Until the death of Burhan Wani, Kashmir’s new militancy on social media was little understood by the establishment, intelligence agencies and media

It’s exactly a year since Kashmir turned on its head and commenced a self-destruct campaign with the avatar of a new leadership and new foot soldiers. There are varying perceptions of why Burhan Wani’s death, in an encounter on 8 Jul 2016, led to the outpouring of emotions converted to extreme violence and a change in the nature of conflict. Most of these perceptions are one sided and based on what one wishes to believe. A recall of the circumstances of the period 2011-16 may help set the tone for analysis to seek more answers and suggest a way forward.

The peaceful period of 2011-13 followed in the wake of the stamina sapping 2008-10 when the Separatists attempted a strategy of combining terror and street turbulence to make their struggle more relevant. However 2011-13 was also recovery time which the Indian establishment failed to cash on despite its default actions of changed strategy of outreach and engagement, and the Interlocutors’ genuine attempt at discerning the aspirations and seeking the path towards compromise. The ray of hope created in the people, especially the youth, did not find matching energy or sense of commitment and continuity in the establishment.  The demand by the State Government to do away with AFSPA and the contestation by the Army only helped create wrong narratives and took the focus away from the emerging situation.  Drift was the order of the day with little idea of the direction towards which it was heading. It is this drift and the dashing of hope of the people that led to the rise of Burhan Wani and the renewed romanticism with the gun.  It was brushed aside as just an isolated resurgence among renegades but the groundswell of support eluded our assessment. The flood of 2014, followed by the elections, the heavy voter turnout, attempts at political experimentation, its initial disappointments and the passing away of Mufti Sayeed, all kept the eye away from the scanner.  The engagement with the people once again became transactional providing the window that was needed by the Separatists to energize the movement. Pakistan had probably never considered that an opportunity was emerging and emerging fast. It desisted from anything major in the Valley and concentrated its focus South of Pir Panjal in its strategy of keeping the fires burning. Recall that major actions in the Valley had ceased prior to 8 Jul 2016. In repeated assessments I wrote at that time that making things happen in the Valley was becoming increasingly more difficult forcing Pakistan’s efforts to the Jammu sector because it was easier to infiltrate and execute actions in a single night. Pakistan found that the ground under its feet in the Valley had substantially shifted as Burhan and his friends were not listening to Pakistani advice nor remain under the tutelage of Syed Salahuddin and the United Jihad Council.

It may be important to note from a lessons point of view that the new militancy characterized by the presence of social media wielding youth was little understood by the establishment, intelligence agencies and the media. Their assessments were archaic and based on assumed beliefs. While the youth may have focused on weapon snatching to overcome arms shortage, many were also killed in encounters. All the while they were building a new narrative of resistance through social media outreach. The state was observing this but did little to launch an effective counter in the domain that mattered, social media or any form of communication to the public. Simultaneously a quiet process of radicalization was also on. Social media, ideology and   religion are the last things that security establishments understand because it involves rebooting, relearning, mastering technology and most importantly getting to know the religious underpinnings of the time. With their typical tenure based approach to problem solving the establishment of the security forces (SF) does not display the capability to assess intellectually or learn nuances beyond the ordinary response involving gun on gun. Intelligence agencies have a better measure of institutional continuity but lack the means of persuasion to convince and thereby alter understanding and planning. It is not as if the media had any measure of things to come. Mainstream media was suggesting in late 2013 that the Army should withdraw and give the dividends of success achieved to the people of Kashmir in terms of more freedom of space from the constraining environment brought on by large uniformed presence.

This is not a blame game assessment but an attempt to look at areas where perhaps the ideas of the time remained out of sync with the situation. One of them surprisingly is also in the domain of military deployment. The Army always laid great stress on North Kashmir. This was quite natural with three of its major formation headquarters located there and the task of counter infiltration based on LoC deployment which is essentially  Army oriented.  The romance attached to big ticket achievements in forest tracts also colored the view. By contrast South Kashmir had only a single Rashtriya Rifles (RR)) force headquarters but it had Pulwama, Shupian, Anantnag and Pampore, all trouble spots where better educated youth reside. In sheer statistics of achievements in terms of terrorists killed, the three army formations of the north out did Victor Force the South Kashmir based formation. It created a picture for the leadership that the focus was required in North Kashmir and the south could be treated as a bank for resources because the achievement pattern there was in bits and pieces. In effect the mistake made was that the period of the Nineties and early millennium was forgotten when the major operations and achievements were in the south. The lesson for planners is simple; absence of or lower level of military achievements does not mean normality. It is the social parameters which need to be viewed. Not having done that and not having had an eye on history cost all of us dear. The virtual denudation of the southern belt below Shupian Kulgam and the overall inadequacy of troops in the south allowed the local militancy to bloom.  When it did we fought it in the physical domain while it was actually flowering in the virtual and psychological domain.

There are at least three areas of focus essential to contain and progress towards normality. First the deployment of all forces must be more balanced and no premature withdrawal should be executed on basis of statistical inputs. Second, the fight in the psychological domain can no longer be ignored. This needs an approach beyond what the Army has provided; the Army‘s achievements were highly creditable but can no longer remain the only domain of focused strategic communication. Lastly, the continuity factor in a hybrid conflict environment has to be taken into consideration. Personnel management practices cannot override national needs and the best talent must be made available to fight the enemies of the state. It is only then that the campaign becomes comprehensive.

http://

Beijing, June 27

China on Tuesday lodged a protest with India over alleged “crossing of boundary” by its troops in Sikkim and demanded their immediate withdrawal, warning that future visits of Indian pilgrims to Kailash Mansarovar will depend on resolution of the standoff.”Our position to uphold our territorial sovereignty is unwavering. We hope the Indian side can work with China in the same direction and immediately withdraw the personnel who have overstepped and trespassed into Chinese border,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang told a media briefing here. “We have lodged solemn representations in Beijing and New Delhi to elaborate on our solemn position,” he said.(Follow The Tribune on Facebook; and Twitter @thetribunechd) About the fate of the pilgrims headed to Kailash and Mansarovar, who had returned to Gangtok after denial of permission by China to enter Tibet, Lu said their visit was called off because of security reasons.He also linked future visits of pilgrims to India “withdrawing the troops” from the area.”As to Indian pilgrims’ journey through Nathu La pass at Sikkim section, I think the Indian side is very clear about this. For a long time Chinese government has made enormous efforts to provide the necessary convenience to those Indian pilgrims,” Lu said.”But recently the Indian border personnel trespassed Chinese border to obstruct our construction, we have taken necessary actions. Out of security consideration we have to put off the pilgrimage by the Indian pilgrims through the Chinese pass,” he said. “On the upcoming actions, we have to depend on what the Indian side will do. They have to take action to improve the security situation.”Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang last night said: “China urges India to immediately withdraw its border guards that have crossed the boundary and have a thorough investigation of this matter”.”The Indian border guards crossed the boundary in the Sikkim section of the China-India border and entered the territory of China, and obstructed normal activities of Chinese frontier forces in the Donglang area recently, and the Chinese side has taken counter-measures,” he said in a statement.His statement came after the Chinese Defence Ministry accused the Indian troops of objecting to building a road in what it claimed to be Chinese territory.The dispute over construction of a road was apparently the reason why China stopped a batch of 47 Indian pilgrims from crossing through Nathu La border in Sikkim into Tibet to visit Kailash Mansarovar.Chinese defence ministry spokesman Ren Guoqiang said on Monday that recently China has begun the construction of a road in Donglang region, but was stopped by Indian troops crossing the Line of Actual Control (LAC).In his statement, Geng said that the Sikkim section of the China-India boundary has been defined by treaties, noting that the Indian government has repeatedly confirmed in writing that there is no objection to it.China urges India to respect boundary treaties and China’s territorial sovereignty to maintain peace and stability at the China-India boundary, Geng said.In view of the above event, for safety reasons, China has to put off arranging for the Indian pilgrims to enter China through the Nathu La pass, Geng said, adding that China has informed India of its decision through diplomatic channels.The Nathu La Pass sits 4,545 metres above the sea level and is wedged between Yadong County in Xigaze Prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region, and Sikkim.On Monday, Geng had also said that the foreign ministries of both the countries were in talks over this issue.The Nathu La route, which is the second route for the Kailash yatra, was launched with fanfare by the two countries in 2015.Until 2015, the yatra (journey) was being organised by External Affairs Ministry only through the Lipu Pass in Himalayas connecting the Kumaon region of Uttarakhand with the old trading town of Taklakot in Tibet.The Nathu La route enabled pilgrims to travel 1500 km long route from Nathu La to Kailash by buses.The route through Nathu La reduced the hardship and journey time enabling many more pilgrims, in particular the elderly, to undertake the yatra.Geng’s statement comes after tension mounted in a remote area of Sikkim following a scuffle between the personnel of the Indian Army and the PLA, leading to Chinese troops damaging bunkers on the Indian side of the border.The incident happened in the first week of June near the Lalten post in the Doka La general area in Sikkim after a face-off between the two forces, which triggered tension along the Sino-Indian frontier.After the scuffle, the PLA entered Indian territory and damaged two make-shift bunkers of the Army.Following, the India-China war of 1962, the area has been under the Indian Army and the ITBP, which is the border guarding force and has a camp 15 km from the international border. PTI

Anantnag/New Delhi, June 21 Two additional battalions — a total of 2,000 men — of the Army will be sent as reinforcement to four troubled districts of Jammu and Kashmir, officials said today. With the presence of additional forces in Kulgam, Anantnag, Shopian and Pulwama, some Army camps would be revived again, they said. The officials said the two additional battalions, which have already started moving to Kashmir, would be posted to some of the more vulnerable areas of the four districts. Major General BS Raju, General Officer Commanding of the Army’s Victor Force, today surveyed the region, which has often been described as “ground zero” because of increased militant activities. The officials said the Army camps had been set up to help locals who were “possibly intimidated” by the militants. — PTI

Tribune News Service

Srinagar, June 20

Militants attacked a CRPF camp in south Kashmir’s Tral sub-district by hurling grenades followed by firing late this evening.Two UBGL grenades were lobbed at 180 Battalion, CRPF, at Tral Bala, some 45 km from Srinagar, at around 9 pm. The grenades were followed by firing and the CRPF retaliated.“The exchange of fire continued for some time. There is no immediate report of any injury in the attack,” a CRPF officer said.The area around the camp has been cordoned off to trace the militants involved in the attack.Meanwhile, a cordon and search operations has been launched by forces at Pazalpora, Sopore, in north Kashmir after an input about militants’ presence. – See more at: http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/jammu-kashmir/militants-target-crpf-camp-in-tral/425120.html#sthash.5cfwLlFo.dpuf

A clickbait Gen Rawat-Dyer comparison underlines how eminent post-colonial scholars missed out on the finest Army of this period: India’s

Brigadier General Reginald Dyer was British, but was an officer of the Indian Army. The 50 riflemen who opened fire at a peaceful Baisakhi gathering at Amritsar’s Jallianwala Bagh, killing 396 and wounding more than a thousand, were Indian soldiers.

Within 25 years, the same Army was fighting on both sides of a small, one-sided but historic war. Subhash Chandra Bose’s Indian National Army consisted of Indian prisoners of war with Axis forces. Within three years, in 1947-48 of that fratricide, the Army was at war again, this time to protect its own nation, in Kashmir.

The colonial Army initially split into two, and eventually three in 1971, with the same ethos, training and command structures. In both Pakistan and Bangladesh, the same army has held power more than once, and assassinated elected leaders. Over the decades, Pakistan’s Army has so institutionalised its indirect control over power it calls the shots as elected governments come and go. Why take the opprobrium of martial law?

The Bangladeshi Army has now depoliticised after two decades of Ershad-Zia misadventures. In India, over these decades, the Army has become more apolitical, business-like. It’s also become ethnically, socially and religiously diverse, stepping out of many colonial fixations like martial races and lately batmen (ok, golfing culture has grown, regrettably). Indian Army’s ability to adapt and evolve with times, from Dyer to Azad Hind Fauj to a loyal institution back-stopping a democratic nation is marvelous and must be acknowledged.

Now survey how post-colonial armies have evolved since World War-II: Africa, West Asia, Latin America, Eastern Asia, and definitely the rest of South Asia. Find one sizeable army that stayed out of politics.

The Post-Colonial evolution of the Army has been widely studied in India, although mostly by scholars and historians of military affairs and generally ignored by the eminences of the social sciences. The period up to the debacle of 1962 is the best documented and it is also the most vital because the Army was still Indianising – there were two categories of officers, holding the King’s and the Indian Commission. Defeats tend to produce better, from-the-heart literature and the Army had a generation that brought inherited a commitment to military literature from its past masters, the British. Subsequently, our military scholarship and literature declined, with just two pieces of work, Lt.Gen. Harbakhsh Singh’s War Dispatches and Air Chief Marshal P.C. Lal’s My Years With The IAF on the air war in 1971 standing out. There was always Stephen Cohen’s The Indian Army which, read with his equally thorough The Pakistan Army is still a standard text to understand the contrasting way the two siblings, separated by a calamity as in old Bollywood films, evolved in their own ways.

Lately, there has been another set of solid publications. Four books by Punjab Chief Minister Amarinder Singh, by far the best military historian in India: on Kargil, World War I, a true classic (with Lt.Gen. Tajindar Shergill) on the 1965 war and the latest on the Battle of Saragarhi, hailed as the Sikh Regiment’s Thermopylae. More importantly three recent works by non-military scholars, Yale Professor Steven Wilkinson (Army and Nation), Srinath Raghavan on how the Army changed between the two great wars (India’s War) and to contrast with, Georgetown University scholar C. Christine Fair’s Fighting to the End on the Pakistani Army.

I am being deliberately repetitive: I do not find on any bookshelf a substantive study on this fascinating socio-military-political institution, written by a professional Indian social scientist. It is as if the Army, as we wanted, decided to stay out of our life, and our scholars responded by leaving it alone. They demilitarised their minds – even Raghavan, a world-class scholar, is a former Army officer. Let the Army live in its cantonments. It is this intellectual secession from the military that leads to a regrettable misjudgment like the Rawat-Dyer comparison.

To understand how India succeeded in keeping its Army out of politics, Wilkinson is a must-read. He tells you of the evolution of the military thought from Cariappa to Manekshaw through four wars and onwards but also of how the system worked together to change the social and ethnic composition of the Army. To make it more diverse over the decades, shrewdly reducing the domination of one ethnicity, the Punjabis, shrugging the Colonial legacy of martial races and, ultimately, assigning recruitment quotas to states according to their population. Of course, he fishes out some nuggets like defence minister.

Civilian governments have, however, kept leaning on the Army for help often “in aid to civil power” when it operates under a magistrate’s orders and sometimes to fight insurgencies autonomously, empowered by the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). The mention of both, ironically, brings Gen. Dyer back in our lives.

Jagjivan Ram’s keenness to bring more Dalits into the Army and the letter Manekshaw wrote to Lt.Gen. S.K. Sinha to “handle it”–as a Bihari he would Whatever Dyer’s justification for the Jallianwala Bagh massacre, much of the British establishment did not buy into it and it led to the Indian Army (then) instituting new protocols for civilian control, necessitating the presence of a magistrate and written orders for firing at a crowd. These protocols still exist when the Army is called out in aid to civil power.

Later, during the Quit India Movement, when the Army had to be employed pro-actively they empowered it with the Armed Forces Special Powers Ordinance, the father of today’s AFSPA. This is documented by Raghavan in his Protecting the Raj: The Army in India and Internal Security, published in the December 2005 edition of the journal Small Wars and Insurgencies. know how to do it. Civilian governments have, however, kept leaning on the Army for help often “in aid to civil power” when it operates under a magistrate’s orders and sometimes to fight insurgencies autonomously, empowered by Now think, and I too go back to my own memory bank of covering four decades of civil strife and insurgencies. Do we recall any incidence of the Army opening fire at a mob and massacring people? Don’t tell me about Operation Blue star which was a firefight where 149 Army men were killed too. Or about Gawakadal in Kashmir, 1990, because it wasn’t the Army but paramilitary forces.  Nor about many human rights abuses, fake encounters, some rapes, handled relatively leniently till the mid-nineties but subsequently punished firmly. These are excesses in counter-insurgencies. Think mobs and angry crowds. The Army has never had to fire at one, because the bad guys go away the moment they see the Army. Because they know the Army will be tough, and non-partisan. Communal riots rarely survive a flag-march. In Delhi, 1984, Gujarat, 2002, the Army almost never fired. All the debate about these big massacres is over the delay in calling out the Army.

In Kashmir too, the Army has never been challenged by crowds. Wherever it has operated against terrorists, local people have stayed out of the way. This has lately changed with stone-throwing crowds forming human shields for terrorists. The Army has to find a doctrine to counter this new challenge and it can’t be a tit-for-tat use of human shields. But should it fire at crowds that obstruct it? The chief, General Bipin Rawat, talking aloud, or may be fulminating, could surely have chosen his words better. But also put yourself in his boots. A new doctrine now needs to be evolved for a new situation, and the Army will do it. You won’t see more Kashmir’s driven in front of Army columns. Nor will the Army massacre hundreds, Dyer style. That’s why this comparison is contemptuous of reality. And perverse.

• 

The father and children of Naik Bakhtawar Singh, who was killed in Pak firing along the LoC, at Hajipur village near Mukerian in Hoshiarpur district on Friday. Tribune Photo

Sanjiv Kumar Bakshi

Hajipur (Hoshiarpur) June 16A pall of gloom descended on the village with the news of martyrdom of Bakhtawar Singh (35), an Army jawan from Sandhu Mohalla here, reaching the family this morning.His father Pritam Singh, mother Shila Kaur and wife Jasveer Kaur were in tears, but said that they were proud of his supreme sacrifice while serving his motherland.Pritam Singh said he had three sons, two of them in the Army. Bakhtawar was the youngest. He was recruited in the Army in 2003 and was posted at Rajouri in the Nowshera sector with the 8 Sikh Light Infantry Battalion.His wife got a call from the regiment that Bakhtwar was martyred in cross-border firing. Jasvir Kaur said they got married 12 years ago and had two sons and a daughter. The youngest son is nine months old.She said she was proud of her husband and she would send her sons too to in the Army to serve the motherland.She, however, flayed the Union Government, saying: “Enough blood of soldiers has been spilled. The government should act to restore peace in the region or give a befitting reply to Pakistan’s misdeeds.”

Uttarakhand Chief Minister Trivendra Singh Rawat giving a memento of Kedarnath Temple to Army Chief Bipin Rawat in Dehradun on Friday. PTI

Dehradun, June 10

Youths in Jammu and Kashmir are being misinformed and misguided by forces inimical to peace, Army Chief General Bipin Rawat said on Saturday.Security forces had to devise ways to counter this, he said, while addressing gentlemen cadets at the prestigious Indian Military Academy here.

(Follow The Tribune on Facebook; and Twitter @thetribunechd)

Rawat said terrorism was the biggest challenge in front of the country as he urged the cadets to gear up to grapple with the scourge.The Army chief presided over a colourful passing-out parade by 490 gentlemen cadets on the completion of their course.He said it was time they put the lessons of valour and military skills learnt at the academy to the service of the nation.The Army chief, himself an alumnus of the IMA, said the academy imparted the best training to its cadets which matched up to international standards.Earlier, the immaculately turned-out cadets put up a well-synchronised parade before Rawat at the academy’s famous tarmac drill square with the historic Chetwode Building in the background.As the passing-out parade started two army choppers flew over the drill square to shower rose petals on the tarmac, carpeting it with flowers.The 490 cadets who passed out include 67 cadets from friendly countries. Uttar Pradesh accounts for the highest number of cadets with 74, followed by Haryana 49, Uttarakhand 40, Rajasthan 30, Bihar 28 and Delhi with 23.Later, speaking to reporters, Rawat said women needed to be given combat roles in the army as terrorists often used women as shields. PTI

Major David Manlun, Manipur

Bijay Sankar Bora

Tribune News Service

Guwahati, June 7

An Army officer and three militants were killed during a gunbattle in interior Lappa of Mon district in Nagaland last night. A civilian was also killed in the fire exchange.Kohima-based Defence spokesman Col Chiranjeet Konwer identified the slain officer as Major David Manlun of Territorial Army’s 164 Brigade. While the officer belongs to Manipur, his body was taken to Shillong where his family lives.(Follow The Tribune on Facebook; and Twitter @thetribunechd)The bodies of the militants, who belonged to a combined group of the banned ULFA (Independent) and NSCN (Khaplang), were handed over to the police.Col Konwer said the identity of the civilian was yet to be ascertained.Lappa is located close to the Assam-Nagaland border, about 330 km from state capital Kohima.The encounter took place when a team led by Maj Manlun went to Lappa following specific information on the presence of a group of militants in the area.During a search, the militants lobbed a grenade and fired at the Army men, killing the Major.The Army later found an AK-56 assault rifle, two Chinese AK series rifles, two grenades, three IEDs and 270 live rounds of AK series at the encounter site.