India scrambling to buy weapons, from fighters to ammunition, on an emergency basis during a military crisis has become a familiar sight. India is fast-tracking the purchase of equipment worth ₹400 billion from foreign and domestic suppliers. This is largely about signalling determination in light of the military confrontation with China, but also the partial mobilisation by the Pakistani army. Many of these projects have simply been fast-tracked. Some purchases are designed to provide a financial fillip to domestic Indian defence manufacturers severely stressed by the recession. Unfortunately, that these sort of emergency buys also took place during the Pulwama crisis and the earlier Doklam stand-off points to gaps in the country’s defence equipment and the planning.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s defence policy has been inward-looking. The defence budget has been squeezed, in part to rid the military structure of the considerable flab it has accumulated. There has been an overwhelming emphasis on indigenous defence manufacturing, especially through the private sector. There has been a much-needed cleansing and streamlining of the arms procurement process. The past six years have seen a dizzying array of committees and reports on military reform. All of this is laudable, necessary and will pay dividends in the future. But this has also meant fewer weapons and more inferior ones being bought. The backdrop to all of this has been an assumption that India’s strategic environment is relatively stable. Pakistan is around, but less a threat than an irritant. The big gamble was that India and China had reached a state of competitive equilibrium. Under present circumstances, this assumption no longer holds true.

India’s defence reforms should continue. It remains an absurdity that a great power in the making has to import assault rifles. The lack of battlefield networking simply because of a desire to keep different foreign vendors happy is not working either. In the Balakot strike, India lost a fighter because it lacked a secure data link. It was China that used drones with lethal effect in the Galwan Valley. The deep-seated resistance to the massive expansion of smart weapons, unmanned aerial vehicles and greater investment in cyber-offensive capabilities needs to be overcome, and quickly. The world is becoming an increasingly unsafe place and that means security must reassume priority over shaking things up.

Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi’s speech in Ladakh on July 3, where he addressed Indian Army personnel and commended them for their professionalism and valour, even while asserting that the “era of expansionism is over”, marks the beginning of a definitive reset in the troubled but the, up to now, violence-free India-China relationship.

The cordial tenor changed with the Galwan Valley incident in May/June where the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops moved into previously uncontested locations in eastern Ladakh, taking advantage of the thin Indian tactical presence. This resulted in the loss of 20 Indian lives (PLA is yet to confirm the casualties it has sustained) and led to the surprise Modi visit to Nimu in Ladakh. The signal to Beijing is that Delhi will not blink and that the Galwan knot, triggered by PLA’s pre-meditated belligerence, will have to be untied by China.

On current evidence, it appears that PLA has hunkered down for an extended stay in the areas it has occupied and the two armies will be monitoring each other for compliance as per the agreed disengagement and return to status quo protocols. The received wisdom is that this going to be a long haul into the winter months, even as the freshly-minted Chinese claim to Galwan is on the territorial expansion anvil.

While Modi’s reference to this expansionist characteristic refers to the unresolved territorial dispute on land across 3,800 kilometres which has morphed into a Line of Actual Control (LAC) and shifting claim lines, Beijing has already set a precedent in the maritime domain in an audacious and innovative manner.

The South China Sea (SCS) dispute that pitted Chinese Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and fishing rights claims against those of the Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean) began with the adoption of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS).

China then invoked a historical, but dubious, nine-dash line formulation and adopted the might-is-right approach, much to the chagrin of the smaller nations. Consequently, the SCS dispute festered in an inconclusive manner for decades. The PLA began its creeping assertiveness by occupying certain atolls and enlarging the topography through artificial means and then staking a maximalist EEZ claim.

What does a smaller nation do when a bigger more powerful neighbour refuses to engage in sincere dialogue to resolve a territorial jurisdiction matter? Seek third party arbitration or go to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The Philippines took this path despite veiled warnings from China. Much to the consternation of Beijing, the international tribunal ruled in favour of Manila.

Predictably, China rejected this ruling and asserted that its historical claim was the only truth that mattered. This unabashed assertion of expansionism by Beijing caused dismay in many capitals. But little was done in tangible terms to push back, since none of the major powers wanted to get into this tangle, except to defend the principle of free navigation in international waters.

However, in an unusual development, the 36th Asean Summit held at the end of June under Vietnam as chair, made specific reference to the centrality of the UNCLOS and the need to uphold international law. This is a familiar politico-diplomatic position in relation to the SCS dispute. But what is instructive is that over the last six months, many Asean states have been visibly vocal about China’s expansionism and related belligerence.

Thus, the template which has evolved is that China stakes a maximalist territorial claim, using history among other determinants, and then engages in salami-slicing through military intimidation, even while proclaiming its commitment to peace and tranquillity. Modi has belled the cat in Ladakh. India will now have to stay the course in managing the tensions that are bound to increase in the bilateral relationship.

Whether other nations will support Delhi or not remains opaque at this point. But India could look at other leverages to temper the Chinese response and the maritime domain is the logical choice. Beijing has long harboured a deep anxiety about its vulnerability at sea — or what is referred to as the Malacca dilemma.

India has the potential to either stoke this anxiety along with like-minded nations, or assuage it as part of the common good order at sea. The four-nation Quad (United States, Japan, Australia and India) is a work in progress and India could sherpa a cluster of Indo-Pacific nations into a “sagar panchayat” and uphold the rule of law at sea. Some Asean nations may be willing to join such a grouping. Enhancing interoperability at sea, intelligence- sharing and capacity-building would be the early building blocks.

However, to be effective, India will have to invest in specific transborder military capabilities. The recent announcement by Canberra where it has committed $70 billion to acquire new inventory is illustrative. Delhi will have to undertake a radical review of its defence budget despite the Covid-19 constraints to increase its naval/maritime allocations for over a decade-plus. This could enable creating credible military capability in the Andaman & Nicobar islands, a proposal that has been on Delhi’s pending list since 1963. With a suitably-fortified Andaman & Nicobar, the Malacca dilemma can become very real for Beijing.

India can create more negotiating space along the land border by turning to the seas. If this tenet is appropriately understood by Delhi, this policy transmutation could be the silver lining in the Galwan cloud.

C Uday Bhaskar is director, Society for Policy Studies, New Delhi

The views expressed are personal

Defence minister Rajnath Singh on Tuesday held a meeting with Border Roads Organisation (BRO) chief Lt Gen Harpal Singh and other officials about the progress in ongoing infrastructure projects on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China and Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan.

The meeting went for about an hour where the BRO chief gave presentation to Singh about the work being done to boost infrastructure in India’s border areas, news agency ANI reported.

India’s push to improve the infrastructure in the border areas was the primary reason for clash between Indian and Chinese soldiers in Ladakh’s Galwan Valley on June 15. Beijing was opposed to a 60-metre bridge over Galwan river in eastern Ladakh that would consolidate India’s hold of the sensitive sector by allowing Indian infantry to move across the cold mountain river and also protect the 255 km strategic road from Darbuk to Daulat Beg Oldie, the last military post just south of the Karakoram Pass.

That bridge was completed last month, days after a face-off between Indian and Chinese soldiers led to the death of 20 Indian soldiers and an undisclosed number of Chinese soldiers.

In the last few years, there have been frequent face-offs in certain sensitive areas in Eastern Ladakh. It has been a direct outcome of India’s ability of increased patrolling in the area due to vastly improved infrastructure readiness.

The genesis of the building up of faster strategic infrastructure can be traced back to 2014, when the Modi government gave it a big push. One of the first decision of the government was to issue a general approval in July 2014 for the creation of road network by Border Roads Organisation (BRO) within 100 km of aerial distance from LAC. This general approval ensured that requirement of prior central government and other bureaucratic process were done away with.

In May, the BRO completed a key road in Uttarakhand which will cut travel time drastically. The road was inaugurated by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh through video conferencing. He also flagged off a caravan of nine vehicles from Pithoragarh to Gunji to indicate that both passengers and load can be sent by the new road stretch through mountainous terrain.

The road has been built from Ghatibagar in Dharchula to Lipulekh near the border with China. It is also known as Kailash-Mansarovar Yatra Route. The road is 75 kilometre long.

The road ends at the 17,000 feet high Lipulekh pass. From there, Mount Kailash is located around 97 km north of the pass in Tibet. The Lipulekh pass, close to the tri-junction of India-China-Nepal, is the lowest point in this section of the high Himalayas.

The US military “will continue to stand strong” in relationship to a conflict between India and China or anywhere else, a top White House official has said, after the Navy deployed two aircraft carriers to the strategic South China Sea to boost its presence in the region.

“The message is clear. We’re not going to stand by and let China or anyone else take the reins in terms of being the most powerful, dominant force, whether it’s in that region or over here,” White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows told Fox News on Monday.

“And the message is clear. Our military might stands strong and will continue to stand strong, whether it’s in relationship to a conflict between India and China or anywhere else,” Meadows said in response to a question.

He was told that India banned Chinese apps because Indian soldiers were killed by Chinese troops last month and asked what’s mission of the two aircraft carriers – the Ronald Reagan and the Nimitz – and what’s America’s mission.

The troops of India and China are locked in an eight-week standoff in several areas in eastern Ladakh including Pangong Tso, Galwan Valley and Gogra Hot Spring. The situation deteriorated last month following the Galwan Valley clashes that left 20 Indian Army personnel dead as the two sides significantly bolstered their deployments in most areas along the LAC.

Also Read: The Middle Kingdom’s rush of blood and the need for strong Indian deterrence

The Chinese military on Monday began withdrawing troops from the Galwan Valley and Gogra Hot Spring after National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held lengthy talks on Sunday. Doval and Wang are also the special representatives on the India-China boundary talks. The United States has sent two of its aircraft carriers to the South China Sea. “Our mission is to make sure that the world knows that we still have the preeminent fighting force on the face of the globe,” Meadows said.

President Donald Trump has invested more in the US military, more in not only the hardware, but the men and women who serve so sacrificially each and every day, he said. “He (Trump) continues to do so,” he added.

China is engaged in hotly contested territorial disputes in both the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Beijing has built up and militarised many of the islands and reefs it controls in the region. Both areas are stated to be rich in minerals, oil and other natural resources and are vital to global trade.

China claims almost all of the South China Sea. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan have counter claims over the area.

Meadows also hinted that President Trump might sign an executive order that relates to China, among other issues.

“I’ll give you a couple of hints, all right. So, a sneak preview here. We’re going to be looking at how we make sure that China is addressed, how we bring manufacturing back from overseas to make sure the American worker is supported,” he said.

“We’re also going to look at a number of issues as it relates to immigration. We’re going to look at a number of issues as it relates to prescription drug prices and we’re going to get them done when Congress couldn’t get them done,” Meadows said.

Appearing on the same Fox News on Monday talk show with host Brian Kilmeade, influential Republican Senator Tom Cotton said that the US aircraft carriers are headed to the South China Sea to thwart off any Chinese misadventure against Taiwan or other countries in the region.

“That’s one of the reasons why we have those aircraft carrier groups in the South China Sea. I mean, look what China did in the southwest. It’s essentially invaded India over the last few weeks and killed Indian soldiers,” Cotton said.

“No country on China’s periphery, right now, is safe from Chinese aggression. All those countries want a close relationship with the United States. We ought to have one,” Cotton said.

After escalatory rhetoric, and more important, aggressive actions, a process to slowly, in a calibrated manner, defuse the tensions at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), has commenced. China’s slight withdrawal of troops from Galwan, and the Hot Springs Area, and what appears to be a minor thinning of its presence at Finger 4 in Pangong-Tso, is a positive development. With a two-hour-long conversation between National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi — the designated special representatives on border talks — there appears to be a degree of convergence between the two countries on the need to first disengage, and eventually de-escalate, from the current stand-off.

There are structural reasons why disengagement makes sense for both countries. China was solely responsible for transgressing across LAC. Even the finest scholars who study China have not been able to offer a fully rounded explanation on why Beijing has behaved the way it did. Is it linked to its pattern of aggression elsewhere? Is it to overcome domestic legitimacy issues Xi Jinping may be confronting? Is it a message to India to not cosy up to the United States? Is it to halt India’s border infrastructure development? Is it to gain tactical advantage to secure Aksai Chin and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor? Beijing may have been motivated by all these factors, but the fact is, even for a rising power, its actions defied rational calculation, for it has alienated India, and Indian public opinion entirely, throwing the entire relationship — of which China too has been a beneficiary — off-gear. It will also push India in the very direction Beijing does not want it to move. If Beijing is now waking up to what is a miscalculation, that is wise. New Delhi too does not want conflict. It was left with no choice but to respond aggressively to Chinese incursions and defend its territorial integrity. But given the internal economic weaknesses, the Covid-19 challenge, the gaps in military preparation, and the costs of any conflict, peace is, of course, the most desirable option.

But this seeming thaw needs to be accompanied with two caveats. One is immediate. As the Indian establishment has made clear, every step of the disengagement process will be carefully monitored and verified. China has violated past understandings; its statement contained a hint of continued belligerence; and there doesn’t appear to be a deal on it stepping back from the finger area in Pangong-Tso. India must ensure complete restoration of status quo ante. The second is medium-term. Irrespective of a possible de-escalation, it cannot be business-as-usual. India must ramp up its capabilities, deepen external partnerships, reduce dependence on China, and remain wary, for this is possibly the beginning, not the end, of an era of a new strategic competition.

The Centre on Tuesday received one month to implement the Supreme Court’s path-breaking decision to grant a permanent commission to women Army officers serving under the Short Service Commission (SSC).

An order by the top court passed on February 17 had ended the gender disparity that stood in the way of women SSC officers being denied a permanent commission their male counterparts were entitled to. The Centre agreed to grant a permanent commission to women in 10 non-combat streams and was directed by the apex court to complete the process in three months.

The deadline expired in May. The extension ordered by the court will be valid for a month starting on Tuesday.

Citing the Covid-19 pandemic and the ensuing lockdown, the Centre moved an application before the Supreme Court to extend the deadline expiring in May by six months. Senior advocate R Balasubramanian, appearing for the ministry of defence, told a bench comprising justices DY Chandrachud and Indu Malhotra that the government was is in an advanced stage of implementing the court’s order. The process couldn’t be completed because of the lockdown that caused all government offices to be close abruptly, the lawyer said.

“On account of lack of staff, closure of hospitals, including Army hospital and non-availability of other requirements necessary to comply with the directions of the Supreme Court, it was very difficult to continue with the process of consideration of women officers for grant of permanent commission…..In view of the corona pandemic and the ensuing lockdown coupled with exigencies of service, the applicant has not been able to complete the same and requires more time to complete the entire process,” the Centre said in its petition.

The women SSC officers were represented in the virtual court proceeding by their lawyers Meenakshi Lekhi and Meenakshi Arora. Opposing the application, the counsel argued that an attempt is being made by Centre to dilute the Supreme Court judgment to delay its implementation.

The bench took note of the fact that the Centre had commenced efforts to implement the court order and could not foresee the lockdown due to the Covid-19 outbreak. Recording this submission in its order, the bench said, “We extend the time for compliance by one more month.”

The court kept the matter pending in order to pursue implementation of its direction.

Under the Supreme Court’s February order, women SSC officers who are serving and who had approached the court but retired during the pendency of proceedings were eligible for a permanent commission. It was in 2006 that the Army extended SSC to women recruits allowing them a short stint of 10 years, extendable up to 14 years, to work with the army’s non-combat streams.

In 2010, the Delhi high court, ruling on a batch of petitions filed by women SSC officers, directed Centre to grant them a permanent commission. Challenging this order, the Centre approached the apex court.