Our Correspondent

Ferozepur, March 27

The Ferozepur police today nabbed a former Army driver who had absconded after killing a Chandigarh resident while attending a relative’s marriage five years ago. He was staying with a changed identity in Ludhiana for the past five years.

Sandeep Goyal, SSP, said the accused identified as Ranjit Singh, who was booked in a murder case five years ago, had been working as a driver in 11 Fd unit of the Army in Bathinda in 2014.

The SSP said Ranjit had gone to attend his cousin’s marriage on December 11, 2014, in Makhu where he allegedly killed Gulshan Dhiman of Chandigarh with his licensed revolver following an altercation.

After committing the crime, Ranjit reached Bathinda Military Station, where he continued his service in the Army for the next three months.

When the police reached Bathinda, Ranjit escaped. Later, he was declared as Proclaimed Offender (PO) on August 7, 2015. Subsequently, he was declared PO by the Army also due to his continued absence. For the next five years, Ranjit kept evading arrest and continued to dodge the police, the SSP said.

“At present, he was working as a driver with a local businessman from where he was nabbed,” the SSP added.

New Delhi, March 23

Congress president Rahul Gandhi on Saturday paid tribute to freedom fighters Bhagat Singh, Sukhdev and Rajguru on their death anniversary observed as ‘Shaheed Diwas’ (Martyr’s Day), saying the spirit of revolution espoused by them is running in our veins.

Gandhi said we will continue to fight the battle for their thoughts and ideals.

“Bhagat Singh, Sukhdev and Rajguru are not mere names, they are the spirit of revolution running in our veins,” he tweeted in Hindi.

View image on Twitter

Rahul Gandhi

 ✔@RahulGandhi

  भगत सिंह, सुखदेव, राजगुरु, सिर्फ़ नाम नहीं हैं; हमारे रगों में दौड़ता क्रांति का एक जज़्बा हैं। 

उनका जीवन, आज भी, हमें मज़बूत बनाता है, आज़ाद बनाता है, इंसान बनाता है।

शहीद दिवस पर हमारे वीरों को शत् शत् नमन।

उनके विचारों और आदर्शो की लड़ाई हम जारी रखेंगे।#ShaheedDiwas

 “Their lives make us strong even today and make us free and human. On Martyrs Day, we bow our heads to our bravehearts. We will continue to fight the battle for their thoughts and ideals,” Gandhi wrote. — PTI 

The significance of the Balakot airstrike will wane if the gains do not lead to stabilisation of the turbulent internal security scenario in Kashmir. The stress and strain on national security from LoC intrusions or airspace violations are not as complex to deal with as the internal security stress arising from tackling the Kashmir unrest.

Vikash Narain Rai
Former Director, National Police Academy, Hyderabad

NEED we view separately the Pulwama and Balakot incidents? The two seem cause and consequence; the sheer magnitude of the Pulwama attack shocked the nation and culminated in the Balakot bombing; the expanse of India’s political and diplomatic response against Pakistan was extended to include economic sanctions and military strikes. However, there is no denying that keeping the peace in Kashmir has continued to be as arduous after Balakot as it was before Pulwama. Simply put, the internal security dimensions need a fact check independently too.

According to an old aphorism, a specific racehorse may perform differently depending on the course on which the race is held. The laws of operational surprise are supportive of a small and swift profile. These could be seen, on the fateful day in Pulwama, arraigned against the vast target of slow-moving CRPF convoy of vehicles. ‘Horses for courses’, or lack of clarity thereon has again proved to be the nemesis of our internal security policy-makers. Both the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and the office of the National Security Adviser (NSA) have so far refrained from making any exclusive statement explaining the Pulwama attack. Both are operating without the services of credible advisers in the field of internal security.

Based on national interest perceptions, the profile of a border between two countries may be offensive, defensive, restrictive, facilitative, neutral or a combination of such orientations. Or, like the Indo-Pak border, the picture may be an amalgamation of all possible shades. From the adrenaline-pumping Retreat ceremony at Attari-Wagah to surgical strikes in terrorist-infested stretches, from the Lahore bus and Samjhauta Express friendship journeys to the smuggling of jihadis and armament under intensive fire cover, from trade and religious corridors to hi-tech barriers, it is a strategic map drawn along the contours of peace talks and war histories. The story has gone on too long, inconclusive and uninterrupted. 

From the national security angle, it was only waiting to be announced that India, too, had added a third-dimension border perspective to the conflict over the Kashmir issue. The highly publicised Balakot airstrike in response to the Pulwama terror attack was exactly that. Since the Simla Agreement, the two countries officially acknowledged the existence of a two-character border in Kashmir: International Border (IB) in the settled area and the Line of Control (LoC) in the claimed area. Pakistan, or rather the Pakistan army, in due course, managed to push terrorism wider and deeper into Indian territory and supported it as the third character of the hostile border. India paid them back regularly through its intelligence and security operations, and now with the Balakot strike, the third dimension in its border response has been formally unleashed.

The significance of the Balakot strike, however, will wane if the gains do not lead to stabilisation of the turbulent internal security scenario in Kashmir. The stress and strain on national security from LoC intrusions or airspace violations are not as complex to deal with as the internal security stress arising from tackling the Kashmir unrest. While the Balakot air response is a typical ‘horses for courses’ lesson for Pakistan, the Pulwama attack is to be bracketed as a suicidal setback, the result of a long-term faltering of political will to apply this time-tested strategic doctrine in limiting Kashmir militancy. Here the familiar sequence of events cannot be lost sight of: Pulwama preceded Balakot, the internal security catastrophe leading to a national security situation. It was made to look like a compelling threat of war between nuclear neighbours over an operationally avoidable tragedy!

Let us count the types of hostile borders and lines of control that presently divide Kashmir from the rest of India. The status of Masood Azhar as a global terrorist is one of the foremost issues on the mind of a nation kept obsessed with the national security threat from Pakistan. Either way, though, it would resolve nothing in Kashmir. In contrast, lying uncertain is the relevance of Kashmiri nationalism, which is based on a special status under Article 370 of the Constitution and is equated with deshdroh under the compulsion of supremacist majoritarianism. Simultaneously, it seems Kashmir is destined to be policed differently from the rest of India, by the Army and CRPF. Instead of integrating the trust of a civil police system in day-to-day affairs in Kashmir and using the CRPF as a subsidiary armed support against militants, there is an offensive reliance on strengthening the boastful presence of the Army and the CRPF. There exists, therefore, a visible ‘LoC’ between the Indian Army and the Kashmiri people.

The Balakot episode has confirmed what the Kargil conflict, coming months after the Lahore peace declaration, had warned about, that the predominantly national security approach to the Kashmir imbroglio is fraught with the danger of war with Pakistan. Irrespective of India’s insistence on bilateralism, this approach can at best hope to bag a geo-political solution in the long run. It presupposes strong diplomacy and a capable military — and India boasts of both. A predominantly internal security approach will require bipartisan politics and statesman-like leadership; India has none at present.

It is perceived that Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pervez Musharraf had almost resolved the Kashmir dispute at the Agra summit in 2001. I was a witness to both leaders looking disappointed at not signing the prepared draft. However, the fragility of such a document could never have been in doubt. Parliament was attacked in December that year by Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, two Pakistan-based terrorist organisations, resulting in a prolonged standoff. Even the much-referred Vajpayee peace doctrine of Kashmiriyat-Jamhooriyat-Insaniyat, testimony to his statesmanship, will have no chance to grow in soil kept infertile by the manure of outdated internal security.

When Pakistan handed back Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman to India, the spectacle of the graciously quick return of the MiG-21 pilot, shot down and captured by Pakistan, elicited both international plaudits and misplaced triumphalism. But the spectacle also masked more important military and political factors at play.

The two military rounds played between Pakistan and India on February 26/27 in the wake of New Delhi’s aggression against Islamabad, after the February 14 Pulwama attack, have important lessons for deterrence as well as the question of whether limited war options are possible between a nuclear dyad.

India has, since long, accused Pakistan of playing the conflict game at the sub-conventional level while denying India its superior conventional capabilities by signalling the resolve to introduce nuclear weapons first and early into a conventional conflict. This line of reasoning, simplistic though it is, has been widely lapped up, not only by Indian analysts but also Western scholars.

Meanwhile, India, since the limited conflict in Kargil (1999) and then the 10-month long Twin Peaks crisis (2001-02) has been conceptualising how to punish Pakistan conventionally while remaining below the nuclear threshold.

Pakistan and India came closer to a devastating war than they have in almost 17 years. As the dark clouds of impending all-out conflict begin to dissipate, it is important for both to see what the current tensions can teach us about deterrence and preventing a repeat

Put another way, India thought — and many experts agreed — that there was a band in which India could act militarily and punitively. That, if India were to play within that band, it would make it extremely difficult for Pakistan to escalate to the nuclear level because such escalation would be considered highly disproportionate and would draw international opprobrium and consequences. The argument was that the certainty of international diplomatic and economic isolation would force Pakistan to stay its hand and not escalate to the nuclear level.

The banal equivalent of such a situation would be someone punching another person in a crowded bazaar and the victim, instead of keeping the fight to fisticuffs, chooses to draw and fire a pistol. Not only would such a person lose the sympathy of the crowd, he would also invite the full coercive and normative weight of the law.

Corollary: whoever ups the ante in a basic fight ends up as the loser.

However, while the Indian military planners were thinking about this for the past two decades, until the arrival on India’s political scene of Narendra Modi and his éminence grise, Ajit Doval, New Delhi shied away from actualising a short, sharp military option against Pakistan, focusing instead on exploiting diplomatic channels using its diplomatic heft.

According to India’s official figures, the 2001-02 standoff cost India three billion dollars with hundreds of soldiers killed without any exchange with Pakistan. The mobilisation was a political decision and as then-Indian Chief of Army Staff S Padmanabhan noted, in an interview to The Hindu, “You could certainly question why we are so dependent on our strike formations and why my holding corps don’t have the capability to do the same tasks from a cold start. This is something I have worked on while in office. Perhaps, in time, it will be our military doctrine.”

COLD START DOCTRINE

This was the beginning of India’s Cold Start doctrine that envisaged creating eight Independent Battle Groups, placed closer to the border and capable of a short, sharp, punitive action against Pakistan without the long mobilisation delays India experienced in 2001-02. Interestingly, while India for long denied that such a doctrine existed — despite having done some field exercises to validate it — the current Indian army chief, Bipin Rawat, acknowledged its existence in an interview barely three weeks after taking office on December 31, 2016.

As an explainer in The Economist put it, “Cold Start is the name given to a limited-war strategy designed to seize Pakistani territory swiftly without, in theory, risking a nuclear conflict. It has its roots in an attack on India’s parliament in 2001 … by the time its [India’s] lumbering Strike Corps were mobilised and positioned on the frontier, Pakistan had already bulked up its defences, raising both the costs of incursion and the risk that it would escalate into a nuclear conflict. Cold Start is an attempt to draw lessons from this: having nimbler, integrated units stationed closer to the border would allow India to inflict significant harm before international powers demanded a ceasefire; by pursuing narrow aims, it would also deny Pakistan a justification for triggering a nuclear strike.”

Let’s consider the underlying assumptions in all this.

The ‘theory’ assumes that:

(1) There is a band in which India can use its conventional military option;

(2) that band can be exploited;

(3) India has the conventional superiority to make it work;

(4) if it does so in response to an attack it can pin on Pakistan, it has enough diplomatic weight to have the world opinion on its side for such a strike;

(5) it can make it work through a military surprise which can gain its objectives;

(6) Pakistan, having suffered a setback, will be hard pressed to retaliate because it will have to climb up the escalation ladder, a costly proposition both for reasons of the earlier military setback as well as international diplomatic pressure;

(7) given India’s upper hand, both militarily and diplomatically, Pakistan will choose to not escalate;

(8) if, however, Pakistan did choose to escalate, India will still enjoy escalation dominance because of its superior capabilities and because it will have international diplomatic support; and

(9) India, given its diplomatic and military heft, will be able to raise the costs for Pakistan in an escalation spiral.

Result: Pakistan will weigh the consequences as a rational-choice actor and prefer to climb down.

Modi from the word go has been hyping his masculinity and informing his right-wing Hindutva vote bank that he could and would act where his Congress predecessors failed to, namely that he would teach Pakistan a lesson and create a “new normal”.

The interesting assumption in all this, and one that should not be missed is this: the first-round result. Every subsequent assumption flows from what India could achieve militarily in the opening hand.

Somehow, barring a few analysts, most literature took for granted that the first round would, of necessity, go in favour of India. And therefore, Pakistan’s cost for retaliation would increase both militarily and diplomatically. In fact, this does make sense if it can be guaranteed that India’s gambit will work. Except, the opening round success could be guaranteed only if India were applying force on an inanimate object or if its conventional capabilities were far superior to Pakistan’s.

As Clausewitz noted, “War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty.”

The second crucial point in unpacking these assumptions is the limited nature of the engagement. It should be clear that India’s politico-military strategy post the 2001-02 standoff looked at any punitive military action in a limited, not full-scale, mode: military action below the nuclear threshold.

Pakistan has never drawn clear red lines, managing risk through ambiguity. The only time a former — and longest-serving — Director-General Strategic Plans Division, Lt-General Khalid Kidwai, enunciated four parameters for resorting to nukes was during an interview to two visiting Italian physicists:

(1) India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory (space threshold);

(2) India destroys a large part of Pakistan’s military forces/assets (military threshold);

(3) India strangulates Pakistan economically;

(4) India destabilises Pakistan politically or through internal subversion.

As Dr Nitin Prasad says in his book, Contemporary Pakistan: Political System, Military and Changing Scenario, Kidwai was using hypothetical scenarios, and his four thresholds — geographic, military, economic, domestic-political — were not red lines, defined and understood by the adversary or other parties, because clearly defined red lines dilute deterrence and provide room for conventional force manoeuvring.

The point about the limited nature of India’s military plans is important because, while a case can be made for India possibly overwhelming Pakistan in a drawn full-scale conventional conflict which brings in other factors, a limited thrust or strike — if there’s not a huge differential in technical and other capabilities — may not necessarily play to the stronger adversary’s advantage.

Put another way, if the presumably weaker side denies the stronger side success in the opening round, draws its own blood successfully while showing restraint, it can raise the costs for the stronger actor by upending the latter’s assumptions based on the success of the opening round.

DIMENSIONS OF DETERRENCE

This is exactly what has happened in the two rounds fought this time. One can put it thus: deterrence has held because the aggressor has to factor in the nuclear dimension and keep its military options below that threshold. The defender, having defended successfully and then drawn blood, shows restraint. Third parties get involved knowing and realising that any attempt by one or both sides at escalation dominance could spiral. [Note: Dr Moeed Yusuf has a brilliant book on third party brokering (2018), which studies US diplomacy during three crises — Kargil (1999), Twin Peaks (2001-02) and Mumbai (2008).]

But what exactly is deterrence?

It can have both the conventional and the nuclear dimensions. Essentially, deterrence is the ability to discourage an actor from undertaking an unwanted action, including an armed attack. It is, in other words, about prevention, i.e. convincingly stopping an actor from an action. The sister concept, what Thomas Schelling described as compellence, is about forcing an actor to do something in line with what the compeller (adversary) wants it to do.

By India’s reasoning, its limited military options are about deterring Pakistan to undertake actions at the sub-conventional level and to deter India from making use of its conventional strength because of the existence of nuclear weapons.

This is where the problem begins.

Deterrence is not just about threatening an adversary with punitive action. In order for it to be successful, it must shape the adversary’s perceptions, i.e., force the adversary to change its behaviour by estimating that it has options other than aggression and which are more cost-effective. Shaping perceptions of the adversary that needs to be deterred would then require the deterrer to understand the motives of the actor who has to be deterred. Without that exercise, any limited action, even if it were temporarily successful, would fail to impact a behaviour change or incentivise a state actor to do something different.

Also, deterrence by denial, the ability to deter an action by making it infeasible is a far better strategy than deterrence by punishment which, as the term implies, promises the resolve and the capability to take punitive action(s) and inflict severe punishment.

So, in the case of the rounds played, deterrence has worked at two levels.

First, the overall, umbrella deterrence that flows from the possession of nuclear weapons on both sides. This level ensures that even if one or the other side decides to undertake military action, it must keep it limited.

The second level is about conventional deterrence. If X has undertaken a military action, Y can prevent it from achieving its objective and, by successfully undertaking its own action, can force X to rethink its use of any military option. The rethink is important because, in such a play, if Y has prevented X’s action and successfully undertaken its own, X cannot simply retaliate to a reprisal. X will have to climb up the escalation ladder, i.e., it has to scale up by using an escalatory option to defend his commitment. Escalation is about a higher cost and the rethink is a function of forcing X into that cost-benefit analysis.

It is precisely for this reason that the opening round is so crucial for the aggressor, in this case India. To recap, as noted above in the list of assumptions, every subsequent assumption flows from the success of the opening round.

MODI-DOVAL CALCULATION

At this point it would be instructive to view all this from the perspective of the Modi-Doval duo. Both men believe, or at least had convinced themselves into believing, that the previous Indian governments did not make use of a conventional military option because they were weak-kneed. Modi, by referring to his 56-inch chest, from the word go has been hyping his masculinity and informing his right-wing Hindutva vote bank that he could and would act where his Congress predecessors failed to, namely that he would teach Pakistan a lesson and create a “new normal”.

In September 2016, following an attack on an army camp in Uri in Occupied Kashmir, one morning the Indian Director-General Military Operations announced to a packed press conference that India had conducted “surgical strikes” in Azad Kashmir, across the Line of Control (LoC) and destroyed “terrorist” bases. He also said that he had told his Pakistani counterpart that India did not intend to take any further action and that its action was only directed towards non-state actors.

The Indian media, as well as serious analysts, went into a tizzy. Days on end, there was nothing on Indian TV channels and newspapers other than this “great victory” against Pakistan. We were told that Pakistan had not retaliated because Pakistan Army posts and troops in the area were caught off-guard and Pakistan was playing it down because the action was an embarrassment for it. Even serious analysts began talking about a new normal.

This is what Shashank Joshi, then based at the Royal United Services Institute in London, wrote in the opening paragraph of his op-edin The Hindustan Times: “India’s ‘surgical strikes’ on Wednesday night… — barely a few kilometres across the Line of Control (LoC) — … represent one of the most important changes in India’s military posture to Pakistan in over a decade.” He did acknowledge that this hadn’t happened for the first time and the fact, as he put it, “that Pakistan will not reverse seven decades of policy without a diplomatic process” but there was headiness, nonetheless. And this is just one example. There are scores of others.

Pakistan did not retaliate because it was a fire raid where Indian troops were blocked at two points of ingress but managed to sneak in at the third, fired at some hutments and withdrew.

By hyping it, Modi locked himself further into a commitment trap. Apart from some discerning commentators in India, everyone chose to forget that such actions had been undertaken at the LoC by both sides in the past and that there was nothing ‘surgical’ about India’s fire raid.

On February 14, therefore, when a bomber mounted the deadliest attackon Indian paramilitary troops in recent times, Modi was left with no option but to act. With a tough election staring him in the face and his chest blocking a clear view of rationality, he decided to use a limited military option. Only this time it had to be more than just a raid across the LoC. He jumped a few rungs on the escalation ladder by deciding to use his air force.

The story about what happened on the morning of February 26 has now become a laugh and it has been walked back a few miles and some more by India itself, so those details are not necessary. Whatever little was left of India’s fantastic claim about hitting a “training camp” and killing “terrorists” has been finally laid to rest by a Reuters story that reviewed satellite imagery from Planet Labs Inc.

However, what is important is not whether Indian planes came into Pakistan (original claim), whether they struck in a stand-off mode (i.e. when aerial platforms are used from a safe distance, away from defensive weapons, and use precision munitions such as glide bombs to attack a distant target without actually coming upon the target and swooping down for a bombing run) or even whether they could or could not make a hit. The important and crucial point was that India had challenged Pakistan and Pakistan needed to put an end to the “new normal” talk. Pakistan chose its targets, struck to show resolve and capability and then also won the dogfight.

Later, we are told that India had thought of using missiles to hit nine targets in Pakistan. But Pakistan readied its missiles and informed India that it will hit back. That forced India to back off. If this is true — and it comes to us from a briefing by Prime Minister Imran Khan — then it seems that Modi had nursed the idea of playing a very dangerous hand, which he couldn’t because that would have meant exchange of missiles between a nuclear dyad — a development which has remarkable escalation potential. Missilery between nuclear powers is a big no. There’s no known technology in the world that can determine whether the incoming missile has a tactical or a strategic (nuclear) warhead and that can lead to response miscalculation.

The two sides are back to the ‘old normal’ — artillery and small-arms duelling across the LoC. The attempt by an Indian submarine to enter Pakistan’s territorial waters was also deftly picked up by Pakistan Navy, with the sub forced to return. It could have been sunk but Pakistan, in keeping with its policy of not escalating, chose not to make a hit.

From here on, there’s nothing more for India but to understand the imperative of positive engagement through a sustained dialogue. The framework for such engagement is already in place. There is no alternative to talking and walking that talk. But that will not happen until we see the electoral contest in India and its results.

At the same time, Pakistan must not underestimate India based on these limited rounds. While India could not coerce Pakistan militarily at this moment, if the growth differential between Pakistan and India continues to grow, the technological asymmetry will increase to the point where strategies of coercion could kick into play. That scenario could see very different results on the ground. For instance, India will possess the anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) S-400 system by 2020. That system is not just defensive but can also be employed in a preemptive offensive role. Typically, A2/AD systems ensure that they can deny a mission to incoming hostiles (anti-access) and ensure safety of their own area against any hostile action (area denial mode). If things do not change through engagement, we could see India use the S-400 in any future round. That would be an entirely different ballgame altogether.

The writer is Executive Editor at Indus News and specialises in defence and security.

He tweets @ejazhaider

Published in Dawn, EOS, March 10th, 20

Vijay Mohan

A new war memorial and near-enough war-like situation is perhaps the right time for the country with a rich military heritage to visit  monuments that remember our war dead. With a chequered history having its boot prints from the shores of the Atlantic in the west to the backwaters of the Pacific in the east, hundreds of war memorials have been dedicated to the Indian soldier both at home and overseas where they have fought. Many are located within military stations, some in public places and a few small ones in villages or educational institutions to keep alive the memory of bravehearts who died defending our borders.

The practice of erecting war memorials goes back hundreds of years, both in India and other parts of the world when ancient rulers and kings constructed victory memorials to flaunt their exploits on the battlefield. Among the oldest in India is a carved stone, almost 800 year old, at the Kaitabhesvara temple in Karnataka. With its carvings of soldiers and a Kannada inscription dated 1235 AD, the stone eulogises the prowess of kings and warriors.

India Gate

The India Gate has been the nation’s iconic and most visible war memorial located on the Rajpath in the heart of the Capital. Initially constructed for Indian soldiers killed in World War I, it has served as a national memorial since 1972 after a simple edifice, surmounted with a reversed rifle capped by a helmet, was constructed under the India Gate’s arch. In a brass cauldron on each corner on the platform from which the black edifice bearing the inscription “Amar Jawan” arises, burns the eternal flame.

While the Prime Minister, accompanied by the three service chiefs, has traditionally laid a wreath here on Republic Day each year, a recent convention of the President doing the same on Independence Day has been introduced. The three Service Chiefs and top military brass pay homage at the memorial on assuming charge of their office and on the anniversary or Raising Day of their respective service, arm or branch.

Chandigarh War Memorial

The Chandigarh War Memorial is among the largest war memorials in the country with the names of about 10,500 personnel from the three services who died in the line of duty since 1947 inscribed on its walls. It has a unique architectural concept and design, with the central edifice consisting of three converging posts, signifying the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, emerging from a terraced circular base. It lies within a sunken circular arena about six feet below the ground level. The memorial was conceived by the late Lt Gen JFR Jacob, who had commanded a division in the 1965 Indo-Pak War and later negotiated Pakistan’s surrender in 1971, when he was the Governor of Punjab in 2004.

Twang War Memorial

Built in the memory of soldiers who died in the 1962 Indo-China War, the Twang War Memorial is located near the main town of Twang in Arunachal Pradesh. The 40-feet stupa-like structure, constructed in accordance with the local religious practices, is called Namgyal Chortan by the locals. The surrounding granite walls are inscribed with the names of 2,420 martyrs. Artifacts, maps, photographs, news clippings and remains of the war are displayed. A marble plaque reads, “In the memory of those brave soldiers who made supreme sacrifice defending the frontiers of Mother Land during the 1962 Sino-Indian war.”

Indian Military Academy War Memorial

Inaugurated by India’s most revered soldier, Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw in 1999, the Indian Military Academy War Memorial at Dehradun pays homage to academy alumni who have fallen in the line of duty. The structure replicates the Chetwode Tower, the edifice atop the academy’s main building. The circular memorial with its pillars and columns is built from Dholpur Stone and at the centre of the sanctum sanatorium is a bronze statue of a gentlemen cadet with a sword presenting arms.

Army Heritage Museum at Shimla

The 5,000-year-old history dating from Mahabharata era to the present times is on display at the Army Heritage Museum at Shimla, which is said to be the only museum of its kind in the country. Established in 2006 by the Army Training Command, it houses rare artefacts like the captured flag of 1st Bahawalpur Infantry Battalion of Pakistan, bust of Khudadad Khan, the first Indian to be decorated with the Victoria Cross, execution order of Mangal Pandey and original dress of the first commissioned women officer of the India Army, Major Priya Jhingan. Military philosophy, chronology of events, evolution of Indian military uniforms, arms from the Vedic period, weapons used in the world wars, formation signs, flags, honours and awards adorn its interiors. A section is dedicated to the 21 Param Vir Chakra recipients, rolls of honour and battles of Longewala and Tololing. UN peacekeeping missions, disaster relief operations, military music, music, sports and adventure activities are also featured.

Sea War Memorial in Visakhapatnam

Built in 1996 to commemorate the victory of the Eastern Naval Command in 1971, the Victory at Sea War Memorial in Visakhapatnam carries the epitaph, “The nation that forgets her defenders needs no ancestors” on the central tower’s base. Located near near the Submarine Museum, it represents all three services, with a T-55 tank, a Gnat fighter plane and the Navy’s P-21 missiles that were used to wreak havoc on Karachi harbour on December 4, 1971 being displayed. It was off Visakhapatnam that Pakistani submarine PNS Ghazi sank.

Kargil War Memorial

In the world’s second coldest inhabited place, Dras, stands the memorial commemorating the sacrifices of bravehearts who were martyred in the Kargil conflict in 1999. Every year on July 26, known as Kargil Vijay Diwas, a ceremony is held to pay tributes to the martyrs. Several modifications and additions have been made over the years, the latest being a giant national flag, weighing 15 kg hoisted atop a 100-foot staff in 2012.

Siachen War Memorial

The story of Siachen remains unparalleled in the history of warfare. Nowhere else have soldiers fought and held ground for so long and at such desolate heights, where more men have fallen to the vagaries of nature than to enemy bullets. The Siachen War Memorial is situated in the rugged, barren landscape of the base camp on the banks of the Nubra that flows from the glacier that is also the world’s highest battlefield. The names of all soldiers who have died in Operation Meghdoot since its launch in 1984 are etched at the memorial.

At a time when war clouds are hovering over the sub-continent that has witnessed countless wars and conflicts, a vast new monument has been unveiled in the Capital to honour men and women in uniform. First proposed by the Armed Forces in 1960, the National War Memorial was finally dedicated to the nation on February 25 this year. “The intent of the design is to look at the memorial as a place were soldiers are reborn. The design concept is interpreted as four concentric circles of varied elements as layers with its own functionality and expressing different emotions of protection, bravery and sacrifice through spaces,” says Yogesh Chandrahasan, the project architect.

An open competition for the design was floated by the government in August 2016. Out of 428 entries received, Chennai-based WeBe Design lab won the first and third place. In 2017 first winning entry was commissioned for building the memorial.

The outermost circle, Rakshak Chakra (circle of protection), personifies the territorial control of the borders by the armed forces, with trees being the major elements and arranged in a specific order of circular arrangement, inspired from the formations of soldiers, signifying their firm presence and hold on the ground.

Next is the Tyag Chakra (circle of sacrifice), metaphorically representing the deployment of soldiers in concentric circles on the battlefield, as depicted in the epic Mahabharat. Each granite block represents a martyr, on which his name and rank are engraved. The wall holds name of 25,942 martyrs, who have sacrificed their life since Independence.

The Veerta Chakra (circle of bravery) has been conceived as a subterranean colonnaded semi-open corridor holding stories of valour. The gallery holds six bronze murals which depict the six important battles fought by Indian soldiers post-Independence.

The focal point of the memorial is the innermost circle, Amar Chakra, symbolising the immortality of soldiers who attained martyrdom. The obelisk in the center holds the eternal flame at the bottom with the four-headed Ashoka Lion emblem perched at the top.

The Param Yodha Sthal is unique space dedicated for recipients of the Param Vir Chakra, India’s highest award for gallantry. The park is designed around existing trees; accommodating, bronze statues of 21 recipients.by

“We were a team of eight architects, led by Yogesh Chandrahasan that conceptualised and designed the memorial,” adds Udhaya Rajan N, a partner in the firm. Spread over 42 acres adjoining India Gate, the design of the memorial is subterranean with the built form not exceeding 1.5 metres above ground level.  The design was conceived carefully to retain the character of the existing public open space and the aesthetical sanctity of Lutyen’s planning.

Rezang La battle, Rewari

The Rezang La battle, fought against the Chinese in November 1962 at the height of 18,000 feet in Ladakh was one of the most decisive battles fought against China and is officially recognised as a “rare battle in military history” with the fighting being hard and bitter and troops going beyond the call of duty. A memorial to this battle stands at Rewari, Haryana. With a Sudarshan Chakra adorning the memorial’s edifice, the names of all martyrs have been engraved on it along with comments of some senior officers regarding the gallantry of the soldiers who fought the battle.

fat Mohidin

Tribune News Service

Srinagar, March 9

The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has written to the top security brass in Kashmir, telling them to be on the highest alert as the Jaish-e-Mohammad is planning a Pulwama-type suicide attack.

In a written security advisory, accessed by The Tribune, sent by the Director, Security, MHA, to the top security brass in Kashmir it has said that “it is reported that the JeM outfit members active in Pulwama district are preparing for another fidayeen/spectacular attack in next three days. Although the said terrorist attack was scheduled to be launched after two weeks, the group has decided to pre-pone it, owing to the developments happening on the Indo-Pak front and anti-militancy operations against the JeM,” said the advisory.

On February 14, a JeMsuicide bomber, Adil Ahmad Dar,had rammed his explosive-laden car into a CRPF convoy on the Pulwama highway, killing 40 personnel.

Officials in the Valley have been asked to be on alert as the JeM is planning another attack.

“In view of the above, the peripheral security of vital installations and forces guarding the installations be kept on alert to thwart any such attack.”

The oil companies in the state have also been advised to keep on alert the forces guarding the vital installations.

In a written communication to the J&K Police, they have been asked to furnish the details of the two JeM militants, one local and another foreign named as Muna Bihari who are said to be in possession of “crude bomb lot”. The said group, according to the security agencies, are active in Pulwama and Shopian villages.

General Raymond Thomas emphasised on the need for furthering military cooperation in the field of technology and military-to-military exchanges between the two countries.

A statement said both the generals deliberated on the developing regional security environment (file)

NEW DELHI: 

General Raymond Thomas, the Commander of the US Special Operations Command, met Army Chief General Bipin Rawat here Friday, during which the two officers deliberated on the developing regional security environment and discussed Pakistan’s “continued support to terrorism”, according to a statement.

General Raymond Thomas emphasised on the need for furthering military cooperation in the field of technology and military-to-military exchanges between the two countries.

“Both the generals deliberated on the developing regional security environment, issue of global terrorism and Pakistan’s continued support to terrorism was also discussed,” the statement said.

The visit of the senior US Army officer comes days after the Indian Air Force struck at the terror group Jaish-e-Mohammed’s biggest training camp near Balakot, deep inside Pakistan, on February 26.

A day later Pakistan also retaliated by attempting to target Indian military installations. However, the IAF thwarted the plan.

The Indian strike on the JeM camp came 12 days after the terror outfit claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on a CRPF convoy in Kashmir, in which 40 personnel were killed.

The statement further said in the current scenario, the Indian Army remains fully prepared for emerging challenges.

“In the last three weeks, disinformation campaign by the adversary on digital media has increased. All ranks have been well sensitised of these disinformation campaigns and all ranks can see through the lie, deceit and deception of the terror sponsors,” the statement said.

Lt Gen Ranbir Singh, Northern Command chief, accompanied by the White Knight Corps Commander, Lt Gen Paramjit Singh, visited forward posts in the Akhnoor sector on Friday to review the operational preparedness and the prevalent security situation.

Lt General Ranbir was briefed on the actions taken to meet the challenges of the increased ceasefire violations through superior and aggressive domination of the LoC being exercised by the troops to exert pressure on Pakistan and defensive measures put in place to thwart the designs of the adversary. TNS

OFB gets Defence Ministry’s nod for producing 114 long-range artillery gun ‘Dhanush’

NEW DELHI: The Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) has received a bulk production clearance from the Indian Army and the Defence Ministry for production of 114 ‘Dhanush’ artillery guns, officials said Tuesday.

‘Dhanush’ is the first long-range artillery gun to be produced in India and it is a major success story of the ‘Make in India’ initiative, the defence ministry said in a statement.

The OFB has received a bulk production clearance from the Army and the Defence Ministry for production of 114 first-ever indigenous artillery gun ‘Dhanush’, it said, adding, the clearance was received on Monday.

“The gun is equipped with inertial navigation-based sighting system, auto-laying facility, on-board ballistic computation and an advanced day and night direct firing system. The self-propulsion unit allows the gun to negotiate and deploy itself in mountainous terrains with ease,” the ministry said.

‘Dhanush’ has been mechanically upgraded to fire standard NATO 155 mm ammunition and can accommodate the bi-modular charge system (BMCS) which has resulted in increasing the range, it said.

It has also been electronically upgraded to enhance the firing accuracies, laying speeds of the existing gun and to provide compatibility with various kinds of ammo as well, the statement said.

The performance of the gun has been evaluated under arduous conditions in several phases.

“The guns travelled extensively in towed and self-propelled mode in all terrains viz desert and high altitude with each gun clocking over 1600 km. Such an extensive exercise was carried out by the user for the first time for any gun system under the process of induction,” it added.

The manufacture of a 155 mm modern artillery gun was initially a challenge for the OFB. This was due to change in the vision parameters from 155×39 calibre to 155×45 calibre.

The OFB received the Transfer of Technology (ToT) documents pertaining to 155×39 calibre and then converted it to 155×45 calibre successfully, the statement said.

‘Dhanush’ is the product of joint efforts by the OFB and the Army with contributions from the DRDO, DGQA, DPSUs such as Bharat Electronics Limited, PSUs such as SAIL and several private enterprises.