Lt Gen KJ Singh (retd)

As India takes on Covid-19, I am reminded of a regimental health emergency we battled in April 1980. My roommate announced that he had caught viral infection, which had been reported in Ambala by a few others. His eyes had a distinct pinkish hue and were watering. It was fairly apparent that he had conjunctivitis. As it’s highly contagious, I tried to maintain social distance to the extent possible, in a shared room with beds 4 ft apart and a common toilet. I was doing Adjutant duties, and spending the maximum time in office was a good option. My roommate didn’t believe in concepts like quarantine, and despite being declared sick in quarters, his social forays continued.

Though this infection is limited to the eyes and is highly irritating, it tends to go away in a week. Over the next two days during PT and other regimental parades, it was distressing to see the infection acquiring a virulent form and jawans donning all kinds of sunglasses. My CO got it soon after, and even I was wearing goggles, notwithstanding the irritating infection, refusing to be declared positive.

Regimental Medical Officers (RMOs), due to a shortage of doctors, are rare to find, and invariably shared among units. Our RMO, Capt PK Ghosh, came directly from the medical college after his brief mandatory orientation. Trains those days normally ran six-eight hours late. He arrived past midnight, when a party was in full flow. Upon introduction, he was given regimental wisdom — Peekay (after drinking), one can become madhosh (drunk), but can’t be Ghosh. He readily imbibed not only this wisdom but also reasonable quantities of drinks, becoming a jolly good doctor!

The problem was serious as the RMO was on leave and Gurcharan, his assistant, was holding the fort. Regiments had no medically trained nursing assistants. Gurcharan had learnt it on the job. During a football match, I was forced to take stitches by him. My surgeon-brother saw them later and remarked that only a vet could display such expertise. No wonder, jawans called him neem hakeem.

Saturdays in the Army are utilised for interior economy, as ‘make and mend’ or administrative days. It was decided to extend it till further orders. The meagre stock of eye drops and painkillers, affectionately called ‘All Pain Cure’ (APC) were distributed. Regimental advisory was simple: avoid eye contact, a tacit form of lockdown. Next week, the regiment limped back to normalcy. Die-hard ones like my roommate continued to educate us on the criticality of eyesight, and even warned us of a relapse. Lockdown was becoming part of regimental DNA.

Realising this impasse, we passed simple orders — conjunctivitis is over and there is no relapse; shades are no longer allowed during parade; regimental PT and other parades to resume. One only hopes that life can be equally simple beyond the regiment, and similar orders can be passed — corona has been deported; rise and shine.

Jayadeva Ranade

President, Centre for China Analysis and Strategy

There is high anxiety in the upper echelons of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership in Beijing at the present state of China-US relations. Official Chinese think tanks have described China-US tensions as at a ‘dangerous’ turn and apprehend that relations could rapidly deteriorate further leading even to conflict. China’s leadership assesses that tensions have been sharply accentuated by the coronavirus pandemic and that the consequent worldwide rise in anti-China sentiment has been fanned by the US. The CCP leadership is divided, however, on whether it should make concessions in order to repair relations with the US.

Three Chinese think tanks recently analysed different aspects of US-China relations and issued their reports in late April. Affirming China’s need for good ties with the US, two of them recommended measures to arrest the slide in China-US relations and turn the anti-China sentiment, including in the US, in China’s favour. None recommended yielding concessions to the US, which would mean altering the assertive foreign policy being followed by Chinese President Xi Jinping, and neither suggested steps that might provoke the US. There were two prominent Chinese, though, who hinted through the Hong Kong media at ways to reduce tensions.

The suggestions of these two officials seemed to dilute the deadlines on aspects of China’s ‘Two Centenary’ goals — which include reunification of Taiwan with the mainland and establishment of sovereignty over the South China Sea. Chinese officials have traditionally resorted to publicising their own, or their patrons’, views that are controversial through the Hong Kong media which is read by senior cadres inside China. It is indicative also of serious differences within the top echelons of China’s leadership on whether to re-orient China’s foreign policy.

Reuters reported on May 4 that the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), a think tank of China’s Ministry of State Security (MoSS), had presented an ‘internal’ report to President Xi Jinping and top Chinese leaders in early April. It warned that Beijing faces a rising wave of hostility in the wake of the coronavirus outbreak that could tip relations with the United States into confrontation.

The report concluded that anti-China sentiment globally is at its highest since the Tiananmen Square crackdown and could fuel resistance to China’s Belt and Road infrastructure investment projects. Washington could also step up financial and military support for regional allies, making the security situation in Asia more volatile. The report said Beijing faces a wave of anti-China sentiment led by the United States in the aftermath of the pandemic and needs to be prepared in a worst-case scenario for armed confrontation. It added that the US aims to undercut the CCP by undermining public confidence.

A People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Daily essay on May 5, reinforced the CICIR’s assessment and described the bleak economic and political situation as having reached a ‘high explosive point’. It cautioned that major foreign powers could utilise the difficult global economic situation for gaining overall strategic advantage and use the economic crisis to cause a recession in China and provoke social upheaval. Advocating the need for financial and military preparedness, it warned that an economic crisis could cause a political crisis.

On April 24, China’s biggest government think tank, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) published in its China Social Science Journal a lengthy 3,152-character report analysing US media attacks against China during the Covid-19 pandemic. Published only in Chinese, it identified six main characteristics of the US media ‘slandering and denigrating China’ and said Beijing needs to prepare for future propaganda wars against China during major emergencies.

The CASS report recommended six steps for winning ‘public opinion battles’. Among them are: coordinating with government media, private media, diplomats, enterprises and think tanks to coordinate quick and effective counter-attacks; use all channels including social media and mobilise companies, think tanks, foreign scholars and experts who are ‘China-friendly’ to speak and write articles on foreign platforms; and hire and train people to write op-ed articles in foreign languages and ‘borrow’ think-tank experts and foreign journalists to edit Chinese state media abroad.

The so-called ‘private’ Beijing-based Minzhi International Research Institute, published an article on US-China relations on April 24. The think tank is important because it is headed by Prof Zhang Weiwei, a former Chinese Foreign Ministry official who has successively worked as a translator for then Premier Li Peng, Vice Premier Wan Li and Deng Xiaoping.

Asserting ‘there is no doubt that we can achieve a great renaissance and may even surpass the United States’, the article emphasised ‘senior Chinese officials are very clear-headed that they must improve Sino-US relations’ in which China has invested heavily.

The article discussed 12 ways of reducing anti-China influence in the US, including mobilising lobbies to influence government, and reducing ‘unnecessary’ panic of Americans about China. Panic, it said, will hamper China’s development and rise and ‘is very likely to harm our own fundamental interests.’

Many senior party cadres and officials in Chinese think tanks have since mid-2018 privately blamed Xi Jinping’s aggressive foreign policy for China’s growing international isolation, rapidly deteriorating relations with the US, and poor international image.

Any substantive effort to repair relations with the US would mean backtracking on the ‘Two Centenary’ goals, on which Xi Jinping has staked personal prestige and authority. It would imply reverting to Deng Xiaoping’s policy of ‘lie low, bide your time’. Xi Jinping is unlikely to quietly yield to inner-party opposition.

Manoj Joshi

Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

How must one deconstruct the ongoing Sino-Indian face-off along the Line of Actual Control (LAC)? Are events in Naku La in Sikkim and Pangong Tso, Hot Springs, Galwan Valley in Ladakh connected? Or do they have independent drivers? As usual, the answers are not clear, though we should be clear that the actions are about signalling, not making war.

If the events are connected, they are being directed at the theatre level and may have a larger purpose. But if not, should they not be seen as a part of the normal summer-time patrol rush? This is now more frenetic because both sides have improved their infrastructure and mount more patrols in areas where there is a difference of perception with regard to the LAC.

There is one problem with this thesis. Galwan, Hot Springs and Naku La have not been on the list of the 16-odd places along the LAC where there have historically been differing perceptions of the LAC and consequent ‘transgressions’. These have been addressed by a range of agreements with standard operating procedures laid down to prevent any escalation of tensions. Reports now suggest that the tension in Pangong and Naku La has died down. But the Galwan situation remains a puzzle.

First, let us enter a caveat. China does not have an independent media but India does. And it is important to always question official accounts. Media personnel have no access to the areas we are talking about—Galwan, Hot Springs, north bank of Pangong. What we know is what we are being told by some agency—maybe the intelligence, the Army, or the ITBP. In the past, their approach has sometimes been mendacious and quirky.

In 2009, there were a spate of articles in the Indian media charging China with violating the LAC. In September, ‘official sources’ said Chinese forces had intruded 1.5 km into the Indian side of the LAC near Chumar, and sprayed the word ‘China’ in red paint on many rocks there. In June, two Chinese helicopters had violated the Indian air space near Chumar. A PTI report reportedly based on confidential defence documents said Chinese helicopters entered the Indian air space in Demchok area and the Trig heights in north Ladakh, and air-dropped canned food, which were past their ‘use by’ date.

As for Galwan, India has wrought a qualitative change in the area by completing the Durbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldi road in April 2019. This is also known as the Sub Sector North road and has strengthened India’s posture in this strategic area greatly. The current stand-off was apparently triggered by India trying to build a branch of this road up to its own side of the LAC in the Galwan Valley.

Alarmist reports saying the Chinese have actually intruded into the Indian side area are difficult to accept, since the LAC is just about 10 km from the road. In any case, the Chinese already dominate parts of the road from the heights on their side of the LAC.

Forces in Galwan are separated by at least 500 metres, though the PLA movements seem designed to block further construction of the Galwan Valley road. But they are not into fist fights, as in the Pangong area; or face to face, as in Doklam. Perhaps this is a result of jangled nerves in the local Chinese HQ which has long been used to dominating the area, or a longer term calculation relating to defending Tibet in relation to growing Indian capabilities in eastern Ladakh and northern Sikkim.

A large part of the problem arises from the shifting Chinese stand on just where the LAC lies in the western sector, where their claims have always been somewhat murky. The Chinese claim line of 1956, reaffirmed by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1959, showed both Chip Chap and Galwan rivers flowing into the Shyok, outside their claim. In 1960, they expanded their claim and occupied the Chip Chap and Galwan river valleys. A similar move led to the occupation of Siri Jap on the Pangong Tso. Indians set up posts to counter them, but these were not tenable and wiped out in the 1962 War, after which China occupied another 5,000 sq km along the LAC.

There is a possibility that all the events — in Sikkim, Pangong, Galwan — have another driver: Covid tensions between the US and China. Last week, somewhat uncharacteristically, its outgoing top diplomat for the region, Alice Wells, said the tensions were a reminder of the ‘threat’ posed by China. She added that whether it was the South China Sea of the border with India, ‘we continue to see provocations and disturbing behaviour by China’.

Hit by Covid, and the economic disruption, the Chinese are rattled by the increasingly hostile US. In the past couple of months, temperatures in the South China Sea have been rising; now, US actions, triggered by the approaching elections, have pumped anti-China rhetoric to a dangerously high level. So, Beijing could well be doing some signalling, warning New Delhi to stay away from whatever Washington has to offer. The actions across the LAC could well be a signal to suggest that India, too, has many immediate vulnerabilities and getting involved in any US-led venture could be counterproductive.

Vappala Balachandran

Ex-Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat

Various theories are being proffered on the recent spurt in Chinese incursions, either directly or through third parties like Nepal. Some say that it is to pressure us during the forthcoming WHO-sponsored investigation on the origin of the coronavirus. Others say that it is due to the inner power struggle within the Chinese leadership.

In making a judgement, we should also take into consideration the traditional Chinese way of thinking that the past is a guide for the present and the future. We should also consider the predictable Chinese behaviour while facing, in their assessment, a ‘siege situation’. Hence, I feel that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s complaint on May 24, directed at America, has considerable significance for us. Wang Yi said that the coronavirus and global trade matters “are taking China-US relations hostage and pushing our two countries to the brink of a new cold war”. He added: “It’s time for the United States to give up its wishful thinking of changing China and stopping 1.4 billion people in their historic march toward modernisation.”

While dealing with siege situations in the past, we also witnessed Chinese anger spewing over those who are considered by them as proxies of their main targets. Thus, around 49 years ago, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger got an earful from Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai on July 10, 1971, for aligning with the Soviet Union, their main enemy at that time. Kissinger, who had come secretly with Pakistan’s help to Beijing to arrange President Richard Nixon’s visit to Beijing to start diplomatic relations, was taken aback by the Chinese fury during his talks lasting 17 hours. Zhou told him that a united US-Soviet Union-Japan axis could try to “carve up China”, but China would resist it by a protracted people’s warfare “engaging in a long-term struggle until victory.”

China also singled out India as the Soviet Union’s proxy by favouring ‘Nehru’s aggression’. He told Kissinger that China had built a road in 1951 connecting Sinkiang with Ali district in Tibet, through ‘their’ Aksai-Chin plateau. At Nikita Khrushchev’s instigation, Nehru started claiming this area from 1956 by using a British traveller’s map.

The December 1959 incident took place when India tried to capture the Chinese post in Ladakh. Khrushchev asked Tass to brand China as aggressor. In June 1959, he tore up the Soviet agreement on atomic cooperation with China. “He brought these two things — the Soviet support to India and the tearing up of the nuclear cooperation agreement with China — as gifts to Camp David.”

Kissinger made no attempt to correct Zhou who was chronologically wrong in regard to the Ladakh incident. Khrushchev visited the US for 13 days from September 15 to 27, 1959, as President Dwight Eisenhower’s guest. It also included their talks at Camp David. The Chinese aggression in Ladakh took place on October 21, 1959, in which they killed 10 CRPF men. None in India had imagined the intensity of the Chinese anger until these declassified records were published in 2002.

I was closely involved in the preparatory work on behalf of my organisation for the path-breaking visit of the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China during December 19-23, 1988. From then onwards, the Indo-China border was quiet till 1998. On May 13, 1998, the New York Times published the secret letter from Prime Minister Vajpayee to President Bill Clinton, giving our reasons for nuclear testing. Even now, none knows who had leaked it. However, it caused great embarrassment to India with no benefits from the US.

The letter said: “We have an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962… To add to the distrust, that country has materially helped another neighbour of ours to become a covert nuclear weapons state…”

China has another grievance against India. When Nixon visited China in 1972, their main anger was against the Soviet Union and also on India for not settling the border issues like other countries. The Chinese negotiating technique is harping upon the same points without any regard to truth or validity until the other side gets tired. Now, only India is left out as Russia finally signed the border treaty on July 21, 2008.

Their 4,300-km border had seen violent clashes since March 2, 1969, when the PLA killed 58 Soviet troops on a disputed stretch on Zhenbao Island on the eastern border. These clashes went on till March 17. Clashes broke out on the western border too on August 13, 1969 in which the Chinese lost 28 soldiers. In 2008, China claimed that Russians had conceded most of Chinese claims in the final round of talks. This involved land transfer of half of Heixiazi Island and all of Yinlong Island.

A Hudson Institute paper of August 1, 2008 said that despite persistent Russian prodding, China is unwilling to make major territorial concessions to India “so that all three countries might form an influential trilateral Moscow-Beijing-New Delhi alignment in Eurasian politics.”

The present BJP-led government has given sufficient indications since 2014 that their main foreign and security policy alignment is with the United States. We are also on board with the latest US policy of punishing China by diverting American companies to other countries, including India. Uttar Pradesh has been identified as the destination for such investments. In April, we also changed the rules to block the automatic route for approving FDI from China, which has been branded as discriminatory by them.

Thus, my 40 years’ study of the Chinese habit leads me to believe that they would hit at those who they believe are ‘accessories’ when they are unable to confront the main targets.

In recapitulating all these, I am only conveying that we would go seriously wrong in not understanding the Chinese mind. We would be equally wrong in convincing ourselves that these are temporary aberrations by their local army units or that the power struggle in China would enable us to ignore such border skirmishes.

India now has the dubious distinction of being the Asian nation with the highest number of coronavirus cases. At a time when the country ought to be devoting all its energies to containing the pandemic, it is constrained to keep an eye on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), where Chinese transgressions are growing by the day. Facing the prospect of international isolation over its handling of the Covid-19 crisis, China is busy throwing its weight around in the neighbourhood. ‘Chinese aggression’, the term often used for the 1962 war, is gradually acquiring a contemporary ring. At Galwan in eastern Ladakh, Chinese troops have positioned themselves 3-4 km inside the line indisputably claimed by India. Such brazenness has apparently not been witnessed in decades. China is also cocking a snook at the border pacts signed since 1993, including the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement of 2013.

A former Foreign Secretary, who also served as the chairman of the National Security Advisory Board, has stated that the Chinese actions could be a three-pronged warning to India: don’t join US-led China-bashing over Covid-19; refrain from backing the restoration of observer status to Taiwan in the World Health Organisation (WHO); and desist from steps that harm China’s economic interests. With India now heading the WHO’s Executive Board, and an inquiry into the origin of the lethal virus imminent, China seems keen on browbeating its neighbour into toeing the line rather than acknowledging the latter’s growing clout in the international arena.

The onus is on New Delhi to exercise restraint. Yet, this is also the time for resolute assertion of India’s interests. India’s priority is to tackle the unprecedented health and humanitarian crisis. In the tug-of-war between the US and China, India is merely guarding its own sovereignty. At the same time, it would be naïve of China to assume that it can plough a lonely furrow in the post-pandemic world. That’s where India has a chance to build on the success of the Wuhan and Mamallapuram summits and make China see reason. Bilateral cooperation, not one-upmanship, should be the way forward.

Deepankar Sharda
Tribune News Service
Chandigarh, May 25

For a legend as tall as Balbir Singh Sr, memories of his career were part and parcel of his everyday life. There was not a single day when he would not reminisce the good old times of his golden years as a hockey player and would love to talk about it whenever he had a chance.

“You are very young, I could make you sit on the same sofa for three days and talk about my achievements and what all my team has done,” Balbir was quoted as having said to a reporter during an interview on his 91st birthday in 2015.

A favourite of the media fraternity in the city, the hockey veteran never failed to amaze them with his sharp memory. He used to share numerous moments of his life — starting from his young school days to the journey of grabbing three Olympics gold medals. The cheery legend never did part with two things until the end of his garlanded journey — the hockey stick and his love for the nation. The other fascinating thing about him that everyone was fond of was his admiration for his team. “I am nothing without my team and country,” Balbir used to reiterate frequently. His love for the country largely descended from his father (Dalip Singh Dosanjh), who was a freedom fighter.On an odd day, he would not hesitate in criticising the authorities for losing the memorabilia he had handed over to the Sports Authority of India (SAI) in 1985 for a museum.

That included his captain’s blazer from the Melbourne Olympics, 36 medals and over 100 rare photographs.

Striker who wanted to be a goalkeeper

“I wanted to be a goalkeeper. But as destiny wanted, I got an amazing coach who forced me to play as a striker. I was poor in studies and my father decided to send me to Lahore. But the problem with my academics remained,” he had revealed during an interview. Perhaps, he was the only hockey player whose well-wishers approached the then Indian High Commissioner in London, VK Krishna Menon, after he was not selected for the 39-member probables squad during the 1950s.

“I’ve personally lost a good friend, the gem of Indian sports,” said legendary sprinter Milkha Singh after hearing of the death of three-time Olympics gold medallist Balbir Singh Sr this morning.

“It’s very sad. We joined the Punjab Sports Department together in 1960 and even my wife (Nirmal Milkha Singh) had worked under him,” Milkha said. “As far as my memory goes, we were part of the Indian contingent during the 1956 Melbourne, 1960 Rome and 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games. Apart from these major events, we were part of the Indian contingent in many Asian Games and other international tournaments.”

However, Balbir was not part of the team in the 1960 and 1964 Olympics, though he may have travelled there on his own.

“Balbir was one of the finest hockey players of India after Major Dhyan Chand,” Milkha said. “His contribution cannot be forgotten in decades to come. It’s so disheartening that his death came when the world is under a lockdown. He deserved a huge farewell. I just wish everyone in this country pays a tribute to the departed soul.”

Balbir Singh Sr and Milkha Singh, two of the greatest sportspersons of India, enjoyed such popularity during their heyday that it is said they did not require an appointment to meet Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Indian Prime Minister. “It is true. We could meet him at a short notice. He loved hockey,” Balbir had once said.

Hockey Chandigarh pays tributes to the legend

Meanwhile, Hockey Chandigarh secretary Anil Vohra expressed grief on the death of the hockey icon. “He was the lifetime president of Rock Rovers Hockey Club, one of the oldest clubs in Indian hockey. He will remain in our memories and his achievements will be an example to live up to for the coming generations,” said Vohra.

The UT Sports Department and the Panjab University Sports Department also paid tributes to Balbir Singh Sr

New Delhi, May 26

India will not stop infrastructure development projects in strategic areas along the nearly 3,500-km Sino-India border, notwithstanding China’s well-coordinated efforts to stall them by attempting to vitiate the situation in areas like eastern Ladakh, government sources said on Tuesday.

It is learnt that Defence Minister Rajnath Singh had conveyed to top military brass that there was no need for reviewing the implementation of any of the key projects along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh, Sikkim, Uttarakhand or in Arunachal Pradesh in view of the aggressive behaviour by Chinese troops in several sensitive areas.

Also read PM Modi meets India’s top military brass amid escalating border tension with China

In view of the nearly 20-day standoff between the two sides, the Indian Army has significantly ramped up its presence in sensitive border areas in North Sikkim, Uttarakhand and Arunachal Pradesh besides Ladakh to send across a message that India will not be wilting under any aggressive military posturing by China, the sources said.

They said Army Chief Gen MM Naravane had been briefing the Defence Minister about the fast-evolving situation in eastern Ladakh on an almost daily basis and it has been decided to put up a stiff counter to China’s transgressions into Indian areas along the LAC, the de-facto boundary between the two countries.

The Chinese side has been particularly peeved at India laying a key road in the finger area of Pangong Tso Lake region besides another road connecting the Darbuk-Shayok-Daulat Beg Oldie road in Galwan Valley.

Singh, on Tuesday, held a meeting with three service chiefs on the implementation of a wide range of reform measures in the armed forces. It is not immediately clear whether the situation in eastern Ladakh figured in the deliberations.

In the last five years, India has been focusing on improving road and other key infrastructure along the LAC as part of efforts to bolster military preparedness to deal with any challenge from the Chinese side.

The situation in eastern Ladakh deteriorated after around 250 Chinese and Indian soldiers were engaged in a violent face-off on the evening of May 5 which spilt over to the next day before the two sides agreed to “disengage” following a meeting at the level of local commanders.

Over 100 Indian and Chinese soldiers were injured in the violence. The trigger for the incident was China’s strong objection to the road being laid by India in the Finger area in Pangong Tso lake.

Also read: Govt should be more transparent on what is happening at border with China: Rahul

The incident in Pangong Tso was followed by a similar incident in North Sikkim on May 9. Since then, the Chinese military has increased its strength in Pangong Tso lake, Galwan Valley, Demchok and Daulat Beg Oldi, and is resorting to “aggressive patrolling” in these areas. The India Army was also carrying out a similar exercise in the region, sources said.

India last week said the Chinese military was hindering normal patrolling by its troops and asserted that India has always taken a very responsible approach towards border management.

At a media briefing, External Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Anurag Srivastava also strongly refuted China’s contention that the tension was triggered due to trespassing by Indian forces on the Chinese side.

India’s response came two days after China accused the Indian Army of trespassing into its territory, claiming that it was an “attempt to unilaterally change the status” of the LAC in Sikkim and Ladakh.

On May 5, the Indian and Chinese army personnel clashed with iron rods, sticks, and even resorted to stone-pelting in the Pangong Tso lake area in which soldiers on both sides sustained injuries.

In a separate incident, nearly 150 Indian and Chinese military personnel were engaged in a face-off near Naku La Pass in the Sikkim sector on May 9. At least 10 soldiers from both sides sustained injuries.

The troops of India and China were engaged in a 73-day stand-off in Doklam tri-junction in 2017 which even triggered fears of a war between the two nuclear-armed neighbours.

The India-China border dispute covers the 3,488-km-long LAC. China claims Arunachal Pradesh as part of southern Tibet while India contests it.

Both sides have been asserting that pending the final resolution of the boundary issue, it is necessary to maintain peace and tranquillity in the border areas.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping held their first informal summit in April 2018 in the Chinese city of Wuhan, months after the Doklam standoff.

In the summit, the two leaders decided to issue “strategic guidance” to their militaries to strengthen communications so that they can build trust and understanding.

Modi and Xi held their second informal summit in Mamallapuram near Chennai in October last year with a focus on further broadening bilateral ties. PTI

Sandeep Dikshit
Tribune News Service
New Delhi, May 26

The reason for the stand-off between troops of India and China on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh remains a subject of conjecture among foreign policy experts in the absence of any authoritative commentary from both governments.

At a regular press conference on Tuesday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson received no queries on the LAC stand-off, an indication that both sides would work out the issue away from public glare and commentary.

Quiet diplomacy

The reticence of External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar and Chinese Foreign Office comments on global issues but the LAC suggest quiet diplomacy is being given a chance

The Chinese side has generally withheld comments on the issue except for some observations by “The Global Times”. A regular commentator on India, Long Xingchun, wrote that most face-offs were resolved without the media getting to know about them. He, however, saw the face-off at the Galwan valley as having been planned by India in advance and cautioned that it could snowball into a confrontation worse than Doklam. The MEA has commented on the stand-off twice, on May 14 and May 21, and its Chinese Foreign Office once, that too briefly.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi did not touch on India at all during his 90-minute especially convened press conference on Sunday while External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar has also adopted a low profile on the issue.

Former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran as well as former Ambassadors to China Ashok Kantha and Gautam Bambawale are united in asserting that Chinese aggressiveness on the border is part of its pattern of pushing its advantage on territorial claims while the adversaries are engaged in Covid. This is also an observation made by top US diplomat for the region Alice Wells, who said the LAC stand-off was a reminder that Chinese aggression was not just rhetorical.

However with no word coming from the actual policy-making circles except for a few accounts of the stand-off, strategic experts too have been unable to foresee the end game.