generally growing as a loner, keeping aloof and an introvert, yet the other side of the coin, with split personality, he is ruthless sadist, without remorse, defiant pervert or sort, who after pumping hundreds of bullets at a crowded place, killing innocent men, women and children have a last laugh even if killed in the shootout melee. Mateen, the lone wolf of Orlando who worked as a security guard was inspired by the ISIS. Some reports suggest he was himself a perverted homosexual and visited the gay club but was infuriated when his young son saw a couple kissing intimately. It is believed shortly before Orlando nightclub shoot out, he called 9/11 pledging his support to the ISIS. His dual split personality was not even known to his parents of the Afghan descent. Unfortunately, though he was on the radar of the FBI and investigated thrice for the suspected terror links with the American suicide bomber Moner Abu and making hate speeches, yet not much was done to nip the evil in the bud. After the ghastly Orlando tragedy, the ISIS has claimed the responsibility for the dastardly act of cowardice swallowing so many innocent lives high lighting threat of lone wolves lurking every where all the times.

Why can Lone Wolves attacks cannot be stopped?

Easily available guns are the major problem in the US, Canada, the UK, most of the European Union countries, Australia and the New Zealand. If you have the money, you may get away buying any small arms with bags full of ammunition without impunity. With an assault rifles, he pumped bullets at hundreds of rounds per minute (rpm). It is time the US tightens gun laws in the country and so also all other countries like the UK, France, Australia and New Zealand. Another issue is, if you have a strict gun control regime, the lone wolves would use improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to kill people as a lone suicide bomber in a busy public place as was done by JeM terrorist Dar on 14 February 2019 in Pulwama in India.

After every lone wolf action, more military and security personnel are deployed and restrictions imposed on the Muslim community, mosques and madrassas which are counterproductive. Sudden restrictions imposed on the travel within the US or other affected countries and migration of the Muslim refugees to the US or similarly affected other countries put even the innocent Muslim women, children and sick elderlies under tremendous difficulties and suspicion while the lone wolf either dies in his deadly suicide attack or if alive watches fun of the administration and the government getting in a spin.

All Jihadi terrorists are fluent in English and operate IT to their advantage but how many citizens of the attacked country and officials read, converse and communicate in Arabic imposing impenetrable threat of the lone wolves. Often they carry satellite phones for secrecy.

Since lone wolves attack singly, very many less people are in contact with them leaving behind fewer leads making it difficult to capture them.

Internet, WhatsApp and other social media has played critical role in the spread of lone wolves. With billions of messages originating in multiple languages, often in encryption and cipher codes, it is difficult to collect, collate and interpret them. Lone wolves though work alone but they do brag on social media and give out their blogs just before the terror attack making it difficult for the security agencies to nab them.

The conventional security forces while maneuvering leave clear signals of impending operation or reacting to deadliest lone wolf attacks but lone wolves if survived, easily merge with population with minimal tell tale signs and are not traceable. Massive conventional forces against a lone wolf are counterproductive and poor strategy.

Lone wolves’ community provides shelter and the ISIS like radical groups give training, motivation and money for such ‘leaderless attacks’ making that much difficult to prevent such attacks or apprehend such lone wolves. No wonder, it had given enough ammunition to Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump to ban entry of Muslims, putting Democratic Party’s candidate Hillary Clinton on the back foot.

Night Clubs/Pornography/Gay clubs and liberal boozing, drugs and dancing with strangers are dens of criminal activities and local administration, police and intelligence agencies need to keep a close watch on such outlets. Vandalism is common at such places along with other criminal activities conducive for lone wolves to operate easily.

Too much individual freedom and liberties and human rights groups’ intervention are counterproductive.

What are the answers?

All countries need to keep surveillance and security top most in their minds and each act of such terror taken seriously and ruthlessly curbed. The US regime need to control over 300 million guns with the people and country like India needs to sanitize porous borders and check on smuggling of drugs, arms and ammunition and explosives. More guns with citizens do not make country safer. Obama’s conviction that gun control in France left country helpless after November 2015 attacks helpless has no grounds. It has given enough leverage to Trump to attack Democratic Party and its Muslims’ related policies. Trump supporters must know that one bad Muslim will not rot the society as a whole. In the liberal countries and the US ‘Wild West and ‘Cow Boy’ culture must be ended.

We need to monitor and create mechanism to check IT and social media and scrutiny on madrassas and mosques and similar radical institutions of other faiths and religions. Monitoring IT and social media is easy said than done and indeed is a Herculean task. Individual freedom and liberties if curbed becomes counterproductive. This aspect is difficult to implement with endless people communicating and chatting on Internet and WhatsApp and other social media generating billions of messages every day.

Intelligence gathering and sharing, specially the real time actionable intelligence must be faster, secure and fool proof. ‘Need to know and need to go’ principle should be the cardinal principle of intelligence and security agencies.

Character and antecedents (C&A) verification data bank need to be created in each locality’s police station of all suspected people especially of those suffering from certain key character deficiencies like 3Ws (wine, women and wealth), drug abuse or radical leanings. Such persons should be denied freedom to acquire fire arms and ammunition even for self defense.

Concept of ‘Beat Constable’ whereby police constable of each locality maintains close liaison with all its residents and keeps discreet eye on the new arrivals and those who have left it is obligatory. Involvement of citizenry in locality security needs to build in brick system upwards to form an integrated security networking and pyramid.

Corruption free good governance is need of the hours. In the Indian context, with small bribes, smuggling of guns, narcotics, hawala transactions and terrorists is feasible compromising national security.

Fourth Estate is very powerful medium to tackle terrorism. Media both print and electronic should be more responsible in reporting and avoid high lighting jihadi actions. Imagine psywar being played with every individual with hundreds of national and international channels 24×7 blaring lone wolf Mateen’s killing. Jihadis and terrorists are publicity hungry and unwittingly we lose the game giving them avoidable publicity.

World community must resolve Muslims’ problems from Afghanistan to Syria and Sudan. We should let them form governments as per their aspirations and welfare and security of its people and refrain imposing our ways of life on them. This will curb vendetta.

All nations need to ensure that common citizens irrespective of their caste, colour, creed, religion and culture are treated alike. There are no all good or bad Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Jews, Blacks or Whites. They are all citizens of that particular nation and must live without any discrimination. If in India, all the Hindus, Muslims or Christians were good, then there would not have been Godse who shot Mahatma Gandhi. Likewise. Lone wolves like Oswald shot President Kennedy, while the former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by the lone terrorist Thenmozhi Rajaratnam nicknamed Dhanu who was the member of the Srilankan terrorist organisation LTTE and likes of Mateen, who massacred innocent people in Orlando or Kasab, who did mass killings in Mumbai 26 /11 attacks pose serious challenges to civilized societies all over the world. If Osama bin Laden, the world’s most wanted terrorist of al-Qaida was eliminated by the US Marines, Masood Azhar of the LeT and Hafiz Muhammad Saeed of JeM living and sheltered in Pakistan are declared global terrorists and need to be neutralised through the diplomatic, economic, political and militarily operations isolating Pakistan, terrorism can be greatly controlled in the South Asia. All terrorists are bad and there are no good and bad terrorists as per the Pakistani thinking.

To catch a thief, create a thief is an old saying. The governments and those responsible for the management of the violence need to think ‘lone panthers’ like highly trained, motivated sharp shooters / commandos to suddenly spring and neutralise the ‘lone wolves’.

Each country has specific, security issues but the above guidelines high light the lone wolves menace and awareness, good governance, stringent weapon laws, self defence training of the citizens, international cooperation and sharing of real time intelligence, effective policing, eye on the radical organisations and fundamentalists and self/civil defence are some of the measures to contain the  lone wolves attacks. With this food for thought, let us find the way ahead to tame and eliminate the lone wolves attacks.

The Kargil War underlined the need to have the ability for a swift and devastating response to an adversary’s misadventure. Tribune file photo

Vijay Mohan

In the age of information, 20 years is a long enough time to dissect and lay bare a military operation which, though confined to a small corner of the country, had wide ranging implications at the strategic and geopolitical levels.

The Kargil War was fought along the Line of Control in the remote, icy heights in northern Jammu and Kashmir. While it brought out some serious shortcomings in higher defence management and intra-government interplay, it reaffirmed the grit, valour and legacy of our soldiers. The conflict that had taken the nation by surprise also set the ball rolling for implementing much-needed defence reforms, some of which have still not been implemented.

Every war, conflict and operation has many secrets and untold stories. The Kargil conflict is no different. In the past two decades much has been written and deliberated on this subject, yet, there are a few facets that may still be not known to public.

This book talks about some lesser known facts and accounts of the intrusions and the counter-action, known as Operation Vijay, under various commanders and officers. Some of these officers had held key military appointments during the conflict, while others had served in important positions or are pursuing military matters.

Containing 20 essays, the book is divided into five parts. The first section, Blood, Guts and Glory, briefly discusses the battles fought in Dras, Mushkoh, Batalik, Kaksar and the Turtuk sub-sectors, to evict the Pakistani intruders from the heights dominating National Highway 1-A, the crucial link to Ladakh. 

The second part analyses the supporting forces which synergised the effort to victory, with writers discussing operations by the Air Force and the Navy as well as the role played by the artillery, engineers, army aviation, air defence, signals and logistics.

The section on perceptions and opinions deals with personal experiences. The then Army Chief, Gen VP Malik, shares his views on the military strategy adopted during the conflict, the build-up and subsequent operations and the lessons learnt.

Lt Gen Mohinder Puri, under whose command 8 Mountain Division had played a crucial role at that time, reminiscences about those days. Colonel BM Carriappa, who was in command of a Parachute battalion, details some operations carried by paratroopers in Batalik.

War heroes like Capt Vikram Batra and Lt Manoj Pandey, the two posthumous awardees of the nation’s highest gallantry award, Param Vir Chakra, find a place in the section on Motivation.

The last section deals with the emerging challenges that the nation faces and the way ahead that needs to be defined in the emerging world order. Former GOC-in-C, Central Command and at present Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, Lt Gen VK Ahluwalia, along with Colonel Rajeev Kapur, a veteran of Op Vijay, puts it succinctly that lasting peace with Pakistan seems unlikely. At best what can be expected is an armed truce dictated by Pakistan’s internal fault lines and economic constraints.

The message being sent out by the writers is that considering future threats and challenges, India must build up its comprehensive national power whose edifice should be sustained through economic growth.

Simultaneously, it should progressively build capabilities of hard military power, soft power and demonstrated power which can deter threats to internal security, stability and territorial integrity from potential adversaries. Cosmetic changes will not help and the military should have the ability for swift and devastating riposte to an adversary’s misadventure.

The Kargil War had stirred patriotic fervour across the country but is gradually fading away from public memory, with the new generation having little or no idea of what had happened. It was institutional amnesia, lethargy and a situational disconnect that led to the conflict and the book underlines the need to be prepared at all times and look at national security with a national outlook.

Pragya Thakur is controversy’s child, duly adopted by the BJP. The Bhopal MP proudly claims to have been among the ‘kar sevaks’ who demolished Babri Masjid. Soon after the saffron party welcomed her into its fold in April this year, the Hindutva proponent fired an outrageous salvo. She declared that anti-terror squad officer Hemant Karkare was killed during the 26/11 Mumbai attacks as she had ‘cursed’ him for torturing her in custody. The 2008 Malegaon blast accused then called Gandhi’s killer Godse a ‘deshbhakt’, prompting Prime Minister Narendra Modi to proclaim that he could never forgive Pragya from the heart, whatever that meant. Disciplinary proceedings were apparently initiated against her, but the matter was swept under the carpet amid the post-poll celebrations. Six months later, the ruling BJP has condoned all her indiscretions in one go by appointing her to a 21-member parliamentary consultative committee on defence.

In a bid to defend the indefensible, the party has argued that Pragya can help in framing the right methodology so that innocents are not victimised the way she was (by the UPA government). The top brass is convinced that she remains untainted in the terror case, even though the court is yet to acquit her and she continues to face trial under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. This unstinting support has emboldened her to put her foot in the mouth on a regular basis. In July, the MP told a gathering of party workers that she had not become a lawmaker to clean drains or toilets, a disparaging allusion to Swachh Bharat Abhiyan, the Modi government’s flagship programme dedicated to the Father of the Nation. Recently, she was the lone BJP MP in Madhya Pradesh who skipped the launch of a padyatra to commemorate Gandhi’s 150th birth anniversary.

Pragya has repeatedly got away with insulting the Mahatma in one way or the other. Rather than showing her the door or keeping her on a tight leash, the BJP has let this Godse supporter run amok. How her curses and ‘maarak shakti’ will help to fortify the BJP’s politics is anybody’s guess.

Security personnel stand guard during shutdown, in Srinagar. PTI

Srinagar, November 24

Some of the Kashmiri political leaders who have been under detention since August 5 may be released soon, with the Union Territory administration already easing restrictions on their movement, officials said on Sunday.

As many as four leaders belonging to various political parties were allowed to visit their houses for few hours on Saturday after they requested for it, they said.

Some of the political leaders who are detained in their houses may be allowed to move out of the Valley on health grounds, the officials said.

There was a possibility of some of the detainees being released from the MLA hostel but a final plan will be worked out by the Union Territory administration with the Centre, they added.

The leaders had been under detention since August 5 when the Centre announced abrogation of provisions of Article 370 and splitting the state into two Union Territories of Ladakh and Jammu and Kashmir.

The Union Territories came into existence on October 31.

Among those detained are three former chief ministers—Farooq Abdulalh, Omar Abdullah and Mehbooba Mufti. While senior Abdullah was slapped with the stringent Public Safety Act on September 17, Omar Abdullah and Mehbooba Mufti have been detained at different locations in the city.

Thirty-four political detainees were shifted to MLA hostel from Centaur hotel on November 18 as Srinagar reeled under harsh winter conditions and the hotel lacked proper heating arrangements, the officials said.

The winter chill took a toll on the health of the detainees—National Conference, PDP and People’s Conference leaders and prominent social activists—and the security personnel guarding them.

Mehbooba Mufti was earlier shifted to a government accommodation in the city from a tourist hut located at the foothills of Zaberwan range. — PTI

alampur, November 23

An ex-servicemen reach-out programme was organised by DAH Eagles of DAH Division here today. The main aim of the rally was to boost the morale of the veterans and understand difficulties   being faced by them.

Over  400 ex-servicemen and a large number of military  and civil dignitaries participated in the rally. Its focus was to resolve various problems being faced by ex-servicemen, Veer Naris and war disabled veterans. The event was held in close coordination with the Zila Sainik Board and the civil administration.

A separate stall for the Canteen Stores Department Smart Card, Army Welfare Education Society, Ex-Servicemen Contribution Health Scheme (ECHS) and the Veteran Sahayata Kendra was set at the venue. — OC