Farmers organise ‘Kisan Conference’ at Talwandi Sabo on Baisakhi

BKU leader Joginder Singh Ugrahan addresses gathering during farmers’ conference on Baisakhi at Talwandi Sabo on Tuesday. Tribune photo: Pawan Sharma

Sukhmeet Bhasin

Tribune News Service

Talwandi Sabo, April 13

For the first time, farmers organised a “Kisan Conference” on the occasion of Baisakhi at Talwandi Sabo.

BKU Ekta-Ugrahan president Joginder Singh Ugrahan announced that he would continue his struggle for the rollback of ‘black’ agricultural laws introduced by the Narendra Modi government and “complete liberation from the imperialist plunder of the agricultural sector”.

He also announced that on April 21 a large convoy of thousands of farmers, youth and women from all over the state would again march towards Delhi under the leadership of union general secretary Sukhdev Singh Kokri Kalan and Jhanda Singh Jethuke.

He paid homage to the martyrs of Jallianwala Bagh. He said Modi government was acting like a puppet of domestic and foreign corporate houses. He said BJP government is trying to divide our farmers struggle on communal lines and establishing it only as a Sikh

struggle. The plans of the BJP also need to be defeated, he added.

He said Khalsa Panth was formed by Guru Gobind Singh to unite all the working peasants by abolishing the caste system to eradicate looting and oppression. He announced that a massive and forfeited march would be held towards Parliament in May to further the current struggle.

Another Sanyukt Kisan Morcha leader Balbir Singh Rajewal said that the farmers’ struggle which started from Punjab has turned into a mass struggle of the farmers of the entire country which is getting support from all sections of the people.

He said this historic peasant struggle had exposed the anti-people nature of the political parties. He said this struggle was between the people and the corporate houses of the country and abroad. Rajwal claimed that the Modi government had lost badly at the negotiating table.

Farmers leader Ruldu Singh Mansa, state president of Punjab Khet Mazdoor Union Zora Singh Nasrali, Kiranjit Singh Sekhon, DTF leader Resham Singh and employees leader Megh Singh Sidhu also addressed the gathering

Photo for representation.

Jagdalpur, April 13

A 59-year-old Chhattisgarh Armed Force (CAF) officer allegedly committed suicide by shooting himself with his service weapon in Bastar district on Tuesday, police said.

Kuber Singh, company commander of CAF’s 19th ‘Pokhran’ battalion, shot himself with his Insas rifle this evening at his unit’s camp in Karanpur village under Nagarnar police station limits, a senior official here said.

“When his colleagues heard the gunshot from his barrack, they rushed there and found him lying in a pool of blood. Singh was declared dead on arrival by doctors. Why he took this step is being probed,” he said.

He was a native of Chhatarpur in Madhya Pradesh but his family was currently staying in Bhilai in Chhattisgarh’s Durg district, the official said. PTI

Photo for representational purpose only

Washington, April 13

A top Republican Senator has urged the Biden administration to give CAATSA waiver to India, saying any plan to impose sanctions on New Delhi for buying Russian S-400 missile defence system would undermine its relationship with the US and also affect the QUAD’s ability to counter China. Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act or CAATSA is a tough US law which authorises the administration to impose sanctions on countries that purchase major defence hardware from Russia.

Senator Todd Young, a key member of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wrote in the Foreign Policy magazine that if the Biden administration imposed sanctions on India, it would not deter New Delhi’s purchase of the S-400 missile system from Russia, but would weaken two strategic fronts at a critical time — undermine Washington’s relationship with India. — PTI

What then are India’s options to protect its broader strategic interests, namely, keep the Chinese at bay. (Photo: AP)

The persisting stand-off with China must make India rethink its relationship structures both in the Asian and global context.  How is India geo-strategically placed currently? On its northern borders it confronts an aggressive China. On its western borders it is currently in a state of a partial thaw qua Pakistan. A melt that can again go back to a state of deep freeze at any point of time. On the east the strains with regard to the economic blockade of Nepal in 2015 still continue to linger. Bhutan is caught in the Sino-Indian cleft stick. Bangladesh, though reaffirming the centrality of India to its external environment, is both conscious of and eager to leverage the rise of China. Myanmar is in the throes of violent convulsions following a military coup d’état on February 1, 2021, that is having reverberations across the Indo-Burmese border as well.

Down south, the Rajapaksa administration in Sri Lanka still continues to bend to the Chinese wind. Relations with Maldives have definitely improved after Ibrahim Mohamed Solih ascended to office in September 2018. His predecessor President Abdulla Yameen foreign policy was most eloquently summed up by current Maldivian foreign minister Abdulla Shahid in the following sentence, “The mistake President Yameen made was to play India against China and China against India. That is a childish way of dealing with international relations; it will blow up in your own face.” However, Maldives’ debt to China that ranges from 1 to 3 billion USD should worry India, too, for Maldives’ GDP is only 5.46 billion USD in 2021. Things could easily go the Hambantota way. On balance it does not seem to be a very happy situation for India overall.

However, it is the reinvigorated “great game” in Afghanistan that could once again have a profound impact on the future of the region. As the Americans desperately attempt to sever the two-decade-old umbilical chord in Afghanistan, a deep void may open up in that country once more. Pakistan, Iran, Turkey China and Russia view this vacuum from their own strategic perch. India should also seriously evaluate what its hard strategic interests are in Afghanistan and then proceed accordingly.

Further west, the Saudi Arabia-UAE-Israel triangle is not going to have a free run of the Middle East and Gulf region as it did under the Trump Administration. President Joe Biden is seeking to pick up the threads of the Donald Trump aborted Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) colloquially referred to as the Iran Nuclear deal once again in Vienna through the E3+2 process

The JCPOA signed on July 14, 2015, was further endorsed by the UN Security vide Council Resolution 2231, adopted on July 20, 2015. President Trump unilaterally walked out of this arrangement on the 8th of May 2018 and reinstated sanctions against Iran.

The irony is that none of the Second Nuclear Age powers are party to the current process as they were not to the previous one either.

For India, the Iran situation is further compounded by the epic 25-year Sino-Iranian Strategic Partnership agreement signed on the 27th of March 2021 that envisages a range of investments by China into Iran in fields ranging from oil to agriculture. Interestingly, Iran metaphorically booted India out of the Chabahar-Zahedan railway link in the July of 2020, citing a lack of interest by the Indian side. If the Iran nuclear deal gets reinstated it would further expand Iranian influence in the Middle East.

Iran has been the biggest gainer of the ill-conceived American intervention in Iraq and the subsequent developments in the region post 2003. The US invasion of Iraq allowed Iran to create the Shia crescent encompassing Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, and embracing the Shia populaces in each of these countries. Anchored by Tehran, it spawns major surrogate satellites such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis, and southern Iraqi militias. A rejuvenated Iran in partnership with China having its own strategic interests in Afghanistan and profoundly averse to the growing Saudi-UAE-Israel-India bonhomie would be something New Delhi should watch closely.

India’s great power relationships are also far from rock steady. With Russia warming up to both Beijing and even Pakistan and the United States also requiring Pakistan’s help qua the Taliban to action the Doha deal signed between the US on February 29, 2020, things look rather messy for India.  

What then are India’s options to protect its broader strategic interests, namely, keep the Chinese at bay, guarantee that the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) in the Indo-Pacific open, not allow Afghanistan to become Pakistan’s strategic depth, insulate India’s energy security from the evolving dynamic in the Middle East and ensure that the “great powers” while acting in their own interests do not end up acting against India’s interests

One option that needs to be focussed upon among myriad others is to reengage with the European continent across the spectrum. This essentially from a strategic perspective entails an assignation with Nato (North Atlantic Treaty Arrangement) Conceived as a cold war construct in April 1949 to keep the Soviet Union at bay, Nato, over the years, has evolved both in its role and character.

An engagement does not mean that India should become a Nato adjunct or be designated as a Non-Nato ally by the United States. What it would mean is that India would be able to have access to both political and the military-to-military relationship with 30 odd European nations. Europe remains the neglected template that can still be leveraged by India to further its interests.

The experience and evolution of the Nato alliance over the past seven decades could provide interesting institutional pointers to New Delhi if it were to consider at some point in time in the future the possibility of turning the “Quad” between US, Japan, Australia and India into the linchpin of a broader Asian Nato.

Moreover, India’s engagement with Nato would also be a salutary signal to even Russia that, while India values the “special relationship of the erstwhile years”, it would not be averse to exploring alternative avenues, including alliance arrangements, if Russia’s relationships with China or Pakistan start becoming too close for comfort.

To the Chinese, the message would also be clear that its belligerence would only expand the hub and spoke US-anchored security architecture in Asia currently from Japan all the way downwards to Australia into a more multilateral framework with Nato as the foundational template. It is an idea whose time may have come.…Tags: india relationship structures, india geo-strategically, sino-iranian strategic partnership, investments by china into iran, broader strategic interests, indian bilateral relations

The concept of *Veterans Day* is fast gaining momentum in popularity and support amongst our civilian brotheren. It’s heartening to see Producer Mahima Sharma teaming up with Director Divyansh Ganjoo in bringing out an emotive 2min 30 secs Video to make more and more people aware of the Veterans Day and to garner respect for Veterans and Veer Naris.

Please watch this short but touching and lovely short film. *A MUST WATCH*

https://www.facebook.com/BastaFilms/videos/464201354575898/

US and Indian Navy ships during the Malabar exercise in 2020
by Sandeep Unnithan
The US Navy’s Seventh Fleet conducted what it calls a Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) drill through India’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) on April 7. A strong and unusually worded release from the US Seventh Fleet headquartered in Yokosuka, Japan, said that the destroyer USS John Paul Jones asserted ‘navigational rights and freedoms approximately 130 nautical miles west of the Lakshadweep Islands, inside India’s EEZ or continental shelf’ without requiring India’s prior consent, consistent with international law. (The EEZ is a 200 nautical mile belt of oceanic territory around a costal state.)
India’s demand for prior consent for military exercises or manoeuvres in its EEZ was a claim inconsistent with international law, the release said. The ministry of external affairs (MEA) response on April 9, two days after the US statement, said it had ‘conveyed its concerns regarding this passage through our EEZ to the government of the USA through diplomatic channels’. The MEA said that the government of India’s stated position on the UNCLOS (United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea) is that ‘the Convention does not authorise other States to carry out in the Exclusive Economic Zone and on the continental shelf military exercises or manoeuvres, in particular those involving explosives, without the consent of the coastal state. The warship was ‘continuously monitored transiting from the Persian Gulf towards the Malacca Straits’.
The US has used FONOPs over the past four decades as a way of asserting its right to sail through the EEZ of several coastal countries. It is the explicitly worded statement issued by the Seventh Fleet that has caused dismay in New Delhi. “To issue a press release is a change in approach and obviously a deliberate move,” says Lt General D.S. Hooda (Retd), former Northern Army Commander. It is this change that India will likely have to figure out in the days ahead. Could it be, for instance, a way of telling the Chinese that FONOPs are not China-specific but a principle that the US follows across the world, even with strategic partners.

While attention has been focused on the FONOPs that the US has used to challenge China’s expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea, what has gone unnoticed is a deliberate US policy to simultaneously conduct operational assertions through the EEZ of even close allies like Australia, Japan and South Korea. A study of the annual statements between 1992 and 2021 placed before the US Senate by the Department of Defence reveals only 10 occasions over the last 30 years that the US has not conducted ‘operational assertions’ through India’s EEZ. In the last such drill, in 2019, India was among 21 other countries, including Taiwan, through whose territorial waters the US sailed its warships.
The US Department of Defence identifies “excessive maritime claims” by coastal countries to unlawfully restrict the freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea as reasons for its FONOP drills. UNCLOS, which came into effect in 1994, recognises the rights of coastal nations to exploit the resources of a 200 nautical mile belt of coastline outside their territorial waters. The US is yet to ratify it as 168 other countries have, because of Section XI of UNCLOS which governs the mining of deep seabed resources. In 2010, India had petitioned the UNCLOS, asking for its EEZ to be extended from 200 nautical miles to 350 nautical miles, which would greatly increase the area for the exploitation of natural resources. This proposal has yet to be accepted.
Interestingly, the USS John Paul Jones, which left the Persian Gulf, also carried out a FONOP drill through the territorial waters of the Maldives. The US issued a similar statement on the FONOPs through the Maldivian EEZ. The US and the Maldives signed their first framework agreement last September. The agreement was signed by the deputy assistant secretary of defence for South Asia. Earlier, in 2012, the US had proposed a Status of Forces Agreement, or SOFA, with the Maldives. The SOFA was a precursor to the US stationing its forces on Maldivian soil. New Delhi was then not in favour of the agreement and it died a quiet death but is believed to now favour closer ties between the US and Maldives to checkmate China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean region.
“The irony is that the Chinese, who are signatories to UNCLOS, violate it all the time and the Americans, who have signed it but never ratified it, expect everyone else to stick to it,” says Rear Admiral Sudarshan Shrikhande, former ACNS Foreign Cooperation and Naval Intelligence.

The future of defence procurements will be certainly marred by the infamous Rafale deal, particularly the fate of 114 fighter jets for which request for proposal was already floated a few years back
Two issues struck me when I read a three-part investigative series put out by a French news website, particularly the last part, which allegedly exposes the role of an agent in the Rafale deal.
The first is the question of what should be done now. The Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2013, under which the deal was concluded, mandates that “all actions regarding procurement of any equipment are totally transparent and carried out as per established procedures” and makes it incumbent for the supplier “to accept our standard clauses regarding agents/agency commission, penalty for use of undue influence and Integrity Pact, access to books of accounts, arbitration and laws which would be incorporated in the contract.”
However, this wasn’t the case in the Rafale deal as per widespread revelations. This was expressly precluded by the last-minute removal of the anti-corruption prescriptions in the DPP 2013.
The second issue that arises is the long shadow that this present deal will likely cast on future defence procurement. The acquisition of 114 Medium Multi-role Combat Aircraft (MMRCAs) – for which the Request for Proposal (RFP) was floated a few years ago by the Indian Air Force (IAF) – is presently on the anvil.
Probe And Penalties?
When it comes to the question of what action should be taken in light of the Mediapart revelations, the answer is not very clear. If agents are found to have been indeed engaged by Dassault to clinch the deal after proper investigations (the company staunchly denies all allegations), what punitive action can be taken by the Indian government in the wake of the deletion of the anti-corruption clauses?
Can the Centre outright invoke the provisions of para 23.1 of the DPP, 2013? This para states that:
“The SELLER will also be debarred from entering into any supply Contract with the Government of India for a minimum period of five years. The BUYER will also have a right to consider cancellation of the Contract either wholly or in part, without any entitlement or compensation to the SELLER who shall in such event be liable to refund all payments made by the BUYER in terms of the Contract along with interest at the rate of 2% per annum above LIBOR rate for foreign vendors and Base Rate of SBI for Indian vendors. The BUYER will also have the right to recover any such amount from any contracts concluded earlier with the Government of India.”
Or, can the Centre seek access to the book of accounts of Dassault as per para 35 of DPP, 2013 by leveraging the ‘letter of comfort’ provided by the French government? This is rather unlikely, especially when the anti-corruption clauses have been expunged from the ambit of the supply protocols signed by India with Dassault and MBDA.
That being so, neither can any action be taken against any of the four principal French companies involved in the Rafale deal (Dassault Aviation for design and manufacture; Thales for electronic equipment; Safran for jet engines; and MBDA for missile weaponry) nor can they be debarred from future acquisition projects.
This complicates an already uneven playing field because beyond the 36 Rafale aircraft, it will inevitably raise many gnawing questions for future buys. As I noted in February 2019:
“For one, will this Rafale deal not impact on future benchmark price determination of fighter jets among different vendors that includes Dassault Aviation? Will Dassault not willy-nilly get a head start over other vendors in overall assessment/evaluation of future fighter aircraft RFP(s)? How contractually ‘correct’ and moral will that be? Will it not endow on Dassault an advantage vis-à-vis other competing firms, especially on India specific enhancements (ISE) (or by any other technical specifications these are spelt out in the Request for Proposal (RFP)) that lately have been much in the news and are said to be the vital elements in pushing up the cost of the Rafale deal beyond the cost of bare-bone aircraft?”
The issue here relates to the 13 India Specific Enhancements, which senior journalist N. Ram flagged in his January 2019 story in The Hindu:
“It was the National Democratic Alliance government’s acceptance of the cost of €1.3 billion claimed for the ‘design and development’ of 13 India Specific Enhancements (ISE), and the distribution of this ‘non-recurring cost’ over 36 instead of 126 bare-bones aircraft, that was the major reason for the big increase in price.
Dassault claimed a €1.4 billion cost for the ‘design and development’ of 13 India Specific Enhancements, that is, additional capabilities in the form of hardware as well as software that had been specified by the Indian Air Force all along, and this cost was negotiated down to €1.3 billion. What it meant was that the design and development cost, now distributed over 36 Rafale fighter jets, shot up from €11.11 million per aircraft in 2007 to €36.11 million when the deal was struck in 2016. [Emphasis supplied]”
If one were to say that the amount paid towards “design and development” is indeed the fixed cost for development of the India Specific Enhancements (ISEs), it logically would mean one thing: that the amortisation cost absorbed in the 36 fly-away aircraft (which, as per the NDA government’s decision, ought to have been spread across the 126 MMRCAs), and which, with the number shrunk to 36 pushed up the procurement cost per MMRCA in the 2016 deal, would be offset by no additional outgo from India’s public fund to Dassault for the fresh lot of 114 MMRCAs with the ISEs.
But that, paradoxically, would also have meant that the earlier procurement, in a way, sowed the seeds for Dassault to bag future MMRCA contract(s) – a kind of subinfeudation in the international arms bazaar – by giving the company an unfair and uneven advantage, in an uneven and unlevelled field, and with no matching competitors to generate competition and economise spending and set the ball in motion for eventual price discovery and benchmarking.
Questions For The French
That, in short, was bad enough. But the Mediapart allegations seem to have upset Dassault’s, even India’s, apple cart by adding another dimension — the need to investigate the company’s alleged payment to the agent who just two years ago was arrested in India for his involvement in the VVIP chopper scam.
The logical question is this: what if Dassault is implicated in the case for illegally engaging an agent and practicing unholy business practices proscribed by the DPP 2013? Can the government of India, despite waiving the anti-corruption clause from the body of the Rafale contract, implicate the company and refuse to entertain their RFI?
And, on the contrary, if they do go ahead, how will that action go down in the global defence market? Either way, it seems we are in a bind. But one thing seems fairly clear: the future MMRCA purchase will be at a far higher price mark, and India’s long and vaunted history of murky defence deal shall stand more sullied than before. Like one lie forcing another lie and yet another leading to serial lies, one serious departure from the prescribed integrity pact will not only spawn many more of its kind but will make India pay dearly in terms of loss of face and in more haemorrhaging of taxpayer money.

A report from the United States has claimed that nuclear-armed neighbours India and Pakistan might engage in a large-scale war unwittingly, even as they would like to avoid military hostility
The Global Trends report, released April 7 in Washington, noted: “India and Pakistan may stumble into a large-scale war neither side wants, especially following a terrorist attack that the Indian government judges to be significant.” The report is compiled by the U.S. government’s National Intelligence Council once every four years.
A similar report released by the Obama administration in 2017 had warned of a pandemic and a vast economic disruption as its fallout.
The report looks at the trigger for the potential war between India and Pakistan. It said the ability of some militant outfits to conduct attacks, New Delhi’s resolve to retaliate against Islamabad after such an attack and Islamabad’s determination to defend itself “are likely to persist and may increase” in the next five years.
It warned: “Miscalculation by both governments could prompt a breakdown in the deterrence that has restricted conflict to levels each side judges it can manage.”
The U.S. intel report also noted that such a war could translate into long-term economic fallout. It noted that “a full-scale war could inflict damage that would have economic and political consequences for years”.
The report further underlined that the U.S. policy in Afghanistan is likely to impact the neighbouring countries, especially India and Pakistan. “U.S. actions in Afghanistan during the next year will have significant consequences across the region, particularly in Pakistan and India,” it said.
This would be “especially true” if a security vacuum emerges in Afghanistan that results in a civil war between the Taliban and its Afghan opponents, expanding freedom of manoeuvre for regional militant networks, or criminals and refugees flow out of the country, it adds.
The report concluded that developments in Afghanistan would fuel political tensions and conflict in western Pakistan and sharpen the India-Pakistan rivalry.

PLA armoured vehicles retreating from the Pangong-Sa area in Ladakh
The 11th round of the Corps Commander talks at Chushul took place after almost a two-month gap
There was no visible forward movement at the latest round of military talks between India and China for disengagement of troops at the remaining friction points of Hot Springs, Gogra and Depsang in eastern Ladakh as the Chinese side did not show flexibility in their approach on this issue, people familiar with the negotiations said on Saturday.
A day after the 11th round of talks that lasted for 13 hours, the Indian Army said in a statement that both sides held a detailed deliberation on disengagement in remaining areas and agreed to jointly maintain stability on the ground, avoid any new incidents and resolve the outstanding issues in an “expeditious manner”.
The people cited above said the Chinese delegation came to the talks with a “premeditated mindset” and did not show any flexibility in moving forward on the disengagement process at the remaining friction points.
The Indian Army statement said it was highlighted at the talks that completion of disengagement in other areas would pave the way for considering “de-escalation of forces” and ensure full restoration of peace and tranquillity in the region.
The Corps Commander-level talks took place at the Chushul border point on the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh. The parleys began at around 10:30 AM and ended at 11:30 PM.
The people cited above said the Indian delegation, led by Commander of the Leh-based 14 Corps Lt Gen PGK Menon, particularly insisted on resolving outstanding issues in Hot Springs, Gogra and Depsang.
“The two sides had a detailed exchange of views for the resolution of the remaining issues related to disengagement along the LAC in eastern Ladakh,” the Army said.
It was the second high-level military talks between the two sides after disengagement of troops in the Pangong lake areas in eastern Ladakh in February.
“The two sides agreed on the need to resolve the outstanding issues in an expeditious manner in accordance with the existing agreements and protocols,” the statement said.
In this context, the Army said it was also highlighted that completion of disengagement in other areas would pave the way for the two sides to consider de-escalation of forces and ensure full restoration of peace and tranquillity and enable progress in bilateral relations.
“The two sides agreed that it was important to take guidance from the consensus of their leaders, continue their communication and dialogue and work towards a mutually acceptable resolution of the remaining issues at the earliest,” it added.
“They also agreed to jointly maintain stability on the ground, avoid any new incidents and jointly maintain peace in the border areas,” the statement said.
The border standoff between the armies of India and China erupted on May 5 last following a violent clash in the Pangong lake areas and both sides gradually enhanced their deployment by rushing in tens of thousands of soldiers as well as heavy weaponry.
As a result of a series of military and diplomatic talks, the two sides completed withdrawal of troops and weapons from the North and South banks of Pangong lake in February in line with an agreement on disengagement. India has been insisting that a resolution of outstanding issues including in Depsang, Hot Springs and Gogra is essential for overall ties between the two countries.
Late last month, Army chief General MM Naravane said the threat to India has only “abated” following the disengagement in the Pangong lake areas, but it has not gone away altogether.