Now a medical store, Sur and Co was once clinic of father of Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw

Sam Manekshaw (centre) at Sur and Co shop in 1973; and (right) its present owner Naveen Marwaha cleans the chair that was used by Manekshaw’s father Dr HFJ Manekshaw when he had a clinic here decades ago. Photos: Sunil kumar

Sam Manekshaw (centre) at Sur and Co shop in 1973; and (right) its present owner Naveen Marwaha cleans the chair that was used by Manekshaw’s father Dr HFJ Manekshaw when he had a clinic here decades ago. Photos: Sunil kumar

Divya Sharma

Tribune News Service

Amritsar, January 15

As the armed forces celebrated 70th Army Day across the country, the holy city has its own remarkable association with an Army man who played a major role in 1971 Indo-Pak war and holds the honour of being the first Field Marshal of the Indian Army. Field Marshal Sam Hormusji Framji Jamshedji Manekshaw was also known as Sam Bhadaur.A chemist shop here in the city — Sur and Co — situated at the Katra Ahulwalia area holds the memories of the Field Marshal through pictures of him and his parents. Presently a chemist shop, it was once clinic-cum-dispensary of Dr HFJ Manekshaw, father of Sam Bhadaur.At present, the shop belongs to Marwaha family. The warm relationship shared between the Maneshaw family and Devraj Marwaha, grandfather of Naveen Marwaha, who owns the chemist shop, is beyond words.Naveen Marwaha says, “My grandfather Devraj Marwaha used to assist Maneshaw Senior in his medical practice. My grandfather learnt each and everything from Dr Hormusji Framji Jamshedji Manekshaw. He shared a warm relationship with Sam Manekshaw, too. In fact, there was a regular exchange of letters between the Field Marshal and my grandfather. He paid a visit here in 1973. I have heard all good things about him.”The shop not only houses pictures, but also an antique chair of Dr HJ Manekshaw along with letters Sam Manekshaw wrote to Devraj Marwaha. The interior of the shop very much reflects the era gone by.Manekshaw was born in Amritsar on March 3, 1914. He did his schooling from PBN Senior Secondary School and took admission at Hindu College in 1931 and was part of the college for a year before moving for higher education. He visited the holy city in 1973.PK Sharma, Principal of Hindu College, said, “It is a matter of great honour that he was a student of this college.”The college has displayed his picture along with other distinguished alumni at a special corridor on the premises of the college. Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw was also awarded Padma Vibhushan for his services. He belonged to one of the first batches of the Indian Military Academy.

Army day observed

• An event was held at the Amritsar Cantonment on Monday to celebrate Army Day 2018. Major General DK Nautiyal, General Commanding Officer, Panther Division, laid the wreath at the Army Inspirational Park.

Though the recent local fidayeen action in Letapur could well be a one-off incident, it has caused enough concern. The localisation of the composition of suicide squads is something that experienced J&K hands have always feared.

Fidayeen action in J-K makes our units far more vulnerable.

Lt-Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (retd)ON the last day of 2017, three well-armed terrorists intruded the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) training complex at Letapur, near Avantipur on the Anantnag-Srinagar road in Kashmir. In the ensuing attempts to neutralise them, five CRPF jawans were martyred and all three terrorists were killed, but not before offering stiff resistance which included firing some armour-piercing munitions seen for the first time in the hands of terrorists. Post-operation analysis revealed that two of the three terrorists were local Kashmiris.  The death of Fardeen Ahmad Khanday, the 16-year-old son of a policeman, and Manzoor Baba, both locals from South Kashmir, revealed a new ploy by the Pakistani Masood Azhar terror group Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), under the guidance of the Pakistani proxy controllers: that of inducting local Kashmiris into fidayeen suicide squads. This is a phenomenon rarely seen in the 28-year-old proxy war.In J&K’s bleak proxy conflict scenario, the term fidayeen came into being in 1999. It is borrowed from the lexicon involving the vocabulary of the Palestinian resistance against the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and supposedly alludes to those”who sacrifice themselves in the name of god”. Before commenting on the entry of local terrorists into the ranks of a JeM fidayeen squad, the entire concept of fidayeen in J&K set up by proxy controllers of Pakistan needs to be outlined.It was in1999 (10 years after the proxy conflict commenced in J&K) that the situation in J&K really came to a head. Till then, terror in the state flowed and ebbed; from only local terrorists in 1989-90 to the introduction of foreign mercenaries, made available after the end of the Soviet-Afghan war, to the drying up of that pipeline in 1996 and thence the dominance of the Pakistani terrorists. In May 1999, a larger Pakistani strategy unfolded with the Kargil intrusion. It forced the redeployment of some formations of the Indian Army, deployed in the Valley for counter-terror operations (CT), to the Kargil sector, vacating the space in North Kashmir and segments of the South. In July 1999, infiltrated Pakistani elements along with a few SSG regulars, launched a series of small two- to four-men squads to sneak into the camps of the security forces (SF) and their bases through the weak perimeter security that existed. Some smart ruses were also used to target sentry posts employing effective disguise as Indian soldiers. The intruded elements inflicted as many casualties as they could and came equipped for the long haul and eventual death. Some high-profile actions included the targeting of the 15 Corps PRO offices near the Batwara entry gate, headquarters of Rashtriya Rifles (RR) units and sectors and civil institutions. In December 2000, the Srinagar airport was targeted by a six-man squad of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT); all six were killed at the gate along with six brave CRPF personnel. In all these cases, the fidayeen suicide squads comprised Pakistani terrorists infiltrated into the Valley or in the Jammu region. These actions did succeed temporarily in placing the Indian SF on the defensive with deployment of greater resources on the perimeter and entry point security of establishments. Counter-measures for these were partially found, but mostly resulted in limiting damage rather than preventing terrorist actions. Only in a few recorded cases had local Kashmiris, mostly acting alone, conducted such operations; a car bomb blast at the HQ 15 Corps gate and another against an Army bus in 2000 and 2003, respectively, were the handiwork of local elements. Fidayeen as a concept faded through the years of this millennium until it got revived after July 8, 2016, the fateful day in the history of the proxy war when BurhanWani, the young Kashmiri terrorist leader was killed. A strong counter-infiltration posture was adopted by the Indian Army 2004 onwards after the LoC fence came into being. This has progressively made it much more difficult for proxy controllers to induct trained and motivated Pakistanis willing to sacrifice their lives for the radical Islamic cause for which they have been brain washed. Besides these, suicide missions which intend to achieve something out of proportion in Kashmir need to be executed by extremely well-trained and equipped terrorists. They needed to be infiltrated from the PoK and kept secure in safe houses before being moved to the target area for execution. This could take many months with considerable risk, unlike in the Jammu-Kathua segment where actions could be much faster. The localisation of the composition of fidayeen suicide squads makes the missions easier but also requires religious fervour in the youth volunteers. It is something that experienced J&K hands have always feared. Such religious motivation is already evident in much of South Kashmir in particular, where radical Islam is known to have found root and mosque power is high. Training camps for local terrorists are known to exist well away from the surveillance of SF, in the higher reaches around Tral, Kulgam and Shupiyan. Local terrorists (LT) have been recruited, motivated and trained; their movement is far less difficult than that of FTs as they can merge and receive much greater local support. Although the Letapur fidayeen action could well be a one-off incident, it has caused enough concern. That is because with ready availability of LTs willing to be a part of fidayeen squads, the scope of multiple strikes enhances much like the campaign in 1999-2003. This and the employment of armour-piercing munitions would considerably transform the nature of conflict with VIP security and security of all establishments, HQs and units becoming far more vulnerable. Pakistan’s proxy conflict managers and controllers continue to improvise whenever necessary. The natural next step that can be perceived as part of potential devious planning by the Pakistan deep state could well be the preparation of human suicide bombing squads making use of highly radicalised and alienated young locals. This is the concept employed in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan. The experience of foreign armies has shown that for this threat usually there are least counters. It may be premature yet, but the Indian SF must be trained and geared to face such threats which the Pakistani deep state could bring to bear. The fidayeen threat from local youth will remain in place unless the counter-radicalisation process meets some success and alternatives are provided to wean away the youth from the path of self-destructive violence. Recent events have shown that some youth who picked up the gun did return to normal life after appeals by their parents. It had created hope and some cheer among the SF. However, the Letapur incident has brought in a new challenge for which social handling skills and greater outreach to parents and youth alike is necessary with the help of professional counsellors.

Tribune News Service

Srinagar, January 1

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Northern Command Lt Gen D Anbu on Monday visited the Army units in north Kashmir to review the prevailing security situation, a spokesman said.During the visit, Lt General Anbu was briefed about the winter preparedness and measures taken to meet the challenges posed by weather.“The Northern COmmand chief interacted with the troops on the ground and conveyed New Year greetings to them. He complimented them for their determination and alertness in counter-terrorist and Line of Control operations in 2017,” the spokesman added.Lt General Anbu asked the soldiers to continue to face new challenges with utmost professionalism.

Captain hosts NDA batchmates

CM Capt Amarinder Singh with his NDA peers during a reunion in Chandigarh on Sunday. Tribune photo

Tribune News Service

Chandigarh, December 25

Chief Minister Capt Amarinder Singh hosted his batchmates from the National Defence Academy (NDA) for a dinner on Sunday evening.An official press release said here today that 57 batchmates of the Khadakwasla-based academy shared six-decade-old memories and experiences of their days of training and service.Having grown up seeing the uniform and enamoured with arms since his childhood, the Chief Minister said joining the Army and serving the country was the only life he had dreamt of.His batchmates remembered Amarinder as a distinguished cadet, who captained the riding and polo team at NDA. The CM had served in the 2nd Battalion of the Sikh Regiment – a battalion in which his father and grandfather had served with distinction before him.On the occasion, the CM released a book “Tryst with Perfidy”, authored by Lt Gen Kamal Davar, former Chief of Defence Intelligence Agency.Those present on the occasion included retired officers Lt Gen GS Sihota, Lt Gen BM Kapur, Lt Gen Natarajan, Lt Gen Kamal Dawar, Maj Gen MS Parmar, Lt Gen Prakash Suri, Lt Gen Naryain Chatterjee and Maj Gen Gurjeet Singh Randhawa.

Capt Amarinder hosts NDA batchmates for reunion after 58 yrs

I am writing this on Sunday, October 22, 2017. The prime minister Narendra Modi will visit Gujarat the third time this month. In the run-up to the state assembly elections, he will inaugurate and lay the foundation stones to a number of projects.

The prime minister’s multiple visits to Gujarat have led to the question-is the BJP on a weak wicket in Gujarat? A strong anti- Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) front seems to be emerging in the state. The leader of the other backward classes (OBCs) Alpesh Thakor is expected to join the Congress on October 23, 2017.

Hardik Patel, the leader of the Patidar Patels, through his tweets seems to have indicated his preference for the Congress, though some of his aides have joined the BJP. Also, Patel currently is not old enough to fight elections.

On the flip side, Gujarat (unlike many other Indian states) has always been a two-horse race between the BJP and the Congress. And in this race, the Congress has gone nowhere in the recent decades. Its vote share has moved between 33-38 per cent of the votes polled and hence, India’s grand old party has not managed to displace the BJP. The extra 5 per cent votes that the Congress needs to give tough competition to the BJP, has never really come.

How will things turn out this time around? Honestly, I am not a political analyst and don’t know the answer to this. But what I do know is that the BJP has built a formidable election management system under its president, Amit Shah.

Prashant Jha in his new book How the BJP Wins-Inside India’s Greatest Election Machine describes this election management system in detail. And after reading this book I can say with reasonable confidence that displacing BJP at the state level (in the various assembly elections scheduled up to 2019) and in the Lok Sabha elections scheduled in 2019, will be no cakewalk.

This, despite the fact, that the Modi government has managed to screw up the economy big time through the disastrous decision to demonetise Rs 500 and Rs 1,000 notes, and a terrible implementation of the Goods and Services Tax.

I will not get into the details of the election management system of the BJP that Jha writes about in his book, given that a single Letter cannot do justice to it. Hence, dear reader, if you do have the time and the inclination, do check out the book.

Nevertheless, in this Letter I will talk about the factors that go in favour of the BJP and Modi, and the factors that go against them, when they fight an election in the days to come and this includes the Lok Sabha elections of 2019. Let’s look at these factors one by one.

Let’s start with the performance on the economic front. The promised acche din are nowhere in sight. In fact, the informal part of the economy which forms around 40 per cent of the GDP and employs more than three-fourths of the labour force, has collapsed. Economic growth has collapsed from more than 9 per cent to now less than six per cent. As far as the non-government part of the economy is concerned, which forms close to 90 per cent of the economy, it is now growing at just 4.3 per cent. So, there clearly are issues on the economic front. Having said that the government has time up until 2019 to set it right.

Also, more importantly does economic performance of the nation, really matter to the core supporters of Modi and the BJP. Or are they simply happy with the stand that the government is taking on the Ram temple in Ayodhya and all the rhetoric that surrounds the protection of the cow.

This will be a really important factor in any election. It remains difficult to figure out to what portion of the voters are these issues important. Not surprisingly, a narrative is already being built around these issues, for the core support base. And as May 2019 approaches, things could get murkier on this front.

As Evan Davis writes in Post Truth-Why We Have Reached Peak Bullshit and What We Can Do About It: “Like-minded groups of individuals share a narrative about many things… These narratives are sometimes true, sometimes not, but they are often like stereotypes… Once embedded in our minds though, they can easily gain excessive traction and trample over truth as willing believers put too much weight on propositions that conform to their narrative without looking for evidence in support of them.”

Further, it is worth asking whether voters vote based on the economic policy being practiced by the government. As Davis writes: [THE] argument that who you are matters more than the substantive point you are making is especially true about politicians. Voters focus on character rather than policy partly because they are better able to judge character and are relatively uninformed on policy… So, for a politician, having a good reputation is worth a hundred quick victories in specific arguments.

Modi’s personal brand still remains strong, though it may have been battered a bit. Over and above this, his brand will always be compared to those he is competing against and on that Modi wins hands down.

Expanding on the third point, the question is who will be the leader of the opposition parties. Will it be Rahul Gandhi? Or will it be a leader like Mamata Banerjee? As Jha writes in How the BJP Wins: “Will Rahul Gandhi accept a regional leader? Will a powerful regional leader like Mamata Banerjee accept a Rahul Gandhi?”

It will be imperative for the united opposition (if anything like that emerges) to have a consensus candidate and fight their elections under him, because a presidential style contest is likely to emerge, in the fight against Modi.

Other than choosing the right candidate, the opposition parties will have to build a credible narrative around him and what they have to offer. The narrative will be necessary to expand the core base. Just saying that we are there to displace Modi is unlikely to work. As Jha writes: “If ‘remove Modi’ is the only message, and the glue that binds them together, then they have a problem. Modi will project it, much like Indira Gandhi did, as a battle between him – a man committed to removing India’s poverty, man committed to India’s vikas – against a conglomeration of small, scattered, disparate units – united only by their hatred for him.”

Also, do these parties have the organisational muscle to take on the organisational muscle of the BJP and the Rashtriya Swayemsevak Sangh (RSS). The BJP always had access to the organisational muscle of the RSS, but the Sangh in the past, has not always deployed those resources totally, to help the BJP. That has changed now because of the personal relationship that Modi shares with the Sangh boss Mohan Bhagwat.

Narendra Modi was practically brought up in the RSS. And as Jha writes: “To top it all, Modi’s mentor in the Sangh happened to be Bhagwat’s father.” How do you tackle an equation like this?

In many states, like Gujarat, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Karnataka, any election will be a direct contest between the Congress and the BJP. Does the Congress have the organisational strength to take on BJP and the RSS?

The bigger problem for the Congress is that it does not have full time politicians at the top. Narendra Modi and Amit Shah are full time politicians. They don’t have any other interests in life. The same cannot be said about the Congress leadership. Whatever people might say about the recent revival of Rahul Gandhi, he just doesn’t inspire enough confidence. I am just waiting for him to take his next holiday at a point of time, when he should be in the country.

The Congress Party for the last many years has always been led by a Gandhi. The Gandhis brought in the votes. But now that is no longer the case. So, the question that is being asked can a non-Gandhi lead the Congress. For a moment, let’s assume that the Gandhis take a backseat. Will the other leaders of the Congress be ready to work under the leadership of a non-Gandhi? I don’t think so. Without, the Gandhis at the top, the glue that holds the party together, the party is likely to break up and if not that the factionalism is bound to increase dramatically.

A big advantage that the Modi government has, and which the opposition doesn’t, is that it can use the official machinery in its favour. Recently, the Election Commission announced the election dates for the assembly elections in Himachal Pradesh, but did not do so for the assembly elections in Gujarat and offered a very flimsy reason for it. This gave Modi and the BJP more time to launch more new projects in the state and offer more sops to the voters, something they wouldn’t have been able to do, if the election dates would have been announced.

Over and above this, the government (like the previous governments) can continue using taxpayers’ money to keep building their brand. They can also announce waive offs closer to the election date. I have a feeling that sometime in late 2018, early 2019, a big Mudra loan waive off is on its way. More than 9 crore Mudra loans have been distributed till date. And any waive off of these loans, will give a huge push to the electoral chances of the BJP in 2010, given that it will impact 45 crore individuals in total (assuming a family of 5 per household).

Up until now, I have offered reasons which go for the BJP. Now that doesn’t mean that all is well with the BJP. The section of the population is clearly not happy with the economy not doing well. A million youth are entering the workforce every month and the job scene continues to remain bad. The trouble is that the government is simply unwilling to recognise this problem and keeps talking about self-employment opportunities that it has created. These claims are rarely based on any data. The problem with trying to be too clever all the time is that ultimately you get found out. This something that the BJP leaders need to seriously think about.

So, it remains to be seen whether this issue emerges as a strong political issue. It further remains to be seen whether the opposition parties are able to tap into the frustration of the youth who are entering the workforce and not been able to find decent jobs.

Many land owning communities like Marathas, Jats, Patidar Patels and Kapus, have launched protests in the recent past, demanding reservations in government jobs. This remains a tricky issue to handle.

In states like Uttar Pradesh, where the BJP has done well, it has built a broad coalition of castes. In Uttar Pradesh, along with the support of upper castes, the BJP was able to reach out to backwards particularly those who did not like the rise of the Yadavs under the previous regime, and the Dalits, particularly those who did not like the rise of the Jatavs under Mayawati. The trouble is that the any government has only so many resources to share and distribute.

As Jha writes: “Caste groups end up competing with each other for state patronage, resources, access to power. There are limited opportunities available and so certain caste groups and, within the caste groups, certain individuals end up cornering more than their share of positions… A road is constructed or schemes are more effectively implemented depending on whether the constituents of that village are supporters of the regime in power. Given weak institutions, access to political power often determines if a person of a specific caste has access to the local police station.”

If sabka saath sabka vikaas has to become a reality, then the current governance structures will have to be changed. Local police officials need to respond to various complaints, irrespective of the caste of the individual making the complaint. This remains very difficult to implement.

Already, in Uttar Pradesh there are accusations of Thakurs, the caste to which chief minister Yogi Adityanath belongs to, taking over the police administration.

For a very long time, the BJP was a party supported by the upper castes and the business castes. Under Modi and Shah, the support base of the party has expanded and includes a large section of the poor as well.

While, this has benefitted the party tremendously, the party organisation hasn’t changed to reflect this new reality. As a top BJP leader told Jha: “The party organisation has still not transformed itself. At the moment the party’s character and the PM’s support base may slowly diverge. You cannot have an SUV driving rich contractor as your district president if your target is the poor voter.”

This can lead to a situation where the party’s political messaging is neither here nor there.

To conclude, these are the factors which will matter in the runup to the 2019 elections. While, BJP is on weaker wicket in comparison to 2014, a small industry seems to have emerged in writing off the electoral chances of Modi and the BJP in 2019, on the basis of a few recent losses in assembly, Lok Sabha, and a few other smallish elections. But they are really jumping the gun, on the basis of very little evidence.

The BJP’s election machinery is very strong, and it can take on these defeats in its stride.

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Vivek Kaul is the Editor of the Diary and The Vivek Kaul’ Letter. He is the author of the Easy Money trilogy. The books were bestsellers on Amazon. His latest book is India’s Big Government – The Intrusive State and How It is Hurting Us.

Rajouri, December 21

The Pakistan army today resorted to unprovoked mortar shelling and firing on Indian forward posts in the Nowshera subdivision in Rajouri district.Sources said the Pakistan army besides opening firing onIndian forward posts, also fired 5-10 mortar shells on Thursday evening that fell in uninhabited areas of Numb and Kharali in the Bhawani sector. There was no loss to life or property.The Indian Army retaliated effectively, said the sources.“Immediately after the information of ceasefire violation, chowkidars and lambardars concerned were contacted by the Bhawani police post in charge and an alert was sounded in the area. The firing and shelling stopped after about 30 minutes,” said Abdul Sattar, SDM, Nowshera.In case of any emergency, a contingency plan was ready to evacuate people to safer places, he said. — OC