The number of Chinese patrol boats, sources told The Indian Express, have gone up three times — they had earlier been using only three boats. The Indian Army also has a similar number of boats to dominate the 45-km long western portion of the lake which is under Indian control.

While there have been tensions about the limits of patrolling by the two sides on the northern banks of Pangong Tso, sources said the Chinese “forcefully insisted a couple of days back that the Indian patrols stop at Finger 2”. (Express archive photo)

Two weeks after Indian and Chinese troops came to blows near Pangong Tso, a lake in eastern Ladakh, the Chinese have stepped up patrols and deployed more boats on the lake. They are also objecting to Indian construction of a vehicle track, and patrols beyond a certain point.

The tensions in Ladakh, officials said, can worsen the situation elsewhere along the Line of Actual Control.

The number of Chinese patrol boats, sources told The Indian Express, have gone up three times — they had earlier been using only three boats. The Indian Army also has a similar number of boats to dominate the 45-km long western portion of the lake which is under Indian control.

“Nearly one-third of Chinese transgressions in the western sector (of the LAC) happen in Pangong Tso. Not only have they substantially increased the number of boats on the lake, their patrolling behaviour is increasingly more aggressive. It is not a healthy thing when you consider what has been going on in the Finger Area since late April,” sources said.

The mountains on the lake’s northern bank jut forward in major spurs, which the Army calls Fingers. India claims the LAC is co-terminus with Finger 8, while the Chinese claim that the LAC passes through Finger 2. The area between the two differing perceptions is the territory which both armies try to dominate through regular patrolling.

Explained: The new Indian road to Lipu Lekh, Nepal’s protests, and the area’s strategic importance

While there have been tensions about the limits of patrolling by the two sides on the northern banks of Pangong Tso, sources said the Chinese “forcefully insisted a couple of days back that the Indian patrols stop at Finger 2”.

Since the Indians physically control the area up to Finger 4, this was a “provocative move” by the Chinese following the “disengagement” after a physical altercation between troops of both sides near Finger 5 on the night of May 5-6.

The Chinese, sources said, have been objecting to construction of a vehicle track by Indians in the same area.

While Chinese soldiers patrol the area in light vehicles on a motorable road built in 1999 when India was busy evicting Pakistanis from the Kargil heights, Indian soldiers patrol on foot till their perception of the LAC.

Read| India building facilities in Aksai Chin: China daily

“Yes, tensions have been high. We are doing construction in our area. Also, the Chinese road is rather narrow and has very few turning points. So, when our patrols challenge their patrols and ask them to go back from our area, they physically cannot turn their vehicles and it leads to more acrimony,” sources said.

“There is a situation on the LAC in the Hot Springs sector, which is an ITBP sector. An Army company had moved closer to PP14 and PP15 in 2015 after a minor incident, but this has always been a settled area between us and the Chinese. It is worth considering if the Chinese posture there is linked to incidents at Pangong Tso, just as Depsang was linked to Chumar in 2013,” sources said.

ALSO READ | Will reclaim at any cost: Nepal PM Oli on contested land

In New Delhi, Army officers, however, maintained that the incidents in Pangong Tso are “typical LAC activity witnessed during summer months” when “some new units have been inducted” and “operational familiarisation and occupation of winter-vacated posts” take place. They called these incidents “localised” in nature due to “different perception of the LAC by the two sides”.

Last week, finance minister Nirmala Sitharaman unveiled some major structural reforms in India’s moribund defence sector, as part of a coronavirus disease (Covid-19)-related macroeconomic stimulus, and the increase in foreign direct investment in defence manufacturing to 74% is radical. However, these are all policy changes that have “potential” and need to be implemented effectively before their outcome can be objectively assessed.

In the interim, India’s military security challenges, both current and long-term, came into unintended focus in this month even as the nation is grappling with the pandemic and its tragic impact on millions of citizens.

In early May, the Handwara terror attack saw the Indian Army losing a colonel and other personnel, pointing to the abiding tenacity of the low-intensity-conflict (LIC) that has been simmering in Kashmir. This is a complex proxy war where the external Pakistani stimulus has permeated the internal security strand with all its corrosive communal elements. It is unlikely to end soon.

Currently, India is managing an anomalous territorial challenge exigency, albeit of a low order. The eastern Ladakh sector saw a stand-off between Indian and Chinese soldiers in the Pangong Tso sector. While it is well below Doklam, media reports indicate that stones were used and it is encouraging that no ordnance was exchanged, as has been the pattern for well over three decades. But the long-festering territorial dispute with China, remains alive on the national security radar.

The more intriguing element is that Nepal summoned the Indian ambassador on May 11 to lodge a protest against the construction of a road by India in an area (Lipu Lekh pass to Dharchula in Uttarakhand) that Kathmandu claims lies within its territory.

To add to the spectrum of challenges, reports have emerged of China enhancing its Indian Ocean (IO) footprint in an island proximate to Male in the Maldives. Thus the possibility of a Hambantota kind of facility/access for the PLA navy in the IO cannot be ignored by Indian security planners.

And to cap this opaque security challenge, May also symbolises India’s complex nuclear-missile anxiety. The regional strategic environment became rough for India when China acquired nuclear weapons in October 1964; the subsequent Sino-Pakistan weapons of mass destruction (WMD) covert cooperation presented Delhi with a sui generis security conundrum. The Pakistani nuclear weapon that Beijing had enabled was being used to help terrorism stoked by religious fervour — what one had described as the nuclear weapon-enabled terrorism (NWET) dilemma.

India sought to assuage its latent WMD anxiety in May 1998 through the Shakti nuclear tests under Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s watch on May 11. Two decades later, the regional WMD-terror nexus has become muddier and the techno-strategic permutations are bewildering.

Does India have the wherewithal to deal effectively with this complex spectrum of national security challenges — one part of which is further aggravated by the current domestic political-ideological orientation? The answer is no — and for years experts have been pointing out that the annual defence allocation cannot sustain the kind of human, material and inventory profile that India needs. The last defence budget (excluding pensions) was Rs 3,37,000 crore. The amount available for modernisation of equipment and new acquisitions was shrinking to about 32% from the optimum of 40% of the budget.

In the backdrop of Covid-19, India’s macroeconomic challenge will worsen. The fiscal deficit is set to breach the recommended 3.5% limit; the only question is how high it would go. On May 8, the government pegged central borrowing for 2020-21 at Rs 12,00,000 crore — a significant increase from the budget estimate of Rs 7,80,000 crore. This fiscal stress will have a bearing on sectors earlier referred to as “non-plan” in the budgetary allocation, of which defence is a visible component. Thus, it is unlikely that the armed forces will receive anything close to Rs 3,50,000 crore (approx $46 billion). There are also unconfirmed reports of a budget slash in defence allocation due to Covid-19, ranging from Rs 40,000 to Rs 80,000 crore.

Given that the Covid-19 challenge and its accumulating debris of economic devastation and human destitution will be the higher national priority for some years, India will have to embark on a radical review of its security challenges and the road map to deal with this complex spectrum. Many nations are facing a similar predicament, but some abiding elements in the Indian context must be noted. Strategic geography and its attendant security exigencies will not change due to the pandemic. The low-intensity conflict stoked by Pakistan and the internal security fabric will be turbulent and the political apex will seek to assuage national sentiment in this regard.

What kind of military capability India needs, its technological contour, and how this can be both nurtured and sustained in an affordable manner in a post-Covid-19 world needs careful and objective assessment. Against this backdrop, some of the sweeping remarks attributed to the Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat, justifying lower defence spend and suggesting that the military may have been misrepresenting its requirements are perplexing, to put it mildly. One hopes this is not the distilled wisdom of Modi 2.0 in the security domain.

Tribune News Service

New Delhi, May 22

The Vice Chief of Indian Army, Lt Gen SK Saini, on Friday said the proposed ‘import ban’ list of military hardware will not restrict the forces to procure niche technologies from abroad.

Addressing a webinar organised by the Society for Indian Defence Manufacturers, he said a large number of indigenous industry and micro small and medium enterprises would be given opportunity to fulfil the defence needs of the Army.

The General said there was a perceptible shift of dependence of the Army from OFBs to private entities in terms of non-core activities and certain type of critical ammunition. He expressed hope that other ammunition varieties, including those that were being imported currently, based on the response of the defence industry, would also be added to the list of items to be manufactured indigenously.

He said 80 per cent of the Army’s capability development and more than 92 per cent of its sustenance budget was based on indigenous products and services.

New Delhi: The Indian Air Force (IAF) Thursday observed the second death anniversary of Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Idris Hassan Latif, the man who chose India over Pakistan and went on to become the 10th chief of the IAF.

Latif led the first fly-past over New Delhi after India became a republic in 1950. He was instrumental in procuring Jaguar, MiG-23 & MiG-25 aircraft for the IAF.

A highly-respected officer in the military circles, Latif was the pilot who led India’s first fly-past over New Delhi after India turned republic on 26 January 1950.

A World War II veteran, he also went on to become the governor of a state and a diplomat after retirement.

He even played a key role in the procurement of the Jaguar strike aircraft, still in use with the IAF, and the fleet of the now-retired MiG-23 and MiG-25.

‘He was very clear that his future lay with India’

Born on 9 June 1923 in Hyderabad in the erstwhile Deccan, Latif joined the Royal Indian Air Force in 1941 at the age of 18 and was commissioned in 1942.

During 1943-44, the officer was one of the few Indian pilots to be seconded to the Royal Air Force in the United Kingdom where he underwent training with modern aircraft like the Hurricane and Spitfire.

On his return to India in 1944, the young officer took part in the Burma campaign, flying the Hawker Hurricane for Number 3 Squadron.

Though later posted to Madras, Latif joined the Number 9 Squadron in Burma, again flying the Hawker Hurricane.

He was good friends with his Commanding Officer Squadron Leader Asghar Khan and another flamboyant pilot, Flight Lieutenant Noor Khan.

Both the Khans later went on to become chiefs of the Pakistan Air Force.

“When Partition bought with it the division of the armed forces, Latif as a Muslim officer was faced with the choice of joining both India or Pakistan, but there was no making up of minds for him,” the IAF wrote in his official profile.

“He was very clear that his future lay with India. Even though both Asghar as well as Noor Khan called him up to persuade Latif to join them in the fledgling Pakistan Air Force, Latif made it clear that for him, religion and country were not interlinked. It was no surprise that Latif made his way to become the first Muslim chief of Air Staff of the Indian Air Force,” it added.

Also read: Indian Air Force cancels Services Selection Board interviews amid coronavirus outbreak

Awarded Param Vishisht Seva Medal in 1971

In 1961, Latif was sent as the Air Attache to the United States and he returned in 1965 just before the India-Pakistan war broke out.

Latif eventually moved to the Air headquarters as the Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Plans), a newly created post, in the rank of Air Vice Marshal in-charge of modernisation plans.

He was awarded with the Param Vishisht Seva Medal (PVSM) in 1971 for his work as the ACAS (Plans).

During the 1971 war, Latif was still the ACAS (Plans) and was involved with the monitoring of the air assets and their best utilisation.

He later became the vice chief of Air Staff, a post he held until 1978, when he took over as chief of Air Staff.

“As the first Muslim chief of Air Staff of the IAF, Latif was involved fully in the re-equipment and modernisation plans of the air force. He convinced the government to approve the procurement of the Jaguar strike aircraft, a proposal which was lying dormant for over 8 years,” according to Latif’s official profile.

As the IAF chief, he also held negotiations with the Russians, and inducted MiG-23 and later, the MiG-25 aircraft into the IAF.

After his retirement in 1981, Latif held posts of the governor of Maharashtra and Indian ambassador to France.

It was prime minister Nehru’s vision that led to the raising of 61st Cavalry. He had sound reasons to favour pomp, pageantry and ceremonials. Their value in instilling national pride and fostering elan and panache in the public was fully appreciated by him. The plan was to raise no less than three regiments of horsed cavalry to perform ceremonial roles and promote equestrianism.

However, there were problems in achieving such a goal. The Wilcox Committee which planned the organisation of the Army after World War Two had recommended that two regiments, Poona Horse and 19th Lancers be retained as horsed cavalry. But there was a need to have more and more tank units to man the two armoured divisions required as a reserve in case of a German thrust through the Caucasus and consequent threat to the Middle East oilfields. In addition, the planned reconquest of Burma required four tank brigades. Therefore, these two regiments found themselves getting mechanised too. The Governor-General’s Bodyguard (later PBG) was heavily committed to its own dedicated duties. The horsed bodyguard units of the Governors of the three Presidency provinces (Madras, Bengal and Bombay) had been disbanded at Independence, being considered anachronisms.

There were however a number of horsed cavalry regiments still in existence, the reorganised remnants of the States Forces maintained by the erstwhile princely rulers. A number of them were amalgamated to form 61st Cavalry in 1953. These were the Gwalior Lancers, Jodhpur/Kachhawa Horse, Mysore Lancers and ‘B’ Squadron, 2nd Patiala Lancers.it was on the legacy of these distinguished regiments that the new unit sought to make its mark. Rajputs from Jodhpur Lancers, Kaimkhanis (Muslim Rajputs from Rajasthan)  from Kachhawa Horse and Marathas from Gwalior Lancers formed a sabre squadron each.The Mysore Lancers and Jodhpur Lancers had fought together as part of the 15th Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade in Egypt, Sinai and Palestine during the First World War.

On 23rd September 1918 the two regiments joined forces through a brilliant manoeuvre to capture the strategic port of Haifa after a great charge on Turkish positions in the face of withering artillery and machine-gun fire. This was a rare instance of cavalry taking a fortified town at the gallop. The credit for the audacious victory went to the cavalrymen’s bold, courageous actions backed up by experience and professional excellence.

The main role of 61 Cavalry was mounted ceremonials and promotion of equestrian sports and polo. In addition, to justify their existence they were allotted an operational task as scouts in the desert. Its organisation was modelled on that of cavalry regiments from between the two world wars – more mounted infantry rather than the traditional horse-borne troops. Consequently, they were stationed at Jaipur. The regiment got down to both its roles with gusto. Its polo team was the country’s best; so were its competitive riders. In 1965 the regiment was deployed to cover approaches to Ganganagar under a distinguished Commandant, Lieutenant Colonel Thakur Govind Singh. The area of responsibility was nearly a hundred kilometres of semi-desert terrain. While armed police detachments manned border outposts to mark sovereignty, 61st Cavalry carried out intensive night patrolling on horseback. No enemy infiltration or penetration was reported. The taste of active service was exhilarating.

 Lt Gen PP Kumaramanglam, then Vice Chief of Army Staff inspecting the horse lines of 61 Cavalry in their concentration area in Ganganagar sector after the 1965 war. (Credit: Thakur Indra Vijay Singh Khatipura)

In 1970, Lieutenant General MS Wadalia, the regiment’s long-standing Colonel retired. It was suggested that the unit’s future depended on having a strong, energetic successor. In a strategic move it was decided to invite the then Army Chief, General Sam Maneckshaw to be the next Colonel of the Regiment. Maneckshaw was a visionary commander with a proven track record of building and nurturing institutions. In an era when camel pack artillery was wound up because it was realised that tracked vehicles could go anywhere that camels could, he realised that 61 Cavalry needed a change in role otherwise the military and civilian bureaucracy would demand it shed its horses. For horsed cavalry to operate even in a reconnaissance role on a bullet-swept battlefield facing all the modern implements of war – artillery, mines, machine guns, barbed wire etc was unthinkable. In the prelude to the 1971 war Maneckshaw moved the regiment to Delhi to take on the tasks of the Rashtrapati Bhawan guard battalion – guarding the presidential residence, the internal defence of Luttyen’s Delhi and dismounted ceremonials. To their credit the cavalrymen adapted well to their new duties. They had the honour of presenting the first guard of honour to Sheikh Mujibur Rehman on his release from Pakistani prison in January 1972. Their versatility was commendable.

The regiment suffered a big blow, nevertheless in 1974. The Krishna Rao Committee in its report on the Army’s reorganisation recommended a drawdown in its strength. Consequently, a whole sabre squadron was disbanded along with specialist troops for mortars, medium machine-guns, light machine-guns and signals communication. One sabre squadron was permanently stationed at Delhi for performing ceremonial duties. 61st Cavalry took the setback in its stride and continued its quest for excellence on the polo field, the equestrian arena and mounted drill.

Small detachments were sent for deployment in an infantry role in Sri Lanka as part of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force giving the cavalrymen some combat experience. In 1990 after another review of operational roles the regiment took over the protection of Vital Areas/Vital Points in areas along the Western front. To give them some added punch, discarded Soviet BTR-60 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) were given to them. These were however too old, very prone to mechanical breakdowns, lacked spare parts and consequently unreliable. The descendants of the Mysore and Jodhpur Lancers preferred their trusty steeds for patrolling. The regiment took part in exercises, operational alerts and was deployed during Operation Parakram. During the latter stand-off it provided security to the field maintenance area (FMA) at Jaisalmer with its mobile patrols protecting the lines of communication between that place and Jodhpur against enemy special forces and non-state actors.

How has the regiment fared in its main role – ceremonials and promotion of polo and equestrian sports? I’d say exceedingly well. 61 Cavalry has produced eleven Arjuna Awardees and a Padma Shri with the tally of their medals and trophies too numerous to enumerate. They dominate the polo field and equestrian arena. Hard work put in to rehearse and train mounted drills has paid off in the quality of their ceremonial presentations very visible to the public.

It is generally not known but the directive style of command practiced in the regiment has paid dividends. The regiment provides equitation instructors for the National Defence Academy, Indian Military Academy and Officers Training Academy and the Armoured Corps Centre and School. The armed forces view horse riding as a risk exercise and therefore character building in nature. It helps in the blossoming of young men into soldiers and leaders.

 Army Chief General JN Chaudhri visiting 61 Cavalry in peace time at Jaipur, 1965. (Credit: Thakur Indra Vijay Singh Khatipura)

While 61 Cavalry has been under a Damocles’ Sword for the last three decades the latest proposal on the regiment’s future is gaining currency. It has been recommended that the regimental headquarters and combat service support elements take under command three independent armoured squadrons currently affiliated to 7th Cavalry, Central India Horse and 63 Cavalry to convert to a new armoured regiment. The two sabre squadrons of horsed cavalry are to move to Delhi to come under the Directorate General of Mechanised Forces carrying on with their current jobs. There will be a wholesale posting out of cavalry-trained officers from the regiment replacing them with tankmen. The new armoured regiment will in effect inherit only the shell of 61 Cavalry, the cap-badge (the double-headed Mysore eagle) and the legacy of Haifa.

Coherent, compelling arguments couched in the language of modern warfare have been advanced, mainly on social media for innovation and augmentation of combat power. They bear all the hallmarks of an orchestrated campaign in favour of a particular school of thought. It seems that certain vested interests are hell bent upon an exercise in empire-building. Green eyes seem to abound!

In an army with upwards of seven hundred combat units, not to mention more than four hundred combat support units is it inconceivable to have two regiments (the other one being the President’s Bodyguard) devoted to ceremonials? 61st Cavalry has set the gold standard in mounted drill and ceremonials as it has in equestrian sports. These standards are sure to drop if the cavalrymen are deprived of the supervision, planning and command structure provided by a regimental headquarters. Animal management is no kid’s game. It involves hard work, constant administration and 24/7 dedication and can only be learnt through specialised training and hands-on experience. The costs involved in keeping the status quo and the new proposals are around the same. In Delhi with so much pressure on land and accommodation where are the facilities to cater for additional horses and men to be created? I need hardly remind the readers that training horses and riders and providing equestrian resources requires a lot of space. Space and utilities which have been in place for more than half a century in Jaipur.

The three independent armoured squadrons are affiliated to three distinguished regiments. Combined together they need to evolve a new tradition and regimental cohesion. Saddling them with the legacy of a fourth unit, a traditional cavalry regiment is unfair and sure to deprive them of the good start that they richly deserve.

Will the Sowars of 61st Cavalry now have to dismount their steeds to the traditional cavalry command of ‘Shabash Ghora!’ (pat and stroke your horses) never to mount again? Could New Delhi’s Teen Murti Memorial become the only remembrance of a gallant, efficient regiment? Let us hope not.

Operation Samudra Setu

Under the Vande Bharat Mission, two naval vessels have been deployed to evacuate Indian citizens stranded abroad because of the pandemic. Codenamed Operation Samudra Setu, during its first phase INS Jalashwa and INS Magar transported 698 and 202 citizens respectively from the Maldives. The operation started on 7th May.

INS Jalashwa returned to Male on 14th May, sailing the next day with 700 passengers aboard including 100 women and children and bound for Kochi.

 INS Jalashwa during Operation Samudra Setu

In the second phase INS Jalashwa will sail from Colombo port, Sri Lanka carrying around 700 Indian nationals to Tuticorin on 1st June. Both ships have a capacity to carry a thousand persons at a time but are currently restricted to 750 passengers keeping in view social distancing norms.

INS Jalashwa is the former USS Trenton, an Austin-class Landing Platform Dock (LPD). She was built by the Lockheed Shipbuilding and Construction Company at Seattle in Washington State and commissioned into the US Navy in 1971. The Indian Nav acquired it in 2007 after an analysis of the response to the 2004 tsunami revealed an acute shortcoming in wherewithal to react to the need for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). This was a stopgap purchase pending the construction of four indigenous LPDs.

INS Magar is the lead ship in the Magar-class of amphibious warfare vessels. Built by Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers, Kolkata she was commissioned in 1987 immediately taking part in Operation Pawan (the intervention in Sri Lanka).

The Navy’s experience in Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) is most heartening and underlines its adaptability and competence.

CDS Gen. Bipin Rawat had said IAF was planning to buy the indigenous LCA Tejas instead of 114 ‘Make in India’ foreign jets.

Bhadauria said Monday that the list of aircraft planned to be inducted by the IAF includes 36 Rafales, 114 multirole fighter aircraft, 100 advanced medium combat aircraft (AMCA) and over 200 LCAs in different variants.

Rawat had told news agency Bloomberg last week that the IAF “is switching to the LCA” when asked about the global tender for jets.

“The IAF is saying, I would rather take the indigenous fighter, it is good,” he was quoted as saying.

The CDS’ words came as a setback for the likes of Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Saab, who were in the race for the contract for 114 aircraft, which would be worth at least 15 billion dollars and would also entail technology transfer under ‘Make in India’.

However, IAF chief Bhadauria told news agency ANI Monday: “This project (114 jets) is in the middle-weight and is in the Rafale class, in this issue, we will deal with it in the Make in India region, with an increase in FDI, with support to the private sector. I think in future this will bring in technology which is required to support the aviation sector. I think it is important to have another generation of aircraft in terms of capability, technology as we go along (sic).”

Also read: Dassault, Boeing and Saab — the front-runners for IAF’s 114 fighter jet contract

Separate programmes

When the CDS had made his comments last week, they had come as a surprise to the Air Force and industry. Sources had explained to ThePrint that the 114 jets cannot be replaced by the 83 LCA as the two fighters are of different classes.

“The IAF projections take into account the 83 LCA Mk 1A, Rafale, the 114 foreign fighters under Make in India, and even the AMCA,” a source had said.

Another source, who was involved in the negotiations for 83 LCAs, said it was wrong to mix up two separate programmes.

Air Chief Marshal Bhadauria also said his force is planning to acquire 450 fighter aircraft for deployment on the northern and western frontiers of the country over the next 35 years.

Regardless, the IAF will not reach its sanctioned strength of 42 squadrons by 2042, its projections have revealed.

The best-case scenario is if the force inducts the Tejas Mark 2, the AMCA and 114 fighter aircraft, for which a request for proposal is still awaited.

Soldiers near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) at Chushul, 59 kilometres from Pangong lake in Leh. (Express Photo: Shuaib Masoodi, File)

As tensions remain high between Indian and Chinese soldiers, the number of recorded Chinese transgressions across the disputed India-China border surged by 75 per cent in Ladakh in 2019, and the Chinese forays into Indian territory in the first four months of the current year have also witnessed an increase compared to the same period last year.

What exactly is a Chinese transgression?

A Chinese transgression across the border is recorded once the Indian border guarding forces in an area – either the Army or the ITBP – are “reasonably certain” that the Chinese soldiers had crossed over to the Indian side of the LAC. A Chinese transgression – in air, land or the waters of Pangong Tso lake – can be recorded, officials said, if it is visually observed by border posts, through use of surveillance equipment, in face-offs by patrols, indicated reliably by locals, or based on evidence left by the Chinese in the form of wrappers, biscuit packets etc to show their presence in an unmanned area.

What does the ‘Indian side’ of the LAC mean?

The border is not fully demarcated and the LAC is neither clarified nor confirmed by the two countries. Except for the middle sector, even the mutual exchange of maps about their respective perceptions has not taken place between India and China. This has led to different perceptions of the LAC for the two sides, and soldiers from either side try to patrol the area up to their perception of the LAC. Essentially, what Indians believe to be ‘their side’ is not the same as what the Chinese believe to be ‘their side’ – this is different from the Line of Control (LoC) between India and Pakistan where everything was agreed upon by the two armies following the 1971 War.

What are the various sectors on the India-China border?

India-China border is divided into three sectors, where the LAC in the western sector falls in the union territory of Ladakh and is 1597 km long, the middle sector of 545 km length falls in Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh, and 1346 km long eastern sector falls in the states of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. The middle sector is the least disputed sector, while the western sector witnesses the highest transgressions between the two sides.

Also read | India builds road north of Ladakh lake, China warns of ‘necessary counter-measures’

Do the higher number of Chinese transgressions matter?

A higher number indicates that the Chinese soldiers are coming to the Indian side more often, and their movements are being observed and recorded by the Indian soldiers. This can be seen as an indicator of increased Chinese assertiveness, but as long as there are no major incidents, it means that the established border mechanisms between the two sides are working. So far, there has been no major standoff between the two sides after the 73-day Doklam standoff on Sikkim-Bhutan border in 2017.

But PM Modi and President Xi met in Wuhan, following the Doklam crisis, and passed some instructions. What were they?

Yes, Modi and Xi had met for their first informal summit at Wuhan in April 2018, where the two leaders had “issued strategic guidance to their respective militaries to strengthen communication in order to build trust and mutual understanding and enhance predictability and effectiveness in the management of border affairs”. They had also “directed their militaries to earnestly implement various confidence building measures agreed upon between the two sides, including the principle of mutual and equal security, and strengthen existing institutional arrangements and information sharing mechanisms to prevent incidents in border regions”.

Also read | China engaged in provocative, coercive military activities with neighbours, including India: White House report

Has the Wuhan spirit vanished?

That is hard to say but tensions between India and China have shot up suddenly in 2020, even as both countries grapple with containing the spread of COVID-19. A terse statement by the Chinese foreign ministry on Tuesday was responded to by the Indian foreign ministry in equally strong terms on Thursday. Besides tensions at Naku La in Sikkim and at Galwan river and Pangong Tso in Ladakh, Indians have been worried about the Nepal government’s recent behaviour on the border map issue. Army Chief General MM Naravane didn’t leave much to imagination when he said that Nepal was doing it at “the behest of a third party,” ostensibly referring to China.

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Should one be worried?

India and China are both nuclear-armed countries with strong militaries. Although not a shot between them has been fired since 1976 or a military skirmish happened after 1967, the fact that Indian and Chinese soldiers are in an eyeball to eyeball situation at two places in Ladakh, with strong statements coming from both sides, can’t be construed as a very happy situation. Because matters on the border have always been resolved peacefully by the two countries in the past four decades, there is hope that the tensions will soon subside.

India has done well in not only combating the coronavirus internally but also assisting nations in the region and beyond, including the US, in a much-needed outreach, enhancing its goodwill and linkages. The world order after Covid-19 is an opportunity for India to position itself as a global leader, asserting its just and rightful place. India will be the ‘balancing power’ and, hence, should leverage its position with China and the US.

Lt Gen Vinod Bhatia (retd)

Director, Centre for Joint Warfare Studies

Having commanded the Sukna Corps, the recent face-off at Nakula in north Sikkim, reportedly leading to a scuffle and injuries to soldiers on both sides, came as a surprise. This was the first of its kind at Nakula, and was closely followed by a similar face-off and scuffle in eastern Ladakh, again reportedly resulting in the scrambling of Indian Air Force Sukhois, to deter Chinese helicopter activity. India shares a 3,488-km contested border with China.

On account of an improved connectivity, infrastructure development and access to the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the depth, frequency and intensity of such face-offs will increase, threatening a fragile peace which exists, with the last shot fired in anger in October 1975. Such incidents and standoffs like the one at Doklam in 2017 or Depsang and Chumar are the ever-present potential drivers of conflict between the two nuclear-armed neighbours — home to one-third of humanity.

The LAC is based on perceptions and, hence, bereft of a common understanding, leading to frequent transgressions and face-offs, with the potential to spiral into a skirmish and an avoidable conflict. China’s assertiveness on the LAC and India’s strong stance of ‘no blinking’ are likely to be the new normal.

The emerging world order after Covid-19 is an opportunity for India and China to resolve the ‘boundary question’, and seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution. Winston Churchill once said, “A pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity, an optimist sees opportunity in every difficulty.” Covid-19 is an opportunity for India to assert its rightful place in the emerging world order and, equally important, to resolve the vexed ‘boundary question’ with China. The last few months have changed the thought and behaviour patterns of society, people, nations and the world. Covid-19 has directly impacted the emerging world order, which is likely to witness a shift of power from the West to the East. The global architecture will witness major shifts as the West battles the pandemic not so successfully and China losing its leverages as it is believed to have caused the pandemic.

India, on the other hand, has done well in not only combating the coronavirus internally but also assisting nations in the region and beyond, including the US, in a much-needed outreach, enhancing its goodwill and linkages. The post-Covid-19 world order is an opportunity for India to position itself as a global leader, asserting its just and rightful place. India will be the ‘balancing power’ and, hence, should leverage its position with both China and the US.

The India-China relationship is one of the most fascinating relationships between two major powers, despite a contested boundary. The way they have managed the relationship ever since the war of 1962 is a remarkable achievement, despite the many sensitive border standoffs. This speaks of the salience of the confidence-building measures (CBMs). The prevailing equilibrium along the LAC is enshrined in the five principles of Panchsheel and the five treaties between India and China which detail the CBMs and military engagements ensure fragile peace and tranquility. However, the prevailing fragile peace is under stress and both countries will do well to delimit, delineate and demarcate the boundary.

The conceptual framework for the resolution of the boundary is defined in the 11 Articles of the April 2005 agreement on political parameters and guiding principles. India and China, with two strong leaders in Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping, have the political capital and clout to resolve the issue. The two leaders have demonstrated mutual respect and chemistry not seen earlier, having met at an average of three to four times every year, including the path-breaking informal summit at Wuhan which resulted in the resolution of the 73-day Doklam standoff.

Modi has also demonstrated political will to implement tough decisions, be it the surgical and precision air strikes against terror camps in Pakistan or the abrogation of Articles 370 and 35-A in J&K. He has been re-elected with a massive mandate and can make a boundary resolution with China acceptable to the nation and the people.

The benefits that accrue of settled northern borders are obvious. It is also a fact that managing contested borders is a continuous costly drain on the armed forces and the ever-depleting defence budget. Once resolved, India will be able to optimise the defence forces, position itself as a military power and focus on the western borders by raising the costs of the proxy war by Pakistan, leading to relative peace.

Xi Jinping has followed many of Mao’s dictums and diktats, one of which envisaged China having inclusive land borders. Whether or not the mention of inclusive maritime borders was left out by default or design is a matter of debate. Accordingly, over the years, China has resolved the land border rows with 12 of the 14 nations, the exceptions being India and Bhutan.

Xi gave the first indication of a shift in China’s position to resolve the boundary row immediately after taking over as the supreme leader of China in March 2013. In a meeting with the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Dublin on March 28, 2013, while discussing the boundary question, he said, “China and India should improve and make good use of the mechanism of special representatives to strive for a fair, reasonable solution and framework acceptable to both sides as early as possible.”

This was a major shift in the position as hitherto, both sides regarded the boundary question as a complex historical legacy which would take time to resolve. It is in the interests of both countries to resolve the matter.

The 22nd meeting of the special representatives, NSA Ajit Doval and Wang Yi, State Councillor, was held in New Delhi on December 21, 2019. An MEA press brief stated: “Both underlined the importance of approaching the boundary question from the strategic perspective of India-China relations and agreed that an early settlement of the boundary question serves the fundamental interests of both countries.”

If ever there is or will be a historic opportunity for the two Asian giants to resolve the contested boundary, it’s now, an opportunity provided by the pandemic.

India Wednesday sharply reacted to Nepal’s new official map that includes disputed territories, saying “such artificial enlargement of territorial claims will not be accepted”.

ThePrint asks: Nepal map row: Has India provoked Kathmandu or is China instigating trouble for New Delhi?

India has escalated tensions with Nepal and China is party to it

Kanak Mani Dixit
Senior Nepali journalist

This is a clear case of India having provoked Kathmandu. In fact, China is very much a party to this affair, on India’s side.

Nepal has historically regarded the 335 sq km triangle (Limpiyadhura-Kalapani-Lipu Lekh) as its territory, defined by the Sugauli Treaty with the East India Company, which has not been superseded. A bilateral foreign secretary-level committee exists to resolve Nepal-India frontier disputes, and Nepal has been demanding talks for years. Kathmandu had also sought to send a special envoy to Delhi in early December.

South Block has remained unresponsive to all approaches. Instead, India carried out four escalatory actions in a row. First, in May 2015 it signed an agreement with China to use the Lipu Lekh Pass for trade; Kathmandu immediately protested to both New Delhi and Beijing. Second, in November 2019 India published a new map that showed Kalapani within its territory. Third, India’s defence minister Rajnath Singh inaugurated a road link to Lipu Lekh amid Covid-19 and an ongoing political crisis in Kathmandu. Fourth was the statement by Indian Army Chief General M.M. Naravane, implying China had instigated Nepal to lay claims on the area.

We need immediate status quo in the Limpiyadhura triangle to help de-escalation between Nepal and India.

Nepal’s revised map an unfortunate attempt to artificially expand its territorial claims

Ashok Kantha
Former Indian Ambassador to China

I don’t see any provocation coming from India through construction of this road to facilitate Kailash-Mansarovar pilgrimage via the Lipu Lekh Pass. This area has historically been part of India which has been exercising effective control over it.

One may recall that the Lipu Lekh Pass was one of the border passes in the agreement on trade with Tibet, signed by India and China in 1954. In 1962, we closed the Lipu Lekh Pass, but in 1981, under a bilateral understanding with China, Kailash-Mansarovar pilgrimage was resumed through the Pass. In 1991, India and China restarted border trade across the Lipu Lekh Pass under another bilateral agreement. The alignment which our pilgrims and traders have been following for accessing the Pass has been made motorable now.

The Chinese have acknowledged the Lipu Lekh Pass as falling on the India-China boundary/LAC and signed agreements to conduct trade and pilgrimage with India through this pass. Limpiyadhura, which Nepal is now claiming, is on the India-China boundary, rather than Nepal-China boundary.

Nepal’s revised map is an unfortunate attempt to artificially expand its territorial claims. Perhaps this unwarranted move is linked to domestic politics, or it has been made due to nudging by China, or both. I don’t want to speculate. There are reports suggesting that China has been interfering in Nepal’s internal affairs, most recently through intervention by the Chinese ambassador to shore up support for the Oli government.

Nepal Prime Minister K.P. Oli is aggressively playing the China card against India

Kanwal Sibal
Executive council member, VIF, and former foreign secretary

Nepal publishing a map that shows Indian territory in the Kalapani area as belonging to it is highly ill-advised. It has created a situation from which it cannot step back. The diplomatic route to a solution has been jettisoned. India has summarily dismissed Nepal’s artificial claims to its territory. Nepal’s decision to
aggressively bring to the fore a sensitive territorial issue, which involves the route to Lipu Lekh Pass and the India-China-Nepal trijunction, is a serious provocation. It touches on India’s defence and security against China.

Nepal citing a new Indian map showing Kalapani in India to justify its decision distorts facts, as Indian maps have always shown this area as Indian. Intriguingly, China had similarly protested when India issued a new map showing changed internal boundaries in the north, after separation of Ladakh from Jammu and Kashmir. This suggests some Nepal-China connivance.

Nepal Prime Minister K.P. Oli, stubborn and unabashedly pro-China, is responsible for this development. He is playing even more aggressively the China card against India, which is an enduring feature of Nepal’s policy. He is mismanaging relations with India by adopting a virulent anti-Indian posture to help him in handling internal
dissensions.

Inappropriate to say China instigating Nepal against India. Nepal has border dispute with China too

Kamal Dev Bhattarai
Political editor, The Annapurna Express, Kathmandu

The Nepal-India border boundary dispute is becoming more complicated with more hardened positions being adopted by both sides. This is because of the lack of negotiations on time. For the longest time, both sides have recognised that there are boundary disputes in Susta and Kalapani. During Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Nepal in 2014, both sides agreed to instruct their foreign secretaries to take up the matter.

In 2015, India and China agreed to boost border trade via Lipu Lekh, without consulting Nepal. Nepal strongly objected to the move and sent diplomatic notes to India and China. China promptly responded, but India remained silent. China said that there was room for improvement, and if necessary, it was ready to revise the India-China agreement. Despite the understanding that it is a disputed territory, India took unilateral steps one after another, from releasing map in November 2019 to inaugurating roads which made matters worse.

The statement made by Indian Army Chief M.M. Naravane last week was totally inappropriate. Nepal is taking up border disputes with China as well. It is inappropriate to say that China is instigating Nepal. Instead, Nepal feels that two giant neighbours, India and China, are taking unilateral decisions on Nepali territory. Nepal has issued the new map Wednesday with sufficient historical proofs in hand, including the Sugauli Treaty of 1816.

As far as Nepal Prime Minister K.P. Oli’s coronavirus remark is concerned, I think he was trying to say that people who came from China and other countries showed mild symptoms, but people traveling from India possess strong symptoms. Still, what Oli spoke about virus and other bilateral issues was inappropriate. Immediate dialogue without any pre-condition is the only way forward.

India, Nepal never worked on the agreed mechanism to solve the dispute. Road ahead only gets difficult

Nayanima Basu
Diplomacy Editor, ThePrint

This is a case of misunderstanding between two friends who share open borders and free movement of people. While most of the border issues have been settled between both the countries, the disputed areas of Kalapani and Susta remained unresolved.

Both sides had an understanding that the issue had to be resolved politically. But that never happened. The matter was kept on the back burner for long, before the Narendra Modi government came to power in May 2014.

The high-level dialogue mechanism, consisting of foreign secretaries of both the countries, to settle Kalapani and other issues was finalised by then external affairs minister Sushma Swaraj during her visit to Nepal in July 2014. This was subsequently committed by Prime Minister Modi when he first visited the Himalayan country in August 2014.

However, the agreed mechanism never saw light of the day. The inauguration of the new road to Kailash Mansarovar and Nepal PM Oli’s statement Wednesday, has left the relations strained. Now, even if both sides meet, as India had promised to meet after the Covid crisis, not much room is left for any kind of compromise or maneuvering.

As relations with Nepal become strained, India is facing additional pressure from China now concerning repeated incidents of scuffles in the border areas.