Current Events :
Jagjeet Singh Grewal
New Delhi, July 20
When the UK’s biggest warship, aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth, arrives in India for an exercise, on board will be Indian-origin Jagjeet Singh Grewal. The warship and its accompanying strike group are to meet the Indian Navy for a series of maritime exercises this week. A leading engineering technician with the Royal Navy, Grewal works in the Marine Engineering Department. — TNS
Rs 43,000-cr project aims at indigenous production of advanced vessels
Within six weeks of having okayed a plan to make six next-generation stealth conventional submarines, the Ministry of Defence on Tuesday formally invited bids for the Rs 43,000 crore ($5.8 billion) project. – File photo
Tribune News Service
New Delhi, July 20
Within six weeks of having okayed a plan to make six next-generation stealth conventional submarines, the Ministry of Defence on Tuesday formally invited bids for the Rs 43,000 crore ($5.8 billion) project.
The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), the apex decision-making body of the MoD headed by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, had on June 4 okayed to issue a Request for Proposal (RFF). Today, the RFP was issued to selected Indian and global companies.
The RFP was issued to shortlisted strategic partners (SPs) or Indian companies — Mazagaon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL) and Larsen & Tubro (L&T), the MoD said. The MDL is largely owned by the MoD while L&T is a private entity.
The two Indian companies will collaborate with any of the shortlisted foreign submarine makers — Naval Group, France; TKMS, Germany; JSC ROE, Russia; Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering Co Ltd, South Korea; and Navantia of Spain.
A foreign manufacturer will tie-up with an Indian partner to make these submarines under what is termed as strategic partnership (SP) model. This is the first project on which this new ‘SP model” policy is being tried.
The project envisages indigenous construction of six conventional submarines.
Indian Navy has asked for the vessels to have a fuel-cell based Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) technology, which allows a vessel to dive for 12-15 days, much more than the 4-5 days of endurance of existing subs.
India at present has 17 submarines, including one nuclear powered INS Chakra on a 10-year lease ending March 2022. Meanwhile the US Department of Defence report ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020’ talks about a growing threat from China.
Officials in the ministry said the plan was yet to be made “fully operational” and, hence, the MHA recently sent a communication to these forces to update it about the development of software managing transfers and postings of the personnel.
Tribune News Service
New Delhi, July 20
The Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has asked the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs), including the CRPF, BSF, ITBP and SSB, to apprise it of the progress on creating an in-house software to implement Home Minister Amit Shah’s proposal to ensure troops spend at least 100 days a year with their families.
The idea was first mooted by the Home Minister in 2019 with an aim to provide rest, recuperation and quality family time to the forces’ personnel deployed in some of the harshest locations and difficult climatic conditions across the country. The purpose of such a move was to reduce stress and enhance the happiness quotient of the troopers, which will effectively reduce the cases of suicides and fratricidal killings.
Officials in the ministry said the plan was yet to be made “fully operational” and, hence, the MHA recently sent a communication to these forces to update it about the development of software managing transfers and postings of the personnel.
They said as per the plan, the software was going to be the precursor to “at least 100 days with the family per year” proposal. A considerable time has elapsed since the Home Minister gave the direction and the proposal is yet to see the light of day.
“It is envisaged that the digitisation of posting and transfer processes for soft, hard and very hard locations will eliminate personal bias and allow a free-and-fair system leading to easy rotation of the troops,” a senior MHA official said.
The over 10-lakh personnel strong paramilitary or the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) include the CRPF, BSF, ITBP, CISF and SSB apart from the Assam Rifles which draws its officer strength from the Army. Officials in the MHA said while the CISF, ITBP and the SSB have developed their respective software, the CRPF, BSF and the Assam Rifles are still in the process.
The tournament is being organised by the Leh-based 14 Corps.
Ajay Banerjee
Tribune News Service
New Delhi, July 19
The Army has chosen a unique location to organise the first-ever Siachen Cricket League to mark the 50 years of victory over Pakistan in the 1971 war. The tournament will be held at Nubra Valley, the base of Siachen glacier along the Line of Control (LoC).
50 years of war
The Battle of Turtuk was fought at this valley in 1971 when the Indian Army captured 800 sq km of Pakistan-occupied area in Gilgit-Baltistan and Turtuk, Dhothang, Tyakshi and Chalunkha villages, which is now part of India. The tournament is being organised by the Leh-based 14 Corps. Eight teams comprising youth from Nubra Valley are participating, said Col Emron Musavi, spokesperson, Ministry of Defence.https://5b61d4f9035cfb783507e4c133c74618.safeframe.googlesyndication.com/safeframe/1-0-38/html/container.html
Major Chewang Rinchen of the Ladakh Scouts had captured the territory without any artillery support and in below-freezing temperatures in December. He was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra. Major Rinchen and his troops had captured this vital territory as the Shyok river enters Gilgit-Baltistan from this valley.
The Northern Command is also commemorating 22 years of the Kargil conflict. A motorcycle expedition comprising 15 riders was flagged off by Lieutenant General PGK Menon, General Officer Commanding of the 14 Corps, from Leh on Monday. The expedition will be crossing the formidable Chang La and Khardung La passes at altitude of over 18,000 ft covering a total distance of 1,000 km from Leh to Daulat Beg Oldie (along the LAC with China) before culminating at Drass. The expedition will go past the Galwan flashpoint.
Supervisors gave hints via body language
The gang, which helped candidates cheat during the online examination for the post of airman in the IAF, had fixed special ‘codes’ to provide help to the aspirants. Photo for representation only
Sonepat, July 19
The gang, which helped candidates cheat during the online examination for the post of airman in the IAF, had fixed special ‘codes’ to provide help to the aspirants. The gang was busted on Saturday.
The gang members struck deals with officials at computer labs at 50 per cent commission per candidate of the total money they took from each of the candidates.
Inspector Anil Chhiller, in charge, CIA-3, said the accused had fixed some codes based on the supervisor’s body language to tell the answers to their paid candidates in the computer lab.
Before sending the aspirants to the lab for taking the exam, they trained them about the codes, he added.
“If a supervisor puts his single hand into his pocket, it means ‘A’ is the answer of the question. If he puts both hands in his pockets, it means that option ‘B’ is the correct answer. If he ties his hands at the back, ‘C’ is the answer. If he ties his hands at the chest, then ‘D’ is the answer. If he claps after rubbing both hands, it means go to the next question,” Chhiller said. —T
The MoD’s obsession with securing an ever higher percentage of indigenous content for its locally manufactured equipment is counterproductive, predicated as it is to the expectation that this would render it cheaper, thereby effecting savings. But no independent studies are there to corroborate this assumption.
Halting affair: Delay in modernisation hampers operational efficiency of the defence forces, which can compromise security. Reuters
The Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) interminable deadlines in concluding procurements of urgently-needed materiel is not at all surprising in a country that prides itself on timelessness and where the word for today and tomorrow — kal — is paradoxically the same.
The equally enigmatic timelines of parson and tarson — the day after or the third day or thereabouts — remain similarly nebulous when it concerns the MoD’s snail pace in concluding pressing defence equipment buys. This, in turn, adversely impinges on the military’s operational efficiency and its long-postponed modernisation.
Instead of swiftly vindicating its acquisition responsibilities within its own stated deadlines, the hidebound MoD expends inordinate effort in publicly iterating its revised procurement measures that, too, have sadly failed to deliver. Conversely, the services, too, continually stress their competence in formulating realistic qualitative requirements for assorted materiel they are seeking and in conducting timely trials for it.
But somehow, there is little that is tangibly achieved. It forced the MoD to abruptly execute Rs 20,000 crore worth of ‘emergency procurements’ last year when the Chinese military challenge erupted unexpectedly in Ladakh.
The list of projected military equipment under MoD negotiations is immense, but column space forecloses the option of tabulating even a fraction of these.
However, four long-pending procurements, which the MoD has frequently dubbed as ‘low-hanging fruit’, highlight the broader malaise of its Byzantine acquisition procedures, bureaucratic procrastination, financial constraints and allegations of wrongdoing in awarding contracts.
These include the Russian Kamov-226T ‘Hoodlum’ light utility helicopters (LUH) for the Indian Army (IA) and Indian Air Force (IAF), Kalashnikov Ak-203 assault rifles for all three services and heavyweight torpedoes (HWT) for the Indian Navy’s (IN) six licence-built Kalvari (Scorpene)-class diesel electric attack (SSK) submarines.
Negotiations for all these four have been going on for years, bedevilled by issues of cost and transfer of technology for local manufacture. These have recently been further complicated by the nebulous goal of securing atmanirbharta or self-reliance in defence equipment needs via a scheme that is still a work in progress.
Both the Ka-226Ts and Ak-203s were badly needed to fill operational voids, presently being managed through emergency imports or via creative jugaad or innovation, at a time when the military is facing enduring challenges on its disputed northern frontier. The Kamovs are also intended to replace the Army’s and IAF’s obsolete and accident-prone licence-built legacy, Chetak and Cheetah helicopters, dating back to the sixties.
The projected Ka-226T deal was initiated in 2014, following which the India-Russia Helicopters (IRHL) joint venture (JV) was constituted in which Russia’s Rostec Corporation had a 49.5 per cent stake and the state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) the remaining 51.5 per cent. The JV was projected to deliver 200 Ka-226Ts, of which 60 were to be directly imported, 40 locally assembled and another 100 built by the IRHL.
But over the past seven years, differences have emerged that threaten to imminently derail the Ka-226T programme. These include its overall cost and the quantum of technology Russia was willing to transfer to the IRHL. Besides, the per unit cost of 140 indigenously produced rotorcraft would be nearly double that of 60 similar platforms that are to be procured in flyaway condition. The price of each indigenously produced twin-engine Ka-226T via a technology transfer is estimated at around $11 million apiece, compared to around $6 million for one manufactured in Russia.
The same confusion prevails over the Ak-203 7.62×39-mm assault rifles project. In March 2019, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had inaugurated an ordnance factory facility at Korwa, near Amethi, to licence-build some 750,000 Russian Ak-203 assault rifles with collapsible stocks. The JV to implement the project followed an inter-governmental agreement between Moscow and New Delhi, in which the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) had a 50.5 per cent stake in the IRPL, the Kalashnikov group 42 per cent and Russia’s state-owned arms export agency Rosonboron export, the remaining 7.5 per cent.
The intent was for the IRPL to import some 100,000 Ak-203s for around Rs 81,000 apiece followed by the licensed production of the remaining 6,50,000-odd units. But again, price differences emerged. The Russians were reportedly demanding a $200 royalty per Ak-203 rifle produced by the JV, making it an astronomical licence fee of $130 million for 6,50,000 units, in addition to the cost of erecting the plant, the bulk of which would be borne by the OFB.
Furthermore, the OFB is believed to have cost each licence-built Ak-203 rifle initially at around Rs 86,000, amortised over time to average around Rs 80,000 per unit. Embarrassingly, the import of a repeat import order for 72,400 assault rifles from the US-based Sig Sauer in early 2019 was considerably cheaper. Hence, the Ak-203 rifle contract remains in limbo, compelling the bulk of Army personnel to field inefficient indigenously designed Indian Small Arms System (INSAS) rifles. Frontline units deployed on counter-insurgency operations were dependent on imported rifles.
The HWT requirement was even more operationally critical as the Navy has already commissioned three Kalvari-class submarines without the torpedoes, leaving the SSKs toothless. In 2016, the MoD had initiated moves to acquire alternates torpedoes, following the termination of the $300-million tender for 98 Black Shark torpedoes from Italy’s Whitehead Alenia Sistemi Subacquei (WASS), but no progress had been made.
In conclusion, the MoD’s obsession with securing an ever higher percentage of indigenous content for its locally manufactured equipment is counterproductive, predicated as it is to the expectation that this would render it cheaper, thereby effecting savings. But no independent studies are available to corroborate this assumption. The three measures needed to achieve better results — composite indigenisation policy focused on major equipment and platforms, an overarching organisation to coordinate these efforts and an adequate funding mechanism — are missing.
Besides, the MoD continues to function more like an industry-development agency, rather than fulfilling its primary responsibility of developing India’s military capability speedily within the available financial resources. This obligation entails undertaking difficult and opportune decisions to resolve hold-ups, which, somehow, the MoD seems unable or unwilling to accomplish.
Central Asian countries are standing by the government
Together: It’s vital for everyone to keep their nerve and take on the challenge. Reuters
The US walked away from Afghanistan in the dead of the night. That was an understandable manoeuvre to prevent any Taliban grandstanding attack on them. Instead of the dramatic photos of the evacuation of the Saigon embassy, all we have as a visual is a frame of the detritus of the American civilisation left behind in Bagram, their biggest base.
The developments in Afghanistan pose an agonising challenge for India. Since 2001, it has operated in the country, mainly in executing development programmes under the US/NATO security umbrella. Now the latter have walked away, and we along with many others are scrambling for a strategy.
India would be advised to measure its steps carefully. Minus security, it cannot, obviously, operate the way it did for so long in Afghanistan. India hardly has the capacity to take up the US burden. Indeed, there could be a good argument for simply walking away from the whole mess. It would be a cold-hearted decision, but the situation there is not of our making, and we have been tertiary players anyway.
For more than a decade after defeating the Taliban, the US discouraged any Indian military involvement in Afghanistan, deferring to the primacy of Pakistan in its calculations. By the time the US got around to accepting the need for Indian military assistance, the situation had deteriorated significantly.
The Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) was constituted in the early 2000s and in the first decade, the US and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was careful in limiting its size and capabilities so as not to offend Pakistan. Unlike regular militaries, they were deliberately kept deficient in artillery and air power. They were viewed as a support element whose primary task was counter-insurgency.
Since 2012, when President Obama spent just six hours on a visit to Kabul, it has been clear that the US would leave Afghanistan. Even though it signed a strategic partnership agreement with Kabul at the time, it did not quite spell out what that meant in terms of financial and military commitments.
In 2013, President Karzai turned to India to provide artillery and military transport aircraft, but New Delhi, too, balked, not wishing to annoy Pakistan. As per a strategic partnership agreement signed in 2011, India had promised to assist in the training, equipping and capacity building of the ANSF, but hesitated in supplying the equipment. In 2015, India did begin a programme that led to the Afghan Air Force getting eight Mi-35 attack helicopters.
In the past decade, however, the US and the ISAF put in a systematic effort to build up the ANSF. But their goal was to train a force with counter-insurgency capability, and not the capacity to militarily disrupt or block the Taliban supply chain leading to Pakistan.
Since 2014, the US began providing some artillery, helicopters and armoured vehicles, but the ANSF’s biggest weakness is in the air force. The US has limited their close air support capacity to some 20 A-29 Super Tucanos and 10 AC-208 Cessna. These are light fighters and can be lethal for the Taliban, without worrying Pakistan. However, there are simply not enough of them. The bigger problem the ANSF faces is in maintaining this equipment.
There is little point in crying over spilt milk. The US and ISAF could have done better, and so could India. All is not lost. If the ANSF is crumbling in parts, the Taliban, too, are not the kind of force that fought in the 1990s. The surge of attacks we are seeing are essentially psychological warfare, aimed at paralysing the ANSF and the government in Kabul. It is important for everyone to keep their nerve and take on the challenge.
It would be foolhardy to underestimate the Taliban. But the ANSF are numerically superior to the Taliban, and perhaps through trial and error, they will find their own set of strategy and tactics and let go of those taught to them by the Americans and the NATO. What they need is unambiguous support.
As of now, the US has promised to provide $3 billion to support the ANSF, which is about 75 per cent of its requirement. The Europeans, too, need to spell out their commitment. Countries like India can play an important supporting role in assisting the Afghans in ensuring the serviceability of their equipment and training their personnel.
Geopolitically, too, things are not bleak. All the Central Asian countries are standing by the Afghan government. The Chinese, too, have cautiously expressed their support for Kabul. Turkey has said it is willing to have its forces defend the Kabul airport.
Perhaps the most important player here can be Iran which shares a large border with Afghanistan, and through whose Chabahar port, India can access the country. The recent visit of External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar to Tehran is not without significance here.
A Taliban Afghanistan is not a threat to Kashmir. Afghan jihadis have been there earlier and failed. India needs a strong, stable and independent Afghanistan to prevent Islamabad from being tempted to use the country as its ‘strategic depth’ area.
Contrary to the popular adage, history does not usually repeat itself. There is no certainty that the Taliban will prevail in Afghanistan. If the US and NATO countries step up with financial assistance, which they can easily provide, effective regional diplomacy and Afghan determination can lead to another, more positive outcome for the unfortunate country.
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh. PTI file photo
New Delhi, July 19
The government on Monday informed the Rajya Sabha that in the past three financial years it had accepted the necessity for 119 military equipment making proposals worth Rs 2,15,690 crore and these are to be made domestically.
Acceptance of necessity is a technical term used by the Ministry of Defence, it defines the first stage of the proposal.
The information was part of the written answers the Ministry of Defence submitted to querries of MPs. The reference was the period commencing April 1, 2018, to March 31, 2021 — that is three financial years.
According to the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP), priority has been accorded to capital acquisition and significant projects, including 155 mm artillery gun system “Dhanush”, bridge laying tank, thermal imaging sight for T-72 tank, Light Combat Aircraft Tejas, Akash surface to air missile system, submarine ‘INS Kalvari’, ‘INS Chennai’, anti-submarine warfare corvette (ASWC), Arjun armoured repair and recovery vehicle, landing craft utility, etc have been produced in the country under ‘Make in India’ initiative of the government in last few years.
In response to another question, the MoD said it had been decided to earmark an amount of Rs 71,438 crore for procurement from domestic sources out of the total allocation of Rs 1,11,463 crore acquisition. — TNS
Our force structure has to be specific to our requirements and cannot be based on any external model
by Lt Gen Daljeet Singh, PVSM AVSM VSM (Retd)
Recent comments by the CDS General Bipin Rawat and the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal RKS Bhadauria has kickstarted a series of debates and discussions on different platforms on issues related to the Theatre Commands proposed to be set up in the country. Several highly respected defence experts have expressed their views on issues related to reforms at the higher command structure in the Indian armed forces. These debates and discussions have articulated varying aspects, contradictory at times. There is however a common thread that binds them together. All agree that future conflict scenarios are going to be different from those of the past. Optimisation of force capability in an effective manner, in time and space, is going to be a battle winning factor. Such optimization needs to incorporate cutting-edge technologies to the extent possible. It is also an accepted fact that the current force structure of the armed forces warrants a review and consequent corrections made to effectively orientate the nation’s force capability towards the present and future national security demands. The main issue for discussion therefore is to analyse and identify the way forward in an effort to go about such force organisational and structural reforms.
A look at the past efforts at force modernisation would be an essential first step in such endeavours. Post the conflict with China in the early 1960s, several measures were put in place to upgrade, modernise and expand the nation’s armed forces. Results of these efforts were visible in the 1965 war with Pakistan and even more effectively during the 1971 war. Incidentally, the latter is one of the most successful campaigns in the history of warfare worldwide. It was swift and more effective than the Yom Kippur war of 1973. Several lessons at the operational and strategic levels, the level at which we are planning to restructure, must be revisited and extrapolated to the present and future context. Similarly, our operations in Sri Lanka and the Kargil War should be evaluated and the rights and wrongs taken a note of.
Throughout the 1970s, 1980s and to the present day, there have been continuous efforts towards modernisation of our armed forces. Excellent recommendations were made by highly respected military leaders of the day. These include the post Kargil and political-level studies too. However, for several reasons they were not implemented in their entirety. In the process, some modernisation did take place but it was not sufficient enough to cause a change in the basic philosophy of operations. These upgradations thus got absorbed into the existing doctrine. At best piecemeal and partial reforms served to improve and make the execution of the existing doctrine more efficient. The basic doctrine remained unchanged. The very purpose of modernisation was thus defeated. Economic aspects played a major role in this state of affairs. There was just not enough money to carry out the recommended changes. An important lesson, we must undertake only those reforms that the nation can afford and optimise our force effectiveness from within that. Affordability is an essential input.
It would not be out of place to conclude that the present doctrinal outlook of our armed forces is somewhat dated. Probably that is the reason behind the efforts aimed at the creation of the theatre commands and may also be the logic behind the statements of the CDS and the Air Chief.
Based on the theories of war enunciated by the likes of Clausewitz, who drew his conclusions from the Napoleonic campaigns and later by military thinkers like Liddell Hart and Fuller, many wars have been fought successfully all over the world and over time in the past. However, the foundations of these theories have undergone dramatic changes. Perhaps we have not been able to keep up with such changes. The very aim and purpose of war has changed. Capture of territories, carving out nations and countries and so on are not possible anymore. The aim and purpose of use of violence today is to get a people and a nation to conduct themselves in a desired manner or face consequences. Look at Balakot from this perspective. India sent a strong message to Pakistan through the application of precise destruction power with little collateral damage. The message was clear and needs no reiteration except that it was backed by a firm will and perceivable capability to escalate if required. Attrition therefore has given way to coercion. No longer is war conduct of policy by other means as enunciated by Clausewitz. It is a now an integrated effort between the political masters, armed forces, diplomats, economic factors including the security of financial markets and last but not the least media including social media.
As a result, many new terms have come up that do not find a mention in the classical theories of war. Economic embargos, collateral damage, peace keeping, peace enforcing are only examples. Use of media as a force multiplier has moved to its use as a weapon of war. This was effectively employed by Ho Chi Minh during the Vietnam War. He managed to bring a nation as mighty as the US to its knees. His target was not the US forces on ground but the minds and psyche of the people of US. What followed is history. Closer in time the Arab Spring that shook the Middle East in 2011 is another example of the power of social media. One can thus conclude that the basic concepts have moved from nations at war to people at war. This is one lesson the Americans learnt the hard way in the Middle East. No longer is it enough to overrun a nation state and set up a desired governance system. The people that make up the target nation are equally important. So much can be discussed about this aspect, but it would be best to conclude here that destructive power can only go that far and no more. The sphere of warfare has expanded.
Information technologies have become central to the nature of future wars. Maybe it is because of this understanding that China has spent a major effort to catch up with the US. As a result, today the US has lost its ability to practice IT hegemony the world over as it has been doing here to fore.
Put together, warfare has moved radically away from the old notions of armed conflict and moved away from military power fighting military power. It has permeated across people, moved into space and outer space and sunk itself into all aspects of a nation’s affairs. A first look at recent operations the world over would serve to highlight the present nature of expression of military power by nations. The recent exchanges between Israel and Hamas, the US Seal operation deep into Pakistan to liquidate Osama Bin Laden and our own surgical strikes deep inside Pakistan in response to the Uri episode and Balakot as mentioned earlier. Add to this the increasing role of drones, the availability of precision guided missiles and counter systems and one will get a clearer perception of future conflict scenarios. We have not cranked in nuclear, chemical and biological aspects here. The Israeli raid at the Entebbe airport in 1976 to rescue hostages is a good example of such operations highlighting the vast and diverse nature of such missions. It all boils down to a measured application of destructive power to achieve the desired effect, send a message, so to say, to the target population and nation. This does not render the conventional force capability redundant. Far from it. The conventional capability is equally important as a backup and reinforcing strength to above operations. In our case a strong conventional capability for reason alluded to later, is an imperative must. In effect the nation has to take the ground realties into consideration while designing its force structure and capability.
Complete integration and cohesive force capability, not only within the armed forces but at the national level is an absolute must for achieving such missions. The Indian armed forces have demonstrated such capability from within the present structure twice successfully in recent times. The aim must now be to further enhance capability through a refined doctrine, introduction of cutting edge technologies and above all nurturing their greatest asset, the soldier. The vast and diverse nature of such operations envisages extreme flexibility and adaptability in all its connotations and at all levels. To say that one service is organised and structured to support another is a dated concept. There may be missions where the Air Force supports Army operations, while at other times the Army may be called upon to support Air Force operations under varying circumstances. The Army, Navy and the Air Force must become an integral part of mission-oriented force capability. The lower the level at which such integration is effected, greater will be force cohesiveness, while higher levels of integration would result in greater flexibility in employment of resources. The planners will thus need to strike an appropriate balance and levels of integration and flexibility. These are no doubt conflicting requirements.
Efforts aimed at creating an effective and pertinent force composition and orientation must begin at the highest level of the nation. The political masters should define the tenets of the nation’s security concerns and national interests. It is on these basic enunciations of national security doctrine and strategy that the armed forces can draw their own military doctrine and design their force structure accordingly. The armed forces cannot do so in isolation by themselves. Several allied aspects would need to be factored into this process. India has a major commitment of military resources in fighting insurgencies in different parts of the country. It has thousands of kilometres of border which is not recognized internationally. These areas have to be guarded round the clock. The troops doing so need to be supported; some in very hostile environment. Such aspects need consideration and taken a note of.
The US has an organisational structure based on theatre commands. They have divided the world into theatres and structured their commands and military presence accordingly. Another aspect is that in over 200 years of independence the US has been at total peace for approximately 15 to 20 years only. Rest of the time it has been in conflict with someone or the other in some part of the world. India on the other hand is a peace-loving nation and is focused only on its own national security. Our requirements are specific to our own security concerns. Our theatre commands will have to be orientated on these. Thus, our force structure has to be specific to our requirements and cannot be based on any external model. Of equal importance is our force location and infrastructure to support likely operations. The armed forces need to be optimally dispersed to be able to respond in a balanced manner to an emerging situation in time and space.
A number of factors would thus need consideration while giving a futuristic shape to our armed forces. The idea of integrated theatre commands is a step in the right direction, theoretically for now. Creation of such commands should never be at the cost of the frontline capability, the cutting edge. To the contrary they must serve to enhance the nation’s capability to apply and develop pertinent combat power in a decisive and a proactive manner in a developing conflict situation. We must guard against spreading ourselves thinner on the ground. The idea of theatre commands could be considered when we have built and consolidated our resources of man and machine to an optimal level and we have got a clear vision of our force requirements. Let us get it right this time.
New Delhi: The Defence Ministry has granted yet another extension of the emergency powers, which were accorded to the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force last year, for emergent revenue procurements and works, amid the stand-off with China at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh.
According to top defence sources, the emergency powers for revenue procurements —through the fast track procedure —have been extended till 31 August.
Last month, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh-headed Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) had also extended emergency powers of the defence services for capital acquisitions till 31 August 2021.
The emergency capital and revenue procurement powers were first extended up to March 2021.
Capital procurement powers pertain to the acquisition of capital assets, weapons/weapon systems and other operationally critical equipment which leads to permanent enhancement of operational capabilities of the defence forces. Revenue procurement powers relate to the procurement of critical spares and ammunition required to sustain or maintain these assets.
“Invoking of emergency powers for both revenue and capital procurement indicates the government’s intent to enhance our fighting and engaging capabilities to the next level and also sustain them through the long term,” a source in the government said.
After the Galwan Valley clash in June last year, the defence ministry had, for the first time, given emergency capital procurement powers to the armed forces to procure weapon systems of up to Rs 300 crore on an urgent basis without further clearances to cut short the long and tedious procurement cycle.
Prior to that, emergency powers were granted to the services after the Balakot airstrike in February 2019 and the 2016 Uri surgical strike covered only revenue procurements.
CDS Cited Operational Readiness of Armed Forces In Ladakh
Top defence sources said that before Rajnath Singh approved the extension of the emergency powers, the Chief of Defence Staff, General Bipin Rawat, cited high operational readiness of the forces in Ladakh for the move.
The CDS had noted that it is unlikely that the situation at the LAC will ease anytime soon and that would require the armed forces to be at peak operational readiness in the region, and he thus cited the need for extending the emergency powers both for capital and revenue procurement, the sources added.
In the last one year, India has deployed nearly 50,000 additional troops in the Ladakh region and deployed a large number of ground and air assets for any contingencies.
Spares, HAMMER Under Emergency Powers
Sources said that apart from some major capital purchases, a number of spares and other smaller items will be purchased under the emergency revenue procurement powers.
“Aside from some major capital purchases, there is also a number of spares and other smaller items required to be purchased for maintenance of our assets deployed in the frontlines, its overhauls and refits,” a source said.
Some of these emergency revenue procurement powers will also be helpful in building large-scale infrastructure such as roads and bridges in eastern Ladakh. Among the major capital procurements initiated by the defence ministry are anti-drone systems being procured by the Army which can jam the communication and navigation signals of a rogue drone or spoof it.
Defence sources also said that the IAF is planning to buy another lot of HAMMER air-to-ground precision-guided weapon system for its Rafale fighter jets using the emergency powers. The Highly Agile and Manoeuvrable Munition Extended Range costs around Rs70 lakh and consists of a guidance kit and a range-extension kit fitted on a standard Mk 82 bomb of 250 kg.
Other procurements include armour-piercing fin-stabilised discarding sabot (APFSDS) ammunition fired by the T-72 and T-90 main battle tanks, additional Heron drones, loitering munition, Spice Bombs, and Man Portable Air Defence System (MANPADS).
