Photo Courtesy: BKU Ekta Ugrahan Twitter page

Schedule of Kisan Maha Pachayats announced

New Delhi, February 12, 2021: Samyukta Kisan Morcha announced scheduled of Kisan Mahapanchayat. The organization also condemned the anti-farmer statements of the Prime Minister. Saying that many laws have been made in this country without demanded by people, the Prime Minister has proved that these laws have not been demanded by the farmers. Opposite to it, the government is not serious on fair and genuine demand of “Karja Mukti; Pura Daam”.

“The round of Kisan Mahapanchayats continues against farm laws. A massive rally was organized in Jagraon of Punjab today in which farmers, as well as other citizens, showed huge participation. Farmers also held panchayat on Shambhu border,” said farmer leader Dr. Darshan Pal.

Addressing from the stage, the farmers’ leaders on the Singhu border expressed their views on the implementation of the upcoming programs of the Samyukta Kisan Morcha. The farmers opposed the proposal of the Haryana government to install CCTV on Tikri morcha.

Kisan Mahapanchayats will be organized all over the country in the coming days. The teams of the SKM are planning the programs of the state-wise Mahapanchayats. Samyukta Kisan Morcha will not take back the protest until the repeal of three farm laws and legal recognition to MSP.

Schedule of some Mahapanchayats is given below
12 Feb – Bilari, Moradabad
13 Feb – PDM College Bahadurgarh Bypass
18 Feb – Raisingh Nagar, Sri Ganganagar Rajasthan
19 Feb – Hanumangarh, Rajasthan
23 Feb – Sikar, Rajasthan

New Delhi: Russian news agency TASS Wednesday claimed that “at least 20 Indian soldiers and 45 Chinese servicemen” were killed during the clashes at the Galwan Valley in eastern Ladakh in June last year.

In an article detailing the statement by the Chinese Defence Ministry on China and India withdrawing troops from the shared border near Pangong Tso lake, TASS said that “Chinese and Indian forces clashed in the region in May and June 2020, resulting in at least 20 Indian and 45 Chinese servicemen dead.”

The report also said that it is only after the ninth round of negotiations at the army commanders’ level that an agreement was reached for a simultaneous withdrawal of forces, which had increased to 50,000 on each side.

In June 2020, China had termed reports of more than 40 Chinese soldiers being killed in the face-off in eastern Ladakh as “fake news”.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian had said, “As for what you saw in the media, for example some people alleged that casualties on the Chinese amounted to 40. I can tell you for sure this is fake news,’’ he said, without giving any details.

China refused to reveal casualties

While 20 Indian soldiers were killed in Galwan Valley clash, China did not reveal its casualty figure. When asked at a webinar about reports from US intelligence which said the China’s People’s Liberation Army has suffered 34 casualties, Beijing’s Ambassador to India, Sun Weidong did not answer the question and said it would not help in improving the situation.

Since the clash at Galwan Valley on 15 June last year, China has declined to comment on the casualties. However, reports said that a Chinese army commanding officer was among those killed.

There were also reports putting a number to the deaths on the Chinese side. BJP leader Kapil Mishra, who has also been accused of inciting mobs prior to the Delhi riots, falsely claimed that 100 Chinese soldiers were killed. While an American weekly news magazine, NewsWeek, claimed that over 60 Chinese soldiers were killed in the clash with India.

China, Russia and India are all part of the group of emerging national economies called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).

lso read: How Indian Army’s secrecy & unorthodox deployment fooled the Chinese at Pangong Tso

China’s realisation that India won’t back down — that this stand-off could last longer than it calculated — was a key factor in forcing Beijing to agree to disengagement at Pangong Tso.

New Delhi: A grueling winter deployment resulting in higher Chinese casualties than Indian, Beijing’s understanding that New Delhi is not backing down, coupled with the upcoming 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party in July — these are believed to be the reasons why China finally came around to disengaging at Pangong Tso in Ladakh, ThePrint has learnt.

Government sources said the disengagement process, which began Wednesday, was not sudden but had actually been under discussion since September — the same month that the Indian and Chinese foreign and defence ministers met in Russia. Since then, the sources added, there had been several rounds of discussion during which both India and China eased their stands.

The proposal for a phased disengagement, sources said, actually came from the Chinese after a call was set up between National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister and State Councillor Wang Yi in July.

The call saw both sides agree to the “earliest complete disengagement of the troops along the LAC and de-escalation from India-China border areas for full restoration of peace and tranquility”, for the first time after tensions erupted in Ladakh in April.

When External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar subsequently met his Chinese counterpart Wang on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) foreign ministers’ meeting in Moscow two months later, both sides agreed to a step-by-step plan on “disengagement, de-escalation and finally restoration of status quo”, sources said.

Union Defence Minister Rajnath Singh formally announced Thursday that India and China have agreed to disengage at Pangong Tso, one of the three flashpoint areas in the ongoing stand-off — the others are Gogra-Hot Springs and the crucial Depsang Plains.

According to Singh, the agreement reached will see the Chinese soldiers retreat to east of Finger 8 on the northern bank of the Pangong Tso, which marks the Line of Actual Control (LAC). During the stand-off, the Chinese had moved to Finger 4. Indian troops will be based at their permanent base at Dhan Singh Thapa Post near Finger 3, he said, adding that a similar action will be taken by both sides in the South Bank area.

Experts in defence and diplomacy have greeted the development with caution — noting that disengagement may be a tactical move by China in the face of its deteriorating relationship with the US, they said India should remain “vigilant”.

Also Read: The LAC disengagement will ultimately lead to China giving up claims in northeast

Breaking stalemate

Over the course of the stand-off, India and China have conducted multiple rounds of talks at the military and diplomatic levels, but the stalemate, sources said, was finally tackled during the Corps Commander dialogue last month.

The stalemate was caused as India and China struggled to see eye-to-eye on how exactly to move forward with resolving the stand-off.

In September, China asked India to withdraw from certain crucial heights on the southern banks of the Pangong Tso — heights Indian soldiers occupied in an operation on the intervening night of 29-30 August that took the People’s Liberation Army by surprise.

India, meanwhile, insisted on disengagement at all friction points in Ladakh. However, the Chinese were not open to withdrawing from Finger 4, which they had captured in May 2020.

As the Chinese realised that India was not budging, sources said, China modified its proposal in October and brought in a plan for phased withdrawal. They said the PLA would withdraw from Finger 4 to Finger 5 and called for making Finger 4 a no-go area. This proposal, too, was rejected by India as it wanted the PLA to move behind Finger 8.

With the icy-cold Ladakh winter bringing temperatures as low as minus 20 degrees Celsius in November, China agreed to go behind Finger 8, sources said.

According to the proposal agreed to by both sides, the Chinese were to move back beyond Finger 8 and also remove all tents and observation posts set up in an 8-km area. Similarly, Indian troops were to move back to the Dhan Singh Thapa post, which is between Finger 2 and Finger 3.

After this broader agreement, the talks again went into a stalemate, and the next round of Corps Commander dialogue was not held until 24 January.

In the interim, India and China withdrew over 10,000 troops each from depth areas as part of a joint understanding while keeping soldiers untouched in forward locations.

Speaking to ThePrint, sources refused to get into the reasons for the stalemate. On 24 January, after talks lasting 16-and-a-half hours, the stalemate ended and both sides decided to go ahead with the disengagement.

Multiple talks were held at the local commanders level, sources said, to work out the nitty gritty of disengagement, which began Wednesday.

The row at the two other points — Gogra-Hot Springs and Depsang Plains — will take time to resolve, sources added.

Also Read: India, China begin fresh disengagement, but ‘trust deficit means it’ll be a long process’

Reasons for disengagement

Indian government sources said the Chinese had been keen to disengage before the winter set in, but India did not play ball.

According to them, Chinese troops were being posted to such forward locations for the first time and, contrary to belief that they were well-settled, the medical casualties were higher. The current stand-off marks the first time that India and China have deployed soldiers in forward areas in Ladakh during the region’s bitter winter.

Sources said the Indian operation in August had surprised the Chinese and they realised that India was not backing down and this face-off could last much longer than they had calculated.

Also on the Chinese mind, sources said, was the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party in July and the “image President Xi Jinping wanted to portray”.

Xi, sources added, could not have a situation where the Chinese celebrated even as the stand-off with India continued.

Also Read: Why India, China want to disengage at LAC, & how standoff has changed the strategic picture

‘India should stay vigilant’

M. Taylor Fravel, an eminent China scholar at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), said the two sides have been working towards this disengagement for quite some time.

“Although it remains early days, my view is that China is responding to the significant deterioration of US-China relations in the past year, and the way in which its international image has suffered in many countries, at a time when the party will launch the 14th five-year plan that is critical to its development goals,” Fravel added.

The 14th five-year plan (2021-2025) was unveiled by Xi in October 2020 at the fifth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

“The success of this plan requires China’s greater engagement with the world and thus greater stability and fewer points of friction with other states,” he said. “Thus, China seeks to prevent any further deterioration in ties with India and to prevent the risk of escalation that might upset its development plans.”

Former foreign secretary Kanwal Sibal said India should remain vigilant, noting that disengagement at Pangong Tso can resolve the present stand-off, but the fundamental challenge of defining the LAC remains.

“This is a period of interregnum because uncertainty in bilateral relations continues to prevail… Xi has a ‘certain vision’ of the world and he will continue to pursue it relentlessly,” he added.

“The latest move can be seen as a tactical move because China’s relations with the US will deteriorate in the times to come. Signals from the Biden administration are not going in Beijing’s favour,” he said.

The US Department of Defense Wednesday announced the creation of a 15-member China Task Force to reassert its vision for the Indo-Pacific, which America believes China is “seeking to overturn”.

Jayadeva Ranade, former member of the National Security Advisory Board and an expert on China, welcomed the disengagement but remained sceptical of China.

“I don’t trust the Chinese and I am sure the government and the forces also don’t,” he said.

The withdrawal is not sudden and had been a matter of talks for some time, he added. One will have to wait and see the reaction in China to the disengagement process because “that will be a factor in how China carries the process forward”, he said.

One main reason for Chinese disengagement is that Beijing never calculated that India will be willing to carry forward the stand-off for so long, Ranade added.

Also Read: How India and China resolved three major stand-offs in the Modi era

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh told the Rajya Sabha that India & China have agreed to disengage from the Pangong Tso area in eastern Ladakh. Read his full statement here.

New Delhi: Addressing the Rajya Sabha Thursday, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said India and China have agreed to disengage from the Pangong Tso area in eastern Ladakh and go back to status quo ante after nearly nine months of stand-off.

“I am happy to inform the House today that as a result of our well thought out approach and sustained talks with the Chinese side, we have now been able to reach an agreement on disengagement in the north and south bank of the Pangong Lake,” Singh said.

Giving details of the disengagement, the Defence Minister said the agreement that both sides have reached envisages that both will cease their forward deployments in a phased, coordinated and verified manner.

Read his full speech here:

Hon’ble Chairman,

The House would recall that I had made a detailed statement on the developments in the India-China border areas in Eastern Ladakh during the last session in September last year. I had highlighted that the Chinese side had since April/May 2020 amassed large number of troops and armaments in the border areas adjacent to Eastern Ladakh. It had also made several attempts to transgress the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in various parts. These actions of the Chinese side had been detected and appropriately responded to by our armed forces. The House and the Nation had also paid homage to the brave Indian soldiers who had made the supreme sacrifice and laid down their lives in the cause of defending the territorial integrity of India. I would today like to apprise the House of certain important developments since then.

Since last September, both sides have maintained communication with each other through military and diplomatic channels.  Our objective was to effect disengagement and maintain status quo along the LAC so as to restore peace and tranquility.

Let me briefly recapitulate the main aspects of the situation on the ground. As the House is aware, China illegally occupied approximately 38,000 sq. kms in the Union Territory of Ladakh, mainly during the 1962 conflict. In addition, under the so-called Sino-Pakistan ‘Boundary Agreement’ of 1963, Pakistan illegally ceded 5,180 sq. kms. of Indian territory in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir to China. China, thus is in illegal occupation of more than 43,000 sq. kms of Indian territory. It also claims approximately 90,000 sq. kms. of Indian territory in the Eastern Sector of the India-China boundary in Arunachal Pradesh. India has never accepted this illegal occupation of our territory or the unjustified claims.

I would like to add here that India has consistently maintained that while bilateral relations can develop in parallel with discussions on resolving the boundary question, any serious disturbance in peace and tranquility along the LAC in the border areas is bound to have adverse implications for the direction of our bilateral ties. The Chinese side is well aware of our position. In fact, various high level Joint Statements have acknowledged this point that maintenance of peace and tranquility along the LAC in the border areas is a fundamental premise for development of relations.

The actions by the Chinese side since last year have seriously disturbed peace and tranquility. Consequently they have also had an impact on the overall relationship. In our various high level interactions with the Chinese side, including in my own meeting with Chinese Defence Minister last September, my colleague the External Affairs Minister Shri Jaishankarji’s meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister and NSA Shri Doval’s conversation with his Chinese counterpart, we have made it clear that the foremost need was to ensure disengagement in all the friction points along the LAC in the Western Sector so as to help restore peace and tranquility.

I had apprised the House last year that there were several friction areas in Eastern Ladakh along the LAC. In addition, the Chinese side had mobilized a large number of troops and armaments along the LAC as well as in the depth areas. Our armed forces too had made adequate and effective counter deployments in these areas to ensure that India’s security interests were fully protected.

Over the last year, we have maintained diplomatic and military engagement with the Chinese side. In these discussions, we have maintained the three key principles that determine our approach: (i) both sides should strictly respect and observe the LAC; (ii) neither side should attempt to alter the status quo unilaterally; and (iii) all agreements and understandings between the two sides must be fully abided by in their entirety.  To ensure disengagement in friction points along the LAC, it was our view that troops of both sides, who are now in close proximity, should vacate the forward deployments made in 2020 and return to the permanent and accepted bases.

Hon’ble Chairman,

Our approach and strategy for negotiations with the Chinese side has been guided at the highest level by the Hon’ble Prime Minister’s resolve that we will not give even an inch of Indian territory. Our tenacity and approach during talks have yielded results.

Since September 2020, based on the policy guidance, military and diplomatic officials of both sides have met several times to work out a mutually acceptable solution for disengagement. Till date, there have been 9 rounds of meetings of the Senior Commanders of both sides.  Diplomatic talks have continued in parallel under the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC).

Hon’ble Chairman,

I am happy to inform the House today that as a result of our well thought out approach and sustained talks with the Chinese side, we have now been able to reach an agreement on disengagement in the North and South Bank of the Pangong Lake. It has also been a greed to convene the next meeting of the Senior Commanders within 48 hours after the complete disengagement in the Pangong Lake area so as to address and resolve all other remaining issues.

The agreement that we have been able to reach with the Chinese side for disengagement in the Pangong lake area envisages that both sides will cease their forward deployments in a phased, coordinated and verified manner.  The Chinese side will keep its troop presence in the North Bank area to east of Finger 8.Reciprocally, the Indian troops will be based at their permanent base at Dhan Singh Thapa Post near Finger 3. A similar action would be taken in the South Bank area by both sides. These are mutual and reciprocal steps and any structures that had been built by both sides since April 2020 in both North and South Bank area will be removed and the landforms will be restored. It has also been agreed to have a temporary moratorium on military activities by both sides in the North Bank, including patrolling to the traditional areas. Patrolling will be resumed only when both sides reach an agreement in diplomatic and military talks that would be held subsequently. The implementation of this agreement has started yesterday in the North and South Bank of the Pangong Lake. It will substantially restore the situation to that existing prior to commencement of the standoff last year.

13. I want to assure this House that in these talks we have not conceded anything. The House should also know that there are still some outstanding issues with regard to deployment and patrolling at some other points along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh. These will be the focus of further discussions with the Chinese side. We have agreed that both sides should achieve complete disengagement at the earliest and abide fully by the bilateral agreements and protocols. By now, the Chinese side is also fully aware of our resolve. It is therefore our expectation that the Chinese side will work with us in full sincerity to resolve these remaining issues.

Hon’ble Chairman,

I would like this House to join me in paying gratitude to our armed forces who have shown grit and resolve under these extremely harsh climatic conditions of Ladakh which has resulted in the present agreement. Our Nation will always remember the sacrifices made by our brave soldiers which has been the foundation of this disengagement at Pangong Tso Lake.

Hon’ble Chairman,

I am confident that this entire House, irrespective of political affiliations, is united together for upholding our sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and national security. And further, this House is one in sending out the same message demonstrating the strength and unity of our Nation to the entire world.

Jai Hind.

Also read: Breakthrough in Ladakh deserves cautious welcome

he showdown between Twitter and the Indian govt is another marker of how tough New Delhi can get. But as long as India keeps its Net space open, trying to block contrarian opinion and protest on these platforms is a bit like standing with an umbrella to avoid a tsunami. It’s a battle the govt cannot win, short of banning the site altogether. Twitter is an American company and threatening its employees has attracted criticism in Western media.

Saba Naqvi

Senior journalist

In a healthy democracy, the State is not afraid of the opinion of its citizens, be they critical of the regime. One of the classic signs of a backsliding democracy is the State seeking to criminalise or shut down amplification of opinions by those who disagree. From terra firma, the battle inevitably goes to cyber space these days.

The Indian government is currently in a battle with Twitter, the micro-blogging site with millions of subscribers. It wants to block 1,178 accounts that it says are propagating Khalistani content, in some instances backed by Pakistan. Twitter has made it an issue of free speech though it’s also begun capitulating and has reportedly blocked some 500 accounts, leaving those of journalists, activists and politicians. This is actually the first time that Twitter has taken a ‘free speech’ stance in India, possibly a result of changes in the US where it is headquartered and famously terminated the account of a sitting President Donald Trump this year, just before President Joe Biden took over.

In India, the Modi regime is faced with its biggest challenge in the ongoing agitation against the farm laws; it clearly wants to manage and counter the dissent and to do so is ready to take the battle into cyberspace. Because new media, such as Twitter, is hard to contain, supporters of the regime and prominent ministers have taken it upon themselves to shift to a made-in-India app called Koo and #BanTwitter was the hash-tag trending on, well, Twitter on February 10.

In a nation where demonetisation was abruptly announced and a national lockdown declared at four hours’ notice, it’s not impossible to imagine Twitter being banned. But it’s worth mentioning that the Prime Minister has the largest Twitter following of political leaders in office with 65 million (currently, former US President Barack Obama has the largest following in the world — 129 million). But ever since pop star Rihanna with 101 million followers (the fourth largest) put out a tweet asking “why aren’t we talking about this #FarmersProtest” along with a story about India cutting internet at protest sites, Delhi seems to have lost a certain balance.

The MEA reacted with an official statement, about “sensationalist social media hashtags’ and “poor understanding of facts”, thereby making a celeb tweet a matter of State concern. Since then, other international personalities have also tweeted about the farmers’ protest, illustrating clearly that you can’t shut down social media in an interconnected world. The counter campaign asking or compelling Indian achievers in cinema and sports to tweet identical words in support of the government’s actions was a poorly executed command performance.

The showdown between Twitter and the Indian government is another marker of how tough New Delhi can get. But as long as India keeps its Net space open, trying to block contrarian opinion and protest on these platforms is a bit like standing with an umbrella to avoid a tsunami. Organised protesters have prepared back-up Twitter IDs and intend to share information and opinion linked to the farm protest in accounts bearing other names. It’s a battle the government cannot win, short of banning the site altogether, akin to actions taken in nations that do not claim to be democratic. Twitter is an American company and threatening its employees with arrest has already attracted criticism in the Western media.

Beyond cyberspace, what is being done on the ground is to use the police to intimidate the media. Just look at the events of January alone: two journalists covering farm protests were arrested for allegedly obstructing police, FIRs were filed from BJP-ruled states against a total of 10 journalists and three Manipur journalists were arrested under the draconian UAPA for an opinion piece.

Conditions in Kashmir remain deplorable and the restoration of 4G Internet there was a reminder of how long people there were denied freedoms. This week, there were raids on the Delhi-based news website Newsclick that’s done several gritty ground reports on the farmers’ protest.

The assault on independent media is a sign of paranoia as it takes place in spite of mainstream broadcast media being overwhelmingly in support of all policies of the regime. Little wonder, India is slipping on the Democracy Index prepared by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). Last week, it slipped two places in the 2020 report to land at position 53 and therefore in the category of “flawed democracy”. In 2014, India was 27 in the rankings, but has been steadily moving downwards since.

More challenges await some citizens. Any Indian who has ever applied for a passport would know that there is a police verification required. The police in Uttarakhand have declared an intention of monitoring social media posts to see if passport applicants have “anti-national sentiments” which in the current climate may be a case of supporting the farm protests or being politically opposed to the state or Central regime. There is nothing in the Passports Act that supports this, but the police can certainly impede the process. Likewise, the regime of Bihar CM Nitish Kumar, himself a product of the JP movement, has threatened a similar sort of police verification to deny protesters a government job, financial aid from the state and a passport.

A democracy at its best represents all the people all the time. We have already created an election template where we get some of the people against another set of people and mobilise voter blocs to get adequate votes to win a seat in the first-past-the-post system. One section of India’s society is all too often treated as the enemy within. With the farm protests, we are labelling other industrious citizens as hostile inhabitants of the land.

The vocal section that sees the nation embodied in an individual or a party has ironically amplified its views through the very social media platform that the government would now like to censor. The government has consistently refused to call out hate speech or fake news peddled by accounts loyal to its ideological fraternity. Indeed, it is the right wing cause that has gained the most through social media campaigns and hash-tags.

New media has played a big role in changing the nature of discourse in the post-truth age. It has promoted the worst tribalism and prejudice, but it can also be used to counter them. Democracy is not about electoral conquest that culminates in the victorious regime treating all critics as enemies of the State. If that were indeed to be the permanent state of mind, India would fall into the category that the EIU Democracy index calls authoritarianism. If India bans Twitter, the long protest, the crackdown and the state of our democracy would invite further international scrutiny.

The reasons for the border dispute lie in the pages of history that show why an acceptable settlement is still a far cry, despite several Sino-Indian pacts. For China, there is Mao Zedong’s vision that saw Tibet as the palm of its right hand and Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh as its five fingers that China has to ‘liberate’. For India, it meant accepting Chinese claims.

At odds: China has been alarmed at the thrust laid by India in areas over which it claims hegemony. PTI

Maroof Raza

Strategic Affairs Analyst

The Chinese army is there to stay in Aksai Chin. This reality had become known to our leadership in the 1950s and so it is now — though admitting this fact will be seen as a mark of defeat — and hence the claims and counter-claims, even when the reports about China ramping up its military capabilities and infrastructure in Tibet continue to appear in the Indian media. The Chinese are past masters at giving assurances and then doing another thing on the ground. No wonder that our External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar had recently stated that “significantly, to date, we have yet to receive a credible explanation for the change in China’s stance or reasons for massing troops in border areas”. Furthermore, his comments at Vijayawada (as reported in the print media) indicated that not only had Chinese actions shown ‘disregard’ for the commitment to minimise troop levels, but also ‘a willingness to breach peace and tranquillity’.

The reason why China has resorted to this build-up, and would stay there as long as it takes, hasn’t been lost on the policy-makers at South Block. Thus, Jaishankar has said, “We know the reason why China amassed troops at the border and breached peace.”

The reasons lie in the pages of Sino-Indian history that show why an acceptable settlement is still a far cry, despite the Sino-Indian ‘agreements’ signed in 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2013. These did provide a clear direction, if there was a sincere desire to settle this long-standing issue. But in some ways, it is like the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. Neither side can be seen to be giving in, with so much at stake for their political leadership. For China, there is Mao Zedong’s vision that saw Tibet as the palm of its right hand and Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh (earlier NEFA) as its five fingers that China has to ‘liberate’. For India, it meant accepting the Chinese claims — as suggested by China’s Zhou Enlai in 1959 and 1960 — which would lead to charges of ‘horse trading’, as Nehru had put it, since all the territory that China claimed, “whether Arunachal Pradesh in the east or Aksai Chin in the west, were Indian,” states Zorawar Daulet Singh in his recent book, Power Shift: India-China relations in a Multipolar World. For many years even after Nehru had passed away, Indian diplomats were loyally hanging on to his legacy. This stand in due course has become an Indian article of faith.

Thus, despite the much publicised meetings between the leaders of India and China — Prime Minister Narendra Modi and CPC Chairman Xi Jinping — who had first engaged in 2014, and then following the standoff over Doklam in 2017, over structured summits at Wuhan in 2018 and then at Mamallapuram, near Chennai, in 2019, there were major Chinese intrusions across the LAC in 2014 and then in 2020. One reason was that the directions to their respective militaries, to have better and more frequent communication and strengthen the existing confidence building measures (CBMs), so that the special representative (SR) could “seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement to the border question”, were quite vague.

And so, there was room for (mis)interpretation leading to transgressions by troops on either side of the LAC, whenever the opportunity arose. But these were generally by patrols along the LAC or the McMahon Line, and were rarely entrenched intrusions, barring a few like those in 2013, in eastern Ladakh, before April 2020.

However, the absence of political drive to find a solution over the boundary disputes, especially after the 2013 Chinese intrusions in east Ladakh, and the 2017 Doklam stand-off, and a Chinese desire to position oneself at an advantage became more noticeable, with ‘nearly 75 per cent of the transgressions’ by Chinese troops taking place across the LAC, and only 20 per cent in India’s eastern front along Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. This makes it apparent that for the Chinese, the Aksai Chin area was ‘a valued piece of real estate’, and the Ladakh crisis could thus be explained as a ‘belated reassertion of China’s original claims over the area’.

What had brought matters to a head in 2020 — as China would’ve seen it — were several actions initiated by India in recent years. First, India’s effort to improve infrastructure — roads, bridges, tunnels and communication arteries — at various points along the Sino-Indian boundary. For years after the 1962 conflict, India hadn’t developed these for fear that better roads from the Himalayas onto the plains would aid an invading Chinese force to roll down! Then in July 2013, a decision was taken to raise a strike corps for the Indian Army in the eastern sector, with offensive (defence) capabilities to monitor China’s activities and have acclimatised Army units for rapid responses. But it was finally the Modi government’s decision to abrogate Article 370 of the Constitution — that gave J&K special status — and the creation of the Union Territory of Ladakh, and the call thereafter “to liberate 38,000 square kilometres of Aksai Chin” by no less than the Home Minister that contributed to China’s aggressive behaviour. These issues have been brought out in detail in essays in a recent book compiled by bureaucrat-turned-academic Shakti Sinha, One Mountain Two Tigers.

With talks leading nowhere, in early 2020, the Chinese army dramatically increased its presence in Aksai Chin, along the LAC as the snow melted, which India mistook as military exercises, even though there were substantially larger elements of tanks and artillery. Thereafter, Beijing made its intentions known. It was in no mood to pull back its army, and as it did in 1959-60. China then conveyed to New Delhi, that a solution to the latest boundary tensions could be found around the Chinese proposals of 1959. Is it time, therefore, for India to do a reality check?

China recognises that geography gives India special position in the Indian Ocean but has warned that the ocean is not its backyard. China’s Defence Papers have linked its national security and development interests. China buys most of its oil from the Middle East and access to ports in the Indian Ocean Region is among its economic and security priorities.

Anita Inder Singh

Founding Professor, Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution

Geography gives India a strategic edge in the Indian Ocean, but that is insufficient to counter China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), which stretches from Africa to Australia. Sino-Indian rivalry and New Delhi’s wish to balance China largely explain India’s offer to sell arms to countries in the IOR at the inaugural Indian Ocean Defence Ministers’ Conclave, held on the sidelines of the Aero India show in Bengaluru on February 4. More than 20 countries — from Madagascar to Singapore — attended the meeting, which focused on the enhancement of stability and prosperity in the IOR.

As an arms retailer, India will face tough competition from China. The world’s seventh largest arms vendor, China is already the top seller of weapons to several Indian Ocean states, including India’s friendly neighbours like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar. India ranks 23rd as an international arms seller. So, how realistic is New Delhi’s aim of selling $5 billion worth of arms in five years’ time? That is an open question.

Attempts by India and China to expand their influence in the IOR highlight the strategic and economic importance of the ocean’s international waters to both countries. Traditionally, India has regarded the Indian Ocean as its maritime sphere. Parts of the ocean comprise India’s territorial waters. Most of India’s trade by volume and all its vital oil imports traverse the ocean, so maritime security in the IOR is a strategic and economic imperative.

China recognises that geography gives India a special position in the Indian Ocean but it has warned that the ocean is not India’s backyard. Since 2015, China’s Defence Papers have linked its national security and development interests. The world’s largest oil importer, China buys 40 per cent of its oil from the Middle East, so the openness of the ocean’s seaways, access to ports in the IOR and the acquisition of a stake in them are among China’s top economic and security priorities. Throughout the IOR, China’s presence and influence have increased. Most countries in the IOR have joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative, presenting it with the opportunity to offer them both investment and military gear.

China’s naval strength in the Indian Ocean is greater than India’s. The People’s Liberation Army Navy is bigger than the Indian Navy and it can deploy more sea-based aircraft. India is safeguarding its interests in the IOR. The Indian Navy has significantly increased its deployment of warships, submarines and other assets in the IOR, in an attempt to send across a message to China. The extent to which India is able to deploy advanced technologies will have a bearing on its status as major South Asian and Indian Ocean power.

China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean reflects its wish to consolidate its role in the IOR and enhance its global maritime power. China has moved submarines, destroyers, special operations forces and guided-missile frigates into the Indian Ocean.

With most states in the IOR, China has strengthened its trade and investment ties. It has developed ports in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar and enhanced its influence in the region. It has also built its first overseas naval base in Djibouti in north-west Africa. Djibouti is strategically located at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, en route to the Suez Canal. The canal connects Asia to Europe and Africa.

The China factor also represents the most significant challenge to India’s politico-military strategy in the Western Indian Ocean. In recent years, China has strengthened trade ties with Middle East countries. Beijing is a major import-export partner of India’s friend, Israel. It is also Saudi Arabia’s largest trading partner and is helping to finance Riyadh’s ‘Vision 2030’ to help diversify the Saudi economy and transform Saudi Arabia into a major industrial powerhouse and an international logistics hub.

India must contend with the hard fact that it cannot take even friendly neighbouring countries for granted. Take the case of Sri Lanka. On January 15, about 10 days after External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar visited Sri Lanka, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa declared that because of regional security considerations — implying India’s suspicions of China’s clout in Sri Lanka — India’s Adani Ports company and its Japanese partners would build the East Container Terminal of Colombo port. But on February 2, Sri Lanka made the shock announcement that Adani Ports would not be allowed to develop the terminal because the “foreign company” did not agree to its proposals and because of opposition from trade unions. Some Indian officials see Chinese prodding behind Sri Lanka’s volte face. News of its U-turn came a few days after Sri Lanka received free anti-Covid vaccines from India. Good vaccine diplomacy is clearly not intertwined with success in port diplomacy.

China’s strengthening influence in the Indian Ocean goes against the Indian vision of an IOR where security rests on the balance of power rather than dominance by any single country — whether that is the US or China. This is a major reason why New Delhi has signed logistics agreements with the US, France and Australia to counter China’s naval presence beyond India’s immediate maritime neighbourhood. But to counter China successfully in the choppy waters of the Indian Ocean, arms sales, military strength and partnerships must be accompanied by more economic investment and trade with countries in the IOR.

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Kuldip Bhatia

Jagraon (Ludhiana), Feb 11

Not just farmers, but people from all walks of life attended Punjab’s first “kisan mahapanchayat” here on Thursday. Women too participated in large numbers. Enthused by the massive turnout, Sanyukt Kisan Morcha leader BS Rajewal claimed that the determination shown by farmers camping at Delhi borders had shaken the Modi government, “which is now trying to find a face-saving formula to wriggle out of the mess it created through the agri laws.”

Ready to amend laws, if need be: Centre

The Union Government is ready to discuss the new laws with farmers’ leaders with an open mind and to amend these, if necessary, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said on Thursday.

He said the agitation had “awakened” the entire nation and the global community too was keenly watching the developments in India. “The government is out to disband the mandi system by allowing free trade of foodgrain so as to leave the farmers at the mercy of big business houses,” Rajewal alleged.

He said farmers would hold candlelight marches on February 14 to pay tributes to the Pulwama martyrs and observe February 16 as “kisan-mazdoor day” in memory of Sir Chhotu Ram. Other leaders, SS Dharamkot, KS Sandhu, Manjit Dhaner, Nirbhai S Dhudike, HS Lakhowal and JS Ugrahan, vowed to take the agitation to its logical conclusion. Dhaner claimed it was no longer a farmers’ struggle. “With a majority of people backing the farmers, it has become a mass movement,” he said. Ugrahan exhorted the people to prepare for a long battle. “The government is trying to impose a globally failed model of agricultural system on the farmers. Over 80 per cent farmers, especially small cultivators, will lose their landholdings to corporates because of the laws” he claimed.

A series of ‘mahapanchayats’ have been held in Haryana against the farm laws.Three of these were addressed by BKU leader Rakesh Tikait, who has been spearheading the protest at the Ghazipur border for over two months.

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Tribune News Service

New Delhi, February 12

A day after Defence Minister Rajnath Singh told Parliament that India had not lost any territory in the LAC standoff in Eastern Ladakh, the Congress on Friday alleged that the government had ceded land to China saying the Indian territory between Fingers 3 and 4 had been ceded to China.

In a press conference at the AICC headquarters before leaving for his tractor rally in Rajasthan, Congress leader Rahul Gandhi accused the government of compromising the previous demand or status quo ante as of April 2020.

“There are a couple of things that need to be made clear. The government position at the beginning of the LAC standoff was status quo ante as of April 2020. Now, sheepishly the Defence Minister comes and makes a statement and we find that the Indian troops are going to be stationed at Finger 3. Indian territory was till Finger 4. Why has the PM ceded the land between Fingers 3 and 4 to the Chinese?” Gandhi asked accusing the PM of cowardice and of not being able to stand up to China.

Gandhi asked why the Chinese had not withdrawn from the Depsang Plains and the Gogra and Hot Springs areas.

Attacking the PM for not protecting Indian land, Gandhi said, “Why have the Indian troops after all the hard work they did capturing Kailash Ranges been asked to move back? Why have the Chinese not withdrawn from strategic areas?”

Gandhi said India didn’t have any strategic advantage during LAC discussions and the only proof of any advantage was when the Indian troops captured Kailash Ranges.

Even that had been lost, said Gandhi, asking the PM to explain the position and accusing him of betraying the valour of Indian troops.