Tribune News Service

Jammu, June 21

Gen Bipin Rawat, Chief of Army Staff, accompanied by Northern Command chief Lt Gen Ranbir Singh, visited troops on the Line of Control (LoC) to review the prevailing situation and operational readiness of the units of the White Knight Corps.

The Army Chief was briefed and updated by Lt Gen Paramjit Singh, General Officer Commanding, White Knight Corps, and ground commanders. He reviewed the mission readiness of units, response mechanism to ceasefire violations, measures adopted to deal with Pakistan proxies, counter-infiltration posture and preparation to deal with violent actions on the LoC.

In addition, the Army Chief was also briefed on the strategy to deal with inimical elements who are attempting to revive terrorism south of Pir Panjal, misguiding youth and attempts to radicalise the innocent youth.

Interacting with soldiers deployed on the LoC and for counter-terrorism operations, General Rawat commended them for their unwavering dedication to duty, selfless devotion and high standard of professionalism.

He was appreciative of the measures and standard operating procedures instituted by the units to ensure secure environment, synergy with the civil administration, and mission readiness.

Conveying his satisfaction on the state of operational readiness, he assured material and moral support for enhancing the Army’s capabilities.

He exhorted all ranks on the need to remain vigilant to counter the nefarious designs of the enemy and anti-national elements.

During the visit to the forward areas, he rewarded the soldiers for gallant actions on the LoC.

For too long, lip service has been paid to the modernisation of the forces. Maritime security has been particularly neglected. The immediate replacement of obsolete/obsolescent weapons and equipment must be addressed by Rajnath to ensure qualitative upgrade of combat capabilities for tomorrow’s battlefields.

Gurmeet Kanwal
Former Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi

Rajnath Singh has taken over as the Defence Minister at a time of strategic uncertainty and growing regional instability. The country faces multifarious threats and challenges in both conventional and sub-conventional fields of conflict. Besides, non-traditional vulnerabilities to contend with such as cyber war and defence of assets in outer space are emerging on the horizon.

While the resolution of the longstanding territorial disputes with China and Pakistan and the latter’s proxy war as well as internal security issues will doubtlessly engage his attention, defence preparedness and higher defence management must be given an equally high priority.

First, the minister must address what a former Army Chief, Gen VK Singh, had termed as ‘critical hollowness’ in defence preparedness: insufficient units in some fighting formations (according to authorised scales), large-scale ammunition deficiencies and inordinate equipment shortages.

For too long, lip service has been paid to the modernisation of the forces. Maritime security has been particularly neglected. The immediate replacement of obsolete/obsolescent weapons and equipment must be addressed to ensure qualitative upgrade of combat capabilities for tomorrow’s battlefields.

Better combat capabilities require more funds than being provided presently. The current defence budget, pegged at less than 1.5 per cent of the projected GDP, is grossly inadequate to support the modernisation of the forces. The ratio of revenue to capital expenditure, which is approximately 60:40 (for the Army, it is 80:20) shows that the bulk of defence expenditure goes towards salaries, rations, ammunition, transport and other day-to-day necessities. The capital budget is utilised mainly to service committed liabilities (previously purchased weapons system being paid for in annual instalments), leaving little or no funds for new acquisitions for modernisation.

India has the lowest per capita defence expenditure among major powers and a very low citizens-to-soldier ratio. Successive Parliamentary Standing Committees for Defence have recommended that the ratio of defence expenditure be raised to 3 per cent of the GDP.  To begin with, it must be raised to at least 2 per cent in the current year.

Five-year Defence Plans are not being given the committed budgetary support, which leads to notional planning. A rolling, non-lapsable defence modernisation fund, linked with the Consolidated Fund of India, is needed. The NDA government had instituted such a fund in the interim budget of 2004-05, but the proposal did not find favour with the UPA government that followed.

Long-term defence planning is being neglected and is marked by haphazard single-Service growth. Defence planning is the responsibility of the National Security Council, which seldom meets. The Defence Minister should consider recommending the formation of a national security commission. The commission should formulate India’s national security strategy, after conducting a long overdue strategic defence review.

Defence reforms are urgently needed. A Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)/ permanent Chairman COSC should be appointed. This step should be followed a few years later by reorganising single-Service commands into integrated theatre commands for better synergy in joint operations. Tri-Service aerospace, cyber, special forces and integrated logistics commands are necessary to meet emerging challenges.

For a better civil-military interface, it is necessary to undertake a comprehensive integration of the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces HQ; it is nominal at present. To ensure rapid indigenisation of defence production in line with the Prime Minister’s call to ‘Make in India’, the minister must expeditiously review the defence procurement procedures so as to streamline them and eliminate the remaining red tape.

A holistic review of the functioning of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is called for so that the private sector and universities are usefully involved in research and development. Similarly, the privatisation of most of the ordnance factories and the defence PSUs has been discussed for long but not implemented. Besides improving functional efficiency, such an exercise will result in considerable savings.

Analysts have commented that India lacks a strategic culture. The minister must involve himself in the raising of strategic consciousness in the country. The establishment of the National Defence University has been long delayed and must be taken up immediately. The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and the think tanks established by the armed forces — CLAWS, NMF, CAPS, and CENJOWS —must be given greater encouragement and funding support. Their analyses and recommendations should be given due weightage in decision-making.

The softer issues affecting the morale of the armed forces must not be neglected. While the National War Memorial has at last been constructed to honour personnel who made the supreme sacrifice in the service of the nation, the issue concerning the pay and allowances and the welfare of serving soldiers as well as veterans continues to be ignored. The anomalies of the Sixth and Seventh Pay Commissions are yet to be resolved. The shortage of ‘married accommodation’ in peace stations is excessively high. The MoD continues to indulge in excessive litigation against soldiers.

In fact, the present state of civil-military relations is far from healthy. Distrust does not result in smooth functioning. Armed forces personnel are desirous of the restoration of their post-Independence status vis-à-vis civilian employees. While that may not now be possible, an acceptable solution can be found.

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has a great deal on his plate. Not all the issues listed above can possibly be resolved satisfactorily in one five-year tenure. Surely, the new minister will prioritise wisely, decide quickly and implement his decisions resolutely.

Karamjeet Singh. Tribune photo

Tribune News Service
Srinagar, June 7

A paratrooper of the 23 Para regiment, posted at Muchpora in Kellar area of south Kashmir’s Shopian district, allegedly committed suicide using his service rifle while he was on duty on Friday.

The slain solider has been identified as Karamjeet Singh from Hafizabad village near Chamkaur Sahib.

A police official from Shopian district confirmed that Singh was killed.

“We have registered a case and investigation in this regard has been taken up,” the police official said.

An Army officer in Srinagar, however, said the paratrooper died in an accidental fire when his services rifle went off.

Hyderabad: As many as 18 military officers at the ‘Colonel’ rank have refused to undergo the prestigious Higher Command Course (HC) and the Higher Defence Management Course (HMDC) despite being selected on the basis of their performance as commanders and their 18 years’ service in the Indian Army.

The coveted HDMC is held in Secunderabad, while the HC is conducted in Mhow (Dr Ambedkar Nagar, Indore). These courses are undertaken by Colonels prior to being promoted to the Brigadier rank but do not guarantee the promotion. So far, 18 officers have expressed their unwillingness to participate in the courses, which means that they don’t desire to be promoted. Alarmingly, the number of officers opting out of the programmes this year happens to be the highest in over a decade.It has been independently learnt that of the 18 Colonels, two belong to the Army Air Defence (AD) while two belong to The Corps of Electronics and Mechanical Engineers.

The HC and HDMC are both 11-month-long courses during which, officers are exposed to warfare simulation, the latest technology, and more. However, after the completion of the course, officers have to sign a 5-year bond with the Indian Army, thereby committing to serving the forces until the completion of the bond period.

Additionally, after completion of the course, officers are posted in the forward lines, otherwise known as ‘high-pressure appointments’, which demand tremendous amounts of time and dedication. Several officers have been reported to be suffering from health issues following these appointments.

“The reason for this could be the elimination of the ‘structured marking system’ in 2017. As per the policy, the HC and HMDC assessments involved the addition of certain points for the promotion of officials to the Brigadier rank. However, the system was scrapped in 2017. And 178 officers apply for the 150 vacant Brigadier positions every year, which implies that promotion isn’t guaranteed,” said an officer on the condition of anonymity.

A highly placed source told the Deccan Chronicle, “Why should one want to put their effort and achievements to waste when the Armed Forces are constantly being demeaned by the ever conspiring ‘babus’ of the Ministry of Defence? It wouldn’t be very surprising if the mid-level officers chose a well-paying corporate job instead.”

It may be further noted that a high number of Colonels seek retirement after 20-21 years of service. “Most such officers are between 43 and 47 years of age and while some choose to stay, a large number retires. Promotion from the rank of a Major to the Lt Colonel rank is rather rapid, so pretty much everyone makes it to the Lt Colonel rank. However, promotions upward of the Lt Colonel rank are a challenging affair. Many miss out on the promotion board. Some choose to retire and seek opportunities in the outside world. With the high growth in the economy and the rising demand for highly qualified officers, many opt to take up corporate jobs.

In addition to the above, there could be several other personal reasons for officers seeking premature release after the completion of 20 years of service.

Manoj Joshi
Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation

The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was announced by President Xi Jinping at a function in Kazakhstan in 2013. It began as a Chinese national project, funded with Chinese money to serve Chinese national goals. Six years down the line, it is mutating and imposing a Chinese-designed layer on to the existing pattern of globalisation.

It has taken aboard criticism that its projects were creating debt traps to make countries vulnerable to Chinese geopolitical designs. Last week the second Belt and Road Forum (BRF) for International Cooperation was held in Beijing, providing us an outpouring of speeches, opinion pieces and research. It  was as much a stock-taking exercise as the platform to announce the new directions to what is now a set Chinese policy that  will impact the world in the coming decades.

These new directions have been shaped by the criticism of the BRI in India and other western countries, as well as the issues raised in the ongoing trade and technology war, where the US has charged Beijing with denying western companies market access, subsidising the activities of its state-owned enterprises abroad, compelling companies to make forced technology transfers and using opaque policies in issuing tenders and so on.

In his speech inaugurating the BRI Forum, President Xi signalled that China was willing to adjust its policies and shape a BRI which would emphasise international collaboration, transparency, high-quality products, procedures and processes, enhance market access, and promote imports of goods from developed and developing countries.

It must be noted, to start with, that the criticism of BRI has been somewhat over-the-top. Take for example the notion of that it encourages ‘debt traps’. For India this has been a major issue because of the manner in which the Sri Lankan port of Hambantota slid into the hands of a Chinese company under a 99-year lease. In an article in the New York Times last week, Deborah Brautigam of Johns Hopkins University noted that specialists studying the subject have found ‘scant evidence’ that Chinese banks were lending to projects that had little prospect of profit for the sake of gaining strategic advantage for China. Looking at the data of two major US institutions studying the subject, she concluded that ‘the risks of BRI are often overstated or mischaracterised’. In both Latin America and Africa, fears that China ‘was deliberately preying on countries in need are unfounded’.

Even so, Beijing has moved to address these issues relating to the

$440 billion worth of loans it has so far provided for BRI projects. At a meeting of finance professionals at the second BRF, Yi Gang, China’s Central Bank Governor, acknowledged the need for China to address the issue of the countries to service their borrowings at the time they were given the loans. At the same meeting, Li Kun, finance minister of China, said his country would develop a ‘debt sustainability analysis framework’ which will use World Bank and IMF methodology as well to ensure that risks from debts did not go out of control. Both these measures have won praise from Christine Lagarde, IMF Managing Director, who was present at the meeting.

The new financing criteria are also designed to attract foreign investment partners in the BRI financing. Western firms have always sensed the opportunities that the BRI would present. Their problem was that they were more or less frozen out of the action by the Chinese who tilted the playing field against them. However, and this is to the credit of President Trump, those walls are now crumbling and the Chinese are understanding that it may actually be advantageous for them to have others share risks as well as the gains.

Another major development in the BRI has been the evolution of the ‘third party’ cooperation model aimed at promoting shared development and spreading China’s risks. The origin of this model lies in the political decision of Japan to cooperate with BRI in practice, if not in name. As part of this, the two countries agreed in 2018 to jointly execute 50 infrastructural projects across Asia. This would combine China’s financial support and production capacity, with Japan’s rich overseas experience, advanced technology and risk management mechanisms. The UK has also expressed interest in getting involved in such projects. Both London and Tokyo figure that BRI is going to be around for a while and to oppose it is to deny their own companies the opportunity for profit. In the coming period, as the Chinese make their policy more open and market- friendly, other private players are also likely to jump in.

Chinese-led globalisation is a fact of life. BRI has already created facts on ground—rail lines, highways, ports and pipelines—which cannot be denied, leave alone reversed. Now, facing economic and political headwinds from the US and Europe, China is readjusting its policy. A great deal depends on the sincerity with which it can implement the changes it has spoken about.

Notwithstanding everything, BRI remains a Chinese-led project aimed at securing Chinese goals. They are not in it for altruistic purposes, but to enhance their own economic and political standing in the world. That is what all countries would do if they were in China’s position.

But where BRI v1.0 provided a vision of a stark approach aimed at maximising China’s advantage, v 2.0 indicates that Beijing has understood that it cannot be a zero-sum game and that if it wants its boat to rise in the harbour, it has to ensure that the other boats, too, do the same.

The writer was recently in Beijing to atten

Photo for representational purpose only.

Islamabad, April 5

Pakistan on Friday announced that it will release 360 Indian prisoners, mostly fishermen, this month in four phases, as a “goodwill gesture” amidst tensions between the two countries after the Pulwama terror attack

Foreign Office spokesperson Mohammad Faisal said the process of releasing the Indian fishermen will start on April 8 when 100 prisoners will be released. In the second phase on April 5, another 100 will be released. In the third phase on April 22, another 100 will be released and in the fourth and last phase on April 29, the remaining 60 prisoners will be released.

“We are doing it as goodwill gesture and hope that India will reciprocate it,” Faisal said while addressing his weekly briefing to the media in Islamabad.

The spokesperson said currently there are 347 Pakistani prisoners in India and 537 Indian prisoners in Pakistan.

“Pakistan will release 360 Indian prisoners, of which 355 are fishermen and 5 are civilians,” he said.

The fishermen will be taken from Karachi to Lahore and handed over to Indian officials at the Wagah border.

Anwar Kazmi, a spokesman of Edhi welfare organisation, which helps the released fishermen with clothes and food, told PTI from Karachi that the process of releasing the fishermen will start from Sunday.

“First a group of 100 fishermen will be taken from Karachi to Lahore on Allama Iqbal Express on Sunday,” he said.

They are likely to be handed over to India on Monday at Wagah. They spent months and sometimes years before repatriated.

Pakistan and India frequently arrest fishermen as there is no clear demarcation of the maritime border in the Arabian Sea and these fishermen do not have boats equipped with the technology to know their precise location.

Owing to lengthy and slow bureaucratic and legal procedures, the fishermen usually remain in jail for several months and sometimes years.

Pakistan’s announcement to release the fishermen came amidst escalating tensions between India and Pakistan after a suicide bomber of Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) terror group killed 40 CRPF personnel in Jammu and Kashmir’s Pulwama district on February 14.

India launched a counter-terror operation against a JeM training camp in Balakot in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. PTI

The Principal Bench of the AFT made these comments in its judgment in the case of a Brigadier of the Army Education Corps (AEC) who had not been promoted to the rank of Major General despite being approved by a promotion board because he was medically unfit.

The Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) has ruled that there cannot be different set of medical standards for promotion for Combat Arms and Services in the Army in any rank, and in particular senior ranks of Major General and above, where they are to “lead from the front” and set examples for others in the organisation to follow.

The Principal Bench of the AFT made these comments in its judgment in the case of a Brigadier of the Army Education Corps (AEC) who had not been promoted to the rank of Major General despite being approved by a promotion board because he was medically unfit. The Brigadier had contended that since the only post, which he was to hold as a Major General was located in New Delhi he could be posted there in his low medical category too.

The bench comprising Justice Virender Singh and Lt Gen Sanjiv Chachra (retd) has said that medical fitness for promotion to higher ranks is an important facet of military services considering the nature of duties performed.

“There is no dispute that the requirement of medical fitness is applied uniformly to Combat Arms, Combat Support Arms and Services, including minor corps. An officer, right from his joining the service till he leaves, is subjected to same medical standards applicable for all officers,” the bench said.

It added that to question the validity of application of similar medical standards for all officers in the Army, irrespective of their Arm, Service or their rank, “is to question the organisation, structure and ethos of the Army,” which is not in the realm of the court. “By allowing discretion and liberal application of medical status for promotion or employment to some Arms or Services or specifically to some officers would make the entire policy discriminatory and biased, which shall be detrimental for a disciplined organisation like the Army,” the order read.

The bench said that all officers, at the time of joining the Army, follow the same medical standards and eligibility criteria, irrespective of the Arms or Service that they subsequently serve. Consequently, they take oath to serve at land, sea or air, whenever the situation so demands.

“Medical fitness continues to remain a hallmark of their growth in the Army and their consequent employment as they rise in ranks. Tinkering with this sacred yardstick or questioning the validity of this would shake the very edifice, on which the foundation of the Indian Army is built on. We, thus, have no hesitation to state unequivocally that there cannot and should not be different set of medical standards for promotion for Combat Arms and Service in any rank and in particular senior ranks of Major General and above, where they are to lead from the front and set examples for others in the organisation to follow,” the bench said.

However, the bench has also said that there is a need for the government to re-visit the guidelines set for the classification of officers suffering from hypertension so as to void any ambiguity in future.

The AFT order deals with the new health care system in the Army introduced in 2011, which laid down the policy and medical classification of officers. Under this policy a COPE Coding System was put in place to guide the employability of Army Officers under: (a) C – Climate and terrain restrictions (b) O – Degree of medical observation required (c) P – Physical capability limitation (d) E – Exclusive limitations as per disease. In that, with each alphabet depicting a different level and type of restriction/limitation on the serving officers of the Army.

Lack of empathy and understanding of an operational requirement due to bureaucratic procedures and attitudes is a cause for concern. In any other country, where the political and bureaucratic climate is cognisant of military urgencies, many heads would have rolled.

Air Vice Marshal Manmohan Bahadur (retd)
Addl Director General, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi

THE Pulwama and Balakot incidents have pushed into the background the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) on the Indian Air Force (IAF) acquisitions, of which the Rafale deal hogged the limelight. Despite the favourable Pulwama end state being achieved, albeit temporary, there is an imperative that needs urgent government attention. Tucked away in the CAG report is a cry beseeching a look into what one may call ‘defence distress’, paraphrasing the term from the agrarian and farmers’ distress that every politician is talking about. The last two are vote banks which no politician can be reticent about, as they are leveraged through morchas, hartals and strikes. Unfortunately, when defence distress strikes, it is deadly, and often ‘fatal’ in a way. The Balakot incident demonstrated resoundingly that India has had enough of Pakistan’s support to terrorism; however, it should not divert our attention from the fact that defence pangs are a reality and the tell-tale signs should be recognised and acted upon. There are three pointers that need elaboration; though IAF examples are discussed, the issues are valid for other defence forces too.

Critiquing sub-optimal defence procurement procedures, CAG has commented that the non-conclusion of a usage contract precluded the use of the flight simulator for the C-130 Hercules aircraft till 2016, despite it being ready four years earlier. In the interim, India lost five air warriors and a multi-million-dollar aircraft in 2014, attributed to a training issue. This is the first pointer — lack of empathy and understanding of an operational requirement  due to bureaucratic procedures and attitudes (remember, the simulator was fully ready). In any other country, where the political and bureaucratic climate is cognisant of military urgencies, many heads would have rolled.

The second pointer is of an intangible kind, which, if neglected, shows up with deadly results later. The HAL-built HPT-32 trainer was grounded in 2009 after many accidents, 13 of which were fatal. Many red flags had been raised about the stone-like gliding quality of the HPT after an engine failure (a frequent occurrence). The IAF had pulled along till the proverbial straw fell on the camel’s back and we lost two flying instructors at the Air Force Academy (AFA). The HPT was grounded, throwing the training profiles of rookie pilots into bedlam, and for the next few years a sub-optimal training pattern on the HJT-16 Kiran was followed. The emergency purchase of the Pilatus aircraft revolutionised training; AFA’s flight line was chock-a-block with the gleaming new trainers till 2017 or so when, due to non-finalisation of maintenance contracts, a severe lack of spares ensued. This is the situation even now, as per media reports. However, training has to continue to ensure a regular pilot feed for frontline squadrons and one is sure that cannibalisation (shifting) of spares among aircraft is being done and extension given to parts whose life is expiring. The situation must be similar for some other fleets, too, as many acquisition and upgrade programmes have been inordinately delayed, a fact stated by the Air Chief last month. This unacceptable situation is the second indicator of a serious problem, where lack of funds could be pushing reliability of war- fighting equipment towards an unsafe zone, which may translate into tragic results later.

The third warning is where op-preparedness starts getting affected. Under-equipping of the Indian Army was one of the major causes of the 1962 China debacle. At a recent conference, tears welled up in a retired Lt General’s eyes while narrating the humiliation the armed forces had felt then. “Thank God for the subsequent 1965 Indo-Pak war that brought back some self-respect,” remarked the General. After 1962, the government funded an accelerated re-equipping plan and the victory in the 1971 war bears witness to that effort. However, as per recent media reports, we are on the downslide again with a shortage of fighter squadrons and many critical items; soldiers’ rifles are having to be imported by the fast-track route, ammunition is in short supply, and sniper rifles, Naval helicopters and MiG-29 fighters for the IAF are planned to be imported too. But will these just remain plans, as this year’s defence acquisition budget is insufficient even for previously concluded contracts? Answers to these pointers have a bearing on what happens hereafter.

Will the post-Pulwama happenings deter Pakistan? The answer is an emphatic no. It is time to remember Bernard Brodie, the doyen of strategic thought, who said, “Avoidance of blackmail can be achieved only by demonstrating that our readiness to accept risks need not be and is not less than the blackmailer’s.” 

History shows that adversaries cannot be reformed as per one’s wish but have to be coped with through management strategies in which hard power is vital to prevent blackmail. Addressing defence concerns (though not a vote catcher) is an imperative first step to ‘manage’ Pakistan and simultaneously weigh against China. While short-term responses after the Pulwama attack will be implemented, long-term solutions require tons of money and decades of time spread over many governments. Of the three attributes that determine deterrence to prevent blackmail — resolve, capability and capacity — the Balakot incident demonstrated the first two; the third, dependent on an indigenous arms base, is in short supply. Politicians of all hues need to put their shoulders to the wheel and address defence preparedness in a bi-partisan manner — indigenous defence R&D and manufacture must be kickstarted. Hard power, in quality and quantity, is the key to building deterrence to avert future Pulwamas. Can every political party elaborate, in its election manifesto, what it would do to address defence preparedness? That would indeed be welcome.

Views are personal