Tribune News Service

Amritsar, August 26

The two-day defence pension adalat was inaugurated by the Controller General of Defence Account, SK Kohli, at the Army cantonment auditorium here today.The event was organised for on-the-spot redressal of pension- related problems of ex-defence personnel.A defence pension camp to create awareness among pensioners about various schemes available for them was also organised at Satkar Palace in Tarn Taran today.Ex-servicemen from Amritsar, Tarn Taran, Gurdaspur and Pathankot districts attended the lok adalat at the Army cantonment here today.Speaking on the occasion, Kohli said the purpose of the event was to ease official work for pensioners. He, however, added that legal disputes pertaining to pensions or its various heads were not considered as pensioners were free to appeal with the competent authorities.

RANGRETH: At a time Kashmir’s youth are raging against the Indian state, a small group has donned the khaki-and-olive green of the army and pledged to fight for the country.

WASEEM ANDRABI/HT PHOTOA Kashmiri father kisses his son who graduated as an army soldier at a military base in Srinagar.

On a bright, clear Thursday, 308 soldiers participated in a passing-out parade to join the Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry (JAKLI) — an exclusive regiment of soldiers drawn from the state. Of the 308, 116 were from the Valley and Muslim dominated areas of Jammu. Their families travelled in the stealth of night to watch them take the salute and fly the tricolour at the Rangreth Centre in Budgam district — mindful of the tension outside its walls. A 41-day curfew keeps a fragile peace after violent clashes between young Kashmiris and security forces that have left 66 dead and thousands injured.

Most of the recruits from Kashmir and their families weren’t keen to discuss why they joined the army.

Asked why he had sent his son to the army, Ghulam (who refused to reveal his full name) said, “The situation is very bad. It is not easy to talk.” The farmer hails from south Kashmir’s Anantnag, which has seen the highest number of killings (18) in the ongoing unrest that is a result of the people’s anger against the killing of a militant commander.

“We are poor families. That is why we send our children to the army. We know the sentiment of the people (against the army) is not favourable,” said a woman from the same district, who had come to cheer her cousin

The USI National Security Lecture

‘A Comprehensive Strategy to Counter China-Pakistan Collusion’

 An Over view: India’s Bilateral Relations with Pakistan and China

Since Independence, India’s relations with Pakistan have fluctuated but always remained below the friendly level. Pakistan has never shed the animosity and employed various means to pursue its feud through direct military aggression, supporting insurgencies, stoking communal tensions, infiltration and use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy. It has used foreign collusion against India, whenever and wherever it could get strategic advantage over India. Pakistan Army, which drives Pakistan’s security and strategic policies, has always endeavored ‘strategic parity’ with India.

China occupies Aksai chin (40,000 Sq Km), which de jure is part of India’s Jammu and Kashmir (J & K). It keeps asserting claim on Arunachal Pradesh (92,000 Sq Km). The Line of Actual Control (LAC), which came into existence after India-China war in 1962, remains disputed and un-delineated. Since 1962, there have been two incidents of military fire fight on the LAC; in 1967 (Natu La) and 1986 (Wangdung). China has now improved military infrastructure and capability in Tibet substantially. Despite several high level agreements to maintain peace and tranquility on the LAC, and many rounds of negotiations to work out a frame work to resolve the border dispute by the Special Representatives, border confrontations, where even a slight miscalculation can spark off a limited border war, keep occurring frequently.

China, which received Shaqsgam Valley by Pakistan from the Gilgit-Baltistan region of J & K in 1963, treats India’s J & K and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir on different footings; apparently challenging Indian sovereignty over J & K.

China has also positioned itself in the rest of South Asia. It has been increasing its economic and military footprints in India’s immediate neighbourhood-Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives-and its maritime interest and assets in the Indian Ocean.

Despite the strategic challenges mentioned above, India and China have been able to maintain political, diplomatic, economic and military dialogues. There have been regular high level state visits and rapid improvement in the trade (Expected to touch $100 bn by 2015) despite an ever increasing trade deficit for India.

An important factor in China- Pakistan- India security relationship is that all three nations are nuclear weapons equipped nations. This has an impact on the possible nature of conflict.

There are reports that Pakistan is developing/has developed tactical nuclear weapons. As per current Indian nuclear doctrine, our response to all types of nuclear, chemical, or biological strike would be a massive counter strike.

Definitions: Collusive and Collaborative Threats

‘Collusive threat’ from China and Pakistan to India implies both countries acting in secret o achieve a fraudulent, illegal, or deceitful goal’ or being engaged in secret or hidden avowed goals vis a vis India.

‘Collaborative threat’ implies a joint threat by working together. Basically, that would cover overt as well as covert threat to India from the China-Pakistan nexus.

History of China-Pakistan Collusion and Collaboration

Pakistan was the first non-communist, Islamic country that broke relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) to recognize Peoples Republic of China and establish diplomatic relations with it.

The China-Pakistan collusion started soon after India China 1962 war. In 1963, China and Pakistan signed a Boundary Agreement to formally delimit and demarcate the boundary between China’s Xinjiang and the contiguous Northern Areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.  With this delimitation, Pakistan ceded the Shaksgam Valley to China. Both countries extended their common boundary up to Karakoram Pass. China was careful. Article 6 of the Agreement states that after the settlement of Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, the ‘sovereign authority’ will re-open negotiations with the Chinese Government so as to sign a formal Boundary Treaty to replace the Agreement.

Cooperation in Nuclear, Missiles and Arms Industry

China has played a major role in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure.[1] In 1990s, China designed and supplied heavy water Khushab reactor, which plays a key role in Pakistan’s production of plutonium. A subsidiary of the China National Nuclear Corporation contributed to Pakistan’s efforts to expand its uranium enrichment capabilities by providing 5000 custom made ring magnets, which are a key component of the bearings that facilitate high-speed rotation of the centrifuges.

When China joined the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group in 2004, it ‘grandfathered’ its right to supply Chashma 1 and 2 reactors.[2]

Despite growing threats of Pakistani terrorists acquiring material to make nuclear devices, in March 2012 China re-affirmed that it would continue to support Pakistan’s civilian nuclear programme. Currently, Chinese state-run companies are in talks to build three 1000 megawatt plants in Pakistan-two at the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant and the third at the Chashma Nuclear Power Complex.

 On the missiles front, it is well known that the Chinese sale of 34 complete M-11 ballistic missiles around 1990 was in contravention of the Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines. China also built Pakistan’s missile plant at Tarwanah, near Rawalpindi.

In the last 20 years, China and Pakistan have been involved in several joint ventures to enhance military and weaponry systems. These include the JF-17, K-8 advanced training aircraft, AWACS, Al Khalid tank, Babur cruise missile, and so on.

Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-Neighbourly Relations

Of all the treaties and agreements signed between China and Pakistan, the China-Pakistan Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-neighbourly Relations, ratified by both the sides in 2005-06, is the most significant in China Pakistan collusion and collaboration. It binds the two nations to desist from ‘joining any alliance or bloc which infringes upon the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other side’. It also forbids both countries to conclude a similar treaty with a third country. Then Chinese President Hu Jintao had described it as ‘an important legal foundation for the Strategic Partnership’. While Pakistan considered significance of the Treaty in terms of protecting its security and a hedge against India[3], the Chinese downplayed the security aspect but laid stress to the importance of the document in preventing Pakistan go back to the US camp[4].

China and Pakistan have signed several agreements for development of communications along the Karakoram Highway, and railway and oil pipe line from China to Gwadar Port (of Pakistan), which has been constructed by China and is being managed by their company. Optical Fibre Cable is being laid along the Karakoram Highway. Recently, China has committed $45.6 bn for ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ and for various energy and infrastructure projects.

China and Pakistan have also signed several agreements for the military usable infrastructure in Gilgit-Baltistan and POK. A Chinese Company is building/to build 165-km long Jaglot-Skardu road, and the 135-km long Thakot-Sazin road. China Mobile has set up cell towers in the area. There are some intelligence reports of (a) 22 tunnels being constructed, which could be used for stocking missiles, and (b) about 1000 Chinese working on the Neelum-Jhelum hydro-electric project and on Muzaffarabad-Athmuqam road project. These include elements of the PLA to provide security to the Chinese engineers and workers on these projects.

In March 1997, I was invited by the Chinese PLA for a friendly visit. When I called on the Defence Minister General Chi Haotian, our conversation was mostly about the need to improve military to military relations and implementation of the agreements signed by China and India in 1993 and 1996. I suggested that Chinese and Indian divisional commanders on either side of the LAC should meet each other. He agreed promptly and said that the first such meeting could be held in Leh. Several months later, after I had taken over as Chief of the Army Staff, a date was fixed mutually for the meeting of division commanders of both sides in Leh. At the last moment, the PLA sent word that the Chinese division commander will not be able to go to Leh and that the meeting should be held in New Delhi. I felt that such a meeting in New Delhi will not serve the intended purpose. We therefore called off the proposed meeting. The reason behind this change was not Chinese accessibility to Leh, but because Pakistan did not like a senior Chinese officer visiting J&K.

In 1999, after Kargil war, when all foreign defence attaches were invited to visit Dras and Kargil, only the Chinese defence attaché did not avail this invitation. Later, when I asked him the reason, he told me informally that they did not want to hurt feelings in Pakistan.

In May 30-31, 2011, during Siachen talks between India and Pakistan in New Delhi, Pakistan pushed for China to be represented during negotiations on the ground that Beijing controls the Shaksgam Valley.

On 13 Dec 2011, in an Urdu Daily, Tufail Ahmed wrote ‘Chinese Military Taking over Gilgit Baltistan: Pakistan Considering Proposal to Lease the Dispute Region to China for 50 years’.

The Disputed Border Length

Our Army HQ and MoD claim the length of India-China border to be 4056 km which includes boundary/LAC with J & K and Gilgit-Baltistan, including the Shaqsgam Valley. Beijing declares the length of the border with India to be about 2000 km, which obviously excludes J & K and Gilgit-Baltistan. The strategic implications of this move can be: (1) China has become a new factor in the India-Pakistan debate over J & K. (2) the India-China boundary dispute may get divided into two parts. While the eastern and middle sectors remain a bilateral issue between India and China, the western sector becomes a trilateral issue involving India, China and Pakistan. (3) Repeated references to the length of the India-China border as 2,000 km may impact future global discourse on J & K relating to subjects like construction and international loans or financing of development projects. (4) China can now question India’s locus standi to discuss the western sector, while its own territorial integrity and authority over Shaqsgam Valley and Aksai Chin remains unquestioned and therefore secure. (5) In the security scenario and defence planning for the western sector, Indian armed forces would now have to seriously factor in the collusive, two-front China-Pakistan threat.

Manifestation and Dimensions of Collusion on the Military Front

The dimensions of a China Pakistan military collusion could vary from (A) collusive support without direct military intervention, to (B) activating a second front militarily. The transition from (A) to (B) could also occur seamlessly.

Collusive Support without Direct Military Intervention

This activity, as noted earlier, is already happening. It is likely to increase manifold in an India- Pakistan conflict scenario. Its probability is higher as it is easier to deny, and will accrue high benefits compared to the efforts put in. Such support could take the forms such as:

(a) Military Material Support China has been providing military material support to Pakistan for decades. This is likely to continue. In a combat, it may enhance Pakistan’s weapons and equipment reserves, force re-generation and war duration capability. Support in the nature of high end technological weapons and equipment can become a major advantage for Pakistan.

(b) Locating Extra Forces in Tibet In an India- Pakistan war situation, mere positioning of extra PLA forces in Tibet (from within or outside the military regions) can influence Indian armed forces’ decision to move any dual tasked formations and other military assets from the India-China front.

(c)  Cyber Warfare Support China has potent cyber warfare capability, which if shared with Pakistan, can cripple India’s crucial networks, including strategic forces assets, command and control systems, air defense, and civil support structures like the railways, civil aviation, power grids, banking sector, and so on. It can impact India’s deterrence and war fighting capability very adversely.

(d) Information Warfare Support.  China can support Pakistan’s strategy to shape the world opinion against India, in the UN and other world forums.

(e) Internal Destabilization China in the past has shown capability to exploit India’s internal fault lines and instigate ethnic strife, particularly in the North East. It would result in diversion of India’s war effort.

Collusive Support with Direct Military Intervention

An interventionist military collusion could come about in different scenarios (a) Pakistan led or China led. (b) Either state may take advantage of an adverse situation for India brought on by the other.  (c) It could be part of a grand design between China and Pakistan to bring India down to its knees.

Historically, full scale activation of a second front has never occurred despite the collusion being in place since the 1960s. However, in view of the updated military infrastructure development in Tibet, and by China in Gilgit-Baltistan and POK, the possibility of a two front war can not be ruled out. Let us take the Pakistan-led scenario first.

In this manifestation, China is likely to participate only if it sees some gains for itself. Otherwise, it would not be in its best interest. But then Pakistan could beg for the Chinese support even if China does not wish to be drawn in physically. In such a situation, a major offensive by China is unlikely. That would hurt its global image and scare many friendly neighbors. However, China may use the rail and road communications being developed in Gilgit-Baltistan to provide logistic support to Pakistan. It could also make moves to tie down our forces in the North and East by (a) Moving extra forces in Tibet. (b) Aggressive patrolling by the Chinese leading to provocation and minor clashes. (c) Major/minor fire assaults, and (d) intrusion of Indian airspace. India’s dual tasked formations would then not be available for deployment against Pakistan. Our offensive capability on the Western front would be affected adversely.

In a China-led manifestation, there may be an attempt to seize Tawang or other territory along the LAC, and/or to teach India a lesson. China may then initiate a limited or even a higher level conventional war, depending upon its objective(s). The latter would have to take into consideration its likely escalation into the nuclear, aero-space and maritime domain. In any such conflict, it is unlikely to bank on the Pakistani collusion or participation.

But Pakistan could try to exploit such a situation on the LoC or international border. It could make diversionary moves in Kargil or Siachen, which will result in 14 Corps (based in Ladakh) having to ‘look’ both ways. Pakistan could also upgrade proxy war conditions in J & K.

The possibility of a concerted twin strike in a ‘grand design’ by China and Pakistan has very serious implications: nuclear, aero-space and maritime dimensions. It may also involve Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh.  Such a venture would hurt China’s global image badly. India would have diplomatic support of almost the entire world. This, to my mind, is the least likely manifestation. However, if it does occur, India could initially hold China in the North, and turn its attention and weight towards Pakistan. This probability will serve as a deterrent to the Pakistani participation. As India would be the main sufferer, it could legitimately ‘hurt’ maritime interests of China and Pakistan in the Indian Ocean and even rescind its NFU of the nuclear doctrine to send warning signals to both countries.

In all these manifestations, China-Pakistan military collusion in the Karakoram Pass region can be considered as the most likely scenario.

Comprehensive Strategy to Counter Collusion and Collaboration

What should be our comprehensive response strategy to the collusive and collaborative threat from China and Pakistan?

India’s national aim is to achieve economic development without compromising its security and strategic autonomy. Thus, it would wish to avoid a war.

The objective of this strategy, therefore, would be to (a) prevent and weaken collusion to minimize its adverse impact on our security, and (b) deal with warlike or a war situation, if it occurs despite our efforts to prevent it. This will have to be a multi-faceted, multi-layered strategy, with synergized political, diplomatic, economic and military measures. These measures will have to be bilateral as well as multilateral.

When deciding on war preventing measures, and their prioritization, we need to look at the history of our relationship as well as the likely future trajectory. While China and India are expected to grow on the world stage, and increase their influencing power, Pakistan’s growth appears stunted. We must also take note of our comprehensive national power. India factors 5 to 6 times ahead of Pakistan, and about 3 to 4 times behind China. Most analysts also believe that this gap is widening on either side of India. China, therefore, requires greater focus in the collusion and war prevention measures.[5]

At the same time, an assertive militarily backed-diplomacy is imperative to safe guard our core interests. There is no need to underplay or de-emphasize the ‘China Threat’, as we have been doing in the past decade. In order to outflank China-Pakistan axis, and/or to create ‘distance’ between Pakistan and China, we should exploit the widespread regional and global apprehensions about Pakistani terrorism, and Chinese hegemony in Asia. India should not severe or compromise its connections and stakes in Tibet. The spark of China’s ‘forcible military occupation of Tibet’ could be kept alive.

A war with China (over disputed territories) can not be prevented unless we maintain active political, diplomatic and economic interactions with China.[6] Such a China India relationship can, and should, transcend bilateral scope. Where possible, it should develop regional, global and strategic significance.[7]

Political and Economic Cooperation Strategy

The desired level of cooperation, without compromising security and strategic autonomy, is already reflected in the ‘India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity Agreement’. Some of the thrust areas mentioned therein are:

• Deeper bilateral and regional economic engagement.[8] Improve trade arrangements, establish industrial zones for enterprises of both countries and explore prospects of regional economic partnership such as the BCIM Economic Corridor etc.
• Maintain peace, tranquility and improve bilateral relations on the India-China border. Border Defence Cooperation Agreement to strengthen measures to maintain stability on the border.
• Exploration of a framework for the settlement of India-China boundary question by the Special Representatives of both countries. We need to push this with greater vigour.
• Defence exchanges and military exercises to build greater trust and confidence. This should continue.
• Strengthening cooperation on trans-border Rivers, exchange of flood season hydrological data and emergency management.
• Facilitation of greater people to people contacts and exchanges, supported by sister-city relationships.
• Coordination and cooperation in multilateral forums (including Russia-India-China, BRICS, and G-20) on tackling global issues such as climate change, international terrorism, food and energy security, and in the establishment of a fair and equitable economic system.

India should also endeavor to forge and sustain strategic relations with its immediate neighbors in South Asia, the littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region including South China Sea, and major powers surrounding China including Russia, Japan, Vietnam, Myanmar, Afghanistan and Iran.

It needs to strengthen its military diplomacy in the immediate neighborhood; even reduce these nations’ dependency on the China made weapons by offering subsidized military equipment.

To cover China’s rise in immediate neighborhood, and other global issues which are likely to be affected adversely by China-Pakistan collusion, India needs to develop a measure of strategic coordination with the US in the Asia Pacific region, the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and Afghanistan. We should aim to leverage our regional and global relations to dissuade or weaken this collusion.

China being a permanent member of the UNSC, and a greater economy, is better placed in the global political and economic structure. It would be possible to neutralize this Chinese advantage to some extent if/when India is admitted to the UNSC.

Military Confrontational Strategy

As stated earlier, India’s national aim is to achieve economic development without compromising its security and strategic autonomy. It would wish to avoid a war. But we all know that there are limits to diplomacy.[9]

While continuing with cooperative strategy and measures, therefore, our military strategy should be to possess a level of military capacity, capability and ‘escalation dominance’, which acts as a ‘deterrent’ against Pakistan, and ‘dissuasion’ against China.

To some extent, the nuclear deterrence and our capability with long range weapon systems will itself act as a war preventive deterrent and/or dissuasion. And if a conflict does take place, it would be desirable to apply the limited war concepts and limit the war in space, in duration, and in its intensity.[10]

The limited war concept also implies that diplomatic channels be kept open, and government to government communication uncluttered. The communications through direct and indirect channels, and tacitly by actions manifest on the ground, would help condition the adversary. At the higher level of a conflict, an early conflict termination would be desirable for both. Localized conflicts are easier to terminate. A face saving is easier because the resources committed are less, and prestige is not staked inordinately. The limited war concept would also ensure that the NFU of the nuclear doctrine holds. Restricting the conflict to one or more theatres (Ladakh theatre, the Central theatre, Sikkim theatre, and the McMahon Line theatre) may localize the conflict. In a sense, this concept avoids the worst penalties of war to adversaries on both sides.

Limiting a conventional war also requires a certain level of ‘escalation dominance’. This can be achieved horizontally as well as vertically. Horizontally, it could mean opening other land border (s) like the Chumbi Valley and the maritime front, where we have some strategic advantage. Vertically, it implies stepping up the ladder-with high caliber conventional weapons, air power, missile strikes, and readiness to use nuclear weapons. Since there is excessive disparity on the land border, we may also consider using naval capabilities to interdict Chinese shipping on the sea lanes near the Malacca Straits and Arabian Sea.

What is important is that we do need to improve our military capacity; with greater focus on cyber, space, C4I and special operations capabilities; and rail, road infrastructure development on both fronts, which enable force mobilization with minimum delay.

I also recommend three additional, more important efforts to improve military capacity. These are:

• The need to improve intelligence gathering in Tibet and China. This is a serious limitation and can significantly affect the performance of the armed forces on the Northern front.
• A unitary control in border management. Operational command and control of para military forces deployed on the LoC/LAC (disputed border belts) should be entrusted to one agency and one ministry.
• A comprehensive operational doctrine for asymmetric war, with special emphasis on the use of Special Forces, against Chinese military adventurism. It is necessary because the desired level of our war preparedness will take years to materialize.

The Siachen Dispute

 Many people in India and Pakistan think that Siachen is a ‘low hanging fruit’ amongst India-Pakistan disputes. They are keen on withdrawal of Indian troops from the Soltoro Ridge. No doubt, in the initial stages, occupation of Siachen, apart from a military effort of Herculean proportions, involved considerable loss of lives and financial drain. The sacrifices made by the army and air force personnel on account of harsh terrain and enemy actions can never be forgotten. But over the years, with experience and ever improving technology, it has been possible to overcome terrain and sustenance problems substantially. Technological advancements in future can be expected to further offset these difficulties. Should India forego its strategic advantage due to cost-benefit ratio analyses?  Or, because not a blade of grass grows in the area! If that is to be believed then why has India put up its flag at Gangotri in South Pole?

Conclusion

The China-Pakistan strategic embrace is not likely to change in the near future. We know that a central feature of Chinese strategy is to persist with a policy of no-compromise on core issues, and to try and win a war without having to fight a battle. Ambiguity with a smile is characteristic of Chinese diplomacy.

China continues to delay delineation of the LAC and to resolve the boundary dispute. It is now becoming shrill on claiming Arunachal Pradesh now. The Chinese strategic presence in the POK, particularly in the Northern areas of Gilgit-Baltistan, which had been accepted by them as a disputed area in 1963-64, is yet another provocative joint venture.

Pragmatism demands that we do all that we can to contain our differences with China and prevent a two-front war situation.  We can continue to build economic links which have made impressive strides, and separate our bilateral differences from the global issues on which we can work together to mutual advantage.

At the end of the day, India’s ability to deal with its external security challenges will be determined by its own comprehensive national will, and tangible power in its economic and military spheres. While forging partnerships with other nations, India must build its own strength. This itself would act as a restraint on China-Pakistan muscle-flexing.

                     General V P Malik (Retd)                                

[1] When stringent export controls by the Western countries had made it difficult for Pakistan to acquire materials and uranium enriching equipment from elsewhere. The US then ignored the China-Pakistan nuclear proliferation nexus, to the point of covering it up in the A.Q. Khan’s case, when India was most affected.

[2] Under a 1991 agreement, permissible under the revised 1992 NSG guidelines. In early 2010, Pakistan ratified an inter-governmental agreement with China, which provided for Chinese funding of the reactors to the extent of 82 per cent.

[3] Hussein Haqqani once said, “For China, Pakistan is low cost secondary deterrent to India while for Pakistan, China is a high value guarantor of security against India.” According to Zardari, “Pakistan is a force-multiplier for China”.

[3] The atmosphere prior to signing of this Treaty was dominated by the US policy announcements to help India to ‘become a major world power in the 21^st century’.

 [5] In fact this is how India-China relations are panning out currently; at bilateral as well as multilateral levels. 

[6] Such relations are also necessary to be able to create ‘distance’ and cracks in the China Pakistan collusion.

[7] “India and China relations today are becoming autonomous and inclusive, moving beyond the orthodox bilateral context. Both are important powers in the current global political and economic structure. They are the two largest economies after the US and have a major impact and influence in the evolving global order. Both are attached to a range of multilateral mechanisms and bodies at regional, cross-continental and global levels, which helps them to establish new layers of engagement and power politics. The emerging layers of power politics do take the scope of their relationship far beyond the purview of bilateralism.”Dr Jagannath Panda in Review Essay, Strategic Analysis, 2014

[8] Create a condition like two boxers getting into a clinch.

[9] Admiral J C Wylie in his papers ‘Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power’ stated (a) ‘Despite whatever effort there may be to prevent it, there may be a war’, and (b) ‘we can not predict with certainty the pattern of war for which we prepare ourselves.’ It has seldom been possible to forecast the time, the place, the scope, the intensity, and the general tenor of a conflict.

[10] On October 18, 2014, the Prime Minister in the Commanders’ Conference said, “Beyond the immediate, we are facing a future where security challenges will be less predictable; situations will evolve and change swiftly; and, technological changes will make responses more difficult to keep pace with. The threats may be known, but the enemy may be invisible. Domination of cyber space will become increasingly important. Control of space may become as critical as that of land, air and sea. Full scale wars may become rare, but force will remain an instrument of deterrence and influencing behavior, and the duration of conflicts will be shorter.”

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Protest on in Srinagar. Tribune photo: Amin War

Ehsan Fazili

Tribune News Service

Srinagar, August 6

At least 40 people, including seven women, were injured in fresh clashes between protesters and security forces in Anantnag town of south Kashmir on Saturday, as curfew continued in many parts of the Valley and normal life remained paralysed for the 29th consecutive day.

The fresh clashes broke out at Chee village on the outskirts of the town, where a protest rally was being organised as part of the ongoing protests against the civilian killings in Kashmir.

(Follow The Tribune on Facebook; and Twitter @thetribunechd)

The police and CRPF personnel removed ‘shamiyana’ and beat up the organisers to prevent them from holding the rally, locals alleged. The police resorted to lathicharge, lobbed teargas shells and opened fire in the air to disperse the protesters, which led to injuries to at least 40 civilians.

The major towns of south Kashmir—Anantnag, Kulgam, Awantipora and Pampore—are under curfew, while restrictions are enforced elsewhere in the area, the police said.A day after the post-Friday clashes that led to the death of at least three people and injuries to over 300 others across the Valley, curfew has been extended to four major towns of Budgam district—Chadoora, Khan Saheb, Magam and Budgam. Two people—Mohammad Maqbool in Chadoora and Zahoor Ahmad in Khan Saheb areas— were killed in the clashes on Friday.Curfew was also imposed in parts of Sopore town of Baramulla district, where a youth, Danish Rasool, was killed and over 50 others got injured in the clashes between protesters and police on Friday afternoon.Curfew was also enforced at Khanpora locality of Baramulla town. Restrictions are in force in other areas of Baramulla, Kupwara and Bandipore districts of north Kashmir.In Srinagar, areas under five police stations in downtown and Batamaloo continue to remain under curfew. Restrictions are also in place in other areas of the district.

When will PM ‘wake up to crisis’ in Kashmir: Omar

Takes to Twitter

Srinagar, August 6

Former Jammu and Kashmir chief minister Omar Abdullah has questioned Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “silence” on the situation in the Valley, which he termed as “heart-breaking” and “worrying”.“Heart breaking & worrying in equal measure. At what point will the Centre (read Hon PM) wake up to the crisis here?” Omar wrote on Twitter on Friday night.He was reacting to the death of three people as security forces tried to quell violent protests on Friday.The opposition National Conference working president had on Friday hit out at the Centre for claiming that the situation in the Valley was improving.(Follow The Tribune on Facebook; and Twitter @thetribunechd) “1 more unfortunate death, countless injuries today & the Centre tells the Hon SC (Supreme Court) that ‘things are improving’. Wow!” Omar wrote.In another tweet, Omar said it was only the ruling coalition partners–PDP and BJP–who agreed with this stand.“Seriously? By which stretch of imagination? I haven’t met anyone in the Valley except the BJP-PDP ostriches who agree!” he said.The Centre on Friday told the Supreme Court that the law and order situation in Kashmir Valley had improved considerably since the outbreak of violence following the killing of Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani on July 8.It said the violent protests had gone down from 201 on July 9 to 11 on August 3. With Friday’s deaths, the toll in the violence in the Valley has now reached 54. PTI

The BrahMos weapon system. — PTI file photo

New Delhi, August 3

The government has sanctioned induction of additional BrahMos supersonic missiles, with steep dive capability and 290 km range, to be deployed in the Eastern sector to ramp up its capabilities along the border with China.Defence sources said the government has cleared the fourth BrahMos regiment at a cost of over Rs 4,300 crore.(Follow The Tribune on Facebook; and Twitter @thetribunechd)The regiment consists of around 100 missiles, five mobile autonomous launchers on 12×12 heavy-duty trucks and a mobile command post, among other hardware and software, sources said.The missile was under test by the Army and last known test of the missile in the Eastern sector was done in May, 2015.The steep-dive attack cruise missile can hit enemy targets hidden in the shadows of mountains.The Indian Army has already inducted three regiments of BrahMos in its arsenal. All are equipped with Block-III version of the missile.The land-attack version of BrahMos has been operational in the Indian Army since 2007.The fire-and-forget BrahMos has the capability to take on surface-based targets by flying a combined hi-lo trajectory, thus evading enemy air defence systems. Fire-and-forget missiles do not need further guidance after launch.BrahMos is a stealth supersonic cruise missile that can be launched from submarines, ships, aircraft or land and has been inducted in all the three services. — PTI

NEW DELHI: The Indian Air Force (IAF) has in principle agreed for civil aircraft operations from Adampur in Punjab, the Union defence ministry said on Tuesday.

In a written reply to a question raised during the ongoing monsoon session in the Rajya Sabha, Union defence minister Manohar Parrikar said it was subject to conditions that the Airports Authority of India (AAI) will create all required infrastructure outside the existing Indian Air Force boundary to facilitate civil aircraft operations.If the move goes through, it will provide relief to lakhs of passengers who now have to take the circuitous route via Amristar to Jalandhar and Ludhiana.

Deepkamal Kaur

Tribune News Service

Jalandhar, June 14

Union Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar said today that decks had been cleared to open the Adampur air force base for commercial flights as the two requisite NoCs required from the defence authorities had been granted.He said that a meeting would be held next month with the officials of Airport Authority of India and Air India. Parrikar said this during his visit to Hoshiarpur where he opened a war memorial. Alighting at the Adampur air force station, he first paid his respects to the 567 martyrs of the district and laid a wreath at the memorial.He was received by Union Minister and Hoshiarpur MP Vijay Sampla and BJP national vice- president Avinash Rai Khanna. Parrikar held a meeting with the intellectuals on the two years of the Modi government followed by a media interaction.Justifying the shoot-at-sight orders by the Indian Air Force against anyone found scaling the boundary walls of an installation, he said it was a normal practice to issue such orders in high-alert areas. He said an NIAteam was leaving for Pakistan for a probe into the Pathankot attack but the green signal from Pakistan was still awaited.On the crash of MiG 27 and a move to ground the aircraft by 2018, he said air accidents were currently rated as 0.23 per cent for 10,000 flying hours and had reduced considerably. “We will phase them out,” he replied.On the NCC cadets not getting their uniform, he said they would start getting these soon.

“India now has the capability of protecting its strategic interests. The massive operation which came as the year was closing, demonstrated that the three services, the Army, the Air Force and the Navy, had acted in perfect coordination. The Maldives Operation has been a show piece in military strategy.” —Janes Magazine, Dec 1988.

In the early hours of 03 November 1988, 55,000 residents of Male (the capital of Maldives) awoke to the reality of an armed coup, hearing gunshots all round for the first time in their lives. Till then, the Maldivian’s had hardly ever witnessed crime leave aside violence. The last murder in this island nation was reported in 1976 and that too of a German murdering his girlfriend and the one before that was way back in 1793. Now, a rich businessman, Abdullah Luthufi, had taken over the island nation, capturing the radio and TV stations and the presidential palace with the help of mercenaries from the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE). The 1500 strong National Security Service (NSS) whose headquarter is located adjacent to the presidential palace was besieged by the mercenaries, who fortunately failed to enter and take over the armoury. Complicity of a few NSS cadres was never ruled out.

Mr Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, the president since 1978, had been returned to power with a 98.5 per cent majority for the third time. He was scheduled to visit India prior to his oath taking ceremony on 11 November. On learning of the coup, the president went into hiding, taking shelter in a safe house in the capital island of Male. From the safe house he requested assistance, first from the U.S. followed by the Soviets and thereafter Pakistan to rescue him. The U.S. base at Diego Garcia was the nearest, located 1,175 kms away, but it was election year with the U.S. Presidential elections scheduled for the 8th of November. Not having received a positive response from the three nations, President Gayoom requested India for assistance. It would be remembered that India was at that time assisting Sri Lanka with the IPKF deployed in the Northern and Eastern parts of Sri Lanka, fighting the LTTE.

3500 kms away from Male, where this violent drama for power of a small though important island nation was unfolding, another seemingly normal day dawned for the paratroopers of 50 (I) Parachute Brigade located at Agra. This was soon to change to an exciting, challenging and historical day. I was then serving as the Brigade Major (BM) of 50 (I) Parachute Brigade and at around 1000h, I received the first indication of an impending operation when I received a call from Brig. V.P. Malik (later General and COAS) the Deputy Director General of Military Operations (DDG MO). Brig. Malik issued crisp instructions and the urgency in the voice conveyed the gravity of an emerging though uncertain situation. I was informed that the Para Brigade was to move to an Island for operations. One company group and one battalion group was to be kept at standby to move at 6 hours notice and at 12 hours notice respectively. The Brigade Commander with one staff officer was required to move to the MO Directorate at Delhi by the evening, but the time was not specified.

At this time, Brig. F.F.C. Bulsara, Commander 50 (I) Parachute Brigade was on a visit to the Army Airborne Training Area at Kheria. He was requested to fall back immediately to the headquarters. Not being privy to any further information, we thought that this was one more of the numerous moves of the Para Brigade’s Reconnaissance and Order group to Sri Lanka for another of those contingency plans for Op Pawan, the codename given to\ operations being conducted by the IPKF.

At about 1040h, I received another call from the Army Headquarters, this time from the VCOAS, Lt Gen. (later COAS) S.F. Rodrigues. As the Commander was moving back from Kheria to the brigade headquarters and was not in communication, the Vice Chief spoke to me and gave the following orders/ instructions:
• Brigade to move to Maldives.
• One Battalion group to emplane by 1230 hours (ie less than 2 hours)
• Brigade less battalion group to move to Maldives on night 03/04 November.
• Prepare for an airborne assault on an island, para drop planned on a beach.
• Enemy is equipped with small arms, rocket launchers, mortars and general purpose machine guns (GPMGs). There is no air defence, though the enemy may possess some surface to air missiles.
• Air effort allotted is three IL-76 and ten AN 32 aircraft.
• First and second line ammunition to be carried.

The brigade was located in Agra, but most troops were committed on training and administrative activities. Of the three battalions of the brigade, 7 Para was out on collective training, 3 Para had two companies deployed at Lucknow and 6 Para had two companies providing security at COD Agra. However, 6 Para and 3 Para were both mobilised and 7 Para was instructed to move back to Agra forthwith. In the meantime, 10 Guards (Mechanised) was also mobilised from Gwalior by MO Directorate to move to Agra and marry up with the Para Brigade at the earliest. Those were not the days of the internet and mobile communications, and we had very little or no information on Maldives. All that we knew was that Male was the capital of the Island nation and the airfield was at Hulhule. It was only after Brig. V.P. Malik landed at Agra at around 1515h, with the Indian High Commissioner to Maldives, Mr Ashok Banerjee, that the clarity and enormity of the task dawned on us. By this time, the Commander had also returned.

Brig. Malik gave out the task and plan as formulated at MO Directorate. The task was categorical “To rescue the President of Maldives and escort him safely to India”. The plan in essence included two airborne assaults – one on a beach at Male and the other in Hulhule airfield. Thereafter, the rest of the combat echelons were to be landed at the Hulhule airfield, once it was secured. However, if the airfield at Hulhule island was under the control of troops loyal to the President, then the two IL-76 aircraft would land troops at Hulhule. However, the airborne assault at Male would still go ahead as there was no wherewithal to move the assault echelons to Male island which was separated by about one kilometre of ocean. If the airfield was in the hands of loyal troops, codeword ‘HADIYA’ was to be sent by radio and the runway lights were to be switched on and off. To facilitate landing, the airfield lights were to be switched on just prior to landing and switched off once the landing was successfully accomplished.

With scant inputs of not only the prevailing situation but also of the topography, the situation remained uncertain and confused. The only maps available were photocopies of tourist sketches of Male and Hulhule islands. But now Brig F.F.C. Bulsara, took charge. A decisive military leader and soldier, he comprehended the seriousness of the situation which was compounded by the prevailing confusion, and issued clear and concise instructions not only to the units of the Para Brigade but also to the Air Force and the Military Operations Directorate. He had trained the brigade very effectively so as to achieve all military tasks,especially airborne tasks under the most challenging of circumstances. After getting as much information as he could from Mr Ashok Banerjee’s detailed knowledge of Male, Brig. Bulsara decided to launch the operation with Col (later Brig.) S.C. Joshi, CO, 6 Para spearheading the operation. Two plans were made for the operation:

Plan ‘A’ was to launch an airborne assault with sixty paratroopers from one IL 76 at Hulhule airfield, to capture and secure the airfield. The remaining paratroopers in that IL-76 aircraft were then to be landed, followed by troops from the follow up IL-76 aircraft. Thereafter, the troops were to move to Male to rescue the President by capturing and commandeering local boats. The limit of sixty paratroopers was dictated by the availability of packed parachutes with the Air Force on that particular day and time. Plan ‘B’ involved a landing at the Hulhule airfield. The decision as to which plan was to be implemented was to be taken by Brig. Bulsara, once the the aircraft were over Hulhule airfield or when nearing Maldives. Flying the two aircraft were Group Captain (later Air Marshal) AK Goel and Group Captain A.G. Bewoor, the Commanding Officer of 44 Squadron.

The assault echelons of 6 Para, 3 Para and 17 Para Field Regiment, along with sappers, signallers and medical detachments, emplaned in the two IL 76 aircraft and took off from Agra at around 1730 hours. I, along with the GSO3, accompanied the Commander in the lead aircraft as part of the tactical headquarter. The four and half hour flying time from Agra to Male was well spent in carrying out detailed briefings of all contingencies, including showing the photograph of the president to all ranks.

On approaching Hulhule one could only see the vast ocean. Group Captain Bewoor then confirmed receipt of codeword ‘HADIYA’ on radio from the ATC. The light signal had also been give. It was decision time now for the Commander.

Was the code given under duress or by deceit? Even during the landing, it was easy for the rebels to simply position a vehicle on the runway, thus jeopardising not only the mission but also the lives of 180 troops on board. The other alternative seemed equally dangerous as Male is about two square kilometres only and the assaulting paratroopers would have mostly landed in the sea, with no chance of survival. The drop zone where the airborne assault was planned was no more than 200 m by 50 m. Weighing up the odds, Brig. Bulsara decided to land. That decision proved vital and was to be discussed in military circles for many years, with many self proclaimed military experts criticising the decision. Given the task and the situation it was a bold and pragmatic decision, the less risky of the two alternatives and with a better probability of success, exemplifying in full measure the motto of the Paratroopers “Who Dares,Wins”.

Fortunately the landing was unopposed and the first IL -76 with 6 Para and the brigade tactical headquarter landed at 2148 hours and secured the airfield in quicktime. The second IL 76 landing after a gap of ten minutes, brought in the company of 3 Para under Maj. (later Lt Gen.) N.K.S Ghei, elements of sappers and medical and the artillery component under Col K.K.K. Singh. Hulhule was totally abandoned, but intermittent firing could be heard at Male. 6 Para with a company under Maj. R.J.S. Dhillon, after commandeering the boats had moved for the main assault to secure a beachhead South West of Male with the 3 Para company heading straight for the Male jetty as a diversionary. Around this time, the troops observed a ship sailing between the two islands. The ATC also gave information that the rebels had taken control of a merchant vessel and were fleeing with hostages including a minister and his wife. The ship was effectively engaged with all available firepower including recoilless guns and machine guns.

In the meantime the Commander got in touch with the President from the ATC. The President informed him that the situation was desperate as he was surrounded from all sides by the rebels and could not hold out any longer. It is to the credit of the Commander’s plan and the flawless execution by the troops that by around 0220 hours, Col SC Joshi and Maj RJS Dhillon secured the President from his safe house. In the meantime troops had lifted the siege on the NSS headquarters, TV and radio stations and the presidential palace and commenced securing and sanitising the areas. President Gayoom, now safe and secure wanted to stay on at Male, whereas the orders were to evacuate him to India. This was also the time that the follow up waves started landing at Hulhule and by early morning more than 1600 troops had built up with all support echelons.

By around 0430 hours the NSS headquarters had been fully secured and the president moved, to enable him to speak on a secure link to the Prime Minister of India. The primary task achieved with surgical precision, the brigade was tasked to now help restore the situation and neutralise all rebels. Early morning the IAF fighter air crafts made a couple of passes over Male reassuring all that normalcy had been restored by the Indian Armed Forces. At 0800 hours an Indian Navy IL 38 reconnaissance aircraft landed at Hulhule and after an update on the ship (MV Progress Light) having escaped with the rebels and hostages on board confirmed that while enroute they had sighted a ship listing portside, South West of Male. The navy thereafter kept a surveillance over MV Progress Light and with INS Godavari and Betwa having moved in on 06 November, rescued the hostages, took the rebels including their leader into custody and destroyed the ship.

The coup leaders and rebels were brought to Male and handed over to the Maldivian authorities. The Indian Army was requested to keep the rebels in their custody till the legal proceedings could be completed, and accordingly they were taken to a prison Island Gamadoo under the escort of Indian troops. 50 (I) Para Brigade less 6 Para with two companies de-inducted by 17 November. Thereafter, the Indian Army, on the request of the Maldivian government took on the task of capacity building and helping NSS reform to meet their future security challenges.

The precision timed “Operation Cactus” in which Indian armed forces acted within hours to thwart a coup attempt to dislodge a lawfully elected government on the Indian Ocean Island of Maldives made military watchers sit up worldwide.

On 03 April 1989, Time magazine ran a cover story “Super Power Rising” stating “India asserts its place on the world stage”, consequent to the Indian Armed Forces unprecedented success in executing an intervention operations albeit at the request of a friendly government. Op Cactus launched to rescue President M.A. Gayoom, demonstrated Indian power and capability to be a ‘net security provider’ in the region. The operations launched from a cold start and executed with surgical precision was successfully accomplished within 16 hours of the first indication of an impending operation, 3000 km from base. The cover story of Timemagazine by Ross H. Munro flags India’s growing military power, quote “At an air force base five miles from the Taj Mahal at Agra, hundreds of India’s finest combat troops (50(1) Parachute Brigade) filed into the cavernous holds of Soviet built IL-76 transporters, whose jet engines were whining impatiently. Soon the transporters were headed into the night, winging southwards across the subcontinent and then out over the Indian Ocean. When they landed four hours later at one of the 1200 coral islands, that make up the republic of Maldives, the paratroopers charged out of the planes, rifles at the ready.”

Operation Maldives launched conjointly by the Army, Navy and the Air Force was successfully accomplished without a single casualty. The operation exemplifies the excellent jointness achieved. The success of this operation at home mostly went unnoticed as did a few important lessons learnt. Had it failed, maybe India too would have created structures and organisations to exploit the full potential of a Special Operations Command to safeguard national interest and assets, much like the United States which established the US Special Operations Command (USSOC) comprising the SOF of the three services and marines, in the aftermath of the failure of Operation EAGLE CLAW to rescue American diplomats held hostage at the US Embassy at Tehran in April 1980.

Operation Cactus is undoubtedly one of the most professionally executed military operation in the world, right on top with the likes of Operation Thunderbolt (Israeli raid on Entebbe), Otto Skorzeny’s rescue of Mussolini, the long range desert patrols of David Sterling (Phantom major) and Op Geronimo, the Abbottabad raid by US seals to neutralise Osama Bin Laden among a few others.

Lt Gen. Vinod Bhatia, PVSM, AVSM, SM was the Brigade Major during the above operation. After superannuating from the Indian Army, he is presently the Director, CENJOWS (Centre for Joint Warfare Studies), an inter-service think tank based in New Delhi. Views expressed are personal.