Sanjha Morcha

What’s New

Click the heading to open detailed news

Current Events :

web counter

Print Media Reproduced Defence Related News

Indian army demands waterproof clothing as water flow increases in Galwan river

The Indian side is preparing itself for the possible long term deployment in the Galwan valley and other areas where the Chinese have deployed heavily along the LAC.

A road bridge built by India between Durbuk and Daulat Beg Oldi in eastern Ladakh (representational image) | Photo: ANI

A road bridge built by India between Durbuk and Daulat Beg Oldi in eastern Ladakh | Representational Image | ANI
New Delhi: As the water-flow has increased in the Galwan river, the Indian Security forces are now feeling the need for specialised waterproof clothing for the troops deployed there in a standoff position with China.

The Chinese side seems to have come prepared for the deployment as their troops deployed in the Galwan river valley bed are wearing water-proof clothes which allows them to step in the icy water there. “There is a need felt for specialised clothing for deployment alongside the river with ice-cold water as the water flow has increased in the river with the rise in temperature,” sources told ANI.

The Chinese side which has made camps all along the Galwan river valley up to near the Indian Patrolling Point 14 has come with specialised clothing where the lower portion of the combat dress is made up of waterproof material which allows them to step into the water, the sources said.

The Galwan river after originating from Aksai Chin passes through the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and merged with the Shyok river near Indian PP-14.

Earlier also while patrolling the area from KM-120 post to the PP-14, Indian security men had to step inside the river water which would wet their shoes, they said.
Sources said the special clothing with Chinese could have helped them in avoiding a higher number of hypothermia casualties during the Galwan valley clash on June 15 with Indian soldiers.

The Indian side is also preparing itself for the possible long term deployment in the Galwan valley and other areas where the Chinese have deployed heavily along the LAC.

All along the LAC from the Ladakh sector to Arunachal Pradesh, the Chinese Army has done heavy deployments and not showing any signs of thinning down despite holding talks at multiple levels with the Indian agencies.

The Chinese buildup had started around May 4 almost two months ago when they marched along the LAC to multiple points including the Finger area, Galwan valley, DBO sector, PP-15, Hot Springs and Ghoghra.

The Chinese have also been fortifying their positions and troops’ strength in areas where they have come and it is being perceived that they are using the time in talks for building up further.


Also read: Shut up and put up — What Chinese companies in India should do as Galwan crisis continues


22 Medium Regiment, which took part in 1962 war, completes 100 years of its raising

In the battle of Bum La and Nuranag of 1962, the regiment played a crucial role in the fight against the Chinese. The regiment also participated in World War I and II.

Victoria Cross Action by Havaldar (Later Honorary Captain) Umrao Singh of the 22 Medium Regiment, World War II, Battle of Kaladan Valley, Burma in 1944 | Source: Army

Victoria Cross Action by Havaldar (Later Honorary Captain) Umrao Singh of the 22 Medium Regiment, World War II, Battle of Kaladan Valley, Burma in 1944 | Source: Army
New Delhi: The 22 Medium Regiment of the Army, which played a crucial role in the 1962 war with China, has completed a century of its raising.

It was 100 years ago on 29 June that four oldest artillery batteries in British India — 22 (Derajat) Mountain Battery (Frontier Force), 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery, 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery (Frontier Force) and 7 (Bengal) Mountain Battery — were grouped to raise the artillery regiment as part of the then British Indian Army at Peshawar in present day Pakistan.

The regiment was initially named 8 Pack Artillery Brigade, but later renamed as 22 Mountain Regiment. The number 22 was taken from 22 (Derajat) Mountain Battery.

Lieutenant Colonel Alan Gordon Haig was designated as the first commandant, Army sources said, explaining the history of the regiment.

While the regiment has participated in World War I and World War II, besides others, one war that stands out, in which it took part, is the 1962 one with China.

“In 1962 war, the accurate fire by the regiment in battle of Bum La, defeated numerous Chinese attacks in support of 1 Sikh,” an Army officer said, adding that the men of the regiment engaged the enemy accurately in battle of Nuranag, including close-range direct engagements of enemy along with 4 Garhwal Rifles.

This is regarded as one of the fiercest defensive actions in the 1962 war.

“The regiment also fought hand to hand combat in the battle of Bomdi La against the belligerents. Twenty gallant men of the regiment, including three officers, were killed in action in this war,” the officer said.


Also read: 61 Cavalry isn’t just a ceremonial Army regiment, it played key role in Pakistan standoff too


Participation in 1965 and 1971 wars

In the 1965 war, the famous battle of ‘Ichhogoil Canal’ was fought under the leadership of Major General Mohinder Singh, Military Cross, first Indian Commandant of the regiment. He was awarded with Maha Vir Chakra during the 1965 operations.

During the 1971 war, the fire power of the regiment proved decisive in numerous battles, including the battle of Madhumati river and raid of Dhopakali. The war in Eastern Theatre commenced with the salvo fired by 7 (Bengal) Mountain Battery, as part of the regiment, the sources said.

In the period after 1971, the regiment has effectively conducted numerous counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations in Northeast, and Jammu and Kashmir.


Also read: Army plans to expand roles for elite special and airborne forces known for surgical strikes

 


Russia to deliver S-400 by 2021-end, but will supply missiles and bombs amid LAC tensions

The S-400 is capable of destroying incoming hostile aircraft, missiles and even drones within a range of up to 400 km. It has a tracking capability of nearly 600 km.

File photo of S-400 | Commons

File photo of S-400 | Commons
Text Size:  

New Delhi: India’s S-400 Triumf air defence system is currently in production in Russia and will undergo a series of trials before its arrival in the country by the end of 2021.

Sources said amid tensions with China at the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh, Russia will supply certain kinds of missiles and bombs for the Indian Air Force and the Army as part of emergency procurement.

Sources also said during the recent visit of Defence Minister Rajnath Singh to Russia, a review of all defence contracts signed and those in pipeline was done.

Diplomatic sources said India has sought emergency delivery of quite a few items.

They said India is aware that according to the contract, the delivery of the S-400 system would begin within 24 months from the payment of the first tranche of the $5.2-billion dollar deal.

Sources said even though the contract for the system, which will be India’s air defence umbrella and the main pillar of the Indian Air Force’s defence grid, was signed in October 2018, the payment took time because both countries had to find a way around the US sanctions against Russia.

Initially, it was expected that the first of the five S-400 systems will start coming in by the end of 2020. Following this, the rest of the four systems will be supplied over a period of four years.

“The production process involves a lot of computing and coding, which is very specific to the requirements of a particular customer. There are series of tests that are conducted, which are also followed up by training. The production can’t be simply sped up,” a source said.

 The source added it is not like in-use missiles, which can be diverted from Russian forces to India or any other customer.

Also read: Covid-19 pandemic won’t affect S-400 deliveries: Indian Ambassador in Russia


India keeps tight watch on Pakistan as ceasefire violations rise at LoC amid China standoff

According to govt figures, April, May and June (as of 25th) have seen 387, 382 and 302 ceasefire violations, respectively — a three-fold rise since 2018.

Indian Army (representational image) | Photo: PTI

Indian Army (representational image) | Photo: PTI
Text Size:  

New Delhi: India is keeping a close watch on Pakistan’s military activities as a massive rise in ceasefire violations has been witnessed at the Line of Control (LoC) this summer, even as a standoff continues between India and China at the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

According to available government data, the months of April, May and June (as of 25th) have seen 387, 382 and 302 ceasefire violations, respectively, this year. In the year-ago period, the respective numbers were 234, 221 and 181.

Compared to 2018, the violations are up nearly three-fold, with the corresponding figures at 176, 104 and 19, respectively.

The full-year ceasefire violation count was 3,168 in 2019 and 1,629 in 2018. In just six months this year, the LoC has already seen 2,215 violations.

Army sources told ThePrint that security forces on the LoC are active and the areas there have been under strict surveillance.

“The counter infiltration grid has been effective and infiltrations (which peak during summer months) have reduced substantially. Also, the terrorists are running out of weapons. The OGW (over ground worker) network has been compromised,” an Army source said, adding that the summer strategy has been effective.

“The LoC remains the priority area,” the source added, given that troops deployed in the Valley continue to remain there and the build-up on the LAC has been from the other reserve formations.


Also read: India, China repeat calls for phased de-escalation in 3rd round of corps commander talks


Summer strategy

The summer strategy involves redeployment of troops who are already present in Jammu and Kashmir, explained the Army sources.

Along the LoC, there are four divisions but they have got enhanced strength this summer with additional battalions and brigades. In addition, there are five Rashtriya Rifles divisions and reserve formations, which are deployed in the hinterland of J&K.

“Due to the terrain and heavy snow in winters, certain troops pull back from some posts and occupy the lower heights during winter and are staged forward on the LoC as the snow melts,” a second Army source said.

“Infiltration is difficult during the winters in the areas north of Pir Panjal, while in the Rajouri-Nowshera belt, there is an all-season scope for infiltration. In summers, the troop moves to the higher reaches in areas north of Pir Panjal, to dominate the routes of infiltration and effectively patrol the LoC,” added the source.

Data shows 47 terrorists have been killed in J&K until 29 June, while 18 and 28 terrorists were killed in May and April.


Also read: 118 militants, 11 of them Pakistanis, killed in 6 months, 48% dip in recruitment: J&K Police


Defence ministry approves purchase of 33 fighter aircraft for IAF, 248 indigenous missiles

IAF jets

IAF’s MiG-29 jets. Ministry of Defence has cleared the purchase of 21 MiG-29 aircraft (representational image) | Indian Air Force official website
Text Size:  

New Delhi: In a boost to the armed forces, the Ministry of Defence Thursday cleared the purchase of 21 MiG-29 and 12 Sukhoi-30 MKI fighter aircraft, besides 248 indigenous long-range air to air missiles, Astra, among others.

In total, the ministry cleared the purchase of platforms and equipment for the armed forces to the tune of Rs 38,900 crore. It has also approved the upgrade of the existing 59 MiG-29 aircraft for the Indian Air Force (IAF).

The approvals by the Defence Acquisition Council headed by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh come amid the two-month military standoff with China at multiple points along the Line of Actual Control in Eastern Ladakh.

Of the 248 indigenous Astra missiles, 200 is for the Air Force, and 48 for the Navy, and the estimated cost of their procurement is Rs 2,700 crore, sources said.

According to the ministry, the MiG-29 procurement and upgrade from Russia is estimated to cost Rs 7,418 crore. The Sukhoi-30 MKI will be procured from the state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) at an estimated cost of Rs 10,730 crore.

The approvals would also address the long-felt need of the IAF to increase its fighter squadrons, the defence ministry said in a statement.

Currently, the IAF has 30 active fighter squadrons of a sanctioned strength of 42 squadrons. Air Chief Marshal R.K. Bhadauria in an interview to ThePrint in May had said the depletion will be offset by deliveries of Rafale from France and the indigenous LCA MK IA, while a follow-up acquisition plan will start to recover the overall squadron strength.

The IAF would order Light Combat Aircraft (LAC) Tejas MK IA soon and expects deliveries to commence in three years, even as at least four Rafale fighter jets of the total 36 bought by India are scheduled to land in Ambala on 27 July.


Also read: IAF receives its first Rafale aircraft in France, to be inducted on 8 October


Indigenous acquisition of over Rs 30,000 crore

Stating that the approvals are in line with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s clarion call for ‘Atma Nirbhar Bharat’, the defence ministry said much of these approvals include indigenous acquisition to the tune of Rs 31,130 crore.

It said the equipment to be manufactured in India involves the Indian defence industry with participation of several MSMEs as prime tier vendors, emphasising that the indigenous content in some of these projects is up to 80 per cent of the project cost.

“A large number of these projects have been made possible due to Transfer of Technology by DRDO to the indigenous industry. These include Pinaka ammunition, BMP armament upgrades and Software Defined Radios (SDR) for the Army, Long Range Land Attack Cruise Missile Systems (a derivative of Nirbhay missiles) and Astra Missiles for Navy and Air Force,” the ministry said, adding that the cost of these design and development proposals is in the range of Rs 20,400 crore.

Pinaka is an all-weather, indirect fire, free flight artillery rocket system and consists of a rocket, multi-barrel rocket launcher, battery command post, loader-cum-replenishment vehicle, and digicora MET radar.

SDR is a secure indigenous system with legacy communication support and secure digital voice/data communication.

Astra missiles induction a ‘force-multiplier’

The ministry said the acquisition of new missile systems such as the Pinaka will enable raising additional regiments above the ones inducted.

The procurement of Long Range Land Attack Missile Systems having a firing range of 1,000 km and the induction of Astra missiles having Beyond Visual Range (BVR) capability will serve as a “force multiplier” and add to the strike capability of the Navy and Air Force.

ASTRA is a BVR class of Air-to-Air Missile (AAM) system designed to be mounted on fighter aircraft. The missile is designed to engage and destroy highly manoeuvring supersonic aircraft.

The ASTRA MK-I Weapon System integrated with Sukhoi-30 MKI aircraft is being inducted into the IAF.


Also read: IAF to buy 83 more Tejas fighters from HAL instead of foreign jets, CDS Rawat says


 

ThePrint is now on Telegram. For the best reports & opinion on politics, governance and more, subscribe to ThePrint on Telegram.

Subscribe to our YouTube channel.


India cautious of China on de-escalation at LAC, both agree on 72-hr observation window

File image of Indian soldiers in Ladakh | By special arrangement

File image of Indian soldiers in Ladakh | By special arrangement

New Delhi: India is being cautious of the de-escalation process at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China, and both sides have agreed on a 72-hour observation window to make sure that steps agreed upon have been taken on the ground, ThePrint has learnt.

The 72 hours’ timeframe has been decided on India’s request, sources said, adding that both sides will during this time satisfy themselves about the de-escalation steps agreed upon before moving ahead.

This decision, the sources said, was taken because while India had fulfilled the de-escalation commitment made at a meeting on 6 June, China did not do so.

Indians had observed that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had not lived up to the commitment that both sides would fall back by about 2 kilometres from their current positions at Patrol Point 14, which led to burning down of a Chinese tent in the Galwan Valley on 14 June, as reported by ThePrint earlier.

Another round of meeting between the commanding officers of two sides was held at Patrol Point 14 on 15 June, following which Col Santosh Babu had gone in the evening to check if the Chinese had removed the observation post near the Y Junction, about 1.5 km inside the Indian territory.

This resulted in the deadly clash, which led to fatal casualties on both sides.


Also read: If you don’t shoot, you don’t escalate: NSAB chief explains how India, China have avoided war


Not much of a change in ground situation yet

“The de-escalation will happen in a phased manner. During this process, there will be a 72 hours period during which both sides will make sure that the other has carried out the commitments made. Only then will the next round of de-escalation happen,” a source said, explaining the situation.

They added that there has not been any actual de-escalation since the third round of meetings between the corps commanders of the two sides Tuesday.

However, defence sources have maintained that the process will be long drawn.

The two countries had already agreed to follow some protocols, such as keeping a distance of at least 100 metres between patrols, desisting from ramming boats and vehicles into each other, avoiding confrontation, and disengagement in case of an eventuality.

Despite multiple rounds of talks at several levels, there has not been much of a change in the ground situation.

The sources said implementation of the understanding arrived at by the two sides is a real challenge on the ground.

Following the 12-hour meeting between the corps commanders Tuesday, sources had said they discussed the need for an “expeditious, phased and step-wise de-escalation”.


Also read: China ‘deploys’ S-400s, IAF has war gamed the scenario multiple times for air ops


 

ThePrint is now on Telegram. For the best reports & opinion on politics, governance and more, subscribe to ThePrint on Telegram.

Subscribe to our YouTube channel.


The mistaken Chinese calculation | Analysis Its economy is shrinking; PLA isn’t fully prepared; anti-China sentiment is high; India will be resolute

A mountain strike corps to create a deterrent capability is imperative

A mountain strike corps to create a deterrent capability is imperative(AP)

China has been uncomfortable with the emergence of another Asian power. Apart from checkmating proposals made by India at the United Nations and other global forums, Beijing has tried to contain New Delhi’s influence in the region. In a bid to throw a cordon sanitairearound India, China has focused on the countries in India’s immediate and extended neighbourhood. It has established a strategic partnership with Pakistan and deepened diplomatic, economic and military engagements with others. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)  has been leveraged for this purpose. China also employs both inducements and coercion. In the Indo-Pacific region, Africa and some other regions, China has unabashedly interfered in internal matters.

All emerging great powers tend to be aggressive to maximise their influence in the geopolitical arena. However, in the case of China, such behaviour seems premature. While China has made discernible strides in augmenting its comprehensive national power (CNP), there are still several internal and external challenges that continue to give President Xi Jinping sleepless nights. On the domestic front, these pertain to its economy, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s leadership, national morale, and the rising anti-China sentiment in the international domain.

China’s shrinking economy has generated widespread unemployment. The Chinese Communist Party (CPC)-driven policy of empowering State-owned enterprises has impacted the private sector that used to contribute over 65% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and more than 90% of new jobs. Moreover, the relocation of manufacturing, growing debt, and an ageing population that will shrink its workforce, will impinge on China’s economic stability in the long-term.

In 2012, Xi had announced the transformation of PLA into a world-class military, that would facilitate its journey towards the “world’s centre-stage” by 2049. Since then, multifaceted reforms have been undertaken to enhance its combat power and accountability to the CPC. However, Xi, who personally monitors the reforms, is unhappy with the professional standards of PLA leadership as it lacks practical war-fighting experience. Several think-tanks have assessed that at this juncture, PLA is well short of the capabilities required to challenge other militaries.

National morale is a crucial ingredient of CNP. China’s national morale should not be gauged by its captive media’s reportage and the diplomatic activism unleashed by its new brand of “wolf warriors”. Both are involved in countering the western and Indian media, besides marketing the Chinese model of governance and projecting Xi as a global leader. But beneath the surface, there is growing dissent against the CPC owing to the spike in unemployment, choked civil liberties and victimisation of all perceived detractors and minority communities. Xi’s heavy-handed approach in enhancing the CPC’s control is also creating dangerous undercurrents. As per open-source information, he had dismissed and imprisoned over 2.3 million officials between 2013-2018, including several senior PLA officials and bureaucrats.

Given these challenges, PLA’s adventurism in eastern Ladakh appears to be ill-timed and based on flawed assumptions. Perhaps, Beijing never expected a resolute politico-military response from India. India’s military build-up and posturing, along with the measures to hurt its economy and garner international support, will give Beijing the jitters.

India’s short-term strategy should aim at restoring the status quo ante along the Line of Actual Control through a combination of military and diplomatic negotiations. The use of force should be considered only after exhausting all possible non-kinetic options. While implementing a kinetic option, we must cater for the escalation, institute viable measures in the cyber domain, and also remain poised to thwart any adventurism by Pakistan.

India’s long-term strategy should be guided by its national interests, based on pragmatism. To minimise risk in the face of Chinese deception, the ends, ways and means must be aligned. The ends are the objectives that we wish to achieve vis-à-vis China. The means are the political, diplomatic, economic, military and information elements of national power along with other internal and external resources available to the government. The ways are the most efficient and effective options for the application of resources to achieve the objectives. The ways selected should not get influenced by any extraneous or parochial factors.

While garnering international support, India should incrementally exploit the economic pressure points against China and fast-track the initiatives to enhance its combat power and infrastructure development. A re-evaluation of the mountain strike corps to create a deterrent capability is perhaps a strategic imperative. Its application could be in the newly-created battle groups. I am flagging this issue as, during my official visit to China in July 2014, I had sensed PLA leadership’s concerns and anxiety on its raising. Today, India has the military capability to give China a bloody nose. However, the political leadership will also require large tracts of real estate across the border to enable post-conflict negotiations from a position of strength.

Since the development of the necessary combat power will take time, in the interim, it would be prudent to align with like-minded nations to balance the regional military power equations. However, this should be undertaken with due diligence.

To effectively deal with China’s hostile designs, the nation must stand united behind its soldiers, sailors and airmen. This will help sustain the highest levels of military morale, a sine qua non for victory.

General Bikram Singh is former Chief of the Army Staff
The views expressed are personal

PM Modi flies to Leh in signal to China, gets briefing at 11,000 feet on standoffs

The decision for PM Modi to visit Ladakh sector was taken last evening with National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval handling the last minute detailing with Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat.

Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat and Army chief General MM Naravane with Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Leh on Friday.

Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat and Army chief General MM Naravane with Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Leh on Friday.(ANI Photo)

In a closely guarded move, Prime Minister Narendra Modi accompanied by Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat and Army Chief Gen M N Naravane landed at Leh on Friday morning to review the tri-services preparedness against the aggressive People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as well as understand the proposed de-escalation and disengagement process at the four stand-off points.

The decision for PM Modi to visit Ladakh sector was taken last evening with National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval handling the last minute detailing with Gen Rawat. PM Modi, Doval and Rawat stood together to face the Chinese aggression in Doklam plateau in 2017.

PM Modi was briefed by the Northern Army Commander Lt Gen Y K Joshi and XIV Corps Commander Lt Gen Harinder Singh at Nimu Army headquarters near Leh.

The visit of PM Modi and Army brass will be a huge morale booster for Indian troops deployed in East Ladakh. With NSA Ajit Doval coming out of self imposed isolation, the Leh visit is a huge signal to China as it conveys how seriously does India view the stand-off with PLA.

Although the Ministry of External Affairs spokesman on Thursday called for expeditious dis-engagement from the border, the de-escalation process will take time with the PLA not in the mood to walk the talk between the two governments on ground. Despite talking about peace and dis-engagement, the PLA troop withdrawal from Galwan, Gogra, Hot Springs and Pangong Tso will take a lot of time and serious persuasion.

According to military commanders, the PLA continues to earmark its territory at all the stand-off points by physical deployment while undertaking superficial thinning in the rear by withdrawing a few vehicles and few men. The PLA stands amassed at Galwan River Valley and consolidated at Pangong Tso with massive infrastructure upgrade.

Faced with a recalcitrant adversary, the Indian Army and Air Force are fully deployed to prevent any further aggression from the PLA. The morale of the forces appears to be very high particularly after the June 15 flare-up at Galwan. “ We have no intentions of initiating any skirmish but any aggression from the other side will be fully repelled,” said a senior military commander.

With temperatures in East Ladakh and Tibet well over 20 degree Celsius and high velocity winds sweeping the region, air operations in the area are a challenge with weight limits being imposed during take-offs particularly in Russian origin platforms. While IAF will use the air bases in the plains in the worst case scenario, the PLA Air Force will have serious difficulty in operating from Tibetan Plateau. The coming days will also be a test of unproven Chinese air platforms, missiles and land systems as their battle worthiness has never been challenged.


CO leads from the front, every time

CO leads from the front, every time

Photo for representation only

Col Avnish Sharma (retd)

Colloquially, various entities in an Army unit derive their nicknames from the animal planet. The adjutant, who is the prime functionary responsible for running the unit, is called the ‘lion’. The quartermaster, the annadata, is the ‘panther’. The second-in-command, with his envious charter, is the ‘lamb’, and so on. The Commanding Officer (CO), who earns his stripes in the true sense, however, remains the enigmatic ‘tiger’.

On January 3, 1981, fresh from the training academy, I reported to my unit, then out on a tactical war exercise in the desert of Rajasthan. The moment our jeep entered the camouflaged camp, the sign-postings gave me a feeling of having entered a jungle abode. Arrowed signs spelt every prominent beast until I came across one indicating a tiger’s den, a dugout with an imposing camouflage net. Shy of embarking on a questioning spree immediately, I nonetheless asked the senior subaltern who this tiger was supposed to be. ‘Mister’ (a newly commissioned Second Lieutenant is addressed so), the CO is the tiger.’

During the battle run, where tanks fire live shells while on the move, the CO on his tank was the first to lead the fray, setting an example of fearlessness among the entire regiment. One of the tanks reported a live 105-mm shell stuck in the barrel of the main gun, a dangerous situation requiring precise and cool handling. There was a looming risk of the shell bursting in the barrel with the crew getting roasted in the 40-tonne cast iron. The CO took charge and personally ensured the defusing and unloading of the errant shell, displaying high standards of professionalism. A tiger, indeed!

It is the dream of every officer to don the mantle of a CO. Having experienced the exhilaration of being one, I am reminded of an incident that pushed me towards my goal amidst a highly competitive structure in the Army. We were in a major war exercise and were to link up with troops of another unit. ‘Balkar (his name tab read), what is the name of your CO?’ I, a Captain then, tasked to identify and guide the unit, asked the jawan from the incoming unit. The response was instantaneous, ‘CO saab.’ ‘What is his location?’ I insisted. He proudly thumped his chest, pointing to his heart, ‘CO saab yahan hain shriman.’ Such is the pedestal that a CO occupies among the rank and file of the thousand odd officers and men he commands.

The recent cases of the martyrdom by COs, an anti-terrorist operation at Handwara in north Kashmir, and the deadly brawl in the Galwan valley in Ladakh, has brought the office of the CO into sharp public focus. Yet again, as hitherto, through the ages, it gets demonstrated to our countrymen that he forms the backbone of the Indian Army — an apostle of raw courage and sacrifice.


Mechanised forces remain battle-relevant

There is a need to create an ecosystem for retrofitting and upgrading our tank fleet. The current production base is a combination of Avadi (Chennai) and Medak (Telangana). The new infrastructure for light tanks, armoured cars and retrofitting should leverage the available land and skill base in the vacant HMT Pinjore complex. It can be mentored by the DRDO labs in the vicinity.

Mechanised forces remain battle-relevant

est of grit: Ultimately, it’s the men behind the gun who make the vital difference, the superiority of the enemy’s arsenal notwithstanding.

Lt Gen KJ Singh (retd)

Former Western Army Commander

Satellite imagery has picked up a buildup of Chinese armour — medium and light tanks — in proximity to the Line of Actual Control (LAC). It is the operationalisation of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) concept, practised in mechanised exercises, in recent years. Manoeuvres have included a heavy drop of armoured vehicles, simulating the capture of passes. There are reports that the 6 Mechanised Division has deployed assorted AFVs (armoured fighting vehicles) — medium and light tanks — to leverage their coercive messaging potential, as part of psychological warfare.

At the outset, it will be appropriate to categorically state that India has adequate forces in a prepared and trained state, not only to take care of the threat but even cause criticalities for the Chinese. However, the PLA has more versatility in its fleet with the introduction of light tank, ZTQ, first fielded during the Doklam crisis. Our BMP-2s and ICVs (infantry combat vehicles) can be adapted to a limited extent for relevant tasks.

In the past few weeks, transport aircraft have been making repeated sorties to shore up our mechanised deployment in Ladakh. What is indeed baffling is that there have been discussions, questioning the very relevance of mechanised forces. The unfortunate truth is that it has become almost a compulsive habit to occasionally tinker with our force mix. Mercifully, a crisis jolts us out of such forays. It is also relevant that articles have appeared in magazines, in support of this exercise, sounding the death knell of tanks and calling for major cuts in inventory. Like the proverbial cat with nine lives, tanks have not only survived, but have a battle-winning presence, generating deterrence and psychological pressure, as is being felt in Ladakh.

The fielding of light tanks across the Zoji La pass in 1947 operations, Chushul in 1962 and PT-76 tanks of the 63rd Cavalry racing to Dhaka, are abiding examples of their relevance, provided commanders employ them boldly with imagination. Our armoured cars were in the vanguard in the Katanga (Congo) UN peace-keeping operations in the 1960s and later in counter-insurgency operations in the North-East. Tank battles of Asal Uttar, Basantar and Chawinda in 1965 and 1971 operations are proof of their potential.

One of the widely proliferated images of the ongoing standoff has been the Chinese Humvee type of patrol cars. Yet, we have chosen to eliminate light tanks and armoured cars, part of most modern armies, from our arsenal, citing a host of reasons. The primary justification has been budgetary constraints, especially in the past decade. Naturally, the guillotine has to fall on cost-intensive platforms. The other overriding factor has been a Pak-centric approach with excessive focus on proxy war.

Consequently, we have diluted our conventional options, which entail the use of mechanised forces. Such blinder- driven approach has meant that we are trapped in Pak’s preferred domain of hybrid war and lack deterrence against China. Our mainstay, infantry, has been denied the much needed protection. Ideally, it should have some proportion of lightly armoured vehicles for quick reaction teams, reconnaissance and commanders. A proposal for such vehicles was torpedoed within the Army in 2012, despite multiple screening and demand from the other two services. Considering that it takes six to seven years for the proposals to fructify, we are already pushed back. This proposal was revived and is now in its last stages. Interestingly, it was shot down on specious grounds that once mounted, the infantry would lose orientation, a gross under-estimation of their resilience.

The light tank has been another sad story and a part of the blame lies with the hierarchy of mechanised forces, who have felt that limited budget should be applied on medium tanks like T-90s, T-72s and indigenous Arjuns. Our current force mix in Ladakh and Sikkim can match the Chinese medium tanks— ZTZ-99 and ZTZ-96 (Types 99 and 96) — though in the long run, it will be appropriate to induct the T-90s. The only way to deter the Dragon is by upgrading our equipment profile. There is also a crying need to create an ecosystem for retrofitting and upgrading our tank fleet, as the prohibitive cost of replacement dictates a need for life extension, coupled with modernisation. The current production base is a combination of Avadi (Chennai) and Medak (Telangana). The logistics cost of transportation of equipment for overhaul to South India even when the platforms are deployed on the western and northern borders has been imposed due to parochial preferences. The new infrastructure for light tanks, armoured cars and retrofitting should leverage the available land and skill base in the vacant HMT Pinjore complex. It can be mentored by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) labs in the vicinity, such as the Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory (TBRL) and Snow and Avalanche Study Establishment (SASE), coupled with IIT Ropar and PEC.

The Chinese light tank, ZTQ, is a hybrid variant and essentially a lighter version of the medium tank, weighing 36 tonnes. It is equipped with low-pressure 105 mm gun and has 1,000 HP power pack. India should strive to field agile and versatile — air portable light tank, with missile and gun firing capabilities. It is an ideal platform for high altitude — Rann of Kutch, Siliguri corridor, riverine terrain, island territories and peace-keeping operations. Most importantly, it is crucial for quid pro quo options. It is learnt that some development work has been done by the DRDO and industry. There is also a possibility to optimise the hull (chassis) of K-9, Vajra self-propelled gun system. It will be prudent to quickly fix the qualitative requirements and initiate the project, in mission mode, synergising capabilities on work-sharing basis. If we can find partners like South Korea and Vietnam, it will be a new beginning.

Finally, notwithstanding the Chinese muscle-flexing, it’s the men behind the gun who make the vital difference. Our tank crews have shown their grit in operations and the most notable was overcoming the vast disparity between the Pattons and our Centurions in 1965.