Called Exercise Sea Dragon-25, the drill will test anti-submarine warfare capabilities

The Quad — a four-nation grouping comprising India, the US, Japan and Australia — has been joined by South Korea for a naval exercise focused on tracking submarines.

Called “Exercise Sea Dragon-25”, the drill will test anti-submarine warfare capabilities, including detecting both simulated and live submarines, tracking their locations around the clock and launching attacks.

The exercise is being conducted off Guam, a US military base in the western Pacific Ocean, and is being hosted by the US from March 4 to 19.

Anti-submarine warfare plays a crucial role in enhancing the Quad countries’ ability to conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions.

The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has successfully conducted high-altitude trials of the indigenous on-board oxygen generating system (OBOGS)-based integrated life support system (ILSS) for the Tejas fighter aircraft. This is a critical component for survival of pilots during…

Tribune News Service

The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has successfully conducted high-altitude trials of the indigenous on-board oxygen generating system (OBOGS)-based integrated life support system (ILSS) for the Tejas fighter aircraft. This is a critical component for survival of pilots during flying.

Developed by DRDO’s Defence Bio-Engineering and Electro Medical Laboratory, the OBOGS-ILSS is a cutting-edge system designed to generate and regulate breathable oxygen for pilots during flight, eliminating dependence on traditional liquid oxygen cylinder-based systems.

The ILSS has 90 per cent indigenous content. With appropriate modifications, the system can also be adapted for use in the MiG-29K and other aircraft. The ILSS underwent rigorous testing on the Tejas’ Prototype Vehicle-3 aircraft of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, meeting the required aeromedical standards in varied flight conditions, including altitudes of up to 50,000 feet above mean sea level, a defence spokesperson said.

The appearance of the ‘notice’ and the launch of a major political campaign clearly indicate problems in the higher echelons of the PLA.

Indiscipline, wavering political and ideological commitment of officers and personnel and corruption in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are causing serious concern to Chinese President Xi Jinping and the senior echelons of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and PLA.

The indiscipline and lack of ideological commitment, which includes questioning of the PLA’s “absolute obedience” to the CCP, will worry the CCP leadership more because the PLA is the “party’s army”.

Accordingly, a major new education campaign focussed on instilling political loyalty to Xi Jinping has been launched. This has been accompanied by a raft of measures intended to further tighten discipline.

On February 5, the People’s Liberation Army Daily published a “Notice on Deepening the Education and Practice Activities Focusing on Forging Firm Political Loyalty and Winning the Battle of Hard Work” issued by the Central Military Commission’s Political Work Department — China’s apex military body responsible for the political education and ideology of PLA personnel.

It heralded the launch of the “annual major education of the entire army” and asserted that it would “strengthen political guidance.”R

Emphasising the leading roles of Xi Jinping and the CCP, it stressed that “we must unremittingly use Xi Jinping’s Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era to unite hearts and build souls” and “must always regard the Party’s innovative theoretical arming as the primary task of building souls and educating people….”

Significantly, the ‘notice’ specifically mentioned the need to strengthen learning and ideological transformation of the “key minority.”

The reference to the “key minority” implies there are officers at senior levels in the PLA who are not in step with Xi Jinping’s thoughts or whose ideological commitment that the CCP leadership has assessed is wavering.

The PLA has been trying to recruit larger numbers of college graduates for more than a decade now, but senior instructors have been complaining that the young graduates question instructions and are not amenable to discipline.

The notice also added: “We must closely follow the needs of cultivating officers and soldiers’ values and growing up, and carry out special education focusing on strengthening the belief in strengthening the army ….”

The CCP Central Committee (CC) General Office “recently” issued the “National Party Member Education and Training Work Plan (2024-2028)” and instructed all regions and departments to conscientiously implement it.

The CMC was also instructed to implement it among party members in the PLA.

The work plan highlights its main theme as “of learning and implementing Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.”

Also, last week, Xi Jinping signed an order to issue the newly revised Regulations on Internal Affairs of the People’s Liberation Army of China, Regulations on Discipline of the People’s Liberation Army of China and Regulations on Formations of the People’s Liberation Army of China, which

will come into effect on April 1, 2025.

The revised regulations aim to “thoroughly implement Xi Jinping’s thinking on strengthening the military…achieve the Party’s goal of strengthening the military in the new era and build the people’s army into a world-class army.”

The regulations emphasise Xi Jinping’s thought and focus on training and discipline.

On March 3, the PLA Daily published an interview with leaders of the CMC Training and Management Department on the regulations.

They stressed that it included “ensuring the military is always in complete ideological, political, and operational alignment with the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, ensuring absolute loyalty, purity, and reliability of the armed forces.”

It added that the regulations further refine the officer-soldier relationship by promoting unity, friendship, harmony, and purity within the ranks and ensuring the military remains strong and cohesive.

Corruption remains a problem in the PLA and China’s civil-military industry. Dozens of senior PLA rocket force officers have been dismissed since late 2023, with at least 13 PLA generals ‘removed’ from the National People’s Congress (NPC) — China’s version of a

parliament.

The size of the military delegation to the NPC has fallen and may shrink further. Of the 283 deputies from the PLA appointed to the NPC, there are now only 267. Fourteen have been removed on charges of corruption.

Reports suggest that for the last six months, a quiet purge has also been underway and at least eight senior executives in China’s sensitive defence industrial complex have been removed.

This includes the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), one of China’s top 10 defence groups, that owns some of the most well-known Chinese shipyards which build warships for the PLA navy and China’s aerospace and aeronautics sector.

There are indications now that this purge is likely to expand its remit and sharpen its focus to ensure that senior officials are politically and ideologically aligned with the CCP Central Committee and Central Military Commission, with “Xi Jinping at the core.”

The appearance of the ‘notice’ and the launch of a major political campaign clearly indicate problems in the higher echelons of the PLA.

There are indications of similar problems in the CCP, with Politburo Standing Committee member and director of the CCP CC General Office Cai Qi convening an all-China conference on the “need to continuously strengthen cohesion and forge the Party’s soul” and “enhance the Party’s political building.”

The CCP leadership is likely to take progressively tougher measures to instill the CCP’s ideology among PLA personnel and control corruption, especially as the next party congress draws near.

“Kavach: Ranneeti Ka Rangmanch”, the annual literary and cultural fest of Panjab University’s Department of Defence and National Security Studies, started at the Student Centre on the university premises here today. The department is also celebrating 25th anniversary of its…

Kavach: Ranneeti Ka Rangmanch”, the annual literary and cultural fest of Panjab University’s Department of Defence and National Security Studies, started at the Student Centre on the university premises here today.

Jammu and Kashmir Chief Secretary Atal Dulloo on Tuesday listened to the issues and concerns of ex-servicemen highlighted by Lieutenant General Navin Sachdeva, GOC 16 Corps based in Nagrota, in his office at Civil Secretariat, Jammu. A spokesperson said some…

Jammu and Kashmir Chief Secretary Atal Dulloo on Tuesday listened to the issues and concerns of ex-servicemen highlighted by Lieutenant General Navin Sachdeva, GOC 16 Corps based in Nagrota, in his office at Civil Secretariat, Jammu. A spokesperson said some of the core demands raised with the Chief Secretary included compilation and complete digitisation of the database of all the ex-servicemen of J&K for proper management of the cadre besides preservation and easy maintenance of records for posterity.

They also asked for allowing them to apply for government jobs under ex-servicemen quota in the last year of their service as the recruitment process takes some months in its completion.

In order to bring added efficiency in grievance resolution, the Chief Secretary advised them to utilise the ‘JK Samadhan’ portal for registration of their grievances. He said this platform gives seamless access to the administration and ensures timely resolution of grievances with quality outcomes up to the optimum satisfaction of the aggrieved persons.

Officials say prima facie it appeared to be a case of death by suicide

An Army jawan died of firearm injuries sustained from his service rifle at a forward location in Kamalkote sector of Jammu and Kashmir’s Baramulla district, officials said on Wednesday.

Naik B T Rao (25), hailing from Andhra Pradesh, died on Tuesday.

The bullet was fired from the service rifle of the deceased jawan, they said adding the exact circumstances of his death were being ascertained.

The officials said prima facie it appeared to be a case of death by suicide.

However, Srinagar-based defence spokesman did not comment on the incident.

A suspected grenade attack took place near a police post in north Kashmir’s Baramulla late Tuesday night, Jammu and Kashmir Police said. According to a police spokesperson, a blast-like sound was heard around 9.20 pm from the rear side of…

Our Correspondent

A suspected grenade attack took place near a police post in north Kashmir’s Baramulla late Tuesday night, Jammu and Kashmir Police said.

According to a police spokesperson, a blast-like sound was heard around 9.20 pm from the rear side of Police Post Old Town, Baramulla, raising alarm among residents. However, no casualties or damage were reported.

Following the incident, security forces immediately cordoned off the area in coordination with other agencies. During the search, police recovered a grenade pin from outside the post’s boundary wall, leading them to suspect an attempted grenade attack.

“The grenade landed and detonated inside Police Post Old Town in an area where no damage or casualties occurred. The impact crater is yet to be located,” the police said in a statement.

A thorough inquiry has been launched and search operations are ongoing in and around the area. Urging citizens to remain vigilant, Baramulla police assured the public of their commitment to ensuring safety and encouraged reporting of any suspicious activity to the nearest police unit.

Deep-rooted factionalism, multiple power centres and an ongoing internal power struggle has become the order of the day .

A few months ago, I received an unexpected message from a well-placed source within the Taliban. That message led to a series of secured phone calls, revealing startling insights into the regime’s internal dynamics. Until then, like many others, I believed that the Taliban had consolidated power and was establishing an iron-fisted rule. As the world sees it, the Taliban Emir’s primary focus is the institutionalisation of a gender apartheid regime. However, beneath this rigid surface, the regime is grappling with its own survival.

The communications I received spoke of deep-rooted factionalism, multiple power centres and an ongoing internal power struggle. Every faction within the Taliban is manoeuvring to strengthen itself at the expense of the remaining institutions built during the past two decades of western intervention.

I took these revelations seriously and sought confirmation from multiple sources inside the Taliban and Afghanistan. The more I investigated, the clearer it became: an internal conflict within the Taliban is not a question of if but when.

Recently, these internal divisions have begun surfacing in public discourse. The prevailing narrative often frames the power struggle as a conflict between Taliban leaders based in Kabul and those in Kandahar. In reality, the divisions run much deeper, rooted in regional and ethnic identities. The once-cohesive and monolithic terrorist organisation is unravelling along these very lines.

Unlike its founder Mullah Omar, the current Taliban Emir, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, lacks the authority and unifying force necessary to hold the group together. In an attempt to solidify his rule, he has institutionalised gender apartheid, isolated Afghanistan from the international community and maintained alliances with terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Despite these efforts, he has failed to consolidate power or maintain internal cohesion. His attempts to centralise authority — favouring commanders from his own Noorzai tribe —have only exacerbated the divisions.

The Taliban had a golden opportunity over the past three years to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. Rather than establishing a constitutional government based on popular consent, they have ruled through repression, issuing decrees that strip Afghans of political, social and civil rights. Rather than creating economic opportunities, they have monopolised the nation’s wealth, particularly the lucrative mining sector.

The Taliban’s taxation policies have further burdened ordinary Afghans, leaving them with little purchasing power. For the past three and a half years, US financial aid has propped up the Afghan economy and kept its currency relatively stable. However, as discussions about halting this aid gain momentum, the Afghan currency is plummeting and inflation is skyrocketing. The Taliban regime now finds itself in an increasingly vulnerable position.

Beyond economic mismanagement, the Taliban had a historic opportunity to engage with the world and gain international legitimacy. Despite diplomatic overtures from the US and the UN, they have shown no willingness to become a responsible member of the global community. Instead, they have rejected every pathway to legitimacy.

A comparison with the situation in Syria is instructive. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist group with origins in ISIS and Al-Qaida, faced widespread international condemnation and was designated a terrorist organisation. But, the HTS has actively worked to change its image, preserve Syria’s diverse and pluralistic society and address global security concerns. It is gradually gaining legitimacy both domestically and internationally.

The Taliban had far more diplomatic engagement and international goodwill through its Doha office before taking power. Yet, it has squandered opportunities to reform, choosing to institutionalise gender apartheid, alienating Afghans and global community.

Today, the Taliban stands as the world’s most isolated regime and one of the least popular governments in modern history. It is on the brink of collapse from within. The question is how soon they will bring the regime to its breaking point.

It is often assumed that international pressure and condemnation of the Taliban will have little effect. Recent developments suggest otherwise. The International Criminal Court prosecutor’s request for an arrest warrant against the Taliban’s Emir and Chief Justice for crimes against humanity — specifically their gender apartheid policies — has had a significant impact. The warrant has intensified internal divisions, with some Taliban factions using it to challenge the Emir’s authority. Many Taliban leaders and their followers see it as a sign that their days in power are numbered. The warrant is a formal recognition of the systematic injustice inflicted on Afghan women. It has also struck a nerve within the Taliban, a group that remains highly image-conscious. It is perceived as a public-shaming, reinforcing the idea that the Taliban’s rule is neither legitimate nor sustainable. The international community must remain consistent in calling out the Taliban’s policies on women and human rights.

A second critical development has been President Donald Trump’s decision to halt US financial assistance to Afghanistan under Taliban control. This move has dealt a severe blow to the Taliban’s financial stability, further weakening their grip on power. The Taliban have long manipulated humanitarian aid for their own benefit, monopolising resources while the Afghan people continue to suffer.

Moving forward, aid must be restructured to bypass the Taliban, ensuring that it reaches the Afghan people without strengthening the regime.

Finally, Trump appears keen to regain control over billions of dollars’ worth of US military equipment left in Afghanistan and, if feasible, retake the Bagram Air Base. Two approaches have been suggested: direct engagement with the Taliban or collaboration with the Afghan opposition in exile. However, a third, more strategic option is required — one that blends elements of both.

Direct engagement with the Taliban has failed repeatedly, emboldening them rather than moderating their behaviour. A more effective strategy would be for the US to appoint a strong envoy to work closely with Afghan opposition groups while also exploiting the Taliban’s internal fractures.

A transformation within the Taliban — one that integrates elements of Afghanistan’s previous governance structure with aspects of their conservative ideology — is not inconceivable. A similar shift has occurred in Syria. Given the Taliban’s internal power struggles and the influence of US allies in the Gulf, a similar approach in Afghanistan is plausible.

The international community cannot afford to take a passive stance on Afghanistan. By sustaining legal and diplomatic pressure, restructuring humanitarian aid and adopting a more strategic approach to engaging with opposition forces and internal Taliban factions, the Taliban’s grip on power can be further weakened. The regime is already unravelling from within — these steps can accelerate its collapse.

Courtesy: The Cipher Brief

Views are of the author

No matter how politically inconvenient, military actions should be documented and scrutinised

Lt Gen DS Hooda retd.

On February 27, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) released a 19-page report outlining the military failures leading to and during Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack, which claimed the lives of more than 1,200 people in Israel, while around 250 were taken hostage.

The report highlights that the threat of a surprise and wide-scale attack from Gaza was not perceived as realistic by the IDF due to a major gap in Israel’s understanding of Hamas. There was also a “false belief” that the IDF’s actions during the 2021 Gaza war were a successful deterrence against Hamas. Israel’s perceptions of Gaza were “rooted and deep”. Over the years, there were no meaningful attempts to question the perceptions, and no proper investigation was held to ask, “Where are we wrong?”

The report notes that the IDF struggled to mount a response as 5,000 Hamas terrorists breached the border in southern Israel. The IDF’s Gaza Division, responsible for this area, “was effectively defeated for several hours” on October 7. The Air Force responded quickly, but “there was significant difficulty distinguishing between IDF troops, civilians and terrorists”.

A month before the report’s release, IDF Chief of Staff Lt Gen Herzi Halevi tendered his resignation, stating that under his command, the IDF failed in its mission to protect Israel’s citizens that day. He requested that his tenure be concluded on March 6.

Investigations into military actions serve several crucial purposes. They provide essential insights into the successes and failures of military strategies and tactics. By analysing past operations, the military can identify areas for improvement and refine doctrines, thereby preparing itself better for future conflicts.

Following the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, Congress set up the Afghanistan War Commission to examine in depth the key strategic, diplomatic and operational decisions spanning the 20 years of the war in that country and extract lessons for future leaders.

In September 2024, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which had been actively investigating the US pullout, released a report criticising the Biden administration’s handling of the matter. The report highlighted issues such as delayed evacuation orders and inadequate inter-departmental communication. In addition, the office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction has produced numerous reports on the lessons learnt.

Conducting thorough investigations demonstrates a commitment to transparency and accountability, which is vital for maintaining public trust. When the military openly addresses and rectifies mistakes, it reflects its professionalism and reinforces confidence among the people. There are also critical lessons for national leaders on the necessity of aligning military actions with political objectives. There are several examples in history where a lack of clear political objectives led to the defeat of a superior military force. Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, in their book about the Vietnam War, The Irony of Vietnam, write, “Administration leaders persistently failed to clarify US objectives in concrete and specific terms. Uncertainty and ambiguity in reports were therefore bound to emerge, for no one could be certain what he was measuring progress against or how victory could be defined.”

India’s record of studying its military actions is poor, often marred by delays and excessive secrecy. Even routine reviews are treated with suspicion. The official history of the 1965 India-Pakistan War was published in 2011, 46 years after the conflict, and that of the 1971 war in 2014.

No official history of the 1962 India-China war exists. The Henderson Brooks report, which reviewed the Indian Army’s operations during that war, remains classified despite portions of it being leaked by Australian-British journalist Neville Maxwell.

In July 1999, the government constituted the Kargil Review Committee to review the events leading up to the Pakistani incursions and recommend measures considered necessary to safeguard national security. However, the committee was not mandated to evaluate the actual conduct of military operations.

The Indian military’s record-keeping also does not inspire confidence. In 2010, it was revealed that most of the records pertaining to the 1971 war, held by the Eastern Command Headquarters of the Army, had been destroyed immediately after the war. There was suspicion that this had been done deliberately.

In 2012, in a major embarrassment to the Army, the Armed Forces Tribunal directed it to rewrite portions of ‘Op Vijay: Account of the War in Kargil’. Incidentally, this is an internal document that has not been publicly released. To date, there is no official history of the 1999 war.

In recent years, the cloak around military operations has been tightened further. Much of the Indian military history is penned by authors who participated in the battles or were involved in the decision-making process. In recent times, books by retired military officers have faced increasing scrutiny.

Former Army Chief Gen MM Naravane’s memoir has been held up for more than one year after excerpts from the book were published in December 2023. Similarly, the launch of former Army Chief Gen NC Vij’s book was postponed just days before the event as the Army Headquarters asked the publishers to provide a review copy.

In June 2021, the Department of Personnel and Training imposed new restrictions, barring retired government servants who served in intelligence or security-related organisations from publishing any information related to the organisation after retirement without prior permission. Failure to comply carries penalties, including the withholding or withdrawal of pensions.

The reluctance to openly study and publish lessons from military conflicts carries profound risks. Military institutions could lose the ability to learn from their experiences, while political leaders may continue making decisions in a vacuum. The lack of publicly available records could also result in distorted narratives, where accounts of conflicts are shaped by political biases rather than objective analysis.

No matter how politically inconvenient, military actions must be documented and scrutinised. Only by transparently confronting the past can the armed forces adapt, transform and avoid the tragic results of fighting the last war.

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Experts concerned over ecological impact of schemes

The Union Cabinet on Wednesday cleared two major ropeway projects to facilitate faster travel to the Kedarnath shrine and the Hemkund Sahib gurdwara, both located in Uttarakhand.

The development came even as a high-powered committee set up by the Supreme Court had flagged concerns over the impact of the ongoing Char Dham project on the ecological balance of the state.

The Cabinet approved the construction of 12.4-km ropeway from Govindghat to Hemkund Sahib. The project will be developed on the design, build, finance, operate and transfer (DBFOT) mode at a total capital cost of Rs 2,730.13 crore.

Currently, the journey to the Hemkund Sahib is a challenging 21-km uphill trek from Govindghat and is covered on foot or by ponies or in palanquins. The ropeway has been planned to provide convenience to pilgrims and drastically cut travel time.

The Cabinet also approved the construction of 12.9-km ropeway from Sonprayag to Kedarnath. Its budget is Rs 4,081.28 crore. The journey time will be cut down to 36 minutes from the current eight to nine hours.

The two projects come under the Union Ministry of Road Transport and Highways’ Parvatmala scheme, under which connectivity to remote locations is being provided by setting up ropeways.

Environment experts have cautioned that whether it is the Char Dham project or other modes of transportation being planned in Uttarakhand, these will only lead to the heavy influx of tourists, leading to ecologically disastrous consequences.

Under the Char Dham project, road connectivity to four pilgrimage centres of Kedarnath, Badrinath, Gangotri and Yamunotri is being strengthened.

Vaishnaw skirts question on Railways

Union Minister for Information and Broadcasting Ashwini Vaishnaw, who is also the Railway Minister, on Wednesday skirted a question on the Railways while briefing mediapersons on decisions taken by the Cabinet. While taking questions related to Cabinet decisions, a journalist sought to know from him about the challenges being faced by Railways, but the minister cut him short and said, “Nothing to be asked beyond Cabinet decisions.”

Briefing reporters, Union Minister for Information and Broadcasting Ashwini Vaishnaw sought to allay such concerns. He said the Cabinet had taken the decision keeping in mind the “complex” nature of the Kedarnath ropeway project. He said before clearing the project, surveys had been conducted covering all technical and geological aspects.

He said issues like relief and rehabilitation of local mule operators and other ancillary industries associated with the Kedarnath project had been taken into consideration while sanctioning it.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi had laid the foundation stones of the two ropeway projects in October 2022 and since then the cost has escalated almost five times.